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Thesis Abstract 
The topic of this thesis is Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership, analysed through its politics 
of Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism between 1992 and 1999. The main question 
of the thesis is how Tatarstan's leadership has succeeded in maintaining political power 
and gaining econornic wealth without provoking a backlash both from Moscow and the 
local Russian population. 
The thesis argues that Tatarstan's leadership succeeded in maintaining political power 
and gaining economic wealth through promoting neither the civic nationalism of 
participating citizens in Tatarstan nor the ethnic nationalism of the Tatar nation bound 
together by common culture and history, but pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism which 
demands national autonomy for the Tatars as the only formula for Tatarstan's leadership 
to secure regional stability against ethnic nationalisms of the Tatars and the Russians in 
Tatarstan and the adverse regional effects of the federal policies. The thesis considers the 
weaknesses of the Russian federal centre and Tatarstan's civil society as the main factors 
enabling Tatarstan's leadership to pursue a politics of survival through manipulating 
Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism. 
The thesis begins with an introduction setting out the approach and the argument. The 
first main chapter examines the historical evolution of Russia's relations with the Tatar 
elites both in the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. Chapter Two analyses the President of 
Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev's discourse of Tatar nationalism, and demonstrates how 
Shaimiev's policies served to Tatarise the leading positions in Tatarstan without a 
backlash from the Russians. Chapter Three deals with Shaimiev's politics of Tatar 
nationalism vis-A-vis Moscow before and after the conclusion of the power-sharing treaty 
between Moscow and Tatarstan in 1994. Chapter Four explores society and culture in 
Tatarstan to account for the weaknesses of Tatar and Russian ethnic nationalisms. The 
fifth chapter evaluates the stability of Tatarstan's arrangements with Moscow in terms of 
the trends at the intergovernmental and interethnic levels. The thesis concludes by 
showing how Tatar nationalism under Shaimiev has accommodated itself with Russian 
federalism. 
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Note on Transliteration 
In the transliteration of non-English words, the rules pertaining to the Library of Congress 
transliteration system are followed throughout, except where Russophone scholars are 
cited using a different system. In those cases, their choices are respected. Place names in 
Tatarstan have been transliterated from their most familiar Russian rather than Tatar 
versions (Naberezhnye Chelny rather than lar Chally). Soft signs at the end of words are 
omitted, so Kazan is used instead of Kazan'. Older administrative terms have been used 
in their historical forms. Thus, Tatariia has been used in the Tsarist and Soviet contexts 
while Tatarstan is used in the post-Soviet context. 
Introduction 
Tatarstan, a republic in the Russian Federation (Maps I and 2), has posed one of the most 
formidable challenges to Moscow's authority in the post-Soviet era. When the Soviet 
Union disintegrated in 199 1, many radical Tatar nationalists were demanding 
independence for Tatarstan. In this atmosphere, it seemed likely that a violent ethnic 
conflict would erupt between the two main ethnic groups of the Republic: the Tatars and 
the Russians. Equally alaryning was the fact that the situation was not any better at the 
intergovernmental level. Moscow was not certain about the real intentions of Tatarstan's 
leadership, who refused to sign the Federation Treaty of 1992, and instead held a 
referendum on the status of the Republic in March 1992. In this referendum, 61.4 percent 
of the voters approved the proposal of Tatarstan's leadership that 'the Republic of 
Tatarstan is a sovereign state, the subject of international law, forming its relations with 
the Russian Federation, other Republics and states on the basis of equal agreements'. ' 
Contrary to the expectations of Tatar ethnic nationalists, however, a compromise was 
finally reached between Moscow and Tatarstan when they signed a power-sharing treaty 
granting a special status to Tatarstan in the Russian Federation on 15 February 1994. It 
seems paradoxical that although Tatarstan's leadership secured more autonomy for the 
Republic by claiming the rights of the Tatar nation, this did not prevent them from 
suppressing some Tatar nationalists for promoting 'ethnic hatred'. Moreover, there has 
not been any serious backlash both from Moscow and the Russians in Tatarstan in 
response to the increasing autonomy of Tatarstan from Moscow and to the Tatarisation of 
the Republican administration in the post-Treaty period. 
The topic of this thesis is the post-Soviet leadership of Tatarstan, analysed through its 
politics of Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism between 1992 and 1999. The main 
research question is how Tatarstan's leadership has succeeded in maintaining political 
power and gaining economic wealth without provoking a backlash both from Moscow 
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and the local Russian population during this period. In other words, the thesis seeks to 
explore what Icind of nationalism and federalism Tatarstan's leadership has promoted in 
order to achieve its objectives. The thesis also questions how stable the institutional 
arrangements of Tatarstan's leadership are with Moscow and the authority of Tatarstan's 
leadership is over the population in Tatarstan. 
Why Tatarstan? 
There are several characteristics of Tatarstan that make it an important topic for a case 
study on the politics of nationalism and federalism. To begin with, among the non- 
Russian peoples of Russia, the Tatars became the first people colonised by Moscow when 
the Russian Tsar Ivan IV conquered the Kazan Khanate in 1552. This is a historic 
milestone that marks the beginning of Russian imperial expansion. The formation of the 
Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) in 1920 did not change the 
imperial relationship between Moscow and the Tatar elites. It is, therefore, important to 
explore the impact of the imperial heritage on the forms of Tatar nationalism and 
Tatarstan's federal relations with Moscow. 
Moreover, Tatarstan's demographic and economic characteristics make it a very 
appropriate case to explore the politics of nationalism in the post-Soviet regional context. 
in terms of its demographic composition, Tatarstan enjoys a special place among the 
ethnic republics of the Russian Federation. Tatarstan's population of 3.6 million includes 
Tatars (48.5 percent) and Russians (43.3 percent). However, only 32 percent of the Tatars 
in Russia actually live in Tatarstan. It should also be noted that excluding the Ukrainians, 
whose homeland is outside the Russian Federation, the Tatars are Russia's largest 
national minority, numbering 5.5 million in 1989 out of a total population of 147.0 
2 
million (3-8 percent). In addition to this complex demographic situation that makes the 
development of any nationalist movement very complicated, the struggle for the control 
of Tatarstan's considerable deposits of oil, mainly in its Romashkinskoe, Pervomaiskoe 
and Bondiuzhskoe districts, has required the Republican leadership to combine economic 
'Moscow News, 25 March 1992. 
2 Damir M. Iskhakov, Tatary: Poputiarnyi ocherk etnicheskoi istorii i demografii, Naberezhnye 
Chelny: KamAZ, 1993, pp. 18-21. 
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and national factors in its own unique way for the survival of its rule in the post-Soviet 
era. ' The analysis of Tatarstan's post-Soviet expefience could reveal what kind of 
nationalism is promoted by Tatarstan's leadership in order to maintain its political power 
and gain economic wealth in the multinational context of the Republic. 
Furthermore, Tatarstan is the first federal unit of the Russian Federation that was able to 
gain a special status in the Russian Federation following the signing of the power-sharing 
treaty on 15 February 1994. The study of Tatarstan's post-Soviet challenge to Moscow's 
rule could highlight Moscow's post-Soviet strengths and weaknesses in dealing with 
regional demands for greater autonomy. The study of Tatarstan's federal relationship with 
Moscow could also demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of Tatarstan's leadership 
in manipulating Tatar nationalism through its informal practices within the formal 
framework of Russian federalism. In this respect, it is very important to examine whether 
the Treaty has effectively marginalized all the different forrns of Tatar nationafism. or not. 
Another characteristic of Tatarstan is that Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership has 
promoted its own version of nationalism in an ethnically-heterogeneous society 
characterised by the diversity in Tatar and Russian visions of national identity, history 
and society. The complex history of the relations between the Tatars and the Russians in 
the Republic have resulted in the high levels of religious tolerance, bilingualism, mixed 
marriages and urbanisation as well as the state-dependent economy and a weak civil 
society. in this respect, the political weakness of ethnic nationalism and religious 
fanaticism in Tatarstan's ethnically and religiously heterogeneous society deserves an 
explanation. 
L, ast but not least, Tatarstan's relations with Moscow could serve as a prism for analysing 
the impact of the 'Tatarstan model' on the post-Soviet development of Russian 
federalism. Moscow's practice of signing bilateral treaties with its federal units, which 
started with the Tatarstan Treaty in 1994, resulted in the signing of 46 bilateral treaties by 
the year 1999. These treaties have given preferential treatment to the signatory regions. 
An analysis of Tatarstan's federal relations with Moscow could demonstrate whether 
3 Marat R. Mustafin and Rashid G. Khuzeev, Vse o Tatarstane (Ekonomiko-geograficheskii 
spravochnik), Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1994, pp. 49-50. 
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these relations have strengthened the formal principles of democratic federalism or served 
to camouflage the corrupt and informal practices of Boris El'tsin and Mintimer Shaimiev, 
Russian and Tatar Presidents respectively. 
This thesis focuses mainly on the El'tsin period from the emergence of the Russian 
Federation as a new political entity in 1992 until El'tsin's resignation from the Presidency 
on 31 December 1999. The Tsarist and the Soviet periods will be examined briefly to 
identify the historical background of the relations between the Tatars and Moscow. The 
policies of Vladimir Putin, who replaced El'tsin, will be discussed briefly in Chapter Five 
in order to evaluate the stability of El'tsin's federal arrangements with Shain-tiev in the 
post-El'tsin era. 
Nationalism and Its Variants 
in order to explore the post-Soviet politics of Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism, I 
shall first conceptualise nationalism as a political phenomenon, and relate it to the 
institutional politics of federalism. Next, the existing taxonomies of nationalism will be 
discussed in terms of their capacity to explain the existing forms of post-Soviet 
nationalism. Based on a critical review of the literature on Tatarstan's post-Soviet 
experience, I will put forward my argument on how to explain the politics of Tatar 
nationalism and Russian federalism promoted by Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership. 
To conceptualise nationalism as a political phenomenon, I borrow John Breuilly's 
definition of nationalism because of its capacity to explain the concept of nationalism in 
its political context. Breuilly conceived nationalism as something that 'is, above and 
beyond all else, about politics', and he adds that 'politics is about power'. 4 For Breuilly, 
nationalism refers to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying 
such action with nationalist arguments. In this sense, 'nationalist' action and argument 
are assumed to derive from a doctrine with three basic assertions, that 
15 
(a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character 
(b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests 
and values 
(c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at 
least the attainment of political sovereignty 5 
This political conception of nationalism assumes that there is no single nationalism for 
any one nation but rather multiple nationalisms with differing ideologies and social 
constituencies. Moreover, the social support for any form of nationalism varies among 
social groups due to the diversity of their interests. Among these social groups, elites 
occupy a special place in the politics of nationalism since they are very influential in 
organising and manipulating nationalist movements. Leokadia Drobizheva defines elites 
as, 
[T]hose segments of the population that make strategic decisions because of 
their official status, or that, using their unofficial authority, directly affect the 
making of decisions that control the functioning of society. 6 
Although there are economic and cultural elites apart from political elites, I will use elites 
and political leadership interchangeably in this thesis unless stated otherwise. 
Nevertheless, elites cannot always reach a consensus over the content of nationalism 
because of their conflicting interests. Just like the factions in central elites, local elites 
could contest the dominant discourse of nationalism promoted by the ruling central elites. 
The politics of nationalism took shape mainly in the relationship between central and 
local elites, which is regulated institutionally either through a direct rule or through an 
indirect rule. Direct rule emerges in unitary states, where central elites seek to secure the 
political loyalty of local elites to the central state through promoting a nation-wide 
cultural uniformity. On the other hand, indirect rule emerges in imperial or federal states, 
where central elites control the local population through the mediation of local elites. This 
type of rule generally recognises the cultural differences of the local elites and masses 
from the central elites. 7 
4 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, (hereafter, Nationalism and the State), 2nd ed., Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1993, p. 1. 
5 Ibid., p. 2. 
6 Leokadia M. Drobizheva, 'Comparison of Elite Groups in Tatarstan, Sakha, Magadan and Orenburg', 
Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 15, no. 4,1999, pp. 387-388. 
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In this sense, indirect rule serves to inhibit the development of nationalism arnong the 
local population through co-opting local elites. Nevertheless, the mediating role of local 
elites varies depending on the type of indirect rule. Under the imperial indirect rule, local 
elites serve the imperial centre without enjoying any legally guaranteed autonomy. 
Michael Doyle defines empires as 'relationships of political control imposed by some 
political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies'. 8 The imperial 
relationship makes the imperial centre multinational since empires recruit 'mediating 
elites' drawn from the indigenous colonial society. Federations institute the type of 
indirect rule that grants legally guaranteed autonomy to the regions. Under the federal 
indirect rule, local elites could make final decisions on some regional matters. William 
Riker defines federation as, 
a political organisation in which the activities of government are divided 
between regional governments and a central government in such a way that 
each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final 
decisions. 9 
Since local elites represent regional as well as federal interests in federations, the federal 
relationship invariably requires local elites to negotiate the relationship between central 
elites and the regional population. 
'O In other words, local elites play a very important role 
in containing the growth of nationalism both in empires and federations as long as local 
elites are controlled by the central elites. 
From this point of view, it can be claimed that the collapse of an imperial or a federal 
indirect rule gives the dissatisfied local elites an opportunity to mobilise the local masses 
through their nationalist movements. Ernest Gellner stated this as follows: '[nlationalism 
gets its chance when the non-ethnic imperial structures collapse'. 
" Nevertheless, it is not 
always certain that the local opposition forces could use this opportunity successfully in 
empires or in federations. 
7 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 40. 
8 Michael W. Doyle, Empires, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 38. 
9 William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Boston: Little Brown, 1964, p. 11. 
10 In fact, the term 'federation' comes etymologically from the Latin word 'foederatus' which means 
'bound by treaty' deriving from foedus (treaty) and fidere (to trust). Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring 
Federalism, Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1987, p. 5. 
11 Ernest Gellner, Anthropology and Politics: Revolution in the Sacred Grove, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1995, p. 6. 
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In order to examine the characteristics of Tatar nationalism promoted by Tatarstan's post- 
Soviet leadership, we need to identify whether the existing taxonomies of nationalism are 
capable of explaining the politics of' post-Soviet nationalism. Concerning their origins, 
nationalisms have been categorised into the 'ancient' and 'modem' types. Nationalisms 
have also been treated as taking the forms of 'unification', 'minority' and 'nationalising 
state' nationalisms in terms of the relationship between the nation and the state. Finally, 
nationalisms have been classified into 'civic' and 'ethnic' types in terms of their 
strategies of linking the nation to the individual. 
As for the ancient and modem types of modem types of nationalism, the ancient type of 
nationalism is used to describe nationalisms that have their roots in old and deeply felt 
ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural differences, albeit transmitted into modem forrns. 
This view assumes that the world was divided into nations well before modernity. For 
example, Anthony D. Smith argues that modem nations cannot be understood without 
exploring their ethnic origins. Smith defines the nation as: 
a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and 
historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common 
legal rights and duties for all members. " 
For Smith, 'modem nations simply extend, deepen and strean-dine the ways in which 
members of ethnie (ancient ethnic communities) associated and communicated', by 
adding higher levels of territorial and political organisation to the community. 13 Smith 
defines nationalism as 'an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the 
autonomy, unity and identity of a nation. Nationalism is an ideology of the nation, not the 
state,. " in this way, Smith considered ethno-cultural values of ancient nations as the 
basis of their nationalism. 
The modem type of nationalism is used to describe nationalisms that are invented by 
nationalist elites in order to forge modem societies out of local cultural traditions. For 
example, Ernest Gellner defined nationalism primarily as 'a political principle which 
holds that the political and national unit should be congruent'. " For Gellner, nationalism 
12 jbid, p. 14. 
Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 215. 
Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, London: Penguin, 199 1, p. 74. 
15 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 1. 
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engenders nations, and not the other way around. 16 In this sense, nations have been 
, created' either by turning the 'low', spontaneous and oral cultures into literate and 
cultivated ones, or by imposing the existing 'high' culture on the available and diverse 
idioms of peasants. On the other hand, Marxist theories related nationalism to the 
development of capitalism and its internal contradictions. 17 Eric J. Hobsbawm argued 
that 'nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round'. 18 
Nevertheless, contrary to Hobsbawm's theory, which asserted that ultimately nationalism 
would disappear with the decline of the nation state, we have witnessed the revival of 
nationalism and the collapse of communism since 1989. 
it is, however, problematic to categorise all forms of post-Soviet nationalism strictly as 
either ancient or modem. Although the Soviet Union was home to various primordial 
nations, those nations in Central Asia were created in the modem period. Soviet leaders 
implemented their policies of nation building (natsional'noe stroitel'stvo) through 
defining the rights of nations, as officially recognised by the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. For example, Joseph Stalin, who was chosen by Lenin to formulate the 
Communist Party's official view of nationalism, defined nation as 'a historically evolved 
stable community based on a conurion language, territory, economic life and 
psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture'. 19 This view of nationhood 
is still influential in the post-Soviet period. Although the Tatars form an ancient nation, 
just like the Russians, some post-Soviet Tatar or Russian leaders tend to blend ancient 
and modem elements of nationhood in designing their own versions of nationalism for 
pragmatic reasons because, as Valerie Bunce argues, in the post-Soviet transition process 
'what is open for negotiation is not just the character of the regime but also the very 
nature of the state itself, not just citizenship but also identity'. 
20 
The existing taxonomies of nationalism that relate the nation to the state do not cover the 
types of post-Soviet nationalism adequately either. Rogers Brubaker categorised the 
nationalisms that have resulted from the redrawing of boundaries following the break-up 
16 [bid., p. 55. 
Walter Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 1-5. 
18 Eric 1. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1789, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990, P. 10. 
" Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, Moscow: Progress, 1974, p. 3 1. 
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of the Soviet Union into three distinct and mutually antagonistic nationalisms. The first 
type of nationalism is 'nationalising state nationalism' which refers to ethnically 
heterogeneous nation-states, whose dontinant elites promote the language, culture, 
demographic position, economic flourishing and political hegemony of the nominally 
state-bearing nation .21 
The second type of nationalism is 'minority nationalism' that 
emerges mainly as a reaction to the 'nationalising state nationalism'. The last type is the 
'external homeland nationalism', which seeks to protect the minorities from assi"lation 
22 due to the existence of shared nationhood across political boundaries . 
However, it is very contentious to claim that all forms of post-Soviet nationalism promote 
either nationalising state or minority or external homeland nationalism. Of course, many 
post-Soviet states have embarked on the process of nation-building, as Taras Kuzio 
argues, they cannot be easily labelled as promoting 'nationalising state' nationaliSM. 23 In 
fact, the ruling elites of these states seek to prevent the masses from using nationalism 
against themselves. Moreover, although there are separatist nationalists in many parts of 
the post-Soviet space, such as Abkhaziia and Chechnia, some regions, such as Crimea 
and Tatarstan, simply demand greater autonomy from the political centre. So, not all 
regions seek to secede completely. Furthermore, in the case of the Russians abroad, there 
are significant political groups both in Russia and among the Russian communities in the 
Baltic States who are against external homeland nationalism. These evidences weaken the 
explanatory capacity of Brubaker's categorisation of nationalism. 
Finally, the categorisation of existing forms of nationalism into 'civic' and 'ethnic' types 
in terms of the relationship between the nation and the individual is not adequate to 
explore some types of post-Soviet nationalism. This categorisation stems from the fact 
that in order to mobilise individuals for nationalist goals, substantive symbols, images 
and shared historical experiences are needed. These symbols may be either civic or ethnic 
in character. Civic nationalism defines nationhood with citizenship and political 
participation. It seeks to promote social cohesion and political equality in ethnically 
20 Valerie Bunce, 'Should Transitologists Be GroundedT, Slavic Review, vol. 54, no. 1,1995, p. 125. 
21 Rogers Brubaker, 'National Minorities, Nationalising States, and External Homelands in New 
Europe', Daedalus, vol. 124, no. 2,1995, p. 109. 
22 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, 
(hereafter, Nationalism Reframed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 44. 
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heterogeneous political communities through citizenship rights and democracy rather 
than ethnic ties. Therefore, civic nationalism requires well-developed political and legal 
institutions to regulate relations and distribute political power across ethnic as well as 
other social boundaries. 24 On the other hand, ethnic nationalism defines nationhood with 
a myth of shared physical characteristics, culture, religion, language and common 
ancestry. Ethnic nationalism has nothing to do with individual will, but instead it derives 
from cultural values. Individuals of different ethnicity even though they are citizens of the 
state in question, do not belong to the same nation. 25 
The idea of civic nationalism is rooted in the principle that national identity can be 
acquired or abandoned depending on one's free will. In this sense, for Liah Greenfeld, 
nationalism can be understood as '[t]he form in which democracy appeared in the world, 
contained in the idea of nation as a butterfly in a cocoon'. 26 Rather than defining 
nationalism by its modernity, Greenfeld sees modernity as defined by nationalism. In this 
sense, nationalist behaviour could emerge as a result of the drive of nations to secure their 
equality vis-A-vis other nations. However, as Greenfeld observes, not all nationalisms are 
individualistic. Collectivistic nationalisms define nation as a collective individual, 
endowed with a will and interest of its own, which are independent of and take priority 
over the wills and interests of human individuals within the nation. They tend to be 
authoritarian and imply a fundamental inequality between elites (a small group of self- 
appointed interpreters of the will of the nation) and the masses (those who have to adapt 
to the elite's interpretations). 27 
It should be noted that such collective nationalisms could be either civic as in the case of 
French nationalism, or ethnic as in the case of German nationalisM. 28 In his study of the 
citizenship laws in France and in Gen-nany, Rogers Brubaker identified that in France, 
citizenship is defined as a territorial community based on the ius soli (the law of the soil) 
" Taras Kuzio, "'Nationalising States" or Nation-Building? A Critical Review of the Theoretical 
Literature and Empirical Evidence', Nations and Nationalism, vol. 7, no. 2,200 1, p. 150. 
24 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 73. 
25 Walter Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994, pp. 185-2 10. 
26 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1992, p. 10. 
27 Ibid., pp. 15-2 1. 
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territorial jurisdiction principle. The French case is the example of civic nationalism in 
the sense that the national feeling grew out of the state and its institutions. In Germany, 
by contrast, citizenship is formed on the basis of a community of descent, on the ills 
sanguinis (the law of blood) principle. German national sentiments preceded the 
emergence of a state and adopted the character of the volk (people). Ethnic nationalism 
sees nationality as determined genetically, entirely independent of individual choice, and 
thus inherent. Brubaker concludes that the French model is state-centred and 
assimilationist, while the German model is people-centred and differentialist. 29 
Nevertheless, post-Soviet nations are not likely to go the way of the West and develop 
into liberal democracies, supported by the civic idea of nationhood or to develop strong 
ethnic nationalist movements. Without discussing to what extent the types of post-Soviet 
nationalism can be described as ethnic nationalism, some scholars, such as Anatoly 
Khazanov, assert that ethnic nationalism is emerging in the post-Soviet space like 'steam 
from a pressure cooker. 30 Similarly, George Schbpflin linked the 'rise of ethnic 
nationalism' in the post-Communist world, for which it is very hard to find empirical 
evidence (except for former Yugoslavia), to the underdevelopment of civil society. 31 
Contrary to these assertions, however, it is precisely the weakness of civil society that has 
made ethnic nationalism weak in post-Soviet societies, since it is very difficult to form 
nationalist movements in the absence of a strong civil society. Moreover, the ruling elites 
of these societies, who seek to maintain their ethnic privileges, do not support either 
ethnic or civic nationalism; since both of which imply equality and therefore, the 
levelling of their group status with that of the rest of the population. 
Thus, it can be argued that the attractiveness of ethnic nationalism for regional elites in 
post-Soviet Russian Federation seems to be exaggerated. it is also mistaken to identify 
secessionism with ethnic nationalism. In fact, a secessionist outcome may be the 
culmination of various struggles other than ethnic struggles. As Abby Innes argues, the 
28 On the emergence of French nationalism, see Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The 
Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1976. 
29 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1992, pp. 1- 17. 
30 Anatoly M. Khazanov, 'Ethnic Nationalism in the Russian Federation', Daedalus, vol. 124, no. 2, 
1997, p. 121. 
31 George Sch6pflin, Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe, London: Hurst & Co., 
2000, p. 6- 
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Czech and Slovak states became independent because ofelite and not public support in 
Czechoslovakia, where ethnic nationalism was considerably weak by 199 1.32 Besides, the 
nation-evoking efforts of political entrepreneurs may not be always successful. As Anatol 
Lieven says, 
While both communist and nationalist manipulators have indeed been at work 
in many countries, the readiness of different nations to respond to their 
provocations has differed enormously according to local circumstance, local 
history, local culture, and yes, to 'national character'. " 
From this point of view, post-Soviet Tatar nationalism and the development of Russian 
federalism could be explored by taking the specific characteristics of Tatarstan's history, 
leadership and society as well as the interests of the Russian federal leadership into 
account. These factors cannot be adequately analysed through the normative conceptual 
lenses of 'good' civic nationalism and 'bad' ethnic nationalism. 34 It is important, in this 
respect, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant literature on the politics of 
Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism. 
A Critique of the Literature 
This thesis challenges the dominance of apolitical and normative approaches in the 
literature on the role of nationalism in Tatarstan's political system and in its federal 
relations with Moscow. There are two main schools of thought concerning the politics of 
Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism in the post-Soviet era. The first school of 
thought, which is dorninant among the Tatar scholars, views Tatarstan's drive for 
sovereignty as essentially a civic process. This school is associated with Rafael 
Khakimov, Political Advisor to the President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shainfiev and the 
Director of the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of 
Tatarstan. For Khakimov, the post-Soviet Tatar nation-building process is good since it is 
a civic project, while the Russian nation building process is bad, as it is an ethnic-based 
imperialist project. By contrast, the second school, which is dominant among the Russian 
32 Abby Innes, 'The Breakup of Czechoslovakia: The Impact of Party Development on the Separation 
of the State', East European Politics and Societies, vol. 11, no. 3,1997, p. 434. 
33 Anatol Lieven, 'Anatol Lieven Replies', National Interest, no. 50,1997/1998, p. 112. 
34 David Brown, 'Are There Good and Bad NationalismsT, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 5, no. 2,1999, 
p. 300. 
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scholars, argues that ethnic nationalism fornis the basis of' Tatarstan's drive for 
sovereignty and endangers the civic nation-building process in the post-Soviet Russia. 
This view is associated with the Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology 
Valeiii Tishkov, who was the Head of the Russian State Committee on Nationalities in 
March-November 1992. For Tishkov, the Russian nation building process is good since it 
is a civic project, while the Tatar nation building process is bad, as it is an ethnic project. 
Calling opponents ethnic and oneself civic is a normative way of seeing the reality, since 
ethnic and civic forms of nationalism have been used to identify 'good' and 'bad' forms 
of nationalism. However, for analytical purposes, it is essential for scientists to ask 
whether a nationalist movement, in reality, represents a civic, ethnic or some other fon-n 
of nationalism. 
For Rafael Khakimov, the official version of Tatar nationalism actively promotes civic 
rather than the ethnic form of Tatar nationalism. Actually, during the celebration of the 
sixth anniversary of Tatarstan's declaration of sovereignty in August 1996, Tatarstan's 
President Mintimer Shaimiev described Tatarstan's society as 'a multi-ethnic and 
multicultural democratic community, evolving into a civic nation of Tatarstantsy 
(Tatarstanis)'. 35 Khakimov asserts that the version of Tatar identity being presented to the 
Russians and Russian-speakers in Tatarstan is a 'pluralist', 'civic' and 'non-ethnic' one 
since this strategy involves, in his opinion, both supporting Tatar cultural revival and 
defending the rights of the Russians in the Republic. 
However, Tatarstan's project of nation-building cannot be seen as a 'civic' form of Tatar 
nationalism since Shaimiev's version of Tatar nationalism discriminates against the local 
Russian population, especially in the employment field. In Tatarstan, not only the 
Russians are marginalized, but also elites were Tatarised. Furthermore, the idea of 
multinationalism, which is advocated by Tatarstan's leadership, may not necessarily be 
civic, because ethnicity remains still its basic marker of political identity. The notion of 
civic national identity is quite foreign to Khakirnov's general political discourse since 
Khakimov himself said that it is very useful to categorise people according to their ethnic 
background; 
35 Cited in Galina M. Yernelianova, 'Shaimiev's "Khanate" on the Volga and its Russian Subjects', 
Asian Ethnicity, vol. 1, no. 1,2000, p. 49. 
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Sometimes one can hear appeals to forget about ethnic origin and not to divide 
people according to this category. These appeals derived from the 
misunderstanding of the phenomenon. Ethnic features are not just wishful 
thinking, nor a devil's plot on the part of 'separatists'; they are destined from 
birth. 36 
Another evidence that could challenge Khakimov's claim that Tatarstan's post-Soviet 
leadership promoted a civic form of Tatar nationalism is that Tatar ethnic nationalists are 
suppressed and regional stability is maintained through authoritarian methods. In this 
sense, although Shaimiev's version of nationalism can be described as integrationist, it is 
not an inclusive and a civic form of nationalism, for which there should be democratic 
political institutions. However, the regime in Tatarstan cannot be considered fully 
democratic. 
Besides, the belief that Tatarstan should represent the aspirations of the Tatars, which 
cannot be considered civic, is visible in Khakimov's line of thinking. Khakimov attempts 
to justify is position as follows: 
the centre cannot understand that democracy for the people is meaningless 
without the guarantee of ethnic rights, which allows them to pursue progress in 
decolonisation. Democracy cannot be based on force as the source of law, in 
which case democracy loses its legitimacy. 37 
I think, the main problem in Khakimov's line of thinking lies in his assumption that post- 
Soviet Russia has been still guided by imperial mentality that characterised the Tsarist 
and Soviet orientations towards Tatarstan. In this sense, Khakimov considers the 
emergence of sovereign Tatarstan as a means of 'dismantling the state structures of the 
empire'. Khakimov describes Russia as follows: 
The peculiarity of Russia is that democratic laws have rarely been adopted 
there, and even when they have been adopted they have never been observed. 
Two points are important for understanding the political situation in Russia: 
(1) Russian society has traditionally been undemocratic, and (2) the existing 
constitution and laws have usually been ignored. 39 
36 Rafael S. Khakimov, Sumerki imperii. K voprosu o natsii i gosudarstve, (hereafter, Sumerki imperii), 
Kazan, Tatknizdat, 1993, p. 19. 
37 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
38 Rafael S. Khakimov, 'Prospects of Federalism in Russia: A View from Tatarstan', Security Dialogue, 
vol. 27, no 1,1996, p. 69. 
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Relying on these assertions, Khakimov claims that the post-Soviet process of 
federalisation in Russia could destroy Moscow's 'Imperial control' over the Tatars and 
Tatarstan. In Khakimov's line of thinking, Moscow treats the Russians in Tatarstan as 
imperial subjects just like the Tatars in the Republic. Therefore, the Russians in 
Tatarstan, for Khalcimov, have an interest in developing good relations with Tatarstan's 
government rather than with the federal government in Moscow. These claims are visible 
in Khakimov's following statement: 
[nleither in its foreign, nor in its domestic policy does Russia act as a 
guarantor of the fights of the Russians and this is why the Russian people will 
have to look for support wherever they are, in the republics. '9 
Another reason for the Russians in Tatarstan, according to Khakimov, to support 
Tatarstan's government is that Tatarstan's leadership simply conceived the full 
independence of Tatarstan from Moscow as an unrealistic project. The main reason of 
this, for the Republican leadership, is that Tatarstan was economically dependent on 
Russia. 
In the literature on post-Soviet Tatar nationalism, Katherine E. Graney, Ravil Bukharaev 
and Jean-Robert Ravieaux have taken Khakimov's conception of civic Tatar nationalism 
for granted. Graney conceived Shaimiev's politics of Tatar nationalism as being CiViC. 40 
However, Shaimiev's form of nationalism cannot be considered fully civic since non- 
Tatar national identities in Tatarstan are not accommodated through inclusive democratic 
political institutions. Bukharaev was equally wrong in arguing that 'there is a democracy 
f tv. 41 in Tatarstan, as all the opponents of the President are free to define him as they see I 
However, the existence of alternative opinions about Shaimiev does not mean that 
Shaimiev tolerates independent political activity that could challenge his rule in 
Tatarstan. Similarly, Ravieaux argued that Tatarstan's leadership has adopted economic 
nationalism and used the Republican declaration of sovereignty to gain the control of 
39 Khakimov, Sumerki imperii, p. 18. 
40 Katherine E. Graney, 'The Volga Tatars: Diasporas and the Politics of Federalism', in Nations 
Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union, eds. Charles King 
and Neil J. Melvin, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, p. 157. 
41 Bukharaev's emphasis. Ravil Bukharaev, The Model of Tatarstan under President Mintimer 
Shaimiev, London: Curzon, 1999, p-54. 
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Tatarstan's economic wealth . 
42 However, the so-called 'economic nationalism' of 
Tatarstan's leadership cannot be seen as being identical to a civic Tatar nationalism, since 
it is in the interests of a very small number of Tatars. In fact, Tatarstan's leadership has 
made a pragmatic use of Tatar nationalism, such as the requirement of knowing Tatar, in 
addition to Russian, for certain government posts. 
in opposition to Khakimov's interpretation of Tatarstan's post-Soviet experience, Valerii 
Tishkov criticised the post-Soviet Tatar leadership's promotion of Tatar national identity. 
Tishkov also rejects Khakimov's claim that Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership promoted 
a civic conception of Tatar national identity. Tishkov says that, 
How wide was the circle of 'we' for Raphael [sic] Khakirnov at this time? 
Doubtless its content had changed since local intellectuals and politicians in 
this republic, after proclaiming sovereignty, started to implement the doctrine 
of building a civic, multi-ethnic Tatarstan nation including ethnic Russians and 
other groups living in this republic. 43 
For Tishkov, ethnic nationalism in Russia is a result of the policies of non-Russian elites, 
who seek to gain access to resources and privileges. Tishkov identified the ethnic 
nationalist credentials of Tatarstan's leadership as follows: 
The most striking example is the Republic of Tatarstan. Here the ruling elite 
employed Tatar ethnonationalism, radically expressed by ultra-nationafist 
organisations and local intellectuals, to establish a firm and indisputable 
political order based on titular representation. 44 
Tishkov provides another evidence from one of his interviews with Rafael Khakimov. in 
this interview, Khakimov was quoted as saying that, 
We had learned the technology of how to call up national forces, how to 
organise and to direct them. Now we control the nationals (natsionaly) 
because we had achieved a lot and have another agenda. 45 
To remedy this problem of ethnic mobilisation by non-Russian republican leaders, 
Tishkov argues that a civic Russian nation (rossiiskaia natsha) as a community of all 
42 Jean-Robert Ravieaux, 'Tipy natsionalizma, obshchestvo i politika v Tatarstane', Politicheskie 
issledovaniia, vol. 3, no. 5-6,1992, p. 50. 
43 Valerii A. Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind 
Aflame, (hereafter, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict), London: Sage, 1997, p. 45. 
' ibid., p. 242. 
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citizens of the Russian Federation regardless of their cultural and religious differences 
should be forged through the efforts of politicians and intellectuals. Thus, Tishkov 
recommends that, 
states can abandon the use of the word nation as an academically and legally 
meaningless self-ascription. My position is that the state is just a state. 
Labelling it as a 'national' or not, is like giving it an adjective of colour (for C, C, 46 
example blue state, brown state) . 
Nevertheless, Tishkov's rhetoric of 'civic nationalism' favours Moscow as it downgrades 
the status of the Tatars and other non-Russian minorities from a nationality to an ethnic 
group. For Tishkov, the formation of a civic Russian nation (rossiiskaia natsda) is 
hindered by the existence of national-territorial formations incorporated within Russia. 
Thus, Tishkov strongly objects to the continuing use of the Soviet-era expression 
4multinational people' (nmogonatsional'nyi narod) in the post-Soviet Russian legislation, 
including the 1993 constitution of the Russian Federation. This terminology, according to 
Tishkov, emphasises 'the absence, in a legal sense, of the Russian nation (rossfiskaia 
natsiia) as a single subject of political self-determination and the source of state 
sovereignty'. He believes that the admission in the constitution that many nations exist 
among 'the people (narod) of the Russian Federation' could lead to recognition of these 
nations' right to self-determination. 
47 
Although Tishkov calls for the eradication of post-communist Tatar and Russian ethnic 
nationalisms through a non-ethnic process of federalisation, it should be noted that, as 
Anatol Lieven argues, Russian ethnic nationalism has always been weak compared to that 
of many other nations, since 'Russian political identification has always been with 
imperial or ideological states that, though Russian in origin, were far from being simply 
Russian' . 
48 Therefore, Tishkov's attitudes towards Russia's non-Russian minorities, 
including the Tatars, reflect the legacy of Moscow's imperial control over non-Russians, 
45 Cited in ibid, p. 45. 
46 Tishkov's emphasis. Valerii A. Tishkov, 'Forget the "Nation": Post-Nationalist Understanding of 
Nationalism', Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 23, no. 4,2000, p. 646. 
47 Tishkov, Ethnicityl Nationalism and Conflict, p. ix. 
48 Anatol Lieven, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Scholarly Debate and the Realities of Eastern Europe', 
(hereafter, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? '), National Interest, no. 49,1997, p. 20. 
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which is, for Mark R. Beissinger, still influential in the post-imperial context. 
49 In other 
words, Tishkov's views look like what Michael Billig calls 'banal nationalism'. 
According to Billig, 'banal nationalism' refers to the often-understated nationalism of the Cý 
'established nations'. This form of nationalism emerges when 'our' nationalism is not 
presented as nationalism, which is dangerously irrational, surplus and alien, but as 
patfiotism, which is good and beneficial. 
50 
To sum up, this literature review illustrates that normative theories of nationalism based 
on the categorisation of post-Soviet nationalisms into either civic or ethnic nationalism 
are analytically and normatively problematic in the context of what happened in 
Tatarstan. Analytically, the narrow definition of ethnic nationalism leaves everything 
apart from ethnicity civic. For example, imperial ethnic nationalism might emerge as 
civic. Normatively, the description of a non-ethnic form of nationalism as 'civic' may 
promote cultural chauvinism of the dominant ethnic group, where democracy and civil 
society have not been consolidated. " The confusion between ethnic and civic identities 
in Tatarstan and the Russian Federation partly stems from the fact that ethnic or civic 
nationalisms emerge only if either civil society or democratic state structures exist. 
However, as Richard Sakwa argues, the democratisation process in the post-Communist 
space has taken unique forms, as the political elites in these countries manipulated it to 
promote their self-interests. 
52 In fact, pragmatic politicians operating under the severest 
socio-economic and regional constraints on their behaviours, rather than civic or ethnic 
nationalists, rule Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. For these pragmatic politicians, 
civic nationalism potentially has a broader appeal since it does not exclude anyone within 
the society, but lacks the emotive edge of ethnic nationalism. In general, they make both 
types of claims depending on the circumstances. 
49 Mark R. Beissinger, 'State-Building in the Shadow of an Empire-State: The Soviet Legacy in Post- 
Soviet Politics' in The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective, 
eds. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, p. 178. 
50 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, London: Sage, 1995, p. 6. 
51 Rogers Brubaker, 'Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism', in The State of the 
Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, ed. John Hall, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, pp. 298-30 1. 
52 Richard Sakwa, Postcommunism. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999, pp. 5-6. 
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The Main Argument 
The thesis argues that Tatarstan's leadership succeeded in maintaining political power 
and gaining economic wealth through promoting neither the civic nationalism of 
participating citizens in Tatarstan nor the ethnic nationalism of the Tatar nation bound 
together by common culture and history, but pragniatic nonwnklatitra nationalism which 
demands national autonomy for the Tatars as the only formula for Tatarstan's leadership 
to secure regional stability against ethnic nationalisms of the Tatars and the Russians in 
Tatarstan and the adverse regional effects of the federal policies. The thesis considers the 
weaknesses of the Russian federal centre and Tatarstan's civil society as the main factors 
enabling Tatarstan's leadership to pursue a politics of survival through manipulating 
Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism. 
I think, pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism can be defined as an elite-oriented, 
undemocratic and non-mobilisational form of post-communist nationalism that has been 
promoted by the former communist nomenklatu ra elites in order to justify the demand for 
national sovereignty for the members of a nation within a specific territory in ten'ns of the 
need to protect the nation from the destabilising effects of any form of ethnic nationalism 
in that territory and external political pressures. In addition, I use the 'Tatarstan model' 
of Russian federalism in this thesis in order to denote an institutional arrangement 
between the federal centre in Moscow and the non-Russian Republics of the Russian 
Federation by which the former communist nomenklatura elites of these republics 
were granted privileges in return for their cooperation in keeping ethnic nationalist 
movements in their republics under control. 
Relying on these definitions of pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism and the 
'Tatarstan model' of Russian federalism, this thesis will focus on the nature of 
Tatarstan's leadership as well as its relations with Moscow and the people in Tatarstan 
as factors shaping Tatarstan's post-Soviet politics of Tatar nationalism and Russian 
federalism. 
Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership retains the Soviet-era characteristics of 
nomenklatura, which refers to the sYstern of political appointments in the Soviet 
Union. As Richard Sakwa argues, the concept of nomenklatura took a new meaning 
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in the post-Soviet context as 'a way of identifying a broad social class' rather than a 
precise occupational category. -53 This social class consists of the former communist 
elites who share similar values and interests regardless of the differences in their post- 
Soviet occupations. In this sense, Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership share a 
nomenklatura view of nationalism, which cannot be labelled as a form of civic or 
ethnic nationalism. Emil Pain describes 'nomenklatura nationalism' in the Russian 
context as 
the ideology of the segment of the former Soviet political elite that is now 
re-entering the bodies of government and administration in the centre as C, C, 
well as in the regions or those who have been in power since 1991 but have C, 
stopped concealing their nationalist views and now proclaim them openly. 5' 
However, this fonn of nomenklatura nationalism represents only the reactionary political 
behaviour of former communist nonwnklatura elites to the changing political conditions. 
Most members of the former Communist nomenklatura in various parts of the post- 
communist world, such as Central Asia, Belarus and many regions of the Russian 
Federation, succeeded in realising their political survival without adopting reactionary 
policies, as in the case of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. In Central Asia, Belarus 
and many regions of the Russian Federation, the non-reactionary forms of nonwnklatura 
nationalist behaviour was developed by some post-Soviet leaders in the guise of 
confronting radicalism and ethnic nationalism their territories. 
From this point of view, Tatarstan's leadership promotes a pragmatic form of 
nomenklatura nationalism in the sense that nationalist goals are pragmatically revised in 
line with the changing interests of Tatarstan's nomenklatura leadership and the changing 
political conditions inside and outside the Republic. They do not mobilise the masses 
behind their nationalist projects in order to oppose the process of reform per se. Instead, 
they seek to shape the direction of reform process in their own interest in return for 
cooperating pragmatically with the 'reformers' in demobilising ethnic nationalism, and 
keeping it under control. 
53 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 1996, p. 60. 
54 Emil A. Pain, 'Russkii vopros: Ot internatsionalizma k nomenklatumomu natsionalizmu? ', 
Literaturnaia gazeta, 27 January 1999, p. 3. 
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Pragnmitic nomenklatura nationalism has been advocated by Tatarstan's post-Soviet 
leadership since it is better suited to their strategy of keeping Tatar ethnic nationalists at 
bay while issuing declarations in favour of democratic federalism and civic nationalism 
that are not backed up by a process of democratisation in the Republic. Although 
pragrwitt .c nonwnklatura nationalism prevents the instability of inter-ethnic relations in 
the Republic, it largely constrains the process of democratisation in Tatarstan. In fact, the 
promotion of either civic or ethnic Tatar nationalism is not in the interest of Tatarstan's 
leadership since the development of either form of Tatar nationalism would undermine 
their power. While civic Tatar nationalism requires the promotion of democratisation, 
ethnic Tatar nationalism demands a confrontational policy towards Moscow. Both forms 
of Tatar nationalism imply equality of Tatarstan's nomenklatura leadership with the rest 
of the population in the Republic or with their co-ethnic peoples and, therefore, the 
elimination of their group privileges in Tatarstan. 
in fact, the analysis of Tatarstan's post-Soviet politics through the conceptual lenses of 
'good' civic nationalism versus 'bad' ethnic nationalism could produce reductionist 
explanations. For example, although the political survival policies of Tatarstan's 
leadership increased Tatarstan's autonomy from Moscow and resulted in discrimination 
against the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan, they cannot be seen as evidence of Shain-dev's 
4anti-Russian' Tatar ethnic nationalism, since they are basically unintended outcomes of 
Shain-dev's policies of political survival. Similarly, Shaimiev's public declarations in 
favour of multinationalism do not make him a 'civic' nationalist, since these declarations 
cannot necessarily reflect the 'real' intentions of Tatarstan's leadership. In fact, Shairniev 
uses the discourse of multinationalism against the Tatar and the Russian 'extremists' 
(ethnic nationalists) in Tatarstan for the purpose of justifying his suppressive policies 
against the opposition to his 'centrist' policies. In both cases, the political survival 
policies of Tatarstan's leadership serve to limit the room for democratic change in the 
Republic. Tatarstan's post-Soviet developmental path also served to accommodate the 
interests of both the former imperial elites in Moscow and the regional elites in Tatarstan 
through informal channels. The emerging institutional framework, which is assumed to 
make Moscow's relationship with Tatarstan more 'democratic' through sharing some of 
central powers with the Republic, serves to camouflage what Tatarstan's leadership 
received in return for its contribution to the stability of the Russian Federation. 
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The tendency of Tatarstan's leadership to act in the spirit of pragnuitic nonwnklatilra 
nationalism has been rooted in the evolution of the relations between Russia and the 
Tatar elites. Under the Russian Empire, Moscow and St. Petersburg co-opted a 
significant part of the Tatar elite. This increased the autonomy of the elites from the Tatar 
masses. Their autonomy from Moscow increased when the Tatar elites promoted the 
growth in Tatar national consciousness in the nineteenth century. During the Soviet 
period, there was a lack of interest in Tatar affairs mainly because of the difficulties in 
getting reliable infon-nation from the Soviet Union. 
55 Although the Bolsheviks checked 
the rise of Tatar nationalism, the formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (TASSR) in 1920 provided a durable institutional frame for the long-term 
consolidation of the Tatar nation. Tatar elites adopted national communism, which refers 
to a national route to the construction of communism, as it was the only way to ensure 
popular participation. Moscow controlled Tatar national communism through purges 
during the 1930s and through clientelistic co-optation of the TASSR's leadership during 
the 1970s. This historical background could partly explain why Tatarstan's post-Soviet 
leadership has refrained from sponsoring exclusively ethnic or civic forms of Tatar 
nationalism, and instead has adopted pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism. 
Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership, unlike the federal leadership, have largely maintained 
its Soviet-era closely-knitted monolithic nature. 56 The monolithic composition of 
Tatarstan's leadership is crucial for ethnic nationalists, since its fragmentation could 
enable their ethnic nationalist movements to make progress. 
57 However, Tatarstan's 
leadership has largely remained united in order to exploit the state from within on behalf 
58 
of the nation without going over to the side of Tatar ethnic nationalists. 
55 Gregory Gleason, 'The 'National Factor' and the Logic of Sovietology', in The Post-Soviet Nations: 
Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR, ed. Alexander J. Motyl, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1992, p. 16. 
56 James Hughes, 'Sub-National Elites and Post-Communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to 
Kryshtanovskaya & White', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 6,1997, pp. 1019-1020. 
57 Mark R. Beissinger, 'Elites and Ethnic Identities in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics', in The Post- 
Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR, ed. Alexander J. Motyl, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992, pp. 157-160. 
58 Mary McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 
pp. 6-9. 
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The nomenklatura background of the Tatar elites plays an important role in their politics 
of nationalism. As William Tompson argues, post-Soviet institutions do not operate on a 
tabida rasa, but in a context where Soviet institutions and groups try to preserve their 
position while challenged by new social actors. 59 Alexander J. Motyl supports Torripson's 
argument by explaining the subversive impacts of surviving Soviet institutions as 
follows: 
The Soviet legacies combined to create a particularly resilient political- 
economic amalgam of dilapidated economies, powerful managers, old-boy 
networks, and former Communist apparatchiks fused into closed networks of 
elites with an interest in maintaining a status quo that enabled them to live off 
society while enjoying the perquisites of power. 6" 
In fact, as Midkhat Farukshin's study of Tatarstan's leadership showed, most of the 
leaders of Tatarstan were high up in the local communist nomenklatura before 1991.61 
Shaimiev had the key position of First Secretary of the regional Communist Party until 
1990 and Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet of the TASSR in 1990-1991. The post- 
Soviet Tatar nomenklatura became dependent for their posts on elections and not on the 
approval of Moscow, following the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
Thus, they started to play the ethnic card, presenting themselves as the defenders of the 
Tatar culture, while at the same time seeking to avoid antagonising the ethnic Russians, 
who often form an important part of their electorate. Shaimiev manipulated the inability 
of political movements to attract public support for his rule. Moreover, his ability to rein 
in nationalist fervour and keep the Republic stable has given him wide popular support. 
Shain-tiev has also managed to neutralise much of the political opposition in Tatarstan. To 
this purpose, he has co-opted some of the Tatar ethnic nationalist opposition's most 
popular slogans -including sovereignty itself- and their leading figures, such as 
Shaimiev's adviser Rafael Khakimov. Although Tatarstan's leadership claims that it 
promotes civic Tatar nationalism in order to contain all forms of ethnic nationalism in the 
Republic, as Rogers Brubaker says, an ethnocratic political order could emerge as a result 
of presumably 'Civic' or non-ethnic approach to interethnic relations since; 
59 William Tompson, 'Old Habits Die Hard: Fiscal Imperatives, State Regulation and the Role of 
Russia's Banks', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 7,1997, p. 1159-1160. 
60 Alexander J. MotYl, 'Soviet Legacies, Post-Soviet Transformations', Freedom Review, vol. 28, no. 1, 
1997, P-50. 
6' Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Politicheskaia elita v Tatarstane: Vyzovy vremeni i trudnosti adaptatsii', 
Politicheskie issledovaniia, vol. 5, no. 6,1994, pp-67-69. 
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a formally liberal and ethnically neutral definition of statehood and citizenship 
may, in an ethnically heterogeneous state in which the state-bearing majority 
and a minority or minofities understand themselves as belonging to distinct 
ethno-cultural nations, mask a substantively ethnocratic organisation of public 
life. 62 
in this sense, the politics of nationalism in Tatarstan disguises struggles that are waged 
around the issues of political power and the reallocation of property rights. 
In their relations with Moscow, Tatarstan's leadership sought to maximise the autonomy 
of Tatarstan as far as possible through a pragmatic politics of Tatar nationalism. As Peter 
J. S. Duncan argues, such regional autonomy demands indicate the desire of regional 
elites to ensure that the process of privatisation was implemented under their own control 
and for their own benefit. 63 The contradictions and ambiguities in the text of the treaty 
provided room for Tatarstan's leadership to make use of its own type of Tatar nationalism 
in its relations with Moscow. Consequently, Tatarstan's relations with Moscow between 
1994 and 1999 have taken stronger confederal character than the treaty text would 
suggest. 64 It is the post-Soviet weakness of Moscow that made it easier for Tatarstan's 
leadership to enjoy such de facto autonomy. Thus, Tatarstan's leadership has used its 
pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism not only until the signing of the treaty but more 
significantly in its aftermath. In this respect, Sergei Kondrashov assumes that both the 
federal and Tatarstan authorities share an interest in denying the radical wing of the 
nationalists a pool of potential supporters. 
65 1 think, Kondrashov ignores the fact that 
unlike Moscow, Tatarstan's leadership has no interest in rooting out ethnic nationalism 
per se in Tatarstan, since it justifies Tatarstan's sovereignty over the local population and 
its autonomy from Moscow in terms of the need to protect the Tatar nation from the 
destabilising effects of any form of ethnic nationalism in Tatarstan. In other words, the 
efirriination of ethnic nationalists in Tatarstan would make the main rationale of 
62 Rogers Brubaker, 'Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet 
Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account', Theory and Society, vol. 23, no. 1,1994, p. 69. 
63 Peter J. S. Duncan, 'Russia: Accommodating Ethnic Minorities', in The Politics of Multinational 
States, ed. D. N. MacIver, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 77. 
6" Nail Moukhariamov, 'Tatarstan Model: A Situational Dynamic', in Beyond the Monolith: The 
Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia, eds. Peter J. Stavrakis, Joan DeBardeleben and Larry 
Black, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 230. 
65 Sergei Kondrashov, Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in Tatarstan, 1988-92: Origins and 
Development, London: Macmillan, 2000, p. 197. 
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Tatarstan's pragmatic nomenklatura leadership in justifying Tatarstan's autonorny 
redundant. Thus, in my review of Kondrashov's book, I argued that: 
[t]he Tatar political establishment needs the survival of Tatar ethnic 
nationalism for the continuity of various privileges granted by Moscow. If 
Tatar ethnic nationalism was eradicated for good, then Moscow would not 
need to tolerate Tatarstan's exceptional autonomy in the Russian Federation. 66 
Although Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership has not sought to eradicate ethnic 
nationalism for good, it ensured that its version of Tatar praginatic nomenklatura 
nationalism gained the upper hand vis-A-vis the Russian and Tatar versions of ethnic 
nationalism in Tatarstan. This can be explained by Richard Sakwa's argument that in 
post-Soviet Russia '[t]he very structure of protest and other forrns of collective action 
have been both delegitimized and marginalized' . 
67 In particular, the civil society, where 
nationalist movements could develop, is very weak vis-A-vis the authorities in both 
Moscow and Tatarstan. A thorough study of Tatarstan's society and culture would reveal 
that there is not a strong basis for any ethnic-based nationalist mobilisation in Tatarstan. 
The non-antagonistic character of the self/other perceptions of the Tatars and the 
Russians, the high levels of refigious tolerance, bilingualism, mixed marriages and 
urbanisation as well as the state-dependent economy and a weak civil society have both 
undermined the institutional bases of ethnic mobilisation among the Tatars and the 
Russians in Tatarstan, and increased their dependence on Tatarstan's leadership for their 
socio-economic survival. 
68 
The pragmatic approach of the post-Soviet Russian elites to the question of Russian 
federalism has also enabled Moscow to accommodate Tatarstan's pragmatic politics of 
Tatar nationalism. Thus, Moscow has maintained its territorial integrity in the post-Soviet 
period not because there was a fully-instituted democratic form of federalism, but 
because Moscow made pragmatic concessions to nepotistic regional leaders, such as 
Shaimiev, in the name of multiculturalism. This type of federalism slightly differs from 
66 Oktay F. Tanrisever, 'Review of Sergei Kondrashov's Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in 
Tatarstan, 1988-92: Origins and Development', Slavonic and East European Review, vol, 79, no. 2, 
2001 p. 372. 
67 Richard Sakwa, 'State and Society in Post-Communist Russia', in Institutions and Political Change 
in Russia, ed., Neil Robinson, London: Macmillan, 2000, p. 203. 
68 Damir A Iskhakov, Problemy stanovleniia i transformatsii tatarskoi natsii, Kazan: Master Lain, 
1997, pp. 178-189. 
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the Western conceptions of democratic federation. Since democratic federations increase 
a nation's self-governance, the demands for national sel f-deterrrfi nation through complete 
independence are weak in these federations. However, the Russian Federation has 
problems in instituting even the fundamental qualities of federalism. For example, there 
is no clear legal definition of regional autonomy in the Russian Federation. Unlike the 
Russian Federation, however, Canada is an example of a democratic federalism that 
works, since Quebec with its national identity enjoys a wide range of regional autonomy. 
The governments of Spain and Belgium have also adopted significant constitutional 
moves toward federation as a means of resolving national conflicts. 69 This suggests that 
democratic federations could contain ethnic nationalism. 
Note on the Method 
The methodology that is used in this Ph. D. research is designed to identify the pragmatic 
uses of civic and ethnic symbols by Tatarstan's leadership, and the responses of the 
federal leadership in Moscow and the ethnic Russians and the Tatars in Tatarstan. 
To this purpose, the thesis employs new institutionalism as a method of analysis. New 
institutionalism differs from classical institutionalist analysis in terms of its broader 
conceptualisation of institutions. According to Douglass North, a leading representative 
of new institutionalism, institutions can be defined as 'any form of constraint that human 
beings devise to shape human interaction'. 70 This definition includes both formal 
constraints - such as rules that human beings devise - and informal constraints - such as 
conventions and codes of behaviour. In the absence of formal institutions that constrain 
major actors and their strategies within a given polity, new institutionalism assumes that 
informal institutions like clientelism and corruption could become don-dnant in any 
society. 71 
69 Alfred Stephan, 'Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 16, no. 2, 
2000, P. 137. 
70 Douglass North, institutions, Institutional Changes and Economic Performance, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 4. 
71 For further information on the new institutionalism, see Ellen M. Immergut, 'The Theoretical Core 
of the New Institutionalism', Politics & Society, vol. 26, no. 1,1998, pp. 5-35. 
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New institutional 1 sm is especially useful in identifying the impact of historical legacies 
on the working of political institutions, such as federalism. In the case of Tatarstan, it 
could enable us to identify the impact of the nomenklatura background of Tatarstan's 
post-Soviet leadership on its politics of nationalism. Besides, new institutionalism pays 
more attention to the relationship between formal and infori-nal institutions. Thus, it could 
also enable us to identify the uses of formal institutions, such as federal structures, in 
order to accominodate the pragmatic nonwnklatura nationalism of regional elites, which 
generally seek to secure the political survival of their informal networks of power and 
wealth at the regional level. In this sense, new institutionalism can be used to explain how 
the principle of 'arbitrary rule' emerges in Tatarstan, and in the federal relations between 
Moscow and Tatarstan when formal institutions, such as federation, serve to conceal the 
informal dorrfinance of Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership in the Republic. By combining 
the formal and informal factors together, it would be possible to identify the existence of 
unwritten rules in Russia's federal relations, which sometimes play more important role 
than the written rules in the conduct of centre-periphery relations. Last but not least, new 
institutionalism could enable us to explain why the political actors in Russia's centre- 
periphery relations opt for pragmatic and short-lived arrangements rather than long-term 
systemic solutions in a political environment that has been characterised by increasing 
uncertainty in the post-Soviet era. 
This new institutionalist methodology is used to explore the Tatarstan case from a 
historical and comparative perspective that could enable us to refrain from making 
universal statements concerning the politics of Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism. 
In fact, Tatar nationalism has taken different forms in different historical periods (Tsarist, 
Soviet and post-Soviet). It is also very essential to take local factors and historical 
legacies into account in exploring different forms of nationalism. Anatol Lieven suggests 
that such an approach could contribute to the attempts at overcoming the 
misunderstandings in the studies of nationalism. As Lieven says, 
Ifistory and nationalism too are a kind of jungle, but are also in themselves 
neutral, and can be turned to the account of peace, order and civilisation. But 
in order to travel safely in them you need a proper local map, with a small 
scale and detailed contours. 72 
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The current research was carried out through an analysis of relevant documents, 
including the treaties and agreements between Moscow and Tatarstan. The views of 
ethnic Russians and Tatars conceming their national identities were also traced through 
election, referendum and public opinion survey results. Furthermore, media coverage of 
the developments were explored through examining several newspapers, magazines and 
bulletins such as the Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press (CDPSP), Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and the Jamestown Foundation. Regional developments 
were studied through the Russian Regional Report, which is published by the East-West 
institute (this report was initially published by the Open Media Research Institute in 
Prague). This research is based upon sources in English, Russian and Tatar. 
During this research, two visits were made to the Russian Federation. The first visit was 
in April-June 1996, and the second was in April-July 1998.1 visited Moscow and 
Tatarstan on both occasions. This provided me with an opportunity to observe the 
changes that occurred between these visits at first hand. In Moscow, I studied at the 
Moscow State University Library and the Russian State Library (the Lenin Library). I also 
had the opportunity to visit the Russian Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology. I 
studied at the National Library of Tatarstan and Kazan State University library. Both in 
Moscow and Tatarstan, I had interviews with several participants and specialists, 
including Prof. Leokadia Drobizheva, Chairperson of the Political Anthropology 
Department at the Institute of Anthropology and Ethnology, the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, Dr. Rafael Khakimov, Chief Advisor to the President of Tatarstan, Prof. Indus 
Tagirov, Chairperson of the World Congress of Tatars (Both Khakimov and Tagirov 
represented the Tatarstan government during the negotiations with Moscow), Prof. 
Midkhat Farukshin, a well-known specialist on Russian federalism and Chairperson of 
the Department of Political Science at the Kazan State University, and Rafael 
Mukhammetdinov, the founder of the Tatar National Independence Party - Ittifak (the 
full list of my interviews with participants and specialists is available in the 
Bibliography). During my research, I also had interviews with some ordinary Tatars and 
Russians in Tatarstan. I made use of my fieldwork notes on these interviews briefly in 
72 Lieven, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nationT, p. 22. 
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Chapter Four. This method is adopted from Studs Terkel's work Race: flow Blacks and 
73 
Whites Think and Feel about the American Obsession (1992). 
The Outline of the Thesis 
This study is organised into five main chapters other than the introduction and 
conclusion. The introduction sets out the approach. In what follows, the first main 
chapter provides the historical background of the Russian-Tatar relations. Chapter one 
begins by exploring the Tatar position under Russian imperial rule and the co-optation of 
parts of the noble Tatar elite into the Russian nobility. The main part of the chapter will 
provide a targeted history of Tatariia under the Soviet rule, with a focus on the relations 
between the Tatar communist leadership in Kazan and the Russian and Soviet centres in 
St. Petersburg and Moscow. For this purpose, the formative years of the TASSR will be 
analysed to identify in what fields the TASSR possessed real autonomy. Afterwards the 
chapter will examine two attempts of the Tatar communist leadership to increase its 
autonomy on the eves of the 1936 and 1977 constitutions. In examining each attempt at 
increasing the Autonomous Republic status of Tatariia to Union Republic status, this 
chapter will analyse Moscow's responses as well. Stalin's response was to purge the Tatar 
elites during the 1930s. Brezhnev, on the other hand, responded with accommodative 
measures, such as huge investments in Tatariia and granting the Tatar elites security of 
tenure during the 1960s and 1970s. The following section will examine the impact of 
perestroika on Tatar elites with a special focus on the sovereignty declarations of the 
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and the TASSR. Finally, the post- 
August Coup politics in Tatariia and Checheno-Ingushefiia will be contrasted in the 
remaining section of this chapter. 
The second chapter investigates the pragmatic uses of nationalism by Tatarstan's 
leadership in the formation and working of Shaimiev's regime in Tatarstan. The chapter 
begins with an analysis of the role of nationalism for the political survival of Tatarstan's 
post-Soviet leadership- Afterwards, Shaimiev's discourse of nationalism will be explored 
73 Studs Terkel, Race: How Blacks and Whites Think and Feel about the American Obsession, New 
York: The New Press, 1992. 
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in order to identify whether it is a civic, ethnic or pragmatic forrn of nationalism. Next, 
Tatarstan's policies of nation-building will be analysed by looking at Tatarstan's policies 
in the fields of language, education, culture and religion. This will be followed by the 
analysis of the impact of nation-building policies in employment opportunities and 
economic policy. Furthen-nore, the chapter will examine the absence of a Russian 
backlash by looking at both patronage networks and electoral engineering in Tatarstan. In 
the final section, Tatarstan's politics of nationalism will be compared to the politics of 
nationalism in the Bashkortostan and Chuvashiia republics of the Russian Federation and 
in Kazakhstan. 
The third chapter focuses on the pragmatic uses of Tatar nationalism by Tatarstan's 
leadership in managing Tatarstan's relations with Moscow. The chapter begins by 
mapping out the negotiating positions of Moscow and Tatarstan's leadership concerning 
the status of Tatarstan in the post-Soviet era. Afterwards, we will explore how the Treaty 
with Moscow was finally negotiated. Next, the chapter will analyse what this Treaty says, 
and the reactions of the Russians and the Tatars to the Treaty. In the following section, 
Tatarstan's Treaty will be compared to the successes and failures of the non-Russian 
republics of Bashkortostan and Sakha, and the Russian Sverdlovsk region in their own 
power-sharing treaties with Moscow. Shaimiev's politics of Tatar nationalism in the post- 
Treaty period will be explored by looking at Tatarstan's politics of electoral support for 
the El'tsin regime, Tatar diaspora and foreign economic relations. Furthermore, the 
worsening of relations between Moscow and Tatarstan between 1997 and 1998 will be 
explored by discussing Moscow's economic policies of controlling Tatarstan and 
Shaimiev's politics of Tatar nationalism. In the final section, the impact of Russia's 1998 
financial crisis on Tatarstan will be explored in ten-ns of Tatarstan's capacity to play a 
greater role in shaping the future of the Russian Federation both in economic and 
political spheres. 
The fourth chapter seeks to explore the nature of historical experience, society and culture 
in Tatarstan. Chapter Four starts by examining the historical experience of the Tatars and 
the Russians under Russian Imperial and Soviet rule. Afterwards, we will explore the 
polarisation of the Russian 'democrats' against Tatar 'ethnic nationalists' in late Soviet 
Tatariia. Next, the weakness of ethnic nationalist movements in post-Soviet Tatarstan will 
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be examined. Furthennore, the chapter will compare the Tatar and Russian ethnic 
nationalisms in Tatarstan with other nationalist movements in the post-Soviet world. In 
the remaining part of the chapter, we will analyse the sources of the weak support for 
Tatar and Russian ethnic nationalisms by focusing on the self/other perceptions of the 
Tatars and the Russians, in addition to religion, language use, mixed marriages, 
urbanisation, economy and civil society in Tatarstan. 
The fifth chapter explores how Tatarstan fits into developments in the Russian 
Federation. Chapter Five starts with an analysis of the so-cafled 'Tatarstan model' and its 
impact on the development of asymmetrical federalism in Russia. Afterwards, we will 
discuss why Russia is not disintegrating. Next, the Russian Federation will be compared 
with the following democratic federations: the United States, Canada, Germany, Spain 
and Belgium. In the following section, we will discuss the stability of intergovernmental 
relations between Moscow and Tatarstan by examining the diverging views of Moscow 
and Kazan on federal reforms in terms of their centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. In 
the final section, the stability of interethnic relations between Russians and Tatars will be 
analysed by focusing on the orientations of Russian and Tatar nationalisms. 
The thesis concludes by bringing together all chapter findings concerning the relations of 
Tatarstan's leadership with Moscow and the local population of Tatarstan into a coherent 
perspective on the politics of Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism. 
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Map 1. Tatarstan 
Source: The Territories ofthe Russian Federation, 1" ed., London: EUropa, 1999, p. 98. 
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1. Moscow and the Tatar Elites: A Historical Analysis 
This opening chapter seeks to explain the complex historical background of the 
relationship between Moscow and the Tatar elites through exploring Moscow's strategies 
of controlling Tatariia and the tactics of the Tatar elites in increasing their autonomy. In 
fact, the orientation of Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership toward the Republican 
population and Moscow cannot be explained adequately without exploring the historical 
formation of the Tatar elites in the Tsarist and Soviet periods. Yet, there are a very limited 
number of sources on the history of relations between Moscow and the Tatar elites. 
Although the reliability of Soviet sources is questionable because of the totalitarian 
control of scientific institutions under the Soviet rule, the works of Tatar 6migr6s on 
Tatariia are more valuable. Azade-AyI)e Rorlich's Volga Tatars (1986), which is very 
helpful in understanding the pre-Soviet era, is weak in identifying political relations 
between Moscow and Kazan, since it focuses mainly on the cultural side of the Tatar 
experience under the Soviet rule. 
I Tamurbek Devletshin's Sovetskii Tatarstan (1974) is 
useful to understand the political dimension of the Soviet rule in the Tatar Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR), but this work covers the period up to 1974.2 
Bringing together the original pieces published in various sources, this chapter attempts 
to provide a complete history of the relations between Moscow and the Tatar elites during 
the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. 
The chapter hopes to demonstrate that the indirect nature of Russian and Soviet imperial 
rule over the Tatars has established the institutional power base of the Tatar elites who 
shifted their allegiances pragmatically from Moscow to the Tatar people and vice versa 
both in the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. When there was a strong government in 
Moscow, the Tatar elites adopted subservient policies. However, when Moscow had a 
weak or reformist government that was in need of support from the regions, the Tatar 
elites sought to increase their autonomy by calling for greater privileges and political 
status. In general, the Tatar elites had relied on the Soviet institutional framework in order 
' in this thesis, Tatariia and the TASSR will be used interchangeably in the Soviet context. Azade-Aype 
Rorlich, The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience, (hereafter, The Volga Tatars), Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 
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to increase their autonomy from the Russian centre in Moscow and the local population 
in the TASSR. 
Initially a brief background will be given for explaining the Tatar position under Russian 
imperial rule and the co-optation of parts of noble Tatar elite into the Russian nobility. 
The main part of the chapter will provide a targeted history of Tatariia under Soviet rule, 
with a focus on the relations between the Tatar communist leadership in Kazan and the 
Russian and Soviet centres in Moscow. For this purpose, the formative years of the 
TASSR will be analysed to identify in what fields the Republic possessed real autonomy. 
Afterwards, the chapter will examine two attempts of the Tatar communist leadership to 
increase its autonomy on the eves of the 1936 and 1977 constitutions. In examining each 
attempt at increasing the Autonomous Republic status of the TASSR to Union Republic 
status, this chapter will analyse Moscow's responses as well. Unlike Stalin, who purged 
the Tatar elites during the 1930s, Brezhnev responded with accornmodative measures, 
such as huge investments in the TASSR and granting the Tatar elites security of tenure 
during the 1960s and 1970s. The following section will examine the impact of 
perestroika on Tatar elites with a special focus on the TASSR and RSFSR declarations on 
state sovereignty. Finally, the post-August Coup politics in Tatariia and Checheno- 
Ingushetiia will be contrasted in the remaining section of this chapter. 
The Origins of Russo-Tatar Relations 
The history of Russo-Tatar relations goes back to the formation of the two earliest known 
states in Central Eurasia in the ninth century: the Bulgar state and the Kievan Rus. What 
is now Tatarstan territory was home to a variety of both nomadic and settled peoples, who 
established the Bulgar State. When the nomadic tribes of the Huns, the Avars and the 
Pechenegs started to rriigrate to the Volga region in the fourth century, this region had 
already been inhabited by the Finno-Ugric tribes. The present-day Volga Tatars just like 
the Bashkirs and Chuvash descend from an ethnic inixture of these peoples, who speak 
the dialects of the Kypchak Turkic language. According to the travel notes of Ibn Fadlan, 
an envoy of Abbasid Caliph Jafar-al-Muktadir, Islam was introduced to these peoples in 
2 Tamurbek Devletshin, Sovetskii Tatarstan, London: Our World Publishers, 1974. 
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922. Following their conversion to Islam, the people of this region replaced the Old 
Turkic ScrIpt with the Arabic Alphabet. ' ' 
The Bulgar State's relations with the Russians gained significance when the Kievan 
Russian Prince Sviatoslav defeated the Khazars, the vassal of the Bulgar State. The 
Bulgars improved their relations with the Russians through granting trade privileges to 
the Russian merchants in 984. Although the Russian principalities and the Bulgars 
clashed occasionally, the inu-ninent Mongol danger brought their hostilities to an end. 
Nevertheless, Chingis Khan's grandson, Batu, overcame the resistance of the Bulgars and 
the Slavs in the mid-thirteenth century. After conquering the Bulgar lands in 1236, Batu's 
armies swept through Russia and in the winter of 1240 captured Kiev, the seat of Grand 
Prince Mikhail of Chemigov. When the Eastern Slavs became subjects of the Golden 
Horde they were enslaved and sold in the slave markets of Crimea. The Russians under 
DrWtrii Donskoi gained their first victory against the Mongols led by Mamai at the Battle 
of Kulikovo in 1380. However, to gain their total independence from the Mongol rule, the 
Russians had to wait until 1480.4 
The Tatar elites originated from the ruling elites of three Tatar states: the Bulgar state, the 
Golden Horde and the Kazan Khanate. Although the Bulgar state had its own social 
classes, such as ruling elites, landed nobility and merchants, the Golden Horde had a 
more sophisticated social stratification system. In the Golden Horde, the highest 
institution was the kurultai (council). The landed aristocracy was composed of Tarkans 
and soiurghals, who possessed a right to have peasants as serfs. Free peasantry had to pay 
taxes of kalan (the land tax paid in kind) and urtak (the land rent paid in service). Khan 
Uzbek's decision to adopt Islam as the official religion of empire and to make Turkic the 
official language intensified the Islamic and Turkic culture in the region. Yet, marriages 
between the Russian and the Golden Horde rulers were quite common in this period. For 
example, Khan Uzbek's sister became the wife of Prince lurii of Muscovy in 1317.5 
3 Shirin Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union, London: Kegan Paul 1983, pp. 55-84. 
4 Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, pp. 17-23. 
1 ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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The Tatar elites that were co-opted by the Russian Empire came into existence under the 
Kazan Khanate, which was established by Ulu Mukhanimed in 1437.6 According to the 
elite system of the Kazan Khanate, the Khan had an absolute power. However, the 
Khan's unlimited power was counter-balanced by the power of nobility. The highest 
organ of the Tatar nobility was the Royal Council (kartichi). The Assembly of the Land, 
which was subordinate to the Royal Council, was composed of the representatives of the 
landed aristocracy, the military, and the ecclesiastical establishments. The princes of the 
Tatars (tnirzas), Chuvash and Cheremis were the most prominent members of the landed 
aristocracy. The most prestigious members of the military establishment were the ulans. 
The religious authority was represented by the Seyit, (cleric who belongs to house of the 
prophet) followed by sheikhs (senior Islamic scholars). The free urban population of 
merchants and artisans, free peasants, serfs and slaves fonned the rest of the population. 7 
For Ravil Bukharaev, a well-known expert of Tatar history, the main weakness of the 
Kazan Khanate's elite system lay in its disproportionate reliance on military and religious 
establishments. The railitarist ideology of Islamic expansionism prevented the Kazan 
Khanate from developing a productive economic system. The Russian principalities, 
however, valued trade and artisanship rather than the religious dogma. In fact, the Kazan 
Khanate's collapse coincided with the decline of its parallel medieval institutions 
throughout Europe in the raid-sixteenth century. 8 
Moscow used the tactics of divide and rule to conquer the Kazan Khanate. The Tatar 
princes sought refuge in Moscow in the aftermath of dynastic clashes and domestic 
turmoil. In return, the Grand Princes of the Muscovite State exploited these situations to 
interfere in the domestic crises of the Kazan Khanate on behalf of their protdgds. When 
Mahmud took over the throne of Kazan, his two brothers lakub and Kasim went to 
Moscow and entered the service of Vasifii 11, who endowed Kasim with the small Tatar 
and Finno-Ugric populated town of Meshchera on the Oka River in 1439. The Kasimov 
Khanate was a client of Moscow and served to accommodate pro-Russian Tatar nobility 
who had feuds with their rivals in Kazan. When the Moscow-backed Muharnmed Emin 
6 When Kazan became the new political and economic centre in the Volga region, it was also called 
Bulgar-al-jadid (New Bulgar). Mikhail Khudiakov, Ocherki po istorii Kazanskogo Khanstva, Moscow: 
Insan, 199 1, pp. 17-48. 
7 Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, pp. 28-30. 
' My interview with Ravil Bukharaev, the Russian Service of BBC, Madison, WI, USA, 29 September 
2000. 
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came to power in 1479, Moscow became able to interfere freely in the domestic affairs of' 
Kazan. After the death of Muhan-imed En-iin in 1518, the Crimean Khanate Joined 
Moscow in disputing the succession of Kazan's rulers openly. From 1547 onwardý, Ivan 
IV pursued an overtly hostile policy toward Kazan that culminated in putting an end to 
the Kazan Khanate's 107 years existence on 15 October 1552. " 
Following the capture of Kazan, Russia became an empire. The relationship between 
Moscow and its Tatar subjects conforms to Ariel Cohen's characterisation of an imperial 
relationship. In Cohen's words, 
Empire can be understood to be an age-old form of government between the 
subjects and the objects of political power, involving two or more national 
entities and territorial units in an unequal political relationship. 10 
Since Moscow's imperial control required the collaboration of some Tatars, even when 
policies were largely formulated by metropolitan elites, Moscow had to co-opt parts of 
noble Tatar elite into the Russian nobility. Thus, Moscow gave its priority to the 
recruitment of 'mediating elites' drawn from the Tatar people. It was the changing 
bargains of collaboration or mediation that had defined the actual working of imperial 
rule, and the political roles of the Tatar elites up until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. 
In general, Moscow's policy of co-opting the Tatar nobility had largely been successful. 
in fact, many families of Russian nobility, including many boyars and counts, had Tatar 
origins. Apart from the Godunov family, the following Russian noble families had Tatar 
surnames: Aksakov, Churikov, Derzhavin, lussupov, Karamzin, Kugushev, 
Meshcherskii, Saburov, Shakhovskoi and Tolbuzin. 11 Since the Russian imperial policy 
of co-opting the Tatar nobles required some degree of identity change within local Tatar 
society, Kazan's Archbishop Gurii promoted the policy of converting the Muslim Tatars 
to Christianity in 1555. The Tatars were gradually converted to Christianity creating 
starokreshchenye. An edict of 1592 proclaimed that all mosques in Kazan were closed, 
and no more mosques were allowed to be built without Moscow's permission. Later, the 
9 Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, pp. 24-29. 
10 Ariel Cohen, Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis, (hereafter, Russian Imperialism), 
Westport, CT: Preager, 1996, p. 1. 
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Tatars took part in the revolt of Stephan Razin in 1669-1670. This led to the exodus of 
the Tatars to Central Asia. The decree of 1681 denied many Moslem Tatar nobles the 
right to own serfs, and facilitated the confiscation of their lands. Unlike Russian peasants, 
a half of whom were serfs, the Tatar peasants were largely free. 12 
Although the missionary activity ceased during the 'Time of Troubles', Peter the Great 
pursued a policy of backing up the use of force with economic reprisals. He established 
the Kazan Province in 1708. Five years later, he ordered that the Muslims of Kazan 
should be given no more than six months to convert to Christianity if they wished to 
retain their holdings. A considerable number of Muslim Tatars submitted to this pressure. 
The laws of 1720 and 1721 provided further advantages for those who converted to 
Christianity, including exemption from military service and exemption from tax for three 
years. Consequently, it was estimated that some 40,000 Tatars had been baptised by 
1725.13 Empress Anna Ivanovna continued to pursue Peter the Great's policies. She 
established a department for the affairs of Newly Baptised Peoples (Kontora 
novokreshchenskikh del) in 1740. Two years later, 418 of 536 mosques in Kazan 
province had been destroyed. In addition, the Tatars were prohibited from living in Kazan 
and its environs. As these repressive measures deprived some of the Tatar nobility of their 
lands, the Tatar nobility had to become traders. 14 Nevertheless, this policy became 
counterproductive since it intensified the reactions of the Tatar peasants and united them 
with the Tatar nobility. 
15 
in order to assert Moscow's control over the periphery, where the Pugachev rebellion 
took place, Catherine H divided Russia into provinces (gubemiia) and districts (uezdy). 16 
Kazan became one of the important provinces of the empire, when she organised the 
territories around Kazan into Kazanskaia gubemiia. For Catherine H, Russia's eastern 
expansionism into Central Asia could succeed only if the persecution of the Muslims 
" Nikolai Baskakov, Russkiefamilii tiurkskogo proiskhozhdeniia, Moscow: Nauka, 1979, pp. 5-46. 
12 These converts are called kreshchen, meaning those who became Christian. It'dus Zagidullin, 
'Prichiny otpadeniia starokreshchenykh tatar Srednego Povolzh'ia v musul'manstvo v XIX v. ', 
Panorama-Forum, no. 11,1997, pp. 36-39. 
13 Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, pp. 38-40. 
"' Gaiaz Iskhaki, Idel'- Ural, Chally: Kalkan, 1992, p. 25. 
15 furii 1. Semenov, Natsional'naia politika v imperatorskoi Rossii, Moscow: Staryi sad, 1997, pp. 65- 
71. 
16 S. Frederick Starr, Decentralisation and Self Government in Russia, 1830-1870, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1972, pp. 3-50. 
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stopped. She believed that the Tatars' demands for recognition of their religion, removal Z71 
of restrictions on trade activity, and the restitution of the rights of Tatar nobility could 
have positive results as they could facilitate Russian trade with the Central Asian peoples. 
Apart from supporting the Tatar merchants, she sought to promote a loyal Islamic 
religious leadership. Initially she rescinded the law on building mosques in 1766. In place 
of the traditional Tatar clergy (Mullahs and Abyzes), Catherine instituted the Muslim 
Spiritual Board, which was headed by a pro-Moscow cleric, Mukhamedian Khuseinoglu, 
in 1789. These policies were fruitful as Russia succeeded not only in expanding the 
empire eastwards, but also in capturing the Crimean Khanate, last successor of the 
Golden Horde in the late eighteenth century. 17 
Moscow restarted its missionary campaign when eleven thousand Baptised Tatars 
converted back to Islam in Kazan gubemiia in 1866. To stop the conversions back to 
Islam among the Baptised Tatars, Nikolai II'minskii developed a system of Russian 
schools with local languages of instruction for the natives of the Volga-Ural region. This 
system was 'national in form, Orthodox in content'. 18 II'minskii's system, which was 
officially adopted by the Russian Education Ministry on 26 March 1870, was started to 
be used in the newly-created Russo-Tatar schools in addition to the separate schools 
designed for the baptised and Muslim Tatars. Tatar schools were allowed to be opened if 
they included Russian in their curriculum. Tatars with good command of language were 
given posts in local government offices. 19 When II'minskii died in 1891, there were 130 
schools that followed his model. The II'minskii system was criticised both by the Tatars 
out of fear of assimilation and by the Russian nationalists for its promotion of non- 
Russian culture. H'minskii responded to these critics as follows: 
This is the dilemma: if from fear of separate nationalities, we do not allow the 
non-Russians to use their language in schools and in churches, on a sufficient 
scale to ensure a solid, complete, convinced adaptation of the Christian faith, 
then all non-Russians will be fused into a single race by language and by faith 
-the Tatar and Mohammedan. But if we allow the non-Russian languages, 
then, even if their individual nationalities are thus maintained these will be 
17 The Muslim Spiritual Board was located in Orenburg, and later moved to Ufa. Andreas Kappeler, 
, Czarist Policy Toward Muslims of the Russian Empire,, in Muslim Communities Re-emerge: 
Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, ed. Edward Allworth, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994, p. 146. 
18 Ilminskii's view of education in native languages could be seen as a historical antecedent of the 
Soviet policy of korenizatsiia, meaning seeking roots among native peoples. 
19 Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, pp. 45-46. 
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diverse, small, ill-disposed to theTatars, and united with the Russian people by 
the unity of their faith. Choose! But [ believe that such diverse nationalities 
cannot have any solid existence, and in the end the very historical movement 
of life will cause them to unite with the Russian people. 20 
H'minskii's approach for recruiting the Tatar elites had two dimensions. On the one hand, 
this approach was useful in exporting Russian cultural values to the Tatars, thereby 
Russifying them. On the other hand, it contributed to the modernisation of the Tatar 
culture. To the surprise of the rulers in Moscow, however, the growth of Tatar national 
awareness was an unintended consequence of the modernisation of the Tatar culture. 
jadidism and the Growth of Tatar National Awareness 
The growth of Tatar national identity despite the years of Russian imperial rule over the 
Tatars is one of the remarkable developments in the nineteenth century. This marked the 
inability of Moscow to co-opt the Tatar elites into its centralised rule though its 
Kazanskaia gubemiia, and the rejection of Moscow's assimilation policy by the Tatar 
masses. In fact, it was the weakness of the Russian imperial centre that allowed the Tatar 
elites to promote the growth of Tatar national identity. The Tatar elites and masses started 
to develop their own national consciousness through cultural institutions. Karl Fuks 
observed the persistence of the Tatar national identity under Russian rule as follows: 
This nation, having been conquered for more than two centuries and scattered 
nowadays among the Russians, preserved its traditions, morals and popular 
pride in such a surprising way, as if it had lived separately. 2 I 
In fact, Tatar national awareness took shape after the Tatars, who were influenced by 
Western culture in Moscow, St Petersburg and Paris, initiated a process of religious 
reform at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 22 The supporters of religious reform in 
Islam, who were called reformists Uadidists), condemned religious conservatism and 
blamed the traditional religious leadership (ulema) and the co-opted Tatar nobility 
20 Quoted in Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire: 1801-1917, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1967, p. 502. 
21 Karl Fuks, Kazanskie Tatary v statisticheskom i etnograficheskom otnosheniiakh, Kazan, 1844, p. 34. 
22 Edward J. Lazzerini, 'Beyond Renewal: The Jadid Response to Pressure for Change in the Modem 
Age', in Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change, ed. Jo-Ann Gross, Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1992, pp. 161-165. 
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(tnirzas) for the problems of the Tatar community. 23 Moreover, they considered the 
religiously based curriculum of the Tatar educational system to be the main cause of the C) 
backwardness. The Tatar reformers sought to establish secular schools, where modem 
sciences were taught. By developing an educational system for all Tatars, Muslim or 
Christian, the Tatar elites contributed to the creation of a Tatar 'high culture', forming the in 
cultural basis for the emergence of modem Tatar national identity. 24 
The groundwork for creating a secular Tatar national culture started with the publications 
of Sagit Halfin's Azbuka twarskogo iazyka (Alphabet of Tatar Language) in 1774 and 
Tatarskii slovar (Tatar dictionary) in 1775. Moreover, the first Tatar printing office, 
Aziatskaia tipographiia, was established in 1802. Abu Nasr al-Kursavi (1824-1904) 
denounced the scholastic theology of Islam, and opened a secular school, where he 
stressed the use of Tatar vernacular in literary language. Qayurn Nasiri (1825-1902) 
systernatised the grammar of Tatar language. Husein Faizkhanov (1821-1866) called for 
the reorganisation of the Islamic serninaries to introduce into their programs secular 
subjects modelled on those of the Russian schools. Shigabetdin Maujani (1818-1889) 
wrote a secular account of Tatar history, where he used Tatar as independent from the 
term Muslim, and urged the Muslims in Kazan not to be ashamed to call themselves 
Tatar . 
25 All of these reformist thinkers pointed out that a secular reform in Islam was 
necessary for the survival of Tatar culture in the modem age. 
The growth in Tatar national consciousness gave its results through the increase in 
cultural productions in Tatar language. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Kazan 
became the centre of publishing for the Turkic peoples with 3,000,000 copies of 1,000 
titles printed annuaIly. Musa Akyigitzade who wrote the fast Tatar novel Husanwddin 
Mullah, argued that Tatar nationalism could develop through the westernisation of Tatar 
culture. The leading magazines in the Tatar language (Vakit, Shura and Ang) made Tatar 
nationalism more popular. 26 Meanwhile, Ismail Gaspirinskii, a Crimean Tatar, advocated 
23 The traditional religious leadership refers here to the pro-Moscow heads of the Muslim Spiritual 
Board in Ufa. 
24 The traditional Tatar education system was composed of primary schools (mektebs), where students 
learned some basic religious knowledge, and sen-tinaries (medreses) where senior students studied 
Islamic sciences. Iskander Giliazov, 'Evoliutsiia sotsiat'noi struktury tatarskogo obshchestva i islarn 
(vtoraia pol. XVI-XVIII vv. )', Panorama-Forum, no. 11,1997, p. 20. 
25 Rafael F. Mukharnmetdinov, 'Put' ot ummy k natsii', Panorama-Forum, no. 8,1997, pp. 156-16 1. 
26 Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, pp. 70-72. 
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the ideology of pan-Turkism, which called for greater unity among Russia's Turkic 
nationalities including the Volga Tatars, the Cninean Tatars, the Azeris, the Ka/-akhs and 
the Uzbeks. Gaspifinskii's widely read newspaper, Tercuman (the Translator), 
propagated this ideology through the slogan of 'unity in language, work and spilit'. The 
attempts to forge a cornmon language and identity for this imagined pan-Turkic nation, 
not surprisingly, failed because of its problems in differentiating itself from pan- 
IslamiSM. 27 
The politicisation of Tatar nationalism started after the reforms of 1905. In his famous 
manifesto on 17 October 1905, Tsar Nicholas H proclaimed all Russian and non-Russian 
citizens equal, and introduced several political reforms, including the holding of elections 
to Russia's parliament (Dutna). After a month of this declaration, Kamil Mutii published 
the first Tatar newspaper, Fiker (Idea), followed by Al-Asr al-Jadid (The Century of 
Renewal), a literary journal, and Uqkir (Arrows), a satirical journal. Abdullah Tukai 
28 (1886-1913), the national poet of the Tatars, worked actively for these publications . 
Despite their cultural activism, this generation of Tatar reformers, such as Musa Bigi and 
Rizaeddin Fahreddin, were unable to form a Tatar socio-political movement. 
The political ambitions of the Jadidists found expression during the four Muslim 
congresses. The first of these congresses was held in a boat, Gustav Struve, in Oka River 
on 15 August 1905. The Congress declared the goals of the Muslims as follows: 
Unification of Russian Muslims for the purpose of carrying out political, 
economic, and social reforms 
Establishment of a democratic regime in which elected representatives of the 
people belonging to all nationalities would share in the legislative and 
executive power. 
Legal equality of Muslims and Russians 
Freedom to develop Muslim schools, press, book publishing, and cultural life 
as a whole. 29 
Although the Muslim deputies generally acted as a united faction in the Duma, their 
numbers dectined from twenty-five in the First State Duma to seven at the Fourth State 
Duma, since the Russian nationalists succeeded in changing the election system to their 
27 Sergei A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1960, p. 274. 
28 Tukai's one of the most famous poems 'Tugan tel' is available in Chapter Four. 
29 Musa Bigi, Islahat Esaslari, Petrograd, n. a., 1917, pp. 175-177. 
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own benefit. Between 1907 and 1917 the Tatar cultural elites were unable to forni a 
political organisation. With the exception of a handful of 6rnigr6s residing in the Ottornan C, 
Empire and Gennany, no Tatar leader included political Independence in their national 
programme. Even Yusuf Akchura, the most radical nationalist among them, oscillated in 
his demands between the achievement of national independence and equal treatment for 
the Tatars through granting cultural autonomy. Demands for cultural autonomy meant the 
fight to maintain the Tatar cultural institutions wherever Tatars were living. -Y) 
The Formation of the TASSR 
The Tatar elites were unprepared politically to take advantage of the collapse of the 
Tsarist Empire in 1917, since they were internally divided into the nationalist and the 
socialist factions. These factions took shape during the Russia-wide Congress of Muslims 
in May 1917. The nationalists were called Turkists (Turkculer) because Sadri Maksudi 
Arsal's nationalist party, Ittifaq-al-Muslimin (Alliance of Muslims), demanded cultural 
autonomy for the Tatars and the unity of the Turkic groups. The socialist delegates were 
called territorialists (Tufrakchylar) since Mulla Nur Vakhidov's socialist faction viewed 
territorial federalism rather than cultural autonomy as in the best interest of the Tatars. 31 
These divisions prevented the Tatars from taking advantage of the fact that the immense 
Tsarist army disintegrated into total anarchy, while the Tatars, just like other nationalities, 
had their own armed forces. 
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, the Tatar 
nationalists were very active, and formed many political organisations in several cities. In 
May 1917, Ahmed Tsalikov established the National Council (Milli Shura) in Petrograd. 
Two months later, the Military Council (Harbi Shura) was formed in Kazan with the 
participation of 50,000 soldiers. Sadri Maksudi Arsal founded a National Directorate 
(Milli Idare) in Ufa in the same month. Finally, the Tatar and some Bashkir nationalists 
from the present-day Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and part of the Orenburg region formed 
the National Assembly (Milli Mejlis), which declared the formation of the Idel-Ural State 
30 Jacob A Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Co-operation, London: Hurst, 1995, pp. 7-21. 
31 Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, p. 132. 
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on these territories on 29 November 1917.32 Nevertheless, these organisations had a very 
weak popular support. So, all the Tatar nationalist organisations collapsed without 
offering any resistance when the local Bolsheviks marched in. On 27 February 1918, the 
Soviet of Kazan arrested the leaders of the Harbi Shura, while the Sheik of the Vaisi Sufi 
order sided with the Bolsheviks. The Communists managed to close all units of Tatar 
national organisations by 12 April. 
The reason behind the weakness of these Tatar nationalist organisations was that 
compared to nationalism, socialism was more relevant to the Tatar elites since it provided 
the Tatars with an ideological schema through which they could express their dissent 
against the Russian Empire. It should also be added that socialist political organisations 
were effective in organising mass action for equality, if not for outright independence. 33 
Under those circumstances, the influential Tatar socialists such as Mulla Nur Vakhitov 
and Mir Said Sultan-Galiev joined Joseph Stalin's Narko"Wats (People's Corrurtissariat 
of Nationalities). They were given political and military training in the Central Muslim 
Military College. When Stalin formed the Central Muslim Comrrdssariat in early 1918, 
his aim was to mobilise the Tatar socialists in his fight against Russian and non-Russian 
nationalism. Believing that the creation of an autonomous government for the Tatars and 
the Bashkirs could attract these peoples for the socialist cause, Stalin convened a 
conference on the determination of the boundaries and outlines of the Tatar-Bashkir 
Autonomy on 10-16 May 1918. In his speech, Joseph Stalin clarified what he meant by 
autonomy under a socialist state: 
Autonomy is a form. The whole question is what class content is put into this 
form. The Soviet power is not at all opposed to autonomy. It is in favour of 
autonomy - but only such autonomy in which the entire power belongs to the 
workers and peasants, and in which the bourgeoisie of all nationalities are 
debarred not only from power, but even from participation in the election of 
government bodies. Such autonomy will be autonomy on a Soviet basis. 34 
There were two barriers to the realisation of Tatar autonomy. The first of these barriers 
was the White Army's occupation of the Tatar territory during the civil war, which had 
started in May 1918. Although the White Anny's occupation of Kazan resulted in the 
32 Idel is the Tatar name for the Volga river. 
33 Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, 'Muslim National Minorities in Revolution and Civil War', in Soviet 
Nationalities in Strategic Perspective, ed. S. Enders Wimbush, London: Croom Heim, 1985, pp. 42-48. 
34 Joseph V. Stalin, Sochineniia, vol. 4, Moscow: Politizdat, 1947, p. 92. 
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total destruction of Tatar nationalists, the White forces were fighting against the 
Bolsheviks, and were not sympathetic to the idea of granting territorial autonomy to the 
Tatars. When the Bolsheviks defeated the White forces, and fon-ned a Revolutionary 
Com"ttee (Revkoni) in Kazan in September 1919, it turned out that even the Bolsheviks 
were not ready to accept the autonomy of Tatars. In the Kazan Revkom, whose five 
members were Trotskist, there was not a single Tatar. Not surprisingly, the Kazan 
Revkom rejected the Tatar demands for territorial autonomy. Meanwhile, the Bashk-ir 
communists such as Sharaf Manatov pressurised the Narko"Wats into granting autonomy 
to the Bashkirs on 23 March 1919.35 The decision to form an autonomous state for the 
Bashkirs put the final nail to the coffin of the Tatar-Bashkir Autonomy project. 
Rejecting the anti-federalist views of the Trotskist members of Kazan Revkom, Lenin and 
Stalin shared the idea that federal autonomy could be used to uproot Tatar nationalism. 
Consequently, the Politburo in Moscow created a commission for working out the 
formation and the delimitation of the borders of the Tatar Republic on 4 May 1920. Mir 
Said Sultan-Galiev and Sakhib Garei Said-Galiev were the only Tatars in the commission 
headed by Stalin. At the joint meeting of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the 
All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the Narkonwats on 27 May 1920, a resolution was 
adopted on the formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) as 
a part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Nevertheless, the 
TASSR's borders left 75 percent of the Tatars out of the Republic. TASSR was not an 
autonomous republic created solely for the Tatars since the Republican population was 
composed mainly of Russians (39 percent) as well as Tatars (51 percent). 36 
The TASSR was a weak state that was totally dependent on Moscow for its survival. The 
level of autonomy granted to the TASSR's Sovnarkonz, (Council of People's 
Commissars) by the TsIK and Sovnarkom of the RSFSR in May 1920 reflected that the 
RSFSR was not sincere in recognising Tatar autonomy. %ile the Education, Justice, 
Health, Agriculture, Social Security and Internal Affairs Commissariats were subordinate 
only to the Tatar TsIK, the RSFSR was able to supervise the activities of the following 
35 Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, pp. 133-138. 
36 Ibid, p. 138. 
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Commissariats: Supply, Finance, Labour, Fconomy, Worker Peasant Inspectorate and the 
Administration of Post and Telegraph. " 
Lenin sought to use the Tatar autonomy to attract other Muslim groups to Soviet rule. 
He personally selected the pro-Moscow Tatar Bolshevik Sakhib Garei Said-Galiev 
(not to be confused with Mir Said Sultan-Galiev) as the Head of the Revolutionary 
38 Committee (Revkom) designed to create the Tatar government on 25 June 1920. 
Following Moscow's line strictly, Said-Galiev announced that the Tatar national 
autonomy should be counterbalanced with party centralisation. Moreover, he criticised 
Tatar nationalism, but not chauvinism on the part of the Russians. Thus, from the 
perspective of the Soviet centre in Moscow, the extremely submissive Said-Galiev was 
the ideal candidate for the leadership of the TASSR. 39 
Just like the extremely submissive Tatar Bolshevik leaders, the formal state structures of 
the TASSR were accountable not to the Tatar people, but to Moscow. Although TASSR 
had its Supreme Soviet, Council of Ministers and Presidium, none of these bodies had 
real authority. The only organ that held real power was the Regional Committee (Obkom) 
of the Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks) [RCP(b)], which was controlled by the 
Soviet centre in Moscow. The First Bureau of the Tatar Obkom formed in August 1920 
included two Tatars (Said-Galiev and Iskhak Kazakov) and seven Russians. This bureau 
was a local equivalent of the Politburo in Moscow, the leading party organ responsible for 
daily decision-making. Moreover, the First Secretary of Tatar Obkom was Aleksandr 
Taniaev. The Soviet cadre policy of usuafly appointing a person from a Slavic nationality 
to the highest positions was used in the TASSR to prevent the Tatar elites from adopting 
national communism to the detriment of Moscow's priorities. 40 Unlike the Tatar Obkom, 
which was mainly dominated by the Russians, the TASSR's Council of Ministers, which 
had insignificant powers, was dominated mainly by the Tatars. In the Council of 
Ministers, there were seven Tatars as compared to six non-Tatars. However, Russians 
were controlling the important posts in the Council of Ministers, such as the ministries of 
37 Obrazovanie Tatarskoi ASSR: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1963, p. 230. 
38 M. Saidasheva, Lenin i sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo v Tatarii, 1918-1923, Moscow, 1969, p. 86. 
39 Daniel E. Schafer, 'The Politics of National Equality Under early NEP: Factions in the Tatar 
Republic, 1920-1924', (hereafter, 'The Politics of National Equality'), Central Asian Survey, vol-9, 
no. 2, p. 59. 
40 John H. Miller, 'Cadre Policy in Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU First and Second 
Secretaries in Non-Russian Republics of the USSR', Soviet Studies, vol. 29, no. 1,1977, pp. 3-4. 
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finance and the secret service (ChK- Extraordinary Commission to Combat 
Counterrevolution, Sabotage and Spec u lat ion). -t' 
The First Wave of Tatar National Conununism 
Tatar national communism emerged as an ideological expression of the resentment of 
some Tatar communists at Moscow's chauvinistic treatment of the Tatars and the 
TASSR. For the Tatar national communists, a 'genuinely' communist perspective on the 
question of national autonomy required Moscow to treat its nations equally, and not to 
control them strictly. Thus, the first wave of Tatar national communism emerged as 
reactions to the attempts of the Soviet and Russian centres in Moscow to keep the 
TASSR under the strict supervision of the Soviet State and the RCP(b). 
Having established the dominance of pro-Moscow officials in the political institutions of 
the TASSR, Moscow embarked on stripping Kazan of its role as the political centre of the 
Russian Muslims. For this purpose, the First Tatar Obkom Conference was held in Kazan 
in August 1920. Stalin personally attended the conference, and declared ideological 
deviation as a significant problem in the TASSR. At the root of the problem lay Stalin's 
dissatisfaction with Mir Said Sultan-Galiev, one of the informal leaders of Tatar 
communists, who challenged his drive towards centrafisation in the Communist Party. 
Advocating a class struggle for the equality of nations as well as workers, Sultan-Galiev 
argued that the oppression of Muslim peoples at the hands of the colonial powers 
(including Tatars at the hands of Russians) made them proletarians. Influenced by pan- 
Turkist ideas, Sultan-Galiev called for the establishment of a separate state for the 
Muslim peoples of the fon-ner Russian Empire that would be called 'the Republic of 
42 Turan' . 
41 Schafer, 'The Politics of National Equality', p. 58. 
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Nevertheless, Sullan-Galiev was disappointed at the Congress of' the Peoples of the East 
held in Baku in September 1920, when the majority of the delegates rejected his thesis ZýI 
that the Eastern peoples were proletarian nations par excellence, and pointed to the 
revolutionary potential of the Western proletariat. During the same month, the pro- 
Moscow Tatars strengthened their position further in the elections for the Supreme Soviet 
of the TASSR. The emerging Supreme Soviet elected Burkhan Mansurov as the 
Chairperson of the Tatar TAK and Said-Galiev as the Head of the Council of Peoples' 
Commissars (Sovnarkonz). Consequently, pro-Moscow Tatar leaders dominated all of the 
important positions. 43 
When Moscow had been busy with crushing the nationalist Basnuichi movement in 
Central Asia until the mid-1920s, it opted for relaxing its control over Tatar national 
communists, so that it could prevent the spread of pan-Turkist Basmachi movement to 
Tatariia. Consequently, the right-wing Tatars (meaning national communist Tatars) 
captured power at the third regional party conference held on 23-24 June 1921. At this 
conference, Keshaf Mukhtarov, the right wing former Conunissar of Health replaced 
Said-Galiev, the Head of the Tatar TsIK. Rauf Sabirov occupied this position between 
1922 and 1923. Both Mukhtarov and Sabirov were pragmatic politicians trying to 
accommodate the interests of the Tatars with those of Moscow through redefining the 
Bolshevik project as it aimed to improve the underdeveloped material conditions of the 
Tatars to that of the advanced nations, such as the Russians. 44 In this way, the Tatar 
leadership presented its calls for greater autonomy as a 'genuinely' socialist desire, which 
might be opposed only if one adhered to Great Russian chauvinism. 
The status of the TASSR in Russia was detennined after the formation of the USSR on 
30 December 1922 at the tenth All-Russian (first All-Union) Congress of Soviets by the 
RSFSR, Belarus, Transcaucasia, Ukraine, Khorezrn and Bukhara. Just like other national 
homelands in the Soviet Union, the TASSR bore the name of the Tatar nationality. 
However, the Soviet Union established a hierarchy of national homelands through 
organising them into Union Republics (soiuznye respubliki), Autonomous Republics 
(avtononinye respubliki), Autonomous Regions (avtononwye oblasti) and Autonomous 
43 Schafer, 'The Politics of National Equality', pp. 58-59. 
44 Ibid., pp. 60-64. 
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Districts (avtononinye okruga). The predominantly Russian-populated areas were 
45 
organised as regions (oblasti) in the RSFSR . In this 
hierarchy, the TASSR was not 
granted a Union Republic status because it lacked an external border. By contrast, even 
the Georgians, who were less numerous than the Tatars, were given a Union republic 
status simply because the Georgian SSR had an external border. Many Tatar national 
communists, such as Sultan-Galiev, perceived this as a discrimination against 
themselves. When Sultan-Galiev became a member of the Tatar TsIK in 1923, he 
criticised the second-class status of autonomous republics in his speech at the twelfth 
Congress of the Russian Communist Party. As a result of this speech, he was expelled 
from the Communist Party, and arrested in May 1923 for 'counterrevolutionary 
nationalist conspiracy against the Soviets'. This demonstrated the unwillingness of 
Moscow to tolerate even the discussion of the Union Republic status for the Tatars. 46 
Moscow's relations with the TASSR under the Soviet Union, which was formally a 
federation, were imperial in nature. Dominic Lieven convincingly argues that the Soviet 
Union was indeed an empire, with one ethnic group (the Russians) dominating the others, 
simultaneously drawing on non-Russian elites as imperial servants. Although it was true 
that Russia and the Russians did not benefit materially from the Soviet Union at the 
expense of other nationalities, the Soviet Union had an authoritarian control of the non- 
Russian nationalities and exploited them through a centrally planned economy in the 
name of Communism . 
47 This imperial perspective was reflected in the well-known 
principle of democratic centralism, whereby the central Party organs dominated the 
periphery. The first Soviet Constitution, which was ratified on 31 January 1924, gave 
Moscow a monopoly of jurisdiction over such important areas as diplomatic 
representation, budget control, and military organisation (article 2). The exclusive 
jurisdiction of the republics was limited to the spheres of agriculture, education, justice, 
public health, and social security (articles 67 and 68). 48 
45 Soflia lakubovskaia, Razvitie SSSR kak soiuznogo gosudarstva, 1922-1926 gg., Moscow: Nauka, 
1972. 
46 After being freed in 1924, Sultan-Galiev was arrested again in 1928 for treason, and sentenced to ten 
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Moscow gained the upper hand in controlling the course of developments in the TASSR 
only after it was able to suppress the Basmachi rebellion in Central Asia in the mid- 
twenties. Khadzi Gabidullin, a strong critic of Sultan-Galiev, replaced Mukhtarov as the 
Chairperson of the Ts[K of the TASSR in April 1924. Furthermore, the Secretary of the 
Tatar Obkom, Ivan Morozov, demanded an investigation into the activities of the Tatar 
national communists. Finally, the leftists became successful in the party elections due to 
the ethnic make-up of the Communist Party, which was in favour of the ethnic 
Russians. 49 
The Tatar national communists continued to Tatarise the Republic even after the removal 
of Sultan-Galiev and his close associates from the governing positions in the TASSR. 
Despite the restoration of the pro-Moscow regime in the TASSR, the state structure of the 
TASSR was still filled with national communists advocating greater national autonomy 
for the Tatars. The policy of korenizatsiia, seeking roots in the native populations played 
an important role in the Tatarisation of the Republic. The objective of this policy was to 
develop local elites 'national in form but socialist in content'. Since this policy required 
the use of Tatar language in the conduct of some administrative services in the TASSR, it 
resulted in the upward mobility of the Tatars through preferential access to party 
membership and higher education. In order to promote loyal Tatar Bolsheviks, non- 
Bolshevik Tatar intelligentsia were invited to teach in the schools given the small number 
of educated Bolsheviks among the Tatars. In this way, the Tatars penetrated into the pro- 
Moscow communist government in Kazan. 50 
The Tatar communists actively supported the process of Tatarisation both in culture and 
administration. At the Congress of Terminology in 1924, the participants called for the 
promotion of Tatar words and the elimination of mostly Russian borrowed foreign words. 
Moreover, at the Congress of the Tatar-Bashkir Teachers and Intellectuals that was held 
in Kazan, it was argued that the Tatarisation of institutions was possible with the 
recruitment of educated Tatar personnel with education in Tatar culture. Accordingly, 
Federalism: Nationalism and Economic De-centralization, ed. Alastair McAuley, Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 199 1, p. 129. 
49 Schafer, 'The Politics of National Equality', pp. 68-70. 
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800 Tatar personnel were educated in Tatar language in 1925 for the purpose of talking to 
the Tatar people in their native language. Furthermore, at the First Turcological Congress 
held in Baku in 1926 the Latin alphabet was adopted for Tatar language. 51 The revival of 
the Tatar culture was soon followed by the Tatarisation of the political cadres, since the 
Tatar population was also to be involved in the work of the government, the party, and 
the local Soviet organs. Consequently, the TASSR's Party and Government became the 
bastions of criticism towards Moscow. 
Stalin's Response: Purge of the Tatar Elites 
Moscow became worried about the Tatarisation of politics and culture in the TASSR. In 
line with Stalin's directives, the Party Control Commission arrested Keshaf Mukhtarov 
(Chairperson of the TsIK of the TASSR), Rauf Sabirov (First Secretary of the Tatar 
Obkom), Kasym Mansurov (Commissar for Propaganda), M. Burundukov (Commissar 
for Education), V. lskhakov (Vice President of the Tatar Gosplan), and M. Badaili (First 
Secretary of the Tatar Komsomol) for being national communist in 1928. Two years later, 
the Tatar Obkom was subordinated to the headquarters of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow, and the Tatar Supreme Soviet was subordinated to the 
RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The purge of the top leadership was soon followed by a general 
purge of the Tatar party organisation. In 1930 alone, 2,056 Tatar communists 
representing 13.4 percent of the total party membership were expelled from the Party. 
Moreover, 2,273 Tatars received the death penalty for their 'nationalist deviation'. 52 
In addition to the leading political figures, the economic and cultural bases of Tatar 
national communism were also targeted. The peasant problem, which was thought to be 
feeding Tatar nationalism, was solved through collectivisation, and the decision was 
taken on the liquidation of the kulaks in TASSR on 16 February 1930. In the cultural 
sphere, following the closure of the Society of Tatarology and the Oriental Institute in 
1930, the Union of Tatar Proletarian Writers and the Tatar State Publishing House were 
targeted in 1932. Finally, Cyrillic was adopted to replace Latin for the Tatar language in 
51 Ibid. 
52 Cited in Devletshin, Sovetskii Tatarstan, p. 196. 
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1939. The OGPU (United Main Political Administration 11922-19341) and later the 
NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs [1934-19531), which were the main 
secret services of the Soviet Union until the replacement of the NKVD by the KGB 
(Committee of State Security) in 1953, played a very important role in pressurising the 
53 TASSR leadership into adopting these measures . This 
is not surprising since the secret 
police formed the backbone of Moscow's policies of controlling the TASSR throughout 
the Soviet period. 
When the leadership of the TASSR raised the issue of enhancing the status of the 
Republic during the discussions for the 1936 USSR Constitution, Stalin rejected this 
proposal due to the TASSR's lack of external borders. Consequently, the new 
Constitution of the USSR, which was adopted on 5 December 1936, upgraded the 
autonomous status of various republics, but not that of the TASSR. The Tatars did not 
see this as a major setback, since Stalin's regime was too personalistic, and operating 
beyond the legal framework. For example, although the Union Republics were granted 
the right to secede, any attempt to exercise this right was politically unthinkable for their 
54 leaders 
. 
The TASSR adopted its own constitution in 1937, which was ratified by the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet on 2 July 1940. This constitution reflected the main principles of the 
1936 USSR and RSFSR constitutions. The autonomy of the TASSR was defined in 
articles 13-18. According to article 13, all issues except those cited in article 14 of the 
USSR constitution and article 18 of the RSFSR constitution were left under the Tatar 
autonomy. Since the USSR and RSFSR constitutions granted extensive powers to the 
Soviet and Russian centres in Moscow, the TASSR's autonomy was considerably 
limited. According to article 21, the Supreme Soviet was the highest organ of power in 
the TASSR. The Supreme Soviet, which met only for a few days every year, had an 
exclusive authority only in electing its own Presidium. The Council of Ministers, which 
was more important than the Supreme Soviet in terms of the daily running of the 
republican affairs, was composed of a Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, and the ministers 
55 for Public Service, Internal Affairs, Municipal Economy, Health, Culture and Lind. 
51 Ibid., pp. 197-200. 
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In reality, the main body of decision-making in the TASSR was the Obkom of the CPSU, 
rather than the Council of Ministers or the Supreme Soviet. The TASSR's Council of 
Ministers was simply implementing the decisions of the Tatar Obkom, which was 
controlled by the USSR Central Committee Politburo. Moreover, the Supreme Soviets of 
the RSFSR and the USSR limited the legislative functions of the Tatar Supreme Soviet. 
The TASSR had II representatives at the USSR Supreme Soviet Chamber of 
Nationalities. Moreover, one of the 12 Vice-Presidents of the Presidium of the RSFSR 
was Tatar. These were very limited channels for the TASSR to influence decisions in 
Moscow. As compared to the previous statits quo, the autonomy of the TASSR was 
narrowed by the 1937 Constitution. The supreme bodies of the TASSR were not even 
able to take a decision that would concern renaming a city without the approval of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. Regarding important matters like the use 
of the republican economic resources, finance, the regulation of wages, education, 
culture, health and social security, the TASSR was treated almost the same as the usual 
administrative territorial fon-nations. 56 
The beginning of the Second World War in 1939 halted Stalinist purges in the TASSR as 
the focus of Moscow shifted from the TASSR to the borderlands such as the Caucasus. 
Thus, systematic purges were carried out in other non-Russian regions. Stalin deported 
Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Crimean Tatars, Karachais, Kalmyks, Meskhetians and 
Adygeis en niasse for crimes allegedly corarnitted by some of their members during the 
Second World War. Following the end of the war, Koreans, Balts and Poles were also 
deported. 57 
The Second Wave of Tatar National Conununism 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Stalin was confident about his control in the 
Soviet Union, especially in the inner core, where the TASSR was located. Given that the 
Soviet and the Russian centres in Moscow were in harmony during and after World War 
11, the Tatars were worried about the possibility of Great Russian chauvinism. In order to 
56 Ibid., p. 204. 
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elicit the loyalty of the Tatars to the Soviet State, a Tatar cleric, Abdurrakhman Rasulaev, 
convinced Stalin to establish under his authority the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims 
of the European Part ofRussia and Siberia (DUMES) where the Tatar language was used 
in Ufa. 58 
Having seen no vacuum of power in Moscow that could be manipulated to enlarge their 
room for manoeuvre, the Tatar elites sought to maximise their interests through an over- 
compliant mode of behaviour. The assumption was that if they proved that they deserved 
extra benefits, Moscow could grant them greater concessions and privileges. Without any 
fear of the possibility that the Tatar elites could adopt national communism, Moscow 
started the practice of appointing Tatars to the governing positions in the TASSR, which 
continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. A loyal corrununist Tatar, Said 
Shafaraev, served as the Chairperson of the Council of Ministers between 1943 and 
1950. Between 1944 and 1957, a pro-Moscow Tatar, Zinnat Muratov, served as the First 
Secretary of the Tatar Obkom. Even his Second Secretary was a Tatar, Mukharnmed 
Shafikov. All of these leaders were extremely subservient to Moscow, as they were 
mainly interested in increasing their personal wealth, and in benefiting from the 
industrialisation programme in the TASSR. Their compliance is also related to their need 
to appease the increasing number of ethnic Russians, who immigrated to the Republic 
following the discovery of oil and the beginning of the industrialisation process in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. 59 
Furthermore, the compliant attitude of the TASSR's leadership towards Moscow was 
reinforced when Nikita Khrushchev, who became First Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU in November 1953, started to pursue a policy of de-Stalinisation 
following his 'secret speech' at the 20"' Congress of the CPSU in February 1956.60 
Khrushchev implemented a policy of economic decentralisation through setting up 
regional economic councils (sovnarkhozy) from 1957 until his replacement by Leonid 
Brezhnev in October 1964. According to this policy, the local Party and the Supreme 
Soviets, including those of the TASSR, gained some leverage over econon-dc enterprises. 
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The main sources of income for the regional govemments were the tumover tax r- 2n 
stemming through Moscow's transfers and the payments from the profits of local 
companies. On the expenditure side, local administrations financed their own social and 
cultural programmes. 61 
The drive towards decentralisation was extended to the political sphere at the 240' CPSU 
Congress, which fori-nally granted rights to Obkoms to scrutinise the work of the Union- 
level Soviet State apparatus in their own regions. In this way, the Tatar Obkoin increased 
its control over the implementation of Moscow's policies in the TASSR. This move 
increased the power of the Obkom over the activities of the state structures of the TASSR 
and its Supreme Soviet, which had no autonomy from party supervision and no right to 
intervene into the details of their functioning. In this sense, the function of the Tatar 
Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviets became one of giving legitimacy to the 
practices of the local Obkonz. This meant that the CPSU, to which the Tatar Obkom was 
subordinate, gained full control of the TASSR, provided that the local Tatar communist 
leadership stuck to the party line. 
The second wave of Tatar national communism took shape when the tension between 
those aiming to abolish ethnic republics and those aiming to maintain these republics 
came to the surface in the 1960s. Those Soviet leaders favouring the abolition of ethnic 
republics declared that the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution in 1967 was the 
time to celebrate the birth of the Soviet man (Sovetskii chelovek). Assuming that ethnic 
relations among the Soviet nations progressed dialectically from flowering (rastsvet) 
through rapprochement (sblizhenie) towards merger (sliianie), this group saw no need for 
the existence of ethnic republics, since, for them, ethnic differences had already lost their 
significance. 62 
In opposition to these Soviet leaders, the Tatar elites, such as K. Faseev, the Head of the 
Propaganda and Agitation of the Tatar Obkom, argued that there was still a need for 
ethnic republics. According to Faseev, the post-War stability in the Soviet Union was 
60 William J. Tompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 143-173. 
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partly due to the roles of the ethnic republics in stabilising the situation in the regions. " 
Appreciating the positive contributions of the TASSR to the stability of the Soviet Union, 
the leaders of TASSR claimed that the TASSR deserved a Union Republic status, which 
could have made things better for the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union. 
Although the Tatar leaders were seeking to upgrade the status of the TASSR, they 
were by no ineans in favour of a popular nationalist mobilisation against Moscow. The 
reason being that they were mainly interested in maintaining regional stability and 
increasing the economic fringe benefits of their Party work. As Steven L. Solnick 
argues, the increase in opportunistic and rent-seeking behaviours of the Soviet 
officials played a very important role in undermining the Soviet Union's state 
authority in the eyes of the Soviet bureaucrats as well as ordinary people. 64 
Brezhnev's Response: Acconunodation of the Tatar Elites 
Moscow could have eliminated the Tatar resentments about the second-class status of the 
TASSR through purges as Stalin did. However, Leonid Brezhnev promised the republics 
a substantial degree of local political and cultural autonomy, and security of tenure to 
their leaders in exchange for supporting his policies. For Brezhnev, economic 
concessions and privileges for the regional leaders could solve this problem since this 
could transform the problems of ethnicity into technical issues of resource distribution 
and patron-client relations. 65 As G. Bingham Powell notes: 
in a social structure in which most citizens are involved in personal patron- 
client relationships, ... it will be difficult to mobilize citizens on the basis of 
national group appeals or organizations, because their orientations wiH be to 
the locality and the patron. 66 
Jerry F. Hough's classic study of regional Party leaders explains why a clientelistic 
fon-nula accommodated the Tatar leadership. For Hough, since the regional party leaders 
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were responsible for their territory and population, they had to see that the population was 
fed, taxes were paid, and law and order were maintained. 67 The Tatar leaders were 
middlemen not only serving the Soviet and the Russian centres in Moscow, but also, 
ruling their multi-ethnic population, composed mainly of the Tatars and the Russians. 
They had a wide autonomy in regulating matters related to the agricultural sector. 
However, industrial managers, whose funding and orders came from Moscow, ran the 
TASSR's huge enterprises. Thus, the Tatar leaders needed to establish good relations 
with the industrial managers in order to receive greater housing and local services from 
these enterprises. This encouraged the formation of closely-knit local patronage networks 
as survival mechanisms in the TASSR. 
While Andrei Kirilenko, the Chairperson of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, and 
F. Panin, the Second Secretary of Tatar Obkom, were ensuring that the interests of 
Moscow and the local ethnic Russians were secured, Fikrat Tabeev, the First Secretary of 
the Tatar Obkom, who ran the TASSR from 1960 to 1986, developed clientelistic 
relations with Moscow and local industrial managers. 68 All of the Tatar leaders, including 
Tabeev and his close friend Salikh Batyev, Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet, criticised 
ethnic nationalism and valued the importance of respecting the 'friendship of nations' 
(druzhba narodov) . 
69 The fact that their patronage networks included non-Tatars as weR 
as Tatars necessitated the adoption of such an internationalist ideology. 
Ile way in which Moscow accommodated the Tatar leaders can be seen in the example 
of the Kama Automobile Factory (KanukZ) in the TASSR's Naberezhnye Chelny. Leonid 
Brezhnev personally supported the construction of this factory since the USSR needed 
millions of modem heavy trucks to serve its military-industrial complex in the late sixties. 
The capacity of the Gorkii Automobile Factory, built by Stalin in the 1930s, was not 
enough. This was the inspiration for the founding of KamAZ in 1969. The site was 
chosen taking account of the region's access to the Volga via the Kama river and the 
abundance of labour and energy resources. Another important factor was the Tatar 
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leaders' persistent request that the autonomous republic should be compensated for the 
two billion tons of oil extracted in the TASSR. Furthermore, the Central Committee 
Secretary Mikhail Suslov wanted to promote his native Central Volga region. Finally, the 
project also contributed to Moscow's policies of Russifying the TASSR, since several 
hundred thousand workers arrived from all over the USSR to build and work in the auto 
giant. The general director of KamAZ, by virtue of his position, held the rank of USSR 
70 first deputy n-dnister of the automobile industry . 
Overall, the blossoming of organisations of survival based on personal sympathies and 
financial partnership cutting across ethnic lines pleased the Tatar elites, and allowed 
Moscow to contain Tatar nationalism. Many Tatar leaders benefited from the KamAZ 
project so that they refrained from pressing too hard for a Union Republic status. 
Consequently, as was the case during the discussions of Stalin's constitution in 1936, the 
Tatar elites were unable again to raise the Autonomous Republic status of the Republic to 
a Union Republic status in the Brezhnev constitution, which was adopted on 7 October 
1977.71 
Brezhnev's policy of leaving people in place and when necessary making new 
appointments from within the Tatar Obkorn strengthened the tendency towards 
Tatarisation in the Republican Party and state structures. This solution provided a strong 
basis for the consolidation of the Tatar elites. It was under the brief leadership of lurii 
Andropov, who headed the USSR between 10 November 1982 and 9 February 1984, that 
the existence of growing ethnic tensions was first acknowledged in 1983. In the TASSR, 
there were several street fights between Tatar and Russian students. Social scientists were 
mobilised for the study of ethnic relations both at the micro and macro levels. The KGB 
(Committee of State Security) significantly focused on ethnic relations, and there was a 
renewed crackdown on nationalist dissidents. 72 Because of the fear of reprisals from 
Moscow, the Tatar leaders were mainly silent during this period, as they refrained from 
manipulating these gang fights for their own advantage. 
70 Mary McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 
pp. 91-94. 
71 Leokadia. M. Drobizheva, 'Comparison of Elite Groups in Tatarstan, Sakha, Magadan, and 
Orenburg', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 15, no. 4,1999, p. 390. 
72 Cohen, Russian Imperialism, p. 109. 
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Perestroika and the Tatar Elites 
The final episode of Tatar national communism under the Soviet Union took place when 
Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU on 10 March 1985. 
Gorbachev started to implernent his structural reforms between 1997 and 1991. While 
accepting that the USSR was experiencing a political crisis, with its declining economy 
and ideology, Gorbachev mentioned the nationalities policy as an arena of remarkable 
success in his following statement: 
The USSR represents a truly unique example in the history of human 
civilisation. These are the fruits of the nationality policy launched by Lenin. 
The revolution and socialism have done away national oppression and 
inequality, and ensured economic, intellectual and cultural progress for all 
nations and nationalities. If the nationality problem had not been solved in 
principle, our state would not have survived nor the republics formed a 
community based on brotherhood and co-operation, respect and mutual 
assistance. 73 
An opposite picture of developments was given by Zbigniew Brzezinski. According to 
Brzezinski, Gorbachev's decentralisation provided an opportunity for long-suppressed 
national grievances to surface. Besides, for Brzezinski, nationalism was 'nurtured, rather 
than diluted, in the communist experience'. 74 However, it was very difficult to organise 
the nationalist mobilisation of the masses in the Soviet Union. As Alexander Motyl 
argues, the Soviet Union exercised its state power effectively in preventing non-Russians 
from rebelling: 
At some point, non-Russians may massively want to rebel. But will they? As 
long as the public sphere is occupied and more important, as long as the KGB 
remains intact, the de-privatisation of anti-state attitudes will be problematic, 
anti-state collectivities and elites will be unlikely to mobilize, alliances 
between workers and intellectuals will not materialise, and rebellion, revolt, 
and insurrection will be well-nigh impossible. Because they cannot rebel, non- 
75 Russians will not rebel . 
In addition to the disunity of non-Russian elites and masses, the underdevelopment of 
civil society in the Soviet Union should also be taken into account in explaining why the 
73 Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira, Moscow: 
Politizdat, 1988, p. 104. 
74 Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Post-Communist Nationalism', Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 5,1990, p. I 
75 Alexander J. Motyl, Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity and Stability in the USSR, Ithaca: 
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non-Russian masses lacked the social organisation for rebelling. In contrast to the Soviet 
non-Russian masses, the Soviet regional elites had functioning political organisations 
(republican institutions) that could be used to mobilise the masses against MOSCOW. 76 
Thus, it became very important for Moscow to accommodate regional elites when 
Gorbachev's reforms divided the Soviet elites in the late eighties. Instead of strengthening 
the Soviet leadership, the reforms served to empower the opposition forces of the Soviet 
Union. Gorbachev erroneously assumed that economic decentralisation could increase 
economic interdependence, and weaken the drive towards disintegration. 77 However, his 
reforms undermined the dominant role of the Party as the single co-ordinating force, 
thereby jeopardising the system as a whole. Gorbachev's attacks on bureaucracy and 
patronage encouraged attacks on central authority and its local representatives in non- 
Russian republics, especially those in the Baltic and the Caucasus. 78 
Under pressure from mobilised masses and the Soviet and the Russian centres in 
Moscow, the TASSR's leaders did not adopt the policies pursued by some other 
republican leaders, who either suppressed the local population by picturing them as 
radical deviationists, as in Central Asia, or sided with the local population against 
Moscow as in the Baltics during the final days of the Soviet Union. It was not in their 
interest to suppress the local population, which could easily be mobilised against 
Moscow. Since, there was a low level of ethnic mobilisation in Tatariia, the Tatar elites 
saw no challenge from the nationalists, and sought to consolidate their positions in the 
Soviet state structure with their constructive participation. The Nationalities Plenum of 
the Central Committee of the CPSU at the end of 1989 offered representatives of the 
TASSR an opportunity to articulate Tatar resentment at the Republic's second-class 
status. 
At the Nationalities Plenum, Gurner Usmanov, the First Secretary of the Tatar Obkom, 
highlighted the concerns of the Tatars especially in controlling their economic resources. 
In his speech, Usmanov said that 
76 Mark R. Beissinger, 'Elites and Ethnic Identities in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics', in The Post- 
Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR, ed. Alexander J. Motyl, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992, p. 15 1. 
77 Stephan Kux, 'Soviet Federalism', Problems of Communism, vol. 34, no. 2,1990, pp. 6-9. 
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Comrades! According to the specialists' forecasts, Tatariia possesses 
considerable reserves of petroleum bitumen. The province party committee 
has repeatedly gone to the USSR State Planning Committee and the Ministry 
of the Petroleum Industry with concrete proposals for working these reserves, 
The proposals have met with understanding, but so far the question has not 
been resolved. ... 
I appeal to Comrade Dinkov, Minister of the Petroleum 
Industry: We now have the possibility of creating an autonomous subdivision 
for the workin- of bitumen deposits, and we hope this question will be 
resolved in the near future. 79 
Tufan Minnullin, Secretary of the Board of the USSR Writers' Union and USSR 
Supreme Soviet deputy from Kukmor electoral district of the TASSR said that 
We all know the old truth that only equals can be friends. That is why this 
truth is set down in our Constitution and backed up by article 36. But in this 
basic law, in articles 109,111 and It 8, this truth is called into question. Why, 
for example, do Union republics get to elect 32 deputies from national 
territorial electoral districts, while autonomous republics elect only 11. Why 
are some republics represented in the Council of Nationalities by II deputies 
and others by 4? Where is the logic? What, in essence, distinguishes Union 
republics from autonomous republics? Even at our Congress the Union 
republics are being put into a special class, while we have been relegated to the 
role of listeners. Why has this opposition continued for so many years?... I 
think it is necessary to equalise the status of all the national republics, without 
dividing them into Union and autonomous republics. (Applause). 80 
At the 1989 Nationalities Plenum, Gumer Usmanov reported that a poll showed that 67 
percent of respondents wanted to see the TASSR's status raised to that of a union 
republic. According to Usmanov, even the top-level officials in the Nationalities Plenum 
approached the Tatar position positivel Y. 81 Overall, it can be argued that the Tatar elites 
were successful in using the Nationalities Plenum as an occasion for explaining their 
position on the status of the TASSR effectively. 
The real push for a Union Republic status in the TASSR emerged with the rise of 
Mintimer Shaimiev, an ethnic Tatar, as the First Secretary of Tatar Obkorn in October 
1989.82 Being concerned mainly with consolidating their networks of power in the 
78 Victor Zaslavsky, 'The Evolution of Separatism in Soviet Society under Gorbachev', in From Union 
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80 Pravda, 21 September 1989. 
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12 For the biography of Mintimer Shaimiev, which is explored briefly in Chapter Two, see R. A. 
Mustafin and A. Ch. Khasanov, Pervyi prezident Tatarstana: Mintimer Shaimiev, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 
1995. 
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TASSR, and expanding their privileges in the Soviet system, Shaimiev and his 
supporters' understanding of nationalism was influenced by their communist 
nomenklatura background. This position revolved around their demands for greater 
political, economic and cultural autonomy. 
The TASSR's local bureaucrats sought to pursue their own interests, mostly in the 
political and cultural spheres, because the centre's control over the economy was 
protected under the command planning system. In 1990,98 percent of industrial 
enterprises in the TASSR were under Union or Russian control, while the Republic ran 
only 2 percent of 'secondary' enterprises. However, if we consider the ethnic origins of 
enterprise managers in 1989, the Tatars had a very high representation. In the TASSR, 
the Tatars formed 48.6 percent of the population, but controlled 64.1 percent of the 
83 leading posts in the enterprises (See Table A4.4). With the centre's tacit approval, these 
enterprise managers openly instituted preferential treatment for the Tatar population in 
Tatariia's political and cultural life. From this perspective, Shairniev and his supporters 
had nothing to loose in stressing their Tatar background and demanding concessions for 
themselves in return for their service in 'solving' the national problems of the Tatars. 
Depicting the Autonomous Republic status of the TASSR as responsible for the national 
problems of the Tatars, the Tatar elites sought to challenge the Russian centre in 
Moscow, whose representatives became increasingly critical of the financial transfers 
from Moscow to non-Russian regions. Thus, they saw the Soviet centre in Moscow as 
their ally, because granting a union republic status to the TASSR might not harm the 
interests of the Soviet elites, although the RSFSR elites would certainly refuse to grant 
this status to the TASSR. Another ally of the TASSR leadership was Tatar ethnic 
nationalist organisations, which will be explored in Chapter Four. Initially, these Tatar 
ethnic nationalist organisations were in alliance with the Shaimiev leadership, and 
criticised mainly the Russian rather than the Soviet centre in Moscow. 84 
83 Lev S. Perepelkin, 'Istoki mezhetnicheskogo konflikta v Tatarii', Mir Rossii, vol. 1, no. 1,1992, 
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74 
The Parade of Sovereignties: the TASSR Challenges the RSFSR 
While the Tatars were pressing for greater autonomy, the Russians were divided into 
conservatives of the Russian Communist Party defending the Union as it was and 
democrats led by Boris El'tsin seeking a reform of the Union in a confederal form. El'tsin 
believed that the Union could be saved with a sovereign Russia. It was the loss of CPSU 
monopoly over political activity after the abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution in 
March 1990 that created the potential for substantial political restructuring. The 4 March 
1990 elections in the Republics were the first multiparty elections in Russia with the 
Democratic Russia election bloc challenging CPSU rule. 85 In these elections, the 
supporters of Shaimiev (130 out of total 250 deputies) gained the majority of the seats in 
the Tatar Supreme Soviet. The opposition groups in the Tatar Supreme Soviet included 
the Tatar nationalist Tatarstan bloc, with 70 members and the pro-Moscow Soglasie 
bloc, with 50 members. 86 
Rejecting the proposal of Oleg Runýiantsev, the Executive Secretary of the Constitutional 
Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, to turn the RSFSR into a federation 
organised into 50 new territorial divisions based on the German Onder model (zemli in 
Russian), the TASSR leadership insisted that the Republic should enjoy the rights of a 
Union Republic rather than a Autonomous Republic. 87 Rafael Khakimov clarified the 
TASSR's position as follows: 
It is essential to equalise the rights of federal and autonomous republics as 
sovereign governments. If a republic exists, it must be sovereign. Otherwise, it 
amounts to no more than an oblast. The notion of an autonomous republic as a 
88 government without sovereignty is judicial and political nonsense. 
85 When the 19th CPSU All-Union Conference voted to separate Communist party functions from the 
state administration on 28 June 1988, there were no freely contested multiparty elections. In fact, the 
March 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies were not multiparty elections. Gail 
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The TASSR's position was strengthened on 26 April 1990 with the adoption of the law 
'On the Delineation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation', 
which declared that 
The autonomous republics are Soviet socialist states that are members of the 
USSR federation. Autonomous republics and autonomous formations are a 
part of union republics on the basis of the free self-determination of peoples, 
and they possess all state power on their territory, with the exception of the 
powers they have transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR and union 
republics. 89 
Pleasing the Tatar leaders, article 4 asserted that 'in the field of economic, social, and 
cultural construction on its territory, an autonomous republic has the same rights as a 
union republic, with the exception of those that, by mutual agreement, are assigned to the 
union republic's jurisdiction'. 90 
The RSFSR was also trying to maximise its own autonomy from the Soviet centre in 
Moscow. Russian sovereignty came at the first Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) of 
the RSFSR, which adopted the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the RSFSR on 12 
June 1990. The declaration's preamble asserted that it expressed the will of the 'peoples' 
of the RSFSR, not of 'the Russian people'; Article I stated that the RSFSR was 'a 
sovereign state created by the peoples united within it'; Article 3 asserted that the 
'RSFSR's multiethnic people are the repository of sovereignty and are the source of state 
power'; and Article 4 stated that the RSFSR's sovereignty was being proclaimed in order 
to guarantee the right of 'every people to self-determination in their chosen national-state 
and national cultural form'. 91 At the same time, it went on to assert the supremacy of the 
RSFSR constitution and laws on RSFSR territory over those of the USSR. Following the 
declaration of sovereignty, the RSFSR created its own Communist Party, KGB and 
Academy of Sciences in 1990. 
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Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn formulated a nation-budding strategy reflecting an ethnic 
nationalist position three months after the Russian Republic declared its sovereignty. In 
his programmatic brochure, Kcik nam obustroit' Rossihi (How Shall We Reconstitute 
Russia), Solzhenitsyn contended that the Soviet Union had no future as a single state, and 
could be held together only at the cost of enormous bloodshed. 'We have to choose 
firn-dy', Solzhenitsyn declared, 'between an empire that first of all destroys us and the 
spiritual and bodily salvation of our people'. Solzhenitsyn favoured redrawing sorne of 
those boundaries if that should prove to be the will of the populace, as expressed through 
plebiscites. 92 He hoped that in such a plebiscite, Northern Kazakhstan, Eastem Ukraine 
and Belarus would vote to form the Russian Union (rossiiskii soittz). According to his 
strategy, although non-Russian minorities on the Russian border, like the Chechens in the 
North Caucasus, might secede, those minorities encircled by Russian territories, such as 
the Tatars in the Middle Volga, had to share the fate of the Russian people, with 
maximum autonoMy. 93 
The Tatar leaders perceived Solzhenitsyn's definition of Russianness and the fact that the 
RSFSR's Declaration of State Sovereignty said nothing about a special status for the 
TASSR as manifestations of Russian chauvinism. El'tsin, who was careful in 
maintaining good relations with the Tatars in his intensifying struggle with Gorbachev, 
made his famous statement urging the autonomous republics 'to take as much 
sovereignty as they can swallow' in Kazan on 5 August 1990.94 
Relying on El'tsin's promise of greater autonomy for the TASSR, the Tatar and Russian 
ethnic conu-nunities in the Republic publicised their drafts of the sovereignty 
95 declaration. A compromise was reached between the Tatar and Russian drafts when the 
92 Aleksandr 1. Solzhenitsyn, Kak nam obustroit' Rossiiu. Posil'nye soobrazheniia, Moscow: Patriot, 
1991, pp. 5-6. 
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94 Aleksandr Mineev, 'Boris El'tsin "Berite stol'ko samostoiatel'nosti, skol'ko sumeete obespechit"', 
Moskovskie novosti, 19 August 1990. For a stilted translation of El'tsin's statement into Tatar, 
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Supreme Soviet of the TASSR issued the fornial sovereignty declaration on 30 August 
1990 (the full text of the TASSR's declaration of sovereignty is available in Appendix 
1,1). The preamble of the declaration stated that the declaration was based on 'the 
inherent rights of Tatars, and of the whole population of the Republic to self- 
determination'. " By leaving out the terrn , autonomous republic' the declaration implied 
that it was a union republic. Article 2 stated that 'the land, its natural resources and other 
resources on the territory of the Tatar SSR shall be the exclusive property of the Tatar 
people'. Article 3 identified both Tatar and Russian as the Republic's state languages, 
and guaranteed to all residents equal treatment under the law regardless of nationality, 
social origin, religion, and political beliefs. It made no mention of Tatarstan being a 
constituent unit of the RSFSR. Rather, the declaration was to serve as the basis for a new 
constitution, a 'Union Treaty' with the USSR, and for 'treaties with the RSFSR and other 
republics. It also asserted that Tatarstan's constitution and the laws of the Republic were 
4 97 supreme' on the territory of the Republic. 
The RSFSR legislature rejected Tatarstan's unilateral declaration for changing its status. 98 
Tatar nationalists responded by radical demonstrations. Similarly, some ethnic Russians 
started to discuss the plans to establish a 'Zakamsk Republic' in the Russian-dorninated 
areas around Naberezhnye Chelny and Nizhnekarnsk that would separate from Tatarstan 
and join the RSFSR, if Kazan pressed to secede from the RSFSR. 99 
Two weeks after the Tatar declaration of sovereignty, Shaimiev announced plans for the 
formation of an independent (samostoiatel'naia) Tatar Communist Party. Shaimiev's 
resignation from the First Secretary position in the Tatar Oblast of the CPSU, indicated 
not only that the Party was becoming increasingly marginalized but also that Shaimiev 
did not want to be subjected to Moscow's Party discipline. Moreover, Shain-dev 
encouraged the formation of the Communist Party of the Republic of Tatarstan on 12 
96 'Deklaratsiia o gosudarstvennom suverenitete TSSR', in Belaia kniga Tatarstana. Put' k suverenitetu 
1990-1995 (Sbornik dokumentov), ed. Rafael S. Khakimov, Kazan: 11 ANT, 1995, p. 5. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Tatarstan was not the first Autonomous Republic to declare sovereignty. The following republics 
declared themselves sovereign earlier than Tatarstan: North Ossetiia (20 July 1990), Kareliia (9 August 
1990) and Komi (29 August 1990). 
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December 1990. Besides, the TOTs formed a youth organisation, Stiverenitet 
(Sovereignty) as a grass-roots movement in support of the sovereignty of Tatarstan. ") Z) 
To counter-balance the centrifugal pressures, Gorbachev started to re-centralise political 
power by strengthening the Presidency. He also announced a USSR-wide referendum for Zý 
17 March 1991 on the preservation of the USSR 'as a renewed federation of equal 
sovereign republics, in which human fights and the freedom of people of all nationalities 
will be fully guaranteed'. 101 In turn, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, with El'tsin as its 
Chairperson, announced that voters in Russia would be asked whether they approved the 
establishment of an elected Russian President. Tatarstan announced that it would not 
include the question about the Russian Presidency on the ballot. The outcome of the 17 
March 1991 referendum made it clear that voters in the TASSR considered the USSR 
government an ally in their campaign for greater autonomy, as 87.5 percent of those 
voting in the Republic supported the preservation of the USSR, well above the 71.3 
percent in the RSFSR as a whole. 102 Only Kalmykiia, North Ossetiia and Tyva votes were 
higher than the votes in Tatarstan (See Table A3.2). 103 
As 12 June 1991 was proposed as the date for electing the Russian President, Ittifak 
activists, including its leader Fauziia Bairamova, began a hunger strike, and demanded 
elections for the Tatar Presidency. Tatarstan's Supreme Soviet announced that Tatarstan 
would hold elections for its own Presidency on 12 June 1991. It also announced that the 
Republic's government would not facilitate the RSFSR Presidential elections, although 
neither would it try to prevent them from being held in Tatarstan. Elections were held as 
planned both in Russia and Tatarstan on 12 June 1991. Only 36.59 percent of eligible 
voters in Tatarstan took part for the RSFSR Presidential elections, however, of whom 
only 44.97 percent voted for El'tsin, while Ryzhkov got 16.68 percent of the votes (The 
Russia-wide votes of El'tsin and Ryzhkov were 58.56 and 17.22 percent respectively. See 
Table A3.3). In contrast, 63.4 of the eligible voters participated in Tatarstan's Presidential 
100 'Programma zashchity realizatsii gosudarstvennogo suvereniteta Tatarstana', Panorama, no. 5,1991, 
pp. 9-18. 
101 Ann Sheehy, 'The USSR All Union and the RSFSR Referendums of March IT, RFURL Research 
Report, 29 March 1991, p. 22. 
102 For a position against maintaining the unity of the USSR, see Fauziia A. Bairamova, 'Bez ni ochen 
karshy? ', Sotsialistik Tatarstan, 6 March 199 1. 
101 Pravda, 27 March 1991. 
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elections, with Shaimiev, the only candidate, winning with 70.6 percent of the votes (See 
Table A3.4). 104 
In July 1991, Shaimiev appointed a delegation headed by Vice-President Vasilii 
Likhachev to represent Tatarstan at the Union Treaty talks and to begin discussions over 
a separate treaty with the RSFSR. The prominent members of the Tatar delegation were 
Rafael Khakimov, the Chief Advisor to Shaimiev, and Indus Tagirov, Dean of the 
History Faculty in Kazan University. The Russian delegation included the Head of the 
Presidential Administration Gennadii Burbulis, and El'tsin's advisors, Sergei Shakhrai 
and Oleg Lobov. The delegations met in Moscow for the first time on 12-15 August 
1991. The parties signed a protocol, which stated that the delegations had agreed 'to 
establish relations on the basis of treaty-forms of regulation, taking into consideration 
their key interests but without infringing on the interests of other republics and the Union 
as a whole'. It also recognised the desire of the RSFSR and of Tatarstan, as participants 
105 in the New Union Treaty, to renew and raise their status' . 
At the same time, an 
agreement was reached on the draft of the New Union Treaty (Soiuznyi dogovor), which 
was to create a confederal form of state. 106 This treaty was too late and too little to please 
all parties concerned at once, and the Law on Secession made any concession to the 
secessionists almost impossible. 
The Soviet military and the KGB were very dissatisfied with the draft of the New Union 
Treaty. To prevent the signing of the Treaty, the State Committee for the Extraordinary 
Situation (GKChP) assumed power between 19 and 21 August 1991. The failure of this 
attempted coup greatly strengthened El'tsin and the RSFSR government. When El'tsin 
banned the CPSU in the aftermath of the coup, the Soviet power lost its main instrument 
of controlling the people. Peter I S. Duncan explained this process as follows: 
the USSR was created by the Communist Party, out of the ruins of the Russian 
Empire, and was held together only by totalitarian communist means. The 
10' Izvestiia, 13 June 199 1. 
105 Belaia kniga Tatarstana. Put' k suverenitetu 1990-1995 (Sbornik dokumentov), ed. Rafael S. 
Khakimov, Kazan: H ANT, 1995, pp. 18-19. 
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decline of the CPSU and the removal of its 'leading role' in March 1990 made 
the collapse of the Union inescapable. "" 
In this respect. the Coup of August 1991 could be seen as something that simply hastened 
the inevitable. 
Post-Coup Politics: Checheno-Ingushetiia and Tatarstan Compared 
In the post-Coup period, El'tsin's relations with the non-Russian leaders who supported 
the coup (especially the Tatar and the Checheno-Ingush leaders) deteriorated further. 
During the coup, both Checheno-Ingush leader Doku Zavgaev and Tatar leader Shain-tiev 
were in Moscow. Zavgaev supported the coup leaders in the hope of Moscow's help in 
disarming the Chechen ethnic nationalists. Similarly, Shaimiev flew to Moscow and met 
with Gennadii lanaev, one of the coup leaders. In his radio address, Shaimiev stated that 
the reasons for the coup were justified and that decrees by El'tsin and the RSFSR 
government had no legal status in Tatarstan. 108 
Despite Tatarstan and Checheno-Ingushetiia's initial common position against Moscow 
in declaring state sovereignty and calling for a Union Republic status in 1990, and the 
common position of the Tatars and the Chechens vis-A-vis the Russians in terms of their 
religious orientations (Islam for the Tatars and the Chechens and Orthodox Christianity 
for the Russians), they followed different paths after the August coup: While Chechnia 
sought to achieve outright independence, Tatarstan wanted to obtain a special status in 
the Russian Federation. Although Chechnia's international border with Georgia might 
have led the Chechens to demand independence, and Tatarstan's location in the heart of 
the Russian Federation made the independence option unrealistic, their differences seem 
to he in the variation of institutional and socio-cultural contexts that influenced the 
107 Peter J. S. Duncan, 'The Nationality Factor in Soviet Stability: Western Scholarship Revisited', The 
Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 74, no. 2,1996, p. 260. 
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leaderships of these republics. ""' Anatol Lieven gave a clear explanation of their 
difference as follows: 
The key difference between Tatarstan and Chechnya since 1990 has obviously 
been that in 1991 Chechnya experienced a national revolution which 
overthrew the local institutions of the Soviet state, and Tatarstan did not. The 
Tatar Communist Party First Secretary, Mintimer Shaimiyev, stayed in power, 
defeated the radical nationalist opposition by a mixture of coercion and 
cooptation, and transformed the regional Communist Party into a moderate, 
statist national party under his absolute control. "" 
The Chechen national revolution against Moscow's institutional instruments of imperial 
control in Checheno-Ingushetiia, which forms the key difference between these two 
republics, erupted in a very short span of time. The main reason for the outbreak of the 
revolution was the weakening of the institutional control mechanisms of Moscow over 
Checheno-Ingushetiia. When the coup failed, Moscow lost two of its instruments in the 
Republic: the local branch of the CPSU, which was banned by El'tsin, and the local 
branch of the KGB. In fact, the revolution started when Dzhokhar Dudaev, Chairperson 
of the National Congress of the Chechen Nation (OKChN), demanded on 22 August 
1991 that all branches of State power should resign due to their support for the coup. "' 
Following the refusal of the Supreme Soviet to obey this call, Dudaev's 15,000 active 
supporters overthrew the local branch of the CPSU, which was headed by Zavgaev, on 6 
September 1991. Moreover, the OKChN's forces stormed the local KGB offices. With 
the participation of two hundred prisoners released from the local prison, the OKChN's 
National Guard took effective control of Groznyi on 10 October 199 1.112 The Presidential 
elections were held as quickly as possible so as not to give Moscow the chance to 
organise a counter-revolution. The elections, for which the turn out was 77 percent, were 
held on 27 October 1991 under the strict control of pro-Dudaev forces. According to the 
election results, Dudaev, the only candidate, was voted for President by 85 percent of the 
'09 GuInaz Sharafutdinova, 'Chechnya Versus Tatarstan', Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 47, no. 2, 
2000, pp. 13-23. 
110 Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, 
p. 77. 
111 Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, 'After the Putsch, 1991', in The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian 
Advance towards the Muslim World, ed. Marie Bennigsen Broxup, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1992, p. 221. 
112 Fleming Spirdsboel-Hanson, 'The 1991 Chechen Revolution: The Response of Moscow', Central 
Asian Survey, vol. 13, no. 3,1994, pp. 396-402. 
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total 490,000 votes. Strengthened by this election, the Interim Supreme Soviet declared 
Chechen independence on I November 1991.113 
The weakness of the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership played another important role in 
the outbreak of the Chechen revolution. The Chechen leadership lacked a local power 
base to counter the uprising of the Chechen nationalists. In fact, since the persecution of a 
significant part of the Chechen elite during the 1944 deportations, non-Chechen -mainly 
Russian- administrators had run the Republic. Doku Zavgaev who replaced Vladimir 
Fotaev, an ethnic Russian Communist Party First Secretary of the Republic, in June 
1989, was the first Chechen President. 114 As a pro-Moscow administrator, Zavgaev did 
his best in showing his loyalty to Moscow, instead of establishing his own authority in 
Chechen society. Moreover, pro-Moscow Chechens lacked a party of their own, and were 
scattered over various so-called informal organisations, such as the Union for the 
Assistance of Perestroika and the Popular Front of Checheno-Ingushetia. 11 5 
In examining the Chechen revolution, the strength of Chechen nationalist mobilisation 
should also be taken into account, since the weakening of ties between Moscow and 
Groznyi, and the weakness of Zavgaev leadership alone might not have necessarily led to 
the Chechen revolution. The Chechens had a strong historical experience and ideology of 
anti-colonial resistance, which goes back to the times of Sheikh Shamil. The first 
Chechen resistance to Russian rule was organised by Shamil between 1824 and 1859. 
The abreks and Sufi orders played a crucial role in organising attacks on the colonising 
Russians. ' 16 In the post-Soviet era, the Vainakh Democratic Pany, which was established 
by Zelimkhan landarbiev in February 1990, served to mobilise the Chechens, as it 
provided Chechens with an organisational infrastructure to establish networks inside and 
outside the Republic. ' 17 Although the Sufi orders recruited people for the resistance 
113 Rieks H. J. Smeets and Egbert G. C. Wesselink, Chechenya [sic]: One Year of War -A Pax Christi 
International Report in Collaboration with the Caucasus Foundation, Brussels: Pax Christi 
International, 1995, p. 27- 
114 Timur M. Muzaev, Chechenskaia Respublika. Organy, vlasti i politicheskie sili, Moscow: 
Panorama, 1995, pp. 158-159. 
115 John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of Separatist Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, pp. 88-89. 
116 Abreks were outlaws attacking the Russian officials and the Chechens who collaborated with the 
Russian authorities during the final years of the Russian Empire. 
117 Vadim E. Korotkov, 'Chechenskaia model' etnopoliticheskikh protsessov', Obshchestvennye nauki i 
sovremennost', no. 3,1994, p. 105. 
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movement, they also fed Islamic radicalism, which prevented the Chechens from forming 
a united and democratic Chechen independence movement in the post-Soviet era. '' 8 
In contrast to Checheno-Ingushetiia, Tatarstan saw no revolution in the aften-nath of the 
August Coup. Unlike the Zavgaev leadership, the Shaimiev leadership succeeded in co- 
opting the Tatar nationalists. The main reason for this is the strength of the institutional 
control mechanisms of Moscow over Tatarstan. In fact, the local branch of the CPSU 
transformed itself simply into the Communist Party of Tatarstan, without Shaimiev as its 
leader. Moreover, the Tatar nationalists did not target the local branch of the KGB 
physically. Even when 5,000 members of Tatar nationalist organisations demanded that 
the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan should adopt a declaration of full independence on 13 
October 1991, their clashes with the security forces left only six demonstrators and five 
militiamen in the hospital. ' 19 Consequently, the Tatar nationalists were unable to use the 
violent method of overthrowing the local representatives of the Soviet power, and cutting 
Moscow's ties with Tatarstan. 
Moreover, compared to the weak pro-Moscow Chechen leadership, Tatarstan's 
authorities were powerful enough to prevent such a revolutionary change from taking 
place in their Republic. Shaimiev's pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism, which will be 
explored in the following chapter, enabled him to prevent the division of the Republican 
leadership into hostile camps. Shaimiev sought to ameliorate tensions by accommodating 
both the Tatars and the Russians in Tatarstan. While he was pressurising Tatarstan, s 
Supreme Soviet into declaring that 15 October (when Ivan IV captured Kazan in 1552) 
would no longer be a republic holiday or otherwise officially celebrated, he also refrained 
from backing the decision of the same Supreme Soviet to declare State Independence 
(nezavisimost') of the Republic on 24 October 1991.120 Tatarstan's leadership even 
refrained from changing the name of Tatarstan's secret police (Committee of State 
Security -KGB), which was changed at the federal level from KGB to FSK (Federal 
Counterintelligence Service). 
118 On the destabilising role of radical Islam in post-Soviet Chechnia see Anatol Lieven, 'Russia-U. S. 
vs. Khattab? ', Moscow Times, 24 September 1999. 
119 Pravda, 17 October 1991. 
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Another factor that differentiates the Tatar case from the Chechen case, where there was a 
highly united nationalist movernent, was the division of the Tatar ethnic nationalist 
movement into various factions, such as the TOTs, Suverenitet and Ittifak. For example, 
moderate Tatar nationalists refused to attend the founding conference of the National 
Assembly (Milli Mejlis), which aimed to unite all Tatars for their calls for Tatar 
independence under the leadership of Talgat Abdullin on I February 1992. This showed 
the seriousness of the divisions within the nationalist camp. 121 Moreover, the lack of 
interest in a movement for outright Tatar independence can also be linked to the changes 
in Tatar society during four centuries of Russian rule as compared to the two centuries of 
Russian rule over the Chechens. In this process, the Tatars closely resembled the 
Russians in social and cultural terms. Moreover, the reformist Jadid movement rendered 
Islam capable of surviving in a modem world and created a new political platform, from 
which they could voice their aspirations in the context of the Russian politics. 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to examine the historical sources of elite level pragmatism in 
Tatariia. The Tatar elites have long played the mediating role for containing Tatar 
nationalism under both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The ability of the co- 
opted Tatar elites to perform their mediating functions depended on two conditions: 
demobilisation of Tatar society and some degree of hierarchical discipline between 
Moscow and the Tatar elites. The periodical disappearance of these two conditions 
increased the manoeuvring room of the Tatar elites. The Tatarisation of administration in 
Tatariia made possible the penetration of a pragmatic forrn of nationalism into local 
elites. Therefore, the Tatar elites, who were ostensibly recruited to mediate the Russian 
imperial domination over Tatar society, sometimes defended their own personal interests, 
as if they were defending the interests of the Tatar nation, before Moscow. 
Under the Tsarist rule, the majority of Tatar elites were co-opted. When Moscow was 
strong, the co-opted Tatar elites were submissive. From the time of Ivan Groznyi up until 
120 Bess Brown, 'Tatarstan Adopts Independence Resolution', RFE(RL Research Report, 24 October 
1991. 
121 Artem Karaperian, 'Tatarstan: Chechenskii sindrom', Moskovskie novosti, 19 January 1992. 
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the rule of Catherme 11, Moscow tfied to gain the allegiance of the Tatar nobility through 
granting privileges to compliant Tatar elites and through purging the non-compliant ones. t: ' 
The forced conversions to Orthodox Christianity and punitive economic measures were 
applied to the non-compliant Tatar elites. Partly due to these policies, the Tatar elites lost 
their unity, and became unable to organise a successful independence movement. 
Consequently, the Tatar elites became interested not in independence, but in institutional 
reform. In fact, the reformist atmosphere under Catherine 11 and in the aftermath of 1905 
revolution led to calls for equal treatment for the Tatars, rather than a fully-fledged 
independence-n-ýinded Tatar nationalist movement. 
In the Soviet era, instead of organised Tatar nationalism, the sublimated form of Tatar 
national communism has often been able to play a role in Soviet federal politics. 
Dissatisfied with the administrative status of Tatariia as an Autonomous Republic, which 
was lower on the federal hierarchy of the Soviet Union, the Tatar communist elites 
frequently pressed for a Union Republic status, which was a higher administrative status. 
The link between the status of Tatariia within the institutional fabric of the Soviet Union 
and Tatar national communism was established by the Soviet system of 'ethnic 
federalism', which granted Tatars some, but not all, of the 'privileges' given to the elites 
of the Union Republics. 
Because of these considerations, the Tatars asked twice for upgrading to the status of a 
Union Republic during the discussions for new Soviet constitutions under Stalin in 1936 
and under Brezhnev in 1977. This first wave of penetration of Tatar communists into 
Republican institutions of Tatariia provided the social basis for much of the resistance to 
Stalin's policies. These Tatar elites were labelled as 'national communists', since they 
conceived themselves both communist and nationally conscious. They combined the 
loyalty to the USSR with an attempt to defend Tatar interests. Nevertheless, Stalin 
responded very harshly to this wave of Tatar national communism when he executed 
several of these Tatar leaders for their national communism. 
A second wave of penetration of Tatar national communism into Tatariia's institutions 
occurred in the post-Stalin era before the discussions for new Soviet constitution under 
Brezhnev in 1977. In line with the Brezhnevite approach, the post-Stalin Tatar leaders 
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were bought off with more central investment in Tatariia. Moscow tolerated the 
flourishing of local patronage networks in exchange for the denationalization of politics 
in Tatariia. The soft type of national communism among the Tatar elites could explain 
Moscow's soft approach to Tatariia. Moreover, although this approach led to corruption 
and gradual undermining of discipline from within Tatariia, it was effective in preventing 
the fori-nation of a populist nationalist movement against Moscow. 
On the eve of the disintegration of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, Mintimer 
Shaimiev opened the latest episode in the relations between Kazan and Moscow. The 
strategy of the Tatar leadership under Shaimiev for enhancing Tatariia's autonomy was 
again to claim the Union Republic status for the Tatars. The main flaw in this strategy lay 
in the fact that its success required the survival of the USSR, albeit in a reformed form. 
Consequently, the disintegration of the Soviet Union eliminated the remaining 
possibilities, if any, for the success of this strategy. With the CPSU was banned after the 
August coup, and the communist ideology was discredited, both the Tatar and the 
Russian leaders had to invent new policies for coping with the uncertainties of the post- 
Soviet world. 
The next chapter will discuss the post-Soviet Tatar leadership's pragmatic use of 
nationalism to consolidate its position in the changing conditions of post-Soviet world, 
which left Moscow and the nationalist groups in Tatarstan without reliable instruments of 
making the Tatar leadership accountable for its policies. 
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2. Shaimiev's Politics of Tatar Nationalism: A Strategy of 
Political Survival 
This chapter seeks to explore Shaimiev's politics of nationalism and its role in the 
functioning of the political regime in post-Soviet Tatarstan. Tatarstan's post-Soviet 
politics of nationalism has been discussed in normative terms, which served to label 
Tatarstan's politics of nationalism as 'good' or 'bad'. Some scholars, such as Valerii 
Tishkov, have criticised Tatarstan's post-Soviet drive for greater sovereignty as being a 
form of ethnic nationalism, while some others, including Rafael Khakimov, have 
glorified it as a form of civic nationalism. I think, both of these positions are flawed since 
they are based on normative rather than objective analysis of the situation in Tatarstan. 
Valerii Tishkov in his book, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet 
Union (1997), described the policies of Tatarstan's leadership as ethnic nationalism, 
since it advanced the ethnic interests of the Tatars. 
The most striking example is the Republic of Tatarstan. Here the ruling elite 
employed Tatar ethnonationalism, radically expressed by ultra-nationalist 
organisations. and local intellectuals, to establish a firm and indisputable 
political order based on titular representation... Other republics were carefully 
watching this dispute. Regional leaders soon learned that challenging the 
centre could be much more impressive and legitimate when framed in the 
language of ethnonational demands. ' 
In this analysis, Tishkov ignores the desire of Tatarstan's leadership to distance itself 
from Tatar ethnic nationalists. In fact, Tatarstan's leadership viewed Tatar ethnic 
nationalism as a source of instability that might sabotage Tatarstan's relations with 
Moscow and the ethnic Russians in the Republic. 
Drawing a completely different picture of Tatarstan, Rafael Khakimov, Chief Advisor of 
Shaimiev and the Director of the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences of the 
Valerii A. Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind 
Aflame, (hereafter, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict), London: Sage, 1997, p. 242. 
88 
Republic of Tatarstan, has argued that the official version of Tatar nationalism actively 
promotes civic rather than ethnic Tatar nationaliSM. 2 However, Khakimov tgnores the 
fact that the Tatars and ethnic Russians were prevented from getting organised freely to 
promote their own interests, since any kind of substantial resistance to Shaimiev's rule 
could easily be suppressed in the name of regional stability. Although the Shaimiev 
leadership claimed to promote the interests of both communities, in reality, it only 
promoted the interests of Tatarstan's mainly ethnic Tatar nomenklatura. 
The chapter argues that Shaimiev's politics of nationalism can be described as a type of 
pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism, which justifies the search of Tatarstan's leadership 
for national autonomy in terms of the need for interethnic stability in Tatarstan. To 
maintain its political power and gain economic wealth under the conditions of 
uncertainty emanating from Moscow's post-Soviet 'transition' process and the activism 
of local nationalist movements, Tatarstan's leadership relied on the institutional heritage 
of the formerly communist Republican state structure, and its ideology of 
multinationalism. Although the discourse of multinationality presented the Tatar identity 
to the Russians and Russian-speakers in Tatarstan as a pluralist, civic and non-ethnic 
one, in reality, Shaimiev's policies resulted in the Tatarisation of the administration, 
economy and legislature. Besides, Tatarstan's leadership used patronage networks and 
the rigged elections in order to secure survival of its rule against potential competitors. 
The chapter initially identifies the significance of nationalism for the political survival of 
Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership. Afterwards, Shaimiev's discourse of nationalism will 
be explored in order to identify whether it is a civic, ethnic or pragmatic form of 
nationalism. Next, Tatarstan's policies of nation-building will be analysed by looking at 
Tatarstan's policies in the fields of language, education, culture and religion. The chapter 
will also examine the impact of Shaimiev's version of Tatar nationalism on Tatarstan's 
employment and economic policies. Furthermore, the chapter will examine the absence of 
a Russian backlash by looking at both patronage networks and electoral engineering in 
Tatarstan. In the final section, Tatarstan's politics of nationalism will be compared to the 
2 Rafael S. Khakimov, 'Prospects of Federalism in Russia: A View from Tatarstan', Security Dialogue, 
vol. 27, no 1,1996, p. 7 1. 
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politics of nationalism in the Bashkortostan and Chuvashiia republics of the Russian 
Federation and Kazakhstan. 
Mintimer Shaimiev and the Post-Soviet Politics of Survival 
The process of post-Soviet transition in Tatarstan has potentially endangered the ruling 
position of Tatarstan's leadership, because it could divide them into competing camps 
over the choice of the strategy of transition in the short-terrn. Moreover, the declared 
objective of introducing a free market economy and liberal democracy would make the 
politics in Tatarstan a lot more competitive and accountable to the citizens in the long- 
term .3 In order to cope with these short- and 
long-term challenges, Tatarstan's leadership 
has kept outsiders out of the political competition by sticking together. - 
In achieving mutual understanding and co-operation among themselves, the members of 
Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership have benefited from the prior historical development of 
the Republic, as they have similar backgrounds in the TASSR's Supreme Soviet, Council 
of Ministers and the Tatar Obkom of the CPSU. The nonwnklatura background of 
Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership could be identified by looking at the personal 
biographies of the leading figures of post-Soviet Tatarstan leadership. The President of 
the Republic, Mintimer Shainiiev, has a clear nomenklatura background. Shaimiev, who 
was born in the TASSR's predominantly Tatar village of Aniakovo on 20 January 1937, 
graduated from Kazan Agricultural Institute in 1959, and joined the Communist Party in 
1963. Six years later, Shaimiev was appointed as the Minister of Irrigation and Water 
Resources of the TASSR. After serving as the Chairperson of the Council of Ministers of 
the TASSR between 1985-1989, Shaimiev became the First Secretary of the Tatar 
Obkom of CPSU in 1989. In addition to his Chairpersonship of the political organ of the 
TASSR, the Obkom, he also became the Chairperson of the legislative organ of the 
3 James Hughes, 'Sub-National Elites and Post-Communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply To 
Kryshtanovskaya & White', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 6,1997, pp. 10 17-1018. 
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Republic, the Supreme Soviet, in 1990. He consolidated his position in the Republic 
when he became the President of Tatarstan in June 199 1.4 
Shaimiev's personality could be a guide to his approach towards post-Soviet transition. 
His name 'Mintimer' comes from 'Mingle Timer' meaning 'a child who is as strong as 
iron'. However, his pragmatic personality is not compatible with the meaning of his 
name. R. Mustafin and A. Khasanov described Shairniev's personality as follows: 
He can, at first glance, seem a slug ish and phlegmatic person, yet he is in fact, 119 
rather mobile and dynamic by nature. ... If the solution is clear and there are 
no objections, he expatiates it immediately. But if a situation is tangled and the 
decision is far from obvious, he never rushes it. ' 
Shaimiev's conception of politics represented the mindset of a Communist regional 
leader in that Shaimiev views politics as a technical issue of managing regional affairs. In 
this sense, he favours the depoliticisation of politics in Tatarstan. Shaimiev describes his 
political style as a manager rather than a politician: 
Nowadays, it is hard to separate politics from the economy. Any economic 
issue, especially when ignored, becomes a political one. Therefore, in order to 
be a good politician, it is very desirable to be a fairly good manager as well. 
That kind of synthesis leads to success. I keep an eye on the new politicians 
who have come to power recently. They have it all: a particularly impressive 
appearance, oratorical skill, and the experience of a mentor. They only lack 
one thing: real-fife experience. All the rest pales by comparison. 6 
In line with his apolitical approach to the political problems of Tatarstan, Shairniev 
adopted a conservative position in the face of growing cans for changes. Mustafin and 
Khasanov described Shain-Aev's conservative personal style as follows: 
As far as his character goes, he is not a revolutionary, but rather a rational 
conservative. He never seeks changes for their own sake. He holds to the old, 
whilst it is viable and has considerable use. I-lis main political principle is 
similar to that of a physician: 'do not cause harm'. Any changes, in his 
judgement are necessary only when the time is ripe for them. 7 
4 Nail A Mukhariarnov, 'Politicheskaia elita Tatarstana: Biograficheskie svedeniia', in Regiony Ross& 
Khronika i rukovoditeli. Tom. 7, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato, Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, 
Hokkaido University, 2000, p. 119. 
5 R. A. Mustafin and A. Ch. Khasanov, Pervyi prezident Tatarstana: Mintimer Shaimiev, (hereafter, 
Pervyi prezident Tatarstana), Kazan: Tatkniizdat, 1995, p. 75. 
6 Aleksandr Kuteinitsyn and Viktor Churilov, 'Interv'iu s M. Sh. Shairnievom', Delovaia zhizn', nos. 
11-12,1992, p. 6. 
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It should added here that although Shaimiev has maintained his cautious political style, 
he has shown a remarkable performance in adopting his position to the changing 
conditions of the post-Soviet world very skilfully. 8 
Apart from Shaimiev's personality, his authoritarian policies also prevented Tatarstan's 
post-Soviet leadership from being divided into two centres of power around the 
parliament and the executive, as close associates of Shaimiev headed both of them. Prime 
Minister Mukhammat Sabirov headed the executive organ of the Republic, the Council 
of Ministers. Sabirov was born on 29 March 1932 in the village of Novo-Kurmanovo in 
Bashkortostan. After his graduation from the Institute of Oil in Ufa in 1955, Sabirov 
joined the Communist Party in 1958, and served as Deputy Chair of the Tatar Council of 
Ministers between 1983 and 1991. Farid Mukhametshin headed the legislature organ of 
the Republic, the Supreme Soviet (renamed as the State Council in 1995). Mukhametshin 
was born on 22 May 1949 in the city of AI'metievsk in Tatarstan. Just like Sabirov, 
Mukhametshin joined the Communist Party in 1970 following his graduation from the 
Institute of Oil in Ufa in 1959. His political career started in the city of AI'metievsk. He 
served as the Minister for Trade in the Council of Ministers of the TASSR between 1989 
and 1991. In addition to his position as the Deputy Chair of the Council of Ministers, 
Mukhametshin also became the Chairperson of Tatarstan's Supreme Soviet in 1991.9 
In order not to alienate the interests of ethnic Russians, Shaimiev needed to have at least 
one ethnic Russian at the top-level leadership of Tatarstan. In 1991, the highest-ranking 
ethnic Russian politician in Tatarstan was VasiIii Likhachev, the Vice-President of the 
Republic. Likhachev, who is married to a Tatar, was born in 1952 in Gorkii (renamed as 
Nizhnii Novgorod in the post-Soviet era). After graduating from the Law Faculty of 
Kazan State University in 1975, he became an academician, and taught at Universities in 
Guinea Bissau (1982-1983) and Madagascar (1987-1988). As a deputy in the Supreme 
Soviet of the TASSR, Likhachev worked closely with Shaimiev in formulating the legal 
basis of Tatarstan's sovereignty. As Vice-President, Ljkhachev was given the task of 
promoting Tatarstan's international links in June 199 1.10 
7 Mustafin and Khasanov, Pervyi prezident Tatarstana, p. 75. 
8 Lev Ovrutskii, Shaimiev - Real'nyi i virtual'nyi, Kazan and loshkar-Ola: Maxim, 2000. 9 Evgenii A. Lisin, et. al., Kto est' kto v Respublike Tatarstan, Kazan: Star, 1996, pp. 5-9. 
10 Ibid. 
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In his study on the backgrounds of the members of Tatarstan's Council of Ministers, 
Midkhat Farukshin established that Tatarstan's leadership was predominantly composed 
of ethnic Tatars and the former nomenklatura. of the Republic. In 1992,78 percent of 
Tatarstan's leadership had an ethnic Tatar background, while 68 percent of them were 
active in the leading positions in the TASSR and the Tatar Obkom of the Communist 
Party. According to Farukshin, twenty-six of the thirty ministers in Tatarstan's post- 
Soviet government were Tatar. These ministers came from nomenklatura backgrounds 
with seventeen of them having official party careers. While six of the thirty ministers 
were in the governing posts of the Republic since 1985 or earlier, the rest had moved up 
from ministries and local party organs. Two of them had been rectors of higher education 
institutes. Only one of the ministers (the minister of health) had moved up into the 
leadership of Tatarstan from a non-governmental background. Most of them made their 
careers in the Republic, with only two of them being bom outside Tatarstan. Except for 
one of them, all members of Tatarstan's Council of Ministers had received their higher 
education in Tatarstan. They graduated mainly from the Faculty of Law and the Institutes 
of Agriculture and Economics in Tatarstan. The majority of them were bom during the 
late- 1930s, when Stalin completed his purge of the Tatar national communists that 
challenged Moscow's rule in the TASSR. In ten-ns of gender, with the exception of one 
female member, all members of Tatarstan's Council of Ministers were male. ' 1 
Farukshin's findings were confirmed by Rashid Akhmetov's study on the ethnic 
composition of Tatarstan's urban workforce in 1992. Akhmetov identified that the 
employment rate of the Tatars in the public sector was higher than the Russians. 
Akhrnetov also demonstrated that aniong the urban employees in 1992, the Russians 
were employed mainly in the technical fields of infrastructure, engineering and education, 
whereas the Tatars were employed predominantly in the fields of government, public 
services, literature and arts (See Table A4.5). 12 
11 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Politicheskaia elita v Tatarstane: Vyzovy vremeni i trudnosti adaptatsii', 
Politicheskie issledovaniia, vol. 5, no. 6,1994, p. 69. 
12 Rashid Akhmetov, 'Elita Tatar. K postanovke problemy', in Sovremennye natsional'nye protsessy v 
Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Damir A Iskhakov and Rozalina N. Musina, Kazan: HaLll KNTs RAN, 
1992, p. 126. 
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it can be said that Tatarstan's leadership relied on gaining legitimacy through its politics 
of nationalism. The political survival strategy of the Republican leadership involved the 
elimination of the room left for democratic change. In fact, the conservative 
nomenklatura. elites viewed nationality, which was the simplest form of identity that had 
been preserved in totalitarian society, as an instrument for keeping political power. 
Tatarstan's leadership sought to get rid of its competitors through turning the discontent 
of the people against the sources of regional instability. Their strategy involved the 
manipulation of interethnic conflicts in Tatarstan in such a way that only they could 
guarantee interethnic compromise and regional stability. For this purpose, the mass 
protest and electoral competition were manipulated to articulate the popular demands in 
national terms, and to project national images, which were promoted by Tatarstan's 
leadership, to the populace. In this way, Shainiiev has become able to play the role of a 
4patron' (zashchitnik) of the Republican population. 
The capacity of Tatarstan's leadership in maintaining its unity can be explained by the 
existence of value consensus and personal networks among its members. In terms of 
value consensus, although Tatar and Russian members of Tatarstan's post-Soviet 
leadership had some disagreements over political interests, they co-operated in defending 
their common econon-dc interests. Moreover, concerning personal networks, although the 
members of Tatarstan's leadership were national in form, they were personalistic in 
content, because patronage networks and other forms of informal political relations have 
been very influential for elite mobility and regime formation in post-Soviet Tatarstan. 
Relying on a guiding leader or patron (Shaimiev) and pre-existing personal relationships, 
patronage networks became the vehicles of uniting the career interests of Tatarstan's 
politicians. In this way, Shaimiev recruited his entourage from politicians who are both 
loyal and reliable. Furthermore, Tatarstan's leadership has used the Republican patron- 
client networks to exploit state resources for personal gain. Consequently, corruption, 
which can be defined as the misuse of public office for private gain, has been the most 
common result of Shaimiev's pragmatic politics of Tatar nationalism. 13 
13 Marie Mendras, 'How Regional Elites Preserve Their Power', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 15, no. 4,1999, 
p. 305. 
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Shairniev's Discourse of Tatar Nationalism: Civic, Ethnic or Pragmatic? 
The orientation of Tatarstan's leadership towards nationalism needs to be examined to 
clarify whether it qualifies as a form of nationalism. If so, this analysis should also clarify 
the type of Shaimiev's discourse of nationalism in terms of the typology of nationalism 
developed in the introduction chapter. In fact, Shaimiev's nomenklatura nationalism 
conforms to John Breuilly's definition of nationalism in that Shaimiev's nationalism 
represents a political movement seeking or exercising state power and justifying such 
action with the following assumptions: First, there exists a Tatar nation with an explicit 
and peculiar character. Second, the interests and values of the Tatar nation take priority 
over all other interests and values, otherwise regional stability might be endangered. 
Finally, the Tatar nation must be as independent as possible, which involved, in 
Shaimiev's case, the attainment of political sovereignty. 
Having characterised Shain-ýiev's discourse as a form of nationalism, it should be noted 
that his version of pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism cannot be labelled as ethnic or 
civic nationalism because the Tatar members of Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership have 
been nationalists of convenience rather than conviction. They pragmatically combine 
these types of nationalism in order to promote their own specific elite interests. Through 
playing these forms of nationalisms against each other, Tatarstan's leadership claims that 
only their version of nationalism could ensure the stability of Tatarstan in the face of the 
destabilising influences of other forms of nationalism. 
Shaimiev has branded his version of Tatar nationalism as a civic forrn of nationalism. 
This could be seen in his public speeches. For example, during the celebration of the 
sixth anniversary of the Tatarstan declaration of sovereignty in August 1996, Shaimiev 
labelled Tatarstan's society as 'a multi-ethnic and multicultural democratic community, 
evolving into a civic nation of Tatarstantsy (Tatarstanis)'. 14 It should be noted that 
Shainfiev has used the rhetoric of civic nationalism just to label his version of 
nationalism as a 'good' form of nationalism. Shairrkv's understanding of Tatar 
nationalism focused mainly on the econon-dc aspects of Tatarstan's sovereignty. His use 
14 Cited in Galina M. Yemelianova, 'Shairtliev's "Khanate" on the Volga and its Russian Subjects', 
(hereafter, 'Shaimiev's "Khanate ... ), Asian Ethnicity, vol. 1, no. 1,2000, p. 49. 
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of the rhetoric of civic Tatar nationalism has allowed him to define ethnic problems as 
something technical rather than political. This way of depoliticising ethnic problems 
serves to avoid the alienation of non-titular ethnic groups. During his keynote speech at 
Harvard University (USA) on 6 October 1994, Mintimer Shaimiev said that, 
Yes, we have enormous industrial potential. Yet, we used to live in such a 
system where the population could not take advantage of all these 
opportunities to make their lives better economically because of the over- 
centralised economy. This intensified the feeling of anger among the 
unemployed tabour force. " 
In fact, Shaimiev's version of nationalism involved respect for the state sovereignty of 
Tatarstan and respect for the multiethnic nature of Tatarstan. Shaimiev claimed that his 
4centrist' position is vital for the protection of Tatarstan's state sovereignty and 
multiethnic stability in a manner that is very similar to the Soviet-era discourse of the 
'friendship of nations'. Shaimiev asserted that his fight for sovereignty was aimed at 
increasing local self-government and economic well-being, which would benefit all 
inhabitants of their region, regardless of ethnicity. 
In view of the intense growth of ethnic self-awareness among the peoples of 
Tatarstan, it is impossible to resolve any important issue without state 
sovereignty for the republic. But that point should not be the subject for 
speculation, nor should it be used as a weapon to promote political agendas. 
Unfortunately there are those both in Russia and in our republic who are 
attempting to use it in that manner. That is why sometimes the blows aimed at 
the President rain down from the left and from the right. But I take a firmly 
centrist position on this matter. And I am convinced that in a multiethhnic 
republic there is no other position that the President can take. Otherwise there 
will be no avoiding confrontation between various segments of the population. 
The President's firn-dy centrist position plus complete independence with 
regard to deciding its own fate is Tatarstan's future. 16 
Nevertheless, this centrist position implies an authoritarian tendency, undermining the 
civic claims of interethnic harmony in Tatarstan. 
Although Shaimiev sought to promote the ethnic revival of the Tatars, he did not want to 
achieve this at the expense of alienating the ethnic Russian population of Tatarstan. and 
'5 Mintimer Sh. Shairniev, 'The Future of the Russian Federation: A Look [sic) from Tatarstan', 
(hereafter, 'The Future of the Russian Federation'), in Suverennyi Tatarstan, eds. Farid Kh. 
Mukharnetshin and R. T. Ismailov, Moscow: Insan, 1997, p. 55. 
16 Aleksandr Kuteinitsyn and Viktor Churilov, 'Interv'iu sA Sh. Shaimievom', Delovaia zhizn', nos. 
I 1- 12,1992, p-6- 
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the federal government in Moscow. Shaimiev has adopted a gradualist (Akrinlap) 
approach to the national concerns of Tatars. He also ruled out any radical policy towards 
Russia since it could provoke a civil war between the Tatars and the Russians in 
Tatarstan. 
In our republic, we have the greatest respect for the Russian people. The good- 
heartedness of Russians has never permitted and will never permit them to 
pressurise the others. But attempts to influence the Russians and to accuse 
other peoples of neglecting them are so dangerous that they could lead to 
unforeseen consequences. But I remain firmly convinced that no one will be 
able to undermine the fhendship that exists between Russians and Tatars and 
the other peoples of Tatarstan. Those who are hoping for that are going to be 
disappointed. 17 
Shaimiev sought to justify his view of Tatar nationalism in a territorial sense of Tatar 
national identity. Relying on the slogan that 'Tatarstan is for the Tatarstanis', Shaimiev 
made clear that he was coninfitted to policies that reached out to both Tatars and 
Russians and to a multinational understanding (innogonatsional'nost') of Tatarstan. His 
strategy, in this respect, was to defend the rights of Tatars and Russians within the 
Republic, while opposing both Tatar and Russian ethnic nationalism. 18 
The state sovereignty of Tatarstan is crucial for Shaimiev's discourse of nationalism. 
Shaiýniev defined Tatarstan's sovereignty as follows: 
Tatarstan's sovereignty in its essence means that the republic has to acquire 
the political and economic powers and opportunities which would make it 
possible to improve the living standards of its population, better satisfy the 
cultural needs of the people, cherish and revive their best national traditions 
and encourage the development of national cultures. 19 
This notion of sovereignty privileges the state vis-A-vis the nation. In this sense, Shain-dev 
as the President of Tatarstan assumed the right to exercise the sovereignty of Tatarstan. 
Furthermore, Shaimiev's understanding of Tatarstan's sovereignty is rooted in the Soviet 
nationalities policy of believing in the importance of the state-sponsored ethno-cultural 
development. Conceiving ethnic groups as essentially permanent and unchangeable, 
17 Ibid., p. 7. 
18 Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev, 'Nasha pozitsiia ostaetsia neizmennoi, no suverenitet respubliki Tatarstan ne 
budet imet' natsional'noi okraski', Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 August 1991. 
19 Sovetskaia Tatariia, 31 August 1991. 
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Shaimiev argued that the government of Tatarstan should promote national cultures in the 
Republic. 
Given the significance of the national question, it would be correct to set aside 
certain sums to support national cultures. Ultimately, that would be cheaper 
than later trying to put down conflicts. The threat of ethnic separatism is a C, 
problem that can be resolved on the basis of a well-adjusted national PoliCY. 20 
Although it is clear that Shaimiev's version of Tatar nationalism cannot be considered as 
a nationalising state nationalism that attempts to make a multicultural population 
culturally homogenous, it cannot be considered secessionist either. Even as Shaimiev 
recognised the validity of the right to self-determination, he is not a secessionist 
nationalist. In his own words, Shainfiev stated that '[Tjhe right to self-determination in 
the international sense of the term provides for various forms of organisation and 
secession is only an extreme measure. 21 
Shaimiev is aware of the dangers of calling for independence. In his opinion, Tatars 
cannot achieve full independence from Moscow. 
I can tell you that in Tatarstan in 1991 and 1992,1 went to great nationalist 
rallies and they called on me to announce independence. But I knew that 
complete independence was totally unrealistic, so I braced myself and never 
once said this word. 22 
For Shaimiev, to demand a complete break with Russia would have led to war, which is 
not in the interest of Tatarstan, since Tatarstan is too weak to engage in a military conflict 
with Moscow. 
And I arn afraid it could be a war without any results... I couldn't support this 
idea of independence before the people, knowing in advance that it couldn't be 
realiSed. 23 
Shaimiev thinks that although the militarisation of Tatarstan's problems with Moscow is 
not in the interest of the Tatars, it is not in the interest of Moscow either. Therefore, 
Shaimiev wams that Moscow should avoid an armed conflict with the Tatars. For 
20 Vasilii Filippov, 'Interview with Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 6, no. 3,24 January 2001. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Rubin Trudy, 'Holding Russians at Bay', The Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 February 1995. 
23 David Hoffman, 'Artful Regional Leader Slips Moscow's Grip', Washington Post, 16 June 1997. 
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example, Shaimiev asserted that '[t]he Tatars are the second biggest ethnic group in 
Russia. No sane politician would want a confrontation with Tatars. ' 24 
Despite the fact that both Moscow and the Tatars have much to lose in a case of ethnic 
conflict, Shaimiev argued that the ethnic factor should not be underestimated. According 
to Shain-iiev, Tatar ethnic nationalists could manipulate the ethnic factor to mobilise the 
Tatars against Moscow, which was potentially dangerous: 
This factor is always present in Tatarstan. In the 1990s there was a powerful 
national movement in the republic and even though today its influence on 
policy has weakened, nevertheless, national problems always play a big role in 
the social consciousness. It would be a mistake to underrate the ethnic factor. 
The main thing is for the authorities to avoid making the ldnd of mistakes that 
provide a basis for [ethnic activists] to unite and increase their strength. '5 
Shain-dev has not been in favour of unification nationalism in the sense of uniting the 
Tatars in Tatarstan with the Tatars living in the Volga region. He has simply favoured 
promoting the interests of the Tatar Diaspora without uniting Tatarstan with the 
neighbouring republics, such as Bashkortostan. Shaimiev argued that ethnic problems of 
the Tatar Diaspora were by-products of the reluctance of the central authorities to grant 
formal rights to the republics. Thus, Shaimiev considered that Russia's centralised system 
of power and the lack of real federalism in Russia were the main barriers to the realisation 
of Tatar national interests. 
The mechanism for realising the rights of nations in Russia must be developed. 
The constitution now says only one thing-it forbids secession. But the 
realisation of rights of nations is not limited to this. Take one example: I get 
letters all the time asking how can we listen to music sung in the Tatar 
language? This is the demand of any nation. People cannot hear the language 
they were raised in. I propose that a powerful radio station be set up in 
Tatarstan so Tatars all over can listen to their language. But this issue is not 
being addressed. There are many such problems. There is a problem with 
schoolbooks: we need to supply schools with textbooks in the Tatar 
language. 26 
24 John Thornhill, 'Island of Pragmatism in Russia', Financial Times, 20 February 1996. 
25 VasiIii Filippov, 'Interview with Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 6, no. 3,24 January 2001. 
26 Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev, 'Conflict Prevention and Management: The Significance of Tatarstan's 
Experience', in Preventing Deadly Conflicts Strategies and Institutions, eds. Gail W. Lapidus and 
Svetlana Tsalik, New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998, p. 77. 
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Shaimiev's discourse of nationalism clearly points to the nomenklatura's desire to define 
a new role for themselves as a champion of the process of federalisation in Russia as well 
as the sole guarantor of the national interests of the Tatars and the interethnic peace in 
Tatarstan. 
Shainfiev's Policy of Multinationalism and the Revival of Tatar Culture 
Considering ethnic and civic forms of nationalism as threats to the survival of his 
political regime, Shain-dev sought to develop a multinational state which guarantees 
mainly ethnic and some civic rights to the nations within it. It is basically Tatarstan's 
multi-ethnic character that makes the fon-nation of a purely ethnic Tatar nation in 
Tatarstan unlikely. In fact, Tatarstan's population of 3.7 million in 1989 is composed 
mainly of two nationalities; the Tatars (48.5 percent) and the Russians (43.3 percent). 
The remaining 8.2 percent are from other nationalities (See Table A4.2). 27 Accordingly, 
Shaimiev's discourse of multinationalism reflects this demographic composition of the 
Republic. 
Tatarstan's declaration of state sovereignty in 1990 implies a multinational approach to 
the question of nation-building in the Republic. Its preamble refers to the 'inalienable 
right of the Tatar nation (natsda) and all peoples of the Republic to self-determination'. 
Although all of the people of the Republic are mentioned, the priority was given to the 
Tatars. The multinational approach is also visible in Tatarstan's constitution whose 
Article I states that Tatarstan is 'a sovereign democratic state that expresses the wiH and 
interests of the entire multinational people of Tatarstan, whilst Article 3 guarantees the 
equality of all residents regardless of 'nationality, social position, religion, and political 
28 beliefs' . The same approach could also 
be seen in Tatarstan's choice of state symbols. 
According to the resolution on the flag of Tatarstan, which was adopted on 29 November 
1991, Tatarstan's tricolour flag represents the multinational harmony in Tatarstan. The 
upper green stripe of the flag represents the Islamic identity of Tatars, while the lower red 
27 Marat R. Mustafin and Rashid G. Khuzeev, Vse 0 Tatarstane: Ekonomiko-geograficheskii 
spravochnik, Kazan: Kazanskoe Knizhnoe lzd-vo, 1994, p. 18. 
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stripe represents the Russian imnonty. The thin white stripe between green and red 
stripes represents the peace that unites Tatars and Russians. 29 On 7 February 1992, the 
Tatar coat of arms was introduced. Tatarstan's emblem, the white leopard (akbars), is an 
ethnic Tatar symbol that implies no hatred against the Russians. Akbars is believed to 
30 
protect the people of Tatarstan . 
The promotion of the Tatar language began with the adoption of a language law in 1992, 
After heated argument, the parliament rejected the idea of making Tatar the Republic's 
sole state language, instead gave Tatar and Russian equal rights. Nonetheless, the law 
significantly increased the status of the Tatar language, requiring that the government 
conduct its business and publish its laws in Tatar as well as Russian. The courts, media, 
industrial enterprises, public transport and scientific and cultural institutions were also 
required to use both languages in conducting their affairs and in interacting with the 
public. The law also established a language preservation programme whose goals 
included opening Tatar-language kindergartens, broadening Tatar-language education, 
and expanding Tatar publishing and broadcasting. 31 
According to Luiza Bairamova, the equal status of these two languages in Tatarstan 
neutralises the ethnic conflicts between Russians and Tatars. These languages perforrn 
different functions as Russian is a language of science and bureaucracy, while Tatar is 
used in the domestic sphere. 32 
Echoing Bairamova's approach, Shain-tiev justified the merits of Tatarstan's language 
law in tenns of its contribution to the equality of the Tatar and Russian languages. 
Shainiiev said that, 
28 Rozalina N. Musina, 'Contemporary Ethnosocial and Ethnopolitical Processes in Tatarstan', in 
Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis, eds. Leokadia M. Drobizheva et 
al., Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, p. 203. 
29 Pat Jacobs, Mini Flags Atlas of the World, Finchampstead, Berks, UK: 1999, p. 17 1. 
' Gosudarstvennaia simbolika Respubliki Tatarstan, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1997. 
31 Sovetskaia Tatariia, 30 May 1992. 
32 Luiza Bairamova, 'Ravnopravie iazykov neitralizuet konflikty', Nauchnyi Tatarstan, vol. 3, no. 2, 
1997, p. 9. 
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You know the events in Moldavia developed in the negative way just for one 
reason - they declared one state language. You also know that similar 0 
situations are also arising in Ukraine and in Kazakhstan.... We declared two 
official languages yet, eventually, the native language will benefit from this, 
because it should be upgraded, and be given the conditions for its 
33 development 
. 
According to Tatarstan's programme for the 'Development of Tatar National Education,, 
which was adopted in 1991, Tatar national education is meant to instil in Tatar children 
respect and appreciation for the other peoples and cultures in Tatarstan. The document 
assumed that only a 'heightened consciousness of their own national identity' could help 
them truly respect other nationalities. 34 According to this programme, the mandatory 
study of the Tatar language and literature, with an average of 3.5 hours a week for all 
students in Tatarstan, regardless of nationality, starts from grade one. As a result of the 
implementation of this programme, the proportion of Tatar students who study all 
subjects in their native language became 43 percent by 1994. Moreover, the teaching of 
Tatar to non-Tatar students was expanded in June 1994, when it was decided that Tatar 
would be taught as a required subject in all of the Republic's schools. Besides, 
universities have also joined this campaign by expanding their Tatar language 
departments. 35 
Rafael Khakimov explained the logic behind the multinational approach to education 
as if it was a reflection of the 'civic' nationalism of Tatarstan's leadership. During my 
interview with him, Khakimov stated that 
Mari people wanted 5 years national education, but Tatarstan offered 8 years 
national education even though a legal basis for this does not exist. At present, 
there are 146 Chuvash, 44 Udmurt, 23 Mari and 7 Mordovian schools. ' 
33 Shaimiev, 'The Future of the Russian Federation', p. 57. 
34 'Kontseptsiia razvitiia tatarskogo obrazovaniia', Panorama, no. 8,199 1, p. 15. 
35 Katherine E. Graney, 'Education Reform in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan: Sovereignty Projects in 
Post-Soviet Russia', (hereafter, 'Education Reform in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan'), Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 51 no. 4,1999, pp. 619-620. 
36 My interview with Rafael S. Khakimov, Tatarstan's Chief Presidential Advisor on Political Affairs, 
Presidential Palace, Kazan, 2 June 1998. 
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Contrary to Khakimov, I think that Shaimiev's promotion of multinationalisin in 
Tatarstan cannot be considered adequate to label his policies as 'civic' since the discourse 
of multi nationalism has been basically used by Tatarstan's leadership in order to justify 
the process of Tatarisation in post-Soviet Tatarstan. 
Tatarstan's leadership considered the use of Tatar by the Republican scientific 
community very important for its politics of Tatar nationalism. During the Soviet period, 
academics working in Tatariia's Republican affiliate of the USSR Academy of Sciences 
were subject to the Communist Party control over their choice of subject matter and their 
final projects. Likewise, the curriculum of the general education system of Tatariia was 
detennined in Moscow. The Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan (ANRT) 
was established in October 1991. Its first President Mansur Khasanov established a link 
between the creation of the ANRT and Tatarstan's quest for sovereignty as follows: 
Without the sovereign right to decide our own scientific problems, we can't 
decide the socio-economic, political and cultural problems of state sovereignty 
and political-economic independence in the Republic of Tatarstan. 37 
The Institute of History was formed within the ANRT in 1996 when several members of 
the ANRT declared the need for a conception of Tatar history which was up to 
'international standards'. The lack of this independent history was said to be 'severely 
limiting sovereign Tatarstan'. 38 In the autumn of 1996 Shaimiev named his Adviser for 
Political Affairs, Rafael Khakimov, as the director of the Institute of History at the 
ANRT. Given his proximity to Shairniev, Khakimov's appointment has served to 
promote the ideology that Tatarstan's leadership has been identified itself firn-dy with the 
'civic Tatarstani' discourse in which the boundaries of the national community are 
identified with the territorial statehood of a sovereign Tatarstan. At the first public 
seminar held at the Institute of History of the ANRT Rafael Khakimov stated: 
I believe that a 'territorial' approach to history is good, because we can 
advertise the Republic of Tatarstan. We can help further the development of a 
poly-ethnic, poly-cultural society if we show the poly-ethnic aspects of our 
territory's achievement, for example publicising the achievements of both 
Lobachevsky and Tatar scientists. 39 
37 Mansur Kh. Khasanov, 'Prioritet - interesy respubliki', Sovetskaia Tatariia, 13 February 1993. 
38 'Otkrytoe pis'mo deiatelei nauki i kul'tury Tatarstana Prezidentu M. Shainiievu', Kris, 17 May 1996. 
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Nevertheless, it is very difficult to take Khakimov's claims in favour of a 'territorial' 
approach at face value since, as discussed in Chapter Three, Tatarstan's post-Soviet 
leadership has not limited its activities only to the people of Tatarstan. It has also sought 
to 'defend' the fights of Tatar diaspora occasionally. Furthermore, some members of the 
institute of History stressed the need for writing more Tatar history books in order to 
rectify the years of Russian and Soviet 'falsification' of Tatar history. 40 
In the field of mass media, apart from all of the federation-wide Russian television 
channels, Tatarstan has one Republic-wide television channel 'Tatarstan' and several 
city-based television services, including Efir, which is the television channel of Kazan's 
City Administration. The majority of services are in the Russian language, except for 
those on 'Tatarstan' channel, which broadcasts 71 percent of its radio progranunes and 
46 percent of television programmes in Tatar. In terms of print-media, there were 233 
newspapers and 28 magazines and journals being published in Tatarstan in 1996. The 
following Tatar-language papers are subsidized from the state budget, and benefit from 
postal service discounts: Respublika Tatarstan (Republic of Tatarstan), Vatanyrn 
Tatarstan (Tatarstan Motherland), Tatarstan lashlare (Youth of Tatarstan) and Shakhri 
Kazan (Kazan City). The following Russian-language papers are also subsidized from 
state budget: Kazanskie vedomosti (Kazan Gazette), Kazanskoe vrernia (Kazan Time). A 
number of other Russian-language newspapers including Vechernaia Kazan (Evening 
Kazan), Kris and VreWa i den'gi (Time and Money) do not rely on official Support. 41 
Partly because of the Republican control over Tatarstan's newspapers, the state-financed 
newspapers in Tatarstan promote mainly the Tatar culture. 
Although the religion is separated from the state, Tatarstan's leadership characterises the 
people of Tatarstan in terms of their confessional identity. Shaimiev has characterised the 
Tatars as Muslim and the Russians as Christian, without actually providing statistical 
data on the confessional choices of Tatarstan's population. Besides, Tatarstan's 
government manipulates religious communifies systematically to support its nation- 
39 Cited in Graney, 'Education Reform in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan', p. 622. 
40 Damir M. Iskhakov, 'Tatarskaia istoriia budet napisana po-tatarskii', Idel, nos. 1-2,1997, pp. 24-27. 
4' Howard Davis, Philip Hammond and Lilia Nizamova, 'Changing Identities and Practices in Post- 
Soviet Journalism: The Case of Tatarstan', European Journal of Communication, vol. 13, no. 1,1998, 
pp. 80-8 1. 
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building policies in spite of secular legislation. Shairniev, for example, defined the role of' 
religion in the 'secular' state of Tatarstan as follows: 
Tatarstan -a democratic state, seeks to promote the values and interests of all 
multinational peoples of Tatarstan. Its main ethnic groups belong to two main 
confessions: Islam and Christianity... Islam was discriminated against under 
the Tsarist and Soviet rules. Now, Noel and Kurban Baiýram became official 
holidays. 42 
Tatarstan's political establishment has very little interest and expertise in Islam as they 
have made their careers under the Soviet regime. For example, to the question 'Do you 
attend the MosqueT Shaimiev replied that 'The Mosque? I am an atheist'. 43 Despite 
his secular background, Shairniev views religion as an attribute of statehood. 
Although Islam is taught in secular schools, secular Tatar leaders have been keen in 
not letting political Islamists stir inter-religious confrontations. 44 The existence of two 
rival muftis, Farid Salman and the more radical Gabdullah Galiullah, in Tatarstan 
made it difficult for Shaimiev to control Islamic groups in the Republic. To put the 
rival muftis under its own control, the Shaimiev leadership organised a unifying 
Islamic Congress Kurultai, which was attended by 718 delegates from all over 
Tatarstan, in Kazan in February 1998. The Congress elected the govemment-backed 
candidate, Gusman Ishakov, as the Republic's new mufti with 430 votes. Galiullah 
and Salman accused Shamiev's administration of pressuring the delegates into voting 
for Ishakov. They pointed out the close relationship between Gusman Iskhakov's 
mother, Rashida Abystay, and Shaimiev's wife, Sakine Shain-6eva. 45 
Concerning the relations among the confessional communities in Tatarstan, Shaimiev has 
been manipulating the multiconfessional character of Tatarstan. He adopted a 'centrist' 
policy towards the Muslim, Orthodox and Jewish communities in Tatarstan. Shaimiev 
supports the construction of the Kul Sharif Mosque across the square from the onion- 
domed Russian Orthodox Cathedral of the Annunciation. He has also promised the 
Orthodox diocese that services at the cathedral will be resumed, but only after the 
42 Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev, 'Dialog religii, dialog kul'tur', in Islamo-Khristianskoe pogranich'e: Itogi i 
perspektivy izucheniia, ed. Ia. Abdullin, Kazan: lIaLlf ANT, 1994, p. 2. 
43 Kira Vladina, 'Interv'iu s M. Sh. Shaimievom', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 February 1994. 
44 Andrei Zolotov, 'Keeping Islam in Line', Moscow Times, 16 May 1998. 
45 Robert Coalson, 'Tatar Unity Summit Deepens Moslem Schism', Moscow Times, 17 February 1998. 
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completion of the Kul Shafif Mosque. 46 Tatarstan's leadership has also established very 
good relations with the Jewish community in Tatarstan. When the leaders of the Russian 
Jewish Congress met in Kazan to celebrate the reopening of a synagogue in 1996, 
Shairniev held very constructive talks with Vladimir Gusinskii, the President of the 
Russian Jewish Congress. Since Gusinskii was also the Head of Most Bank, Shain-tiev 
used this opportunity to convince Gusinskii to make more investment in Tatarstan's 
econorny. 47 
Tatarstan's post-Soviet drive to promote has not been welcome by all ethnic groups, in 
Tatarstan. Especially, some leaders of Tatarstan's ethnic Russians, such as the 
Chairperson of the Society of Russian Culture in Tatarstan, Aleksandr Salagaev, criticise 
the cultural policies of the republican leadership in the following way: 
The cultural policy of the Government of Tatarstan doesn't provide for the 
existence of Russian culture on the territory of Republic. A policy that doesn't 
provide TV coverage of Russian artistic groups, artists, writers and painters, 
that doesn't publish their works in the printing house, and doesn't stage their 
plays at the theatre, condemns them to obscurity and gradual moral death. 
Given that there are no Russian papers in Tatarstan and that Russian national 
schools are not established in the capital of the Republic, the situation could be 
described as discriminatory. 48 
Nevertheless, these concerns about the decline in the support for Russian culture seem 
exaggerated since Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership continue to provide some help to the 
cultural activities of the ethnic Russians in the Republic. It should be noted that the main 
problem for the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan stems not from the development of Tatar 
culture, but from the use of cultural criteria in order to Tatarise the key economic and 
political positions in the republic. It would be useful to look at the implications of these 
policies on the employment opportunities for the ethnic groups in Tatarstan in order to 
identify the economic impact of Tatarstan's pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism on the 
ethnic Russian population of the Republic 
46 Ravil Bukharaev, The Model of Tatarstan under President Mintimer Shaimiev, (hereafter, The Model 
of Tatarstan), London: Curzon, 1999, p. 5. 
47 Rachel Katz, 'Synagogue Reopens After 67 Years', Moscow Times, 17 December 1996. 
48 Aleksandr L. Salagaev, 'Russkie v Republike Tatarstant, Kris, 5 March 1997. 
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The Expansion of Employment Opportunities for the Tatars 
The politics of nation-building is more than just a means of identification with a nation. It 
is also about power, status and employment opportunities. Likewise, the nation-building 
policies of Tatarstan's leadership, which adopted employment practices that would 
ensure that political power rested with the Tatars, resulted in an increase in the 
employment opportunities for the Tatars. However, the implementation of the language 
law began slowly, particularly in the industrial and commercial spheres. To speed up 
implementation, the Supreme Soviet adopted the 'State prograrnme for the preservation, 
study and development of the languages of the peoples of the Tatarstan Republic' in the 
summer of 1994. Despite its name, this programme is mainly devoted to the preservation, 
study and development of the Tatar language. While the majority of the 126 points in the 
programme are devoted explicitly to Tatar, the other points address all of the languages 
spoken in Tatarstan in equal measure, and none addresses Russian exclusively. The 
programme recommended the knowledge of both state languages for several professions, 
including the Presidency (Article 1), a 15 percent salary bonus for such bilingual 
professionals (Article 11) and the expansion of Tatar language education and media 
(Articles 3,4,7 and 9). 49 
The spread of Tatar throughout public fife was the result of language programme. 
However, this is not hailed by the non-Tatar peoples of Tatarstan, including the Russians, 
since the gradual process of efirninating Russians from the power structures and the key 
economic, administrative and teaching positions has been conducted under the pretext of 
restoring the linguistic balance in the Republic. Although the Russians may not be forced 
to learn Tatar, it was anticipated that it could be very difficult for the non-Tatars to find 
jobs in the future, or they could even lose their jobs. Aleksandr Shtanin argued that: 
49 Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan o iazykakh narodov Respubliki Tatarstan. Gosudarstvennaia 
programma Respubliki Tatarstan po sokhraneniiu, izucheniiu i razvitiiu iazykov narodov Respubliki 
Tatarstan, Kazan: lzd-vo Gosudarstvennyi Sovet Respubliki Tatarstan, 1996. 
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Already from tomorrow the paraggTaph about official business correspondence, 
for example, can be put into effect. That is, you may be dismissed for not 
being able to fill out some form in two languagoes. 'O t, L, 
These language policies expanded the job opportunities of Tatar-language teachers, and 
increased the proportion of Tatars within the intelligentsia in Tatarstan. The expansion of 
cultural programmes and new centres required workers to staff and manage them. In the 
Ministry of Education, the ethnic schools department was expanded, the position of 
assistant department head in charge of ethnic education was created in each district and 
city education department, and there was a vast increase in the number of openings for 
Tatar language teachers. There were only four Russian writers in the Tatarstan Union of 
Writers, which has almost 400 members. There has been Tatarisation of newspapers' 
editorial boards, and the Republican radio and television company 'Tatarstan'. The 
government has created state centres for the collection and dissemination of Tatar 
folklore and for the promotion of Tatar culture. By 1995,1,645 Tatar clubs, over 100 
folklore ensembles and 1,063 Tatar libraries existed throughout the Republic. 51 
The expansion of opportunities extended into the private sector as well. By law, each 
enterprise has to employ a Tatar speaker to deal with Tatar-speaking customers. The 
requirement for bilingualism in consumer services, trade, health care, and state offices is 
presented not as a form of discrimination, but as a citizen's right to communicate with a 
state office in the state language of which he has a better command, and to receive an 
answer in the same language. Despite these changes, most official communication 
continues to be carried out in Russian, because Tatar is still considered to be less 
sophisticated than Russian in terms of its legal or social science vocabulary. 52 
The most politically significant expansion of opportunity occurred at the top. The 
constitution was written to require the President of Tatarstan to know both Tatar and 
Russian, virtually ensuring that only Tatars would hold that office in the foreseeable 
future (Article 108). 1. Spirin argues that between 1990 and 1995 the Republican 
leadership became much more Tatar-dominated than it had ever been. Tatars are over- 
' Cited in Dn-dtrii Mikhailin, 'Tatarskii mozhem "my ne znae'. No mogut s dolzhnosti uvolit", 
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 23 July 1992. 
51 Dmitry Gorenburg, 'Regional Separatism in Russia: Ethnic Mobilisation or Power GrabT, (hereafter, 
'Regional Separatism in Russia'), Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 5 1, no. 2,1999, p. 262. 
52 Aleksandr Kasimov, 'Tatarstan', Politicheskii monitor, no. 5,1993, p. 78. 
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represented in legislative and executive bodies of Tatarstan. For example, 73 percent of' 
the deputies in the State Council are Tatars, while only 25 percent are Russians . 
53 
The Russians are not proportionally represented at the local level either. In 1992, only 25 
percent of local administrators were ethnic Russian, although ethnic Russians form 43 
percent of the Republican population. Out of the sixty-one local administrators forty-nine 
were ethnic Tatars and twelve were ethnic Russians. In fifteen districts, where the Tatar 
population constitute the minority (as low as 29 percent), Tatar officials were in charge. 54 
The process of Tatarisation can also be identified by looking at the change in the ethnic 
composition of Tatarstan's elites, as recognised by Tatarstan's government in its 
publications of Who is Who (Kto est' kto) in 1993 and 1996. There has been a visible 
change in favour of the Tatars in the composition of the Republican political, econornic 
and cultural elites (See Table A4.6 and Table A4.7). 55 Between 1993 and 1996, 
Tatarstan's top leadership became more Tatarised as the a Russian occupying the post of 
Vice Presidency became the Speaker of the Parliament in 1995, while the more 
prestigious post of Vice Presidency was abolished (All of the three top positions of the 
Repubfic became Tatarised in 1997 when the ethnic Russian Speaker of Parliament 
became the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the European Union. While the 
percentage of the Russians in the ethnic composition of Tatarstan's econmic and cultural 
elites declined sharply, the Tatars increased their shares in the ethnic composition of 
Tatarstan's economic (especially financial sector managers) and cultural elites. As Liliia 
Sagitova. argues, Tatarstan's post-Soviet elites mainly defend their group interests by 
using the nationality card when needed, because ethnic differences could easily be 
manipulated by the mostly Tatar leadership of the Republic in order to mobilise masses to 
56 defend Tatarstan's 'sovereignty' as defined by the Republican leadership. 
53 1. A. Spirin, 'Etnokratiia v Tatarstane', in Etnopolitika na poroge XXI veka, Kazan, 1995, p. 87. 54 Sovietskaia Tatariia, 3 April 1993, p. 7. 
55 Evgenii A. Lisin, et. al., Kto est'kto v Respublike Tatarstan, Kazan: Gazetno-zhumal'noe izd-vo, 
1993, and Evgenii A. Lisin, et. al., Kto est'kto v Respublike Tatarstan, Kazan: Star, 1996. 
56 Liliia V. Sagitova, Etnichnost' v Sovremennom Tatarstane: Vosproizvodstvo etnichnosti v 
tatarstanskom obshchestve na rubezhe 1980-1990-kh gg. (Po materialam respublikanskoi pressy i 
etnosotsiologicheskikh issledovanii), Kazan: Institut Istorii ANT, 1998, p. 173. 
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The Politics of Economic Reform and Ptikhvatizatsiia 
Shaimiev's pragmatic policies of Tatarising the Republic can also be seen in his attempts 
to transfer the ownership of the Republican economic resources into the hands of 
Tatarstan's leadership, which is mainly composed of ethnic Tatars. Shaimiev was a fierce 
critic of the 'shock therapy', which was adopted by the Russian Prime Minister Egor 
Gaidar in 1992. Shaimiev justified his policies as follows: 
Shock therapy affected a big proportion of the population and resulted in a t, 
landslide of impoverishment. We therefore decided to change things more 
gradually in Tatarstan. 
57 
Although Tatarstan was labelled as an 'island of communism' opposing the liberalisation 
of prices, the privatisation of state property and the termination of credits to obsolete 
industrial plants, Shaimiev's criticism of the 'shock therapy' is not related to his 
Communist background, but to his desire to control the economic resources of the 
58 Republic. In 1993, Prime Minister Mukhanmiat Sabirov attempted to justify Tatarstan's 
control of the economy and its conservative position towards market reforrns, as follows: 
Why is the economy of Tatarstan in better shape than that of other regions?... 
It is because we retained control over the economy. We are moving towards 
the market, but not in a hurry, carefully analysing each step. We do not 
command the enterprises but we control them through economic levers. 59 
Shaimiev's conservative policies contributed to the growth of his popularity, since 
Shairniev's 'soft entry' into the free market involved controlling prices and the use of 
Tatarstan's oil revenues to preserve the social safety net in Tatarstan. The economic 
policies of accommodating: the masses at the expense of delaying structural economic 
reforms resulted in serious economic problems in the Republican agriculture and 
industry. Behind the reluctance of the Republican leadership in pursuing liberal market 
refonns, one could identify the fact that economic restructuring is very likely to be 
accompanied by high rates of unemployment. Russians are over-represented in 
managerial and skill-based positions, while Tatars are also over-represented in blue-collar 
57 John Thornhill, 'Island of Pragmatism in Russia', Financial Times, 20 February 1996. 
58 Leokadia A Drobizheva, et. al., Demokratizatsiia i obrazy natsionalizma v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 90- 
kh godov, Moscow: Mysl', 1996, pp. 232-243. 
59 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 25 February 1993. 
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jobs, the most likely positions to suffer major cutbacks. Tatars are over-represented in the 
cultural and scientific intelligentsia, a group that has been hit particularly hard by reduced 
government support. Under these conditions, the costs of reform will be bom 
disproportionately by the Tatars. 
While maintaining the interethnic peace in the Republic, Tatarstan's leadership focused 
also on bringing the economic resources of the Republic under Tatarstan's state 
sovereignty. Jean-Robert Ravieaux argues that economic sovereignty constituted the 
essential core of Tatarstan's post-Soviet politics of nationalism. 60 Dufi ng the Soviet 
period, the TASSR owned only two percent of the property located in the Republic, while 
the eighty percent of its economic potential belonged to the ministries of the Soviet 
Union, and the remaining eighteen percent belonged to those of the RSFSR. Therefore, 
Tatarstan's leaders campaigned not for national self-determination, but for greater 
economic autonomy and the control over Tatarstan's rich natural resources. 
Tatarstan's economic policy has been directed to gain the control of economic assets in 
Tatarstan rather than to construct a market economy. In 1994, Tatarstan's pro-market 
groups headed by Deputy Premier Ravil Muratov prepared a programme of market 
liberalisation with the help of specialists of the American Company, 'Monitor'. Basically, 
the program proposed to transfer the control over the enterprises to private companies and 
foundations, reserving to the government merely the controlling blocks of shares of 
strategically significant enterprises. The program also contemplated terminating state 
capital investments completely in all spheres except the social sphere. The programme 
asked Tatarstan's parliament to restrict the government's right to grant tax privileges. 
Moreover, the President was also expected to give up his special powers in the economic 
sphere. Furthermore, the State Property Committee of Tatarstan was deprived of the 
controlling block of shares. The programme declared its long-term objective as one of 
converting Tatarstan into a competitive region by stopping funding of inefficient 
projects. 61 
60 Jean-Robert Ravieaux, 'Tipy natsionalizma, obshchestvo i politika v Tatarstane', Politicheskie 
issledovaniia, vol. 3, no. 5-6,1992, p. 50. 
61 Moskovskie novosti, 24 March 1996. 
The key component of this program of market liberalisation was the programme of 
privatisation. However, Tatarstan's conduct of privatisation could be described as 
prikhvatizatsiia (insider property 'grabbing' during privatisation), because Tatarstan has 
privatised almost 300 enterprises under controversial circumstances since 1994.62 Marie 
Bennigsen-Broxup argues that the Tatar government played the nationalist card until the 
ownership of Republican resources were divided up among the Presidential inner circle. 63 
While rninimising the role of state in the economic sphere, the conduct of the 
privatisation programme enriched Tatarstan's leadership, and enabled them to continue to 
control the Republican economy informally. Consequently, Tatarstan's privatisation 
prograrmne served the interests of the Republican leadership as well as enterprise 
directors, which was also the case in Russia's first wave of privatisation between 1992 
and 1993.64 
Unlike Russian reformers, the conduct of privatisation programme in Tatarstan has not 
divided Tatarstan's leadership into opposing camps. Instead, Tatarstan's privatisation 
programme consolidated the internal unity of the Republican leadership because 
Shainfiev accommodated both the winners and the losers of the privatisation programme. 
For example, although Shaimiev replaced Prime Minister, Mukhammat Sabirov, with the 
more reformist Farid Mukharnetshin to implement the economic reform programme, he 
succeeded in developing his own virtually no-lose version, with Sabirov becoming the 
director of a privatised company. 
The members of Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership were national in form but 
personalistic in content. Their understanding of the politics of nationalism reflected 
Ambrose Bierce's following definition of politics in his Devil's Dictionary (1958): 
'Politics: A strife of interests masquerading as principles. The conduct of public affairs 
65 for private advantage' . Not surprisingly, Shaimiev's politics of economic reform led to 
widespread corruption and nepotism. According to John Kramer, the opportunities for 
corruption increase when 'the government retains the discretionary right to regulate 
62 For the legal framework of these privatisations, see Osnovnye zakony i polozheniia po privatizatsii v 
Respublike Tatarstan, Kazan: Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Tatarstan, 1994. 
63 Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, 'Tatarstan and the Tatars', in The Nationalities Question in the Post- 
Soviet States, ed. Graham Smith, New York: Longman, 2d ed., 1996, p. 86. 
64 Michael McFaul, 'State Power, Institutional Change and the Politics of Privatization in Russia', 
World Politics, vol. 47, no. 2,1995, p. 21 1. 
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numerous human activities while simultaneously failing to delimit with precision and 
clarity the fori-nal roles of public officials. ' 66 
Accordingly, the key positions in the economy and administration were distributed 
among relatives or close associates of the Shairrýev family. Although there has been no 
concrete evidence of personal corruption involving the President yet, his two sons Airat 
and Radik have become very rich owing to their positions in the oil industry and trade. 
Shaimiev's son, Airat Shaimiev, became a member of the Board of Directors of 
Tatarstan's oil company Tatneft in 1996 and still owns 5 percent of the company. 
Shaimiev's nephew, Ushat Fardiev, is the mayor of the oil-producing town of 
Almetevskii, and works in Tatneft's management. Tatneft's Board of Directors include 
several representatives of Tatarstan's leadership, such as the Prime Minister, the 
Chairperson of Tatarstan's State Property Corrm-iittee, and the Minister of Economy. The 
Director of Tatar-American Investments and Finances (TAEF) company is also a member 
of Tatneft's Board of Directors. 67 To cope with the public criticism of the Shaimiev 
family's control of the Republican oil, Albert Shigabutdinov, the director of TAIF, 
defended the Shaimiev family by saying that the 'oil belongs not to the people of 
Tatarstan, but Tatneft's shareholders'. 68 
Shigabutdinov's active defence of the Shairniev family could be related to the fact that it 
is also through his company that the Shaimiev fan-dly maintains their connection to the 
oil industry. Shaimiev's youngest son, Radik Shaimiev, Chairs the Board of Directors of 
TAIF, whose yearly turnover has been about one billion dollars. The company's Board of 
Directors also includes Rinat Galeev, General Director of Tatneft and Nikolai Lemaev, 
the former General Director of Nizhnekamskneftekhim. 69 Tatarstan's government has 
treated TAIF favourably. For example, on 17 October 1996, the Tatarstan Cabinet of 
Ministers adopted a decree giving TAIF the right to buy at an agreed upon price one 
"Ilion tons of crude oil from Tatneft without paying taxes. Only one person opposed this 
arrangement, the Republican Finance Minister, Dmitrii Nagumanov. Therefore, Shaimiev 
65 Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, New York: Dover, 1958, p. 101. 
66 John M. Kramer, 'The Politics of Corruption', Current History, vol. 97, no. 621,1998, p. 332. 
67 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Shaimiev Family Benefits From Tatneft Ties', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 2, no. 36,23 October 1997. 
68 ibid. 
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replaced him with Rustam Minnekhanov, who has been his son Radik Shaimiev's close 
friend. When Minnekhanov became Tatarstan's Prime Minister in 1998, he issued a 
decree requiring Tatneft to sell crude oil to Tatarstan's Ministry of Finance at 350 rubles 
a ton. This price was cheap since Shaimiev had already been complaining that the price 
of oil was too low at 500-600 rubles a ton. Despite this, Ministry of Finance sold the oil 
to the Nizhnekamskneftekhim Company of TAIF even cheaper at 300 rubles a ton. 
Nizhnekamskneftekhim, which turris the crude oil into fuel oil, sold the fuel oil back to 
Tatarstan's govemment at the normal market prices. This is how Tatarstan's leadership 
have enriched themselves through TAIF. 70 
During my interview with him, Prof Midkhat Farukshin, the Head of Department of 
Political Science of Kazan State University, explained the selfishness of the Republican 
authorities as follows: 
Tatarstan's leadership has not been clear about what sovereignty is and how it 
could be exercised. The Republican leaders cared solely for their own interests 
without carrying out necessary economic and political reforms at a time when 
the ordinary people worried about their economic survival. " 
Three months after my interview, Prof. Farukshin summarised his complaint about the 
Republican authorities in an interview with Tatarstan's popular newspaper, Vechemiaia 
Kazan, through a rhetorical question: 'Why in the Republic, so rich in natural resources 
and clever people, do the citizens suffer because of those unskilftil and stupid 
authorities? '72 
Unlike the wealthy leaders of Tatarstan, the largest segments of the population in 
Tatarstan find the economic situation unbearable. In response to the criticisms against the 
Republican economic policy, Tatarstan's leadership pointed out that Tatarstan's 
population lives in better economic conditions compared to other republics and regions of 
the Russian Federation. In fact, Tatarstan's official minimum wage of 350 rubles (60 US 
Dollars) a month, was higher than the Russian average in 1998. However, this applies 
69 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Tatarstan's Oil Has Already Been Divided Up', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 2, no. 38,6 November 1997. 
70 ibid. 
71 My interview with Prof. Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Chairperson of the Department of Political Science 
at the Kazan State University, Kazan, 2 June 1998. 
72 Vecherniaia Kazan, II September 1998. 
114 
only to those employed in Tatarstan government agencies or organisations funded from 
the Republican (but not from the federal) budget. 
The people around Shaimiev, who have benefited from Tatarstan's economic policies, 
have not taken the people's plight into account. 73 Despite the economic problems of the 
masses, there is a growth in the number of state employees. The number of Republican- 
level employees (not counting those working on the local level) has increased seven-fold 
and the number of managerial departments has risen from 18 to 52 between 1992 and 
1998.74 It is clear that the Republican leadership seeks to attain social consent to their 
policies rather than economic development in the republic. 
The Absence of Russian Backlash 1: Patronage Politics 
Despite Shaimiev's discourse of multinationality and the efforts of the intellectuals 
around him in describing his politics of nationalism as a civic version of Tatar 
nationalism, in reality, there has been a persistent Tatarisation of the cultural, 
administrative and economic spheres. Although this process of Tatarisation discriminates 
against the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan, there has not been any Russian backlash yet. An 
explanation of the absence of any significant Russian backlash to the process of 
Tatarisation in Tatarstan could give us more information on the working of the political 
system in Tatarstan. 
Apart from the nature of the political system in Tatarstan, there are two other 
explanations for the absence of any Russian backlash to the process of Tatarisation, both 
of which will be explored in the following two chapters. One of these causes is the post- 
Soviet weakness of Moscow, which will be discussed in detail in chapter three in terms of 
Moscow's capacity to control its regional governments, including Tatarstan. Concerning 
their relations with Moscow, the Russians in Tatarstan, who feel trapped within the 
ethno-political agenda of Tatarstan's leadership, complain that Moscow has abandoned 
73 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Tatarstan Elites Oblivious To People's Plight', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 3, no. 39, I October 1998. 
74 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Tatarstan: Economy Shrinks, Bureaucracy Grows', Russian Regional 
Report, vol. 3, no. 23,11 June 1998. 
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them and left them to the mercy of the Tatarstan government in exchange for Tatarstan's 
compliance with Moscow. The other cause is the socio-cultural characteristics of 
Tatarstan, which will be discussed in detail in chapter four in terms of the weakness of 
ethnic Russians in Tatarstan to react quickly to the sudden decline in their privileged 
position which they used to take for granted during the Soviet era. 
Concerning the working of the political system in Tatarstan, the absence of any 
significant Russian backlash to the process of Tatarisation in Tatarstan could be 
explained in terms of their political dependence on Tatarstan's leadership, despite their 
resentments about the Tatarisation process. This dependence is secured first through 
patronage networks and second through Tatarstan's electoral engineering that results in 
elections without choices. 
Shaimiev's patronage networks, which serve to co-opt some ethnic Russians to 
Tatarstan's leadership, are the main cause of the absence of any serious Russian backlash 
to the process of Tatarisation in Tatarstan. In order to co-opt ethnic Russians, Shaimiev 
refrained from adopting ethnic Tatar nationalism, which might alienate ethnic Russians 
and destabilise the interethnic relations in Tatarstan. Besides, the policy of co-opting 
ethnic Russians served to divide the Russian community in Tatarstan. Cynthia Kaplan 
explains how Shairniev has consolidated the political power in Tatarstan in his own 
hands though his policy of co-optation as follows: 
He [Shaimiev - OFrJ sought to coopt the issue of nationalism from radical 
elements within the radical Tatar community and pay off others who might not 
normally prefer sovereignty, i. e., ethnic Russians. .. - In doing this, Shaimiev 
succeeded in shifting power from representative institutions to adn-tinistrative 
ones which he controlled. 75 
Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership derived much of its power from the patronage 
networks in the Republic. Patronage can be seen as a method of allocating bureaucratic 
positions, access to scarce resources, language rights, educational opportunities, jobs and 
government contractS. 76 Since Shaimiev used these patronage methods effectively, he 
earned the nickname, Babai, the Tatar word for grandfather. However, some Russian 
75 Cynthia S. Kaplan, 'International Negotiations and Plural Societies: The Cases of Estonia and 
Tatarstan', International Negotiation, vol. 2, no. 1,1997, p. 66. 
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politicians resent his patriarchal approach to politics. For example, Ivan Grachev, a 
Deputy frorn Tatarstan in the Russian Parliament, says that Shaimiev has 'the total power 
77 
of a monarch' . However, 
his powers can hardly be compared to that of a monarch. His 
strength comes not from his authofitarianism, but from his capacity to accommodate the 
significant political forces in Tatarstan. On the other extreme, Ravil Bukharaev was also 
equally wrong in arguing that 'there is a democracy in Tatarstan, as all the opponents of 
the President are free to define him as they see fit'. 'g However, the diversity of opinions 
about Shaimiev does not mean that Shai"ev tolerates independent political activity in 
Tatarstan. 
Although there are various small groups of uncoordinated political opposition that call 
themselves 'parties' and 'political movements', their ability to organise and consolidate 
support outside the parliament is quite weak. Thus, these groups have no bearing on 
Shairniev's policy-making. Furthen-nore, none of the leaders of the local parties or senior 
representatives of the all-Russian movements has a substantial political influence in 
Tatarstan. Reflecting the weak nature of political opposition in Tatarstan, Tatarstan's 
parliament does not show any kind of organised opposition either. The parliament is 
completely subservient to Shairniev. Just like in the old Soviet days, the parliament 
generally approves any bill or resolution submitted by the government or supported by 
the President. This is partly related to the patronage politics of Shaimiev. In fact, one 
must avoid quarrelling with Shaimiev in order to stay in office in the legislature or in the 
government. In general, personnel appointments and operational decision-making in 
Tatarstan are strictly centralised. Every manager of not only state-owned enterprises, but 
also of private joint stock companies, knows that his or her future depends on Shairniev. 
Tatarstan's media also finds itself in utter financial and personal dependency on the 
adn-finistration, and the President in particular. 79 
76 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 10. 
77 David Hoffman, 'Artful Regional Leader Slips Moscow's Grip', Washington Post, 16 June 1997. 
78 Bukharaev's emphasis. Bukharaev, The Model of Tatarstan, p. 54. 
79 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, et. al., Politicheskaia sistema Respubliki Talarstan, (hereafter, 
Politicheskaia sistema Respubliki Tatarstan), Kazan: KGU, 1995, p. 14. 
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In order to maintain his 'neutrality' in Tatarstan's politics, which is a vital condition for 
the success of his patronage networks, Shaimiev has refrained from identifying himself 
with any of the parties in the Republic. It is for this reason that Tatarstan's leadership 
established its own political party to forrn its own power base. Initially, Shaitniev's close 
associate, Mukhammat Sabirov, founded the Republican Party of Tatarstan 
(Respublikanskaia Partha Tatarstana) in January 1992.80 When it became clear that this 
party was unable to attract the loyalty of the masses to the Republican leadership, Rafael 
Khakimov, Shaimiev's Chief Advisor established the Party of Unity and Progress 
(Edinstvo i progress) in August 1993.81 This party of power enables Tatarstan's 
leadership to intervene into Tatarstan's politics, without creating legal problems for its 
'democratic image'. 
The ethnic Russians in Tatarstan have tended to support mainly the 'liberal refortners' in 
Tatarstan. The most influential ethnic Russian politician is Ivan Grachev, who is one of 
Tatarstan's five deputies in the Russian parliament. His party, Ravnopravie i zakonnost, 
maintains very close relations with Grigorii lavlinskii's Iabloko Party in Moscow. 
Ravnopravie i zakonnost' has been lobbying for the economic interests of powerful 
ethnic Russians in Tatarstan. This party also serves to unite a number of smaller parties 
and organisations of liberal, human rights and moderate orientation. Among them are 
Aleksandr Salagaev's Grazhdane Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Citizens of the Russian 
Federation) and Vladimir Beliaev's Soglasie (Accord), the local branches of the LDPR, 
as well as a number of social-democratic groups. Radical ethnic Russians from 
communist hard liners to extreme Russian nationalists have joined forces in the Narodno- 
patrioticheskii soiuz (Popular Patriotic Union). Apart from this, the right-wing 
organisation, Russian National Assembly, is the other influential ethnic Russian group in 
82 Tatarstan. 
Just like the ethnic Russian parties, the Tatar ethnic nationalist parties such as Fauziia 
Bairamova's Ittifak, have increasingly become fragmented and marginalized in 
Tatarstan's politics. Being aware of its marginal position, the Ittifak party has been 
go Gaial Murtazin, Tormirovanie Respublikanskoi Partii Tatarstana i Milli Mejlisa Tatarskogo naroda', 
Suverenitet, no. 11,1993, p. 32. 
8' 'Programma Respublikanskoi Partii Edinstvo i Progress', Izvestiia Tatarstana 15 December 1993. 
82 Farukshin, et. al., Politicheskaia sistema Respubliki Tatarstan, p. 30. 
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backing the communists in Tatarstan since 1994. In July 1996, the regional branch ofthe 
Con-u-nunist Party of the Russian Federation and Ittifak formed a coalition, which led to 
the fon-nation of a new party, Umit (hope), in November 1998. A Tatar nationalist 
Galiullin Gabdulla became the Chairperson of this party. 83 
The disunity of political opposition, both Russian and Tatar, enabled Shaimiev to 
consolidate his power in Tatarstan. In fact, the state structure of Tatarstan is based on a 
system of a strong Presidency. 84 The Tatar government works under close supervision by 
the President and does not enjoy much power in practice. The extent of centralisation of 
power at the executive level is evident even in personnel appointments. Since 1995, 
Shaitýniev has appointed the government and all representatives of executive power 
personafly without parliamentary ratification. Shaimiev also sacks unwanted ministers 
and mayors. Shaimiev's arbitrary rule has affected the ethnic Russian members of 
Tatarstan's leadership negatively. For example, when Vasilii Likhachev, the ethnic 
Russian speaker of Tatarstan's legislature, warned that 'at least one ethnic Russian should 
occupy one of the highest posts in Tatarstan if we want to preserve a centrist position, 
stability and security', Tatar Prime Minister Farid Mukhametshin described these 
concerns as groundless. 85 However, Likhachev's concerns were vindicated later when the 
Tatars, following Likhachev's appointment to the European Union as Russian 
ambassador, occupied all leading positions in the Republic. In his place, the Republican 
parliament elected former Prime Minister Farid Mukharnetshin as its speaker on 27 May 
86 1997 . Consequently, the top three people 
in Tatarstan (President, Prime Minister and 
Speaker of the Parliament) were all ethnic Tatars. 87 
Relying on his political influence in the Republic, Shaimiev arbitrarily appoints and 
dismisses the heads of regional administrations as well. In Tatarstan, there are 43 
83 Sergei A. Sergeev, 'Ob"edinennaia oppozitsiia i izbifatel'noe zakonodatel'stvo v Respublike 
Tatarstan', in Osobaia zona: Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. 
Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodn0i Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 
2000, p. 19 1. 
84 Farukshin, et. al., Politicheskaia sistema Respubliki Tatarstan, pp. 43-53. 
85 Robert Orttung, 'Tatarstan's Speaker Warns against Attempts to Remove Mm', Russian Regional 
Report, vol. 2, no. 15,30 April 1997. 
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Regional Report, vol. 3, no. 22,4 June 1998. 
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districts, 20 cities, 21 towns and 897 village councils. Shaimiev appointed 36 out ol'the 
54 heads of district and city administrations as the Chairpersons of local councils. 
Imitating the nepotistic policies of Shairnýiev, Tatarstan's local administrators, who are 
appointed by Shaimiev, have developed some authoritarian practices at the local level. 
For example, Tatarstan's weekly newspaper, Kazanskoe vremia, published an open letter 
signed by 46 residents of the Sarmanovskii district describing the arbitrary behaviour of 
the Head of the District Administration, Anvar Zalakov. Upon becoming the regional 
boss, Zalakov arbitrarily fired seventy people, to be replaced with his own relatives. The 
letter rhetorically proposed to rename Sarmanovskii district as Zalakovskii, since the 
District defacto works for the Zalakov family. 88 
Shairniev's patronage practices and nepotism have been condoned by the media. 
However, Rafael Khakimov evaluates the media practices positively, as if democracy 
functions fully in Tatarstan. Khakimov asserts that: 
In the republic [Tatarstan-OFrj, only lazy newspapers or lazy journalists did 
not criticise the government, the presidency and the president himself. Every 
citizen of the republic is able to establish any newspaper and join any party, or 
found a party of his own and register it as such. 89 
However, the reality is very different from the picture drawn by Shaimiev's Chief 
advisor, Rafael Khakimov. In fact, Shaimiev's regime does not feel very secure 
concerning a small number of nationalist publications, tied to political organisations, 
such as Izvestiia VTOTs (owned by the VTOTs) and Allyn Urda, which means 'Golden 
Horde' (owned by the Ittifak Party). 90 A city court in Naberezhnye Chelny has closed 
down Altyn Urda on the grounds that the newspaper had violated the federal law on the 
press by publishing in two languages - Tatar and Russian - while it was registered as a 
Tatar-language newspaper. Allyn Urda was closed not only because it was sowing seeds 
of nationalism among the Tatars, but also because it was oppositional. Unlike most media 
in Tatarstan, in which criticism of Shaimiev and his regime is taboo, the newspaper 
slammed the corruption in the Presidential Administration. Another case of Shaimiev's 
88 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Regional Boss in Tatarstan Builds Local Empire', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 2, no. 35,16 October 1997. 
89 Cited in Bukharaev, The Model of Tatarstan, p. 156. 
' Howard Davis, Philip Hammond and Lilia Nizamova, 'Media, Language Policy and Cultural Change 
in Tatarstan: Historic vs. Pragmatic Claims to Nationhood', Nations and Nationalism, vol. 6, no. 2, 
2000, P. 212. 
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persecution of the disloyal press was the closure of Kris. Although its owners did not 
have any affiliation to any nationalist movcment, they were subjected to the sarne 
persecution. The reason was that the newspaper gathered 135,000 signatures demanding 
a referendum on the direct election of administration chiefs. It also questioned the value 
of the World Tatar Congress. Thus, Tatarstan's leadership immediately arrested Albert 
Ishkuvatov, the publisher of Kris, of tax evasion. 91 
Several scholars, such as Ravil Bukharaev, rush to legitimise Shaimiev's regime without 
considering these arbitrary practices. Bukharaev goes even further in categorising 
Tatarstan's regime as democracy. 
Tatarstan indeed shows all signs of democracy, although this democracy has 
never meant a 'free for all'. During the transition period, the authorities closed 
only one newspaper and that was the newspaper of the Tatar radical 
opposition. It was closed for inciting interethnic hostility ... and thus 
destabilising the ethnic balance in the Republic. The Vecherniaia Kazan, for 
all the irritation it causes to the republican authorities of various ranks in the 
best traditions of 'unbridled journalism', is able to do so every day. If that is 
not democracy, then what is it? 92 
However, Tatarstan's leadership tolerated alternative opinions only when they were not 
considered threatening. In fact, Shaimiev made it illegal to 'insult' him. However, it is 
very ambiguous to differentiate insult from criticism. According to Shaimiev's decree, 
anyone who insults him will be fined 20 times the minimum monthly wage, or 4 million 
rubles (800 US Dollars). Repeat offenders whose insults are reported by the media are 
also liable for fines up to 7 million rubles (1,400 US Dollars). The fines for newspapers 
and magazines are even higher. The decree states that the offending publication win pay 
93 30 million rubles (6,000 US Dollars). 
91 Andrei Zolotov, 'Tatarstan Closes Down Opposition Newspaper', Moscow Times, 28 April 1998. 
92 Bukharaev, The Model of Tatarstan, p. 156. 
93 Moscow Times, 25 June 1996. These fines were set in 1996 when old rouble was still in circulation (I 
New Ruble = 1,000 Old Rubles). 
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The Absence of Russian Backlash 11: Elections without Choices 
The absence of Russian backlash has also been prevented by the methods of electoral 
engineering, which makes the election of candidates, outside Shairnýiev's patronage 
networks unlikely. Without a history of free elections during the Soviet period, voters in 
post-Soviet Tatarstan have largely been passive, and directed by the Shaimiev leadership. 
A poll taken in November 1992 showed a very high degree of political apathy with some 
communist support due to market reforms, with insignificant support for ethnic Russian 
and Tatar nationalists. Ittifak received 1.8 percent, DPR 3.6 percent, VTOTs 4.1 percent, 
Communists 7.6 percent, while those with no sympathies to any of them polled 66.8 
percent. 94 Despite this political apathy in Tatarstan, Tatarstan's leadership has been very 
successful in getting high levels of election turnouts (See Table A3.1. ). 
Tatarstan's electoral system enables the Republican leadership to arrange elections to 
their benefit. According to Tatarstan's electoral system, legislative elections are held in 
two types of electoral districts: territorial and administrative-territorial. The legislature's 
composition had been set at 130 members with 61 of them to be elected through the 
administrative-territorial precincts and 69 to be elected in the territorial precincts. Under 
Tatarstan's electoral system each voter casts two votes, one in a territorial district and one 
in an administrative-territorial district. This serves to ensure the election of heads of 
district and city governments to the parliament. Although Tatarstan's law states that 
electoral districts should be nearly equal in the number of voters, allowing for a 15 
percent differential, the number of voters has been either above or below these legal limits 
in 114 of Tatarstan's 130 electoral districts. For example, Kazan (District no. 1) had 
813,396 voters, while Elabuz (District no. 38) had only 7,623 in the 1995 Russian 
parliamentary elections. Consequently, rural voters (the ones who generally vote for the 
Republican authorities) are 2.4 times better represented in the Tatar parliament than 
95 
urban voters. 
94 Farid Kh. Mukhametshin, Aleksandr Lozovoi, et. al., Tatarstan: Na perekrestke mnend, Kazan: 
lzdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Tatarstan, 1993, p. 47. 
95 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Izbratel'noe zakonodatel'stvo i vybory v Tatarstane: Opyt regional'nogo 
pravovogo separatizma', in Osobaia zona: Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, 
Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi 
Assamblei, 2000, pp. I 1- 14. 
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Apart from 'special districts' created for local administration heads, 'special benefits' are 
also stipulated in the law on elections. They include the right to be elected to two councils 
(in order to head 'their own' council again in addition to the post of chief). This fight is 
granted only if one lives or works in the given administrative-territorial district, so that 
the 'aliens' will not get any hope of running for office. Moreover, in such districts, 
nobody is likely to run against the candidate supported by Shaimiev. The fight to election 
without alternatives is also stipulated for administrative-territorial districts. Candidates in 
the territorial precincts could only run if they had given prior formal consent to give up 
their current occupation and become full-time members of parliament. In contrast, 
candidates in the administrative-territorial precincts could run even if they intended to 
keep their previous job upon election. It was in these precincts that heads of local 
governments ran and were elected. 96 
Kimitaka Matsuzato thinks that the relationship between Shaimiev and the local 
administrators in Tatarstan's districts is similar to the Spanish and Latin American 
caciquisnw regime in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 97 Matsuzato 
argues that Tatarstan's political system can be conceptualised as a 'centralized 
caciquisnw in which rampant local boss politics is camouflaged by constitutional 
unitarism and by appointment systems of local chief executives. 98 In this regime, for 
Matsuzato, the position of local chiefs depends on their electoral performance. However, 
Matsuzato's argument that centralised caciquismo replaced ethno-bonapartism 
downplays the significance of Shaimiev's uses of Tatar nationalism in running Tatarstan. 
Matsuzato wrongly assumes that local administrators justify themselves through their 
electoral ability. In fact, Shaimiev keeps them in their posts due to their loyalty to himself 
that ought to be demonstrated always. Thus, Shaimiev could need the loyalty of local 
administrators outside the election periods. Besides, as will be shown below, Shaimiev 
has been able to fix the results of elections anyway. 
The electoral law's requirement that a candidate must speak both Russian and Tatar also 
favours Shaimiev's predominantly Tatar leadership against the ethnic Russians in 
96 Ibid., p. 12. 
97 Cacique comes from the Caribbean Indian word for a chief. 
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Tatarstan, who have little knowledge of Tatar. In effect, this requirement has excluded a 
large group of people who only speak Russian. The Russian Supreme Court ruled that the 
law on electing deputies to the Republican legislature violated the Russian constitution 
because it allowed people working in the executive branch to hold seats in the legislature. 
The electoral law effectively violates the principle of the separation of powers. in 
violation of the Constitution, the heads of district administrations and mayors of cities are 
also nominated by the President. These heads of distirict administrations appoint the 
Chairperson and members of izbirkoiny (the election commissions), which play an 
important role not only in registering candidates, but also in preventing observers from 
checking the voting lists. 99 
Empowered by the electoral system, Tatarstan's leadership has generally been able to fix 
elections in accordance with its own calculations. In the March-April 1995 elections to 
Tatarstan's parliament, 466 candidates competed for 124 seats. In the first round 69 
deputies were elected, 43 of whom were Tatarstan government officials or district 
administrators. 4 seats went to the communists, while the party of ethnic Russians in 
Tatarstan, Ravnopravie i zakonnost' and the party of Tatar ethnic nationalism, Ittifak, 
gained one seat each. When the composition of the new legislature was finalised in April 
1995, the State Council was composed of 91 (73.4 percent) Tatar, 31 (25 percent) 
Russian deputies. Only two deputies (1.6 percent) were from other nationalities. In terms 
of their occupational background, 51 deputies were heads of districts and cities. 
Altogether, bureaucrats formed more than half of Tatarstan's parliamentarians. This is 
how Tatarstan came to have a 'bureaucratic parliament'. 100 
These election results reconfigured the political forces in Tatarstan's parliament. After 
the elections in 1995, the Tatar parliament (State Council) was immediately re- 
structured, and the old-guard bureaucrats and the heads of administration took the 
parliamentary seats of the oppositional deputies. Many laws adopted by the old 
Parliament were altered or cancelled, and new laws giving absolute authority and 
98 Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'From Ethno-Bonapartism to Centralized Caciquismo: Characteristics and 
Origins of the Tatarstan Political Regime, 1900-2000', The Journal of Communist Studies & 
Transition Politics, vol. 17, no. 4,200 1, p. 43. 
99 Farukshin, et. al., Politicheskaia sistema Respubliki Tatarstan, pp. 86-90. 
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limitless power to the President were adopted. Even the Constitution endured 
numerous amendments; many articles were annulled and replaced by new ones. 
According to Article 108 of the Constitution, the President could not be re-elected 
more than twice, and his age could not exceed 65. The new Parliament abolished this 
article and adopted a new concept of unlimited, even life-long, tenure of the 
Presidency. In violation of Article 139 of the Tatarstan Constitution, no Constitutional 
Court has been set up for the Republic of Tatarstan. 101 
Following these changes in the parliament and the legal system of Tatarstan, it was 
very easy for Shaimiev to be re-elected as the President of the Republic. On 24 March 
1996, Shaimiev was re-elected as Tatarstan's President for a second five-year term. 
Although Shaimiev publicly urged the opposition to field one or more candidates, 
three candidates failed to gather the 50,000 signatures needed for inclusion on the 
ballot. A fourth candidate, Ramil Gabdurakhmanov, a member of the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation and the manager of a vinegar factory in Kazan, 
collected enough signatures but he was jailed for two days for allegations against him. 
He was released when Aleksandr SaIii had put the matter on the State Duma agenda. 
He withdrew his candidacy after his release, just before the registration deadline. As a 
result, Shaimiev ran unopposed, winning 97.1 percent of the vote. And despite the 
fact that there was only one candidate, turnout in the election was high at 77.9 percent 
(See Table A3.13). 102 Concerning the turnout level in the Kaibitskii district, Derek S. 
Hutcheson noted that '11,722 of the 11,724 registered voters turned out - an amazing 
99.98 per cent turnout. ' Hutcheson ridicules these figures by saying that 'If it had been 
a competitive election, it is not unreasonable to assume that the turnout would have 
been at least 101 percent. ' 103 
Tatarstan's elections without choices have been made possible by using a loophole in 
Tatarstan's Electoral Law. According to federal legislation, all elections in the Russian 
100 Vybory v Gosudarstvennyi Sovet Respubliki Tatarstan, 5 Marta 25 April 1995 g. Dokumenty, 
materialy, rezul'taly, ed. M. A. Sigaev and N. V. NarYshkin, Kazan: Izd-vo Gosudarstvennyi Sovet 
Respubliki Tatarstan, 1995, p. 29 1. 
101 Aleksandr Vasil'ev, 'Tretii srok dlia. Shaimieva', in Osobaia zona: Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, 
eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, 
Mezhdunarcdnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, p. 296. 
102 John L6wenhardt, 'The 1996 Presidential Elections in Tatarstan', Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics, vol. 13, no. 1,1997, p. 138. 
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Federation must be competitive, which implies that at least two candidates should be 
registered for each contested office with the regional electoral commission. Otherwise, 
elections are null and void. However, Tatarstan's Constitution (Article 77) states that 'any 
number of candidates may be listed on an electoral ballot', which can mean only one 
candidate as well. Tatarstan's administrators naturally use this loophole. '()4 
Having established a strong control over the electoral system, Shaitniev does not have to 
worry about their results. For example, in the 28 March 1999 by-elections for 15 seats of 
the Tatarstan State Council, all of the seats were filled, as expected, by candidates 
supporting Shain-tiev. Apart from twelve pro-Shaimiev local administration heads, the 
Head of Shain-tiev's Presidential Administration and directors of two enterprises close to 
the Republican government were elected to Tatarstan's Parliament. These results 
essentially guarantee Shaimiev total control over the Republican legislature. Shaimiev 
commented that, 'The people are showing their faith in us and we shall govern in the 
105 interests of the people' . He acquired the right to appoint 
deputies to the State Council. 
The new registration rules favoured parties and organisations loyal to the President. In 
July 1999, the State Council adopted amendments to the Constitution and the Election 
Law, which further strengthened the President's control over the Parliament. The Law 
abolished parliamentary elections on the basis of Party lists and legitirnised the election of 
district administration heads as State Council Deputies. 106 
The 19 December 1999 elections for Tatarstan's Parliament became another instance of 
Shaimiev's show of power. In these elections, the voters were to elect 122 of the 130 
members of Tatarstan's parliament. The rest were already elected on 26 March, with six 
districts holding runoff elections on 8 April. Before the elections to the regional 
legislature, the newspaper Vecherniaia Kazan, published in its I December 1999 issue a 
list of 130 candidates whom the authorities wanted to elect to the parliament. '07 
According to the final results, 109 of these individuals were actually elected to 
103 Derek S. Hutcheson, 'Postcard from Tatarstan', Central Europe Review, vol. 2, no. 25,26 June 2000. 
'04 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Izbratel'noe zakonodatel'stvo i vybory v Tatarstane: Opyt regional'nogo 
pravovogo separatizma', in Osobaia zona: Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, 
Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi 
Assamblei, 2000, p. 16. 
105 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Shaimiev Supporters Fill Out Tatarstan Legislature', Russian Regional 
Report, vol. 4, no. 12,1 April 1999. 
106 Izvestiia, 22 July 1999. 
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Tatarstan's Parliament 
nephews. 108 
Not surprisingly, three of these deputies were Shaimiev 
Comparisons with Bashkortostan, Chuvashiia and Kazakhstan 
Shaimiev's politics of nationalism in Tatarstan could be compared to the politics of 
nationalism by the post-Soviet leaderships of the non-Russian republics of Bashkortostan 
and Chuvashiia and the independent state of Kazakhstan. These republics have large 
Turkic and Russian communities. Moreover, they have been ruled by authoritarian 
leaders advocating the continuity of Soviet-era privileges of their fitular nationalities. 
Bashkortostan is located to the Southeast of Tatarstan. Unlike the Tatars, the Bashkirs are 
not the most numerous nationality in their titular republic. There are more Russians (39.3 
percent) and Tatars (28.5 percent) than Bashkirs (21.9 percent) in Bashkortostan. This 
shows that the demographic conditions of Bashkortostan's leadership were less 
favourable than those of Tatarstan's leadership for a pragmatic politics of Bashkir 
nationalism in the post-Soviet era. However, both Moscow and the Russians in 
Bashkortostan favour Bashkirisation to Tatarisation. This makes it easier for 
Bashkortostan's leadership to pursue its pragmatic politics of Bashkir nationalism. 
Resembling Tatarstan, however, the republic's economy is based on oil extraction and 
refining and heavy industry. This formed the econornic motives of Bashkortostan's 
leadership in promoting their version of Bashkir nationalism. 
The Soviet-era Bashkir autonomy formed the basis of the Bashkir declaration of 
sovereignty. Bashkortostan's sovereignty declaration guaranteed equal rights to all ethnic 
groups as well as 'realising the inalienable right of the Bashkir nation to self- 
deterrnination'. Moreover, Bashkortostan's constitution states that the republic's 
existence was a result of the Bashkir ethnic group exercising its right to self- 
deterrnination (Article 69) and emphasises that the republic was responsible for the 
107 Vecherniaia Kazan, I December 1999. 
'08 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Tatarstan President Knows Who Flis Deputies Will Be', Russian Regional 
Report, vol. 4, no-47,14 December 1999. 
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preservation and development of Bashkir culture (Article 53). ")9 Furthermore, 
Bashkortostan's language law of 1998 accorded Bashkir and Russian equal status 
without granting Tatar an official language status. 
Bashkortostan's legal framework served to boost the socio-economic opportunities of the 
Bashkirs in Bashkortostan. Similar to Tatarstan, Bashkortostan favours Bashkirs in top 
government positions. Bashkortostan's laws require candidates for the Presidency to 
know the Bashkir language. According to Valerii Stepanov, 67.5 percent of 
Bashkortostan's Cabinet of Ministers and 58.5 percent of the republican local 
administrators were Bashkir in 1997, while the ethnic Russians in Bashkortostan occupy 
only 19 and 15 percents of these positions respectively despite the fact that they form the 
largest ethnic group in the republic (39.3 percent). 110 
Just like Shaimiev, Bashkortostan's post-Soviet President Murtaza Rakhimov rapidly 
consolidated his authority in the republic through his politics of nationalism. Rakhimov's 
hold on power was further strengthened after the election of a compliant legislature in 
1995. The legislative organ of Bashkortostan is the Kurultai, which is made of two 
houses: the Legislative House (34 deputies on a permanent basis) and the House of 
Representatives (146 deputies who have the opportunity to combine their work with 
duties in the executive system of power). Rakhimov managed to have himself re-elected 
in 1998 after refusing to put on the ballot two opposition candidates despite the fact that 
the Supreme Court in Moscow had declared them legitimate. Consequently, he won a 
two-man fight against a straw candidate, who happened to be his own minister of 
forestry. Just like Tatarstan's electoral districts, Bashkortostan's electoral districts 
coincide with administrative districts. This means that sparsely populated rural districts, 
where the population is predominantly non-Russian, have significantly greater 
representation in legislative bodies than more densely populated city districts. Although 
Russians make up 57 percent of the population in Ufa, they run only three of the seven 
city districts. "' There is no strong criticism of Rakhimov's policy partly because 
109 Konsritutsiia Respubliki Bashkortostana, Ufa: Bashkortostan, 1995. 
110 Valerii Stepanov, 'Ethnic Tensions and Separatism in Russia', Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, vol. 26, no. 2,2WO, p. 312. 
111 Henry E. Hale, 'Machine Politics and Institutionalised Electorates: A Comparative Analysis of Six 
Duma Elections in Bashkortostan', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 15, no. 4, 
1999, pp. 102-104. 
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opposition newspapers have no chance of being printed by the state-owned printing 
presses. The authorities in Bashkortostan are harassing local journalists who write about 
corruption and nationalism among state officials. Vechemii Neftekanuk editor Eduard 
Khusnutdinov has fled fearing that he would be arrested for insulting the President, when 
his paper reported on corruption in the oil industry and local trade. ' 12 
Another republic that shows similarities with Tatarstan is Chuvashia, which is located to 
the Northwest of Tatarstan. The Chuvash people are Turkic and predominantly Orthodox 
Christian. Ethnically, they are very close to the Tatars and the Bashirs. According to the 
1989 census, ethnic Chuvash formed 68 percent of the republican population while 26 
percent were ethnic Russians. The closeness of the Chuvash and Russian cultures and the 
lack of a religious divide between the Russians and the Chuvash people makes the 
politics of nationalism a less attractive option for the Chuvash leadership. Besides, unlike 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, the republic's economy is predominantly agricultural, with 
little industry and no significant natural resources. These factors have undermined the 
significance of the politics of nationalism in Chuvashia. 
Although the Chuvash sovereignty declaration begins by stating that it is expressing the 
interests of all citizens of the republic regardless of ethnicity, it also states that it is 
'taking responsibility for the fate of the Chuvash nation' and 'proceeding from the 
necessity of preserving and developing the culture, language, traditions and way of life of 
the Chuvash nation'. ' 13 Furthermore, the Chuvash language law declares both Chuvash 
and Russian to be state languages. It also calls for unspecified financial bonuses to be 
given to those workers who are able to communicate in both languages (Article 3). 1 14 The 
Chuvash government started to implement the language law by adopting a programme in 
May 1993. As in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, this programme explicitly gives priority to 
expanding the functions of the Chuvash language, including compiling a list of 
professions and positions which would require the knowledge of Chuvash language 
knowledge (Article 1), and giving priority to Chuvash-language publishing, university 
education and radio broadcasting (Articles 3,4,5 and 6). 
112 Robert orttung, 'Bashkortostan Cracks Down on Investigative Journalists', Russian Regional 
Report, vol. 1, no. 14,27 November 1996. 
Gorenburg, 'Regional Separatism in Russia', p. 265. 
'Zakon o iazykakh Respubliki Chuvashiia', Sovetskaia Chuvashiia, 27 October 1990. 
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Furthermore, the Chuvash people have been given privileges in the republican 
administration. Nikolai Fedorov, the former Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation, 
became Head of the Republic in December 1993. He sought to control the extremist 
forms of nationalism in the republic. Chuvashiia's post-Soviet adn-tinistration under 
Nikolai Fedorov included only two non-Chuvash in its 13-person Cabinet of Ministers. "-' 
Fedorov became President again in the first round of the December 1997 Presidential 
elections by getting 58 percent of the vote. This time, the republic's mass media were 
mobilised to shore up Fedorov's image. Fedorov's success in his re-election is also helped 
by the fact that Chuvashiia's constitution requires that the President speak both 
government languages. ' 16 
Tatarstan's post-Soviet political experience can also be compared to Kazakhstan, 
which is an independent post-Soviet state. The existence of an independent state in 
Kazakhstan gives the republican leadership more institutional resources to play a 
pragmatic politics of Kazakh nationalism. Both Tatarstan and Kazakhstan have two 
major ethnic groups of roughly equal size; Russians and the titular nationality. Partly 
due to President Nursultan Nazarbaev's pragmatic politics of Kazakh nationalism, the 
ratio of ethnic Kazakhs in Kazakhstan's population of roughly 17 million increased 
from 39.7 percent in 1989 to 46 percent in 1995 while the proportion of Russians 
decreased from 37.8 percent to 33 percent in the same period. 117 Besides, 
Kazakhstan's rich oil reserves makes it comparable to Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in 
terms of the desire of the republican leadership for using nationalism to gain the 
control of republican oil revenues. 
The effects of Nazarbaev's pragmatic politics of Kazakh nationalism could be 
identified in various dimensions of Kazakhstan's politics. Nazarbaev's idea of 
multinational Kazakhstan enables him to play the role of inter-ethnic mediator in the 
republic. The only nationalist group Nazarbaev's regime has actively suppressed is the 
Alash party of Kazakh ethnic nationalism. Despite this rhetoric of multinationalism, 
Kazakhstan's Supreme Soviet made Kazakh the state language in August 1989. The 
115 Vasilii Filippov, Etnopoliticheskaia situatsiia v Chuvashii, Moscow: lEA RAN, 1994, p. 5. 
116 Rashid Akhmetov, 'Presidential Elections in Chuvashia - Martial Arts, Eastem-Style', Jamestown 
Foundation Prism, 20 February 1998. 
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'State Program for Development of the Kazakh Language', approved in 1990, 
required the translation of the entire body of office regulations and documentation 
into the Kazakh language by 1994. Following the implementation of this programme, 
Kazakhs made up more than 74 percent of the highest levels of the state 
administration, while non-Kazakh workers made up 75.8 percent of the total 
workforce of the country in 1995. Moreover, the parliament that Nazarbaev dissolved 
in 1995 had 103 ethnic-Kazakh deputies as compared to just 49 Russians. 118 
Furthermore, in its programme of pfivatisation, Kazakhstan issued vouchers to 
certified Kazakh citizens in order to assure that the enterprises would remain in 
Kazakh hands, since managers and urban workers were disproportionately non- 
Kazakh. 119 This caused a great deal of dissatisfaction among Russian and other non- 
Kazakh groups, particularly in the northem parts of Kazakhstan where the Kazakhs 
formed a minority. To appease the Russians, the Constitution of 1995 removed the 
phrase defining Kazakstan as 'the form of statehood of the self-determining Kazak 
nation' and elevated Russian to the status of an official language, although Kazak has 
remained as a state language. The 1995 constitution also gave the President the power 
to appoint all ministers (except the Prime Minister) without the parliament's assent, 
dissolve parliament in case of 'severe disagreements', and issue decrees in the force of 
law. 1 20 
This comparative analysis demonstrates that Kazakhstan's post-Soviet leadership has 
promoted the most energetic form of pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism to be 
followed by the leaderships of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Chuvashia. The control 
of the state machinery by these leaders forms the main source of their strength while 
the control of the oil revenue constitutes their main objective, with the exception of 
the leadership of Chuvashia, whose economy is basically agrarian. As the Chuvash 
case shows, the numerical superiority of the titular nationality is not enough to play 
the ethnic card effectively. The ethnic card can be used effectively for political 
117 Edward Schatz, 'The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and Ethnicity in Kazakhstan', Europe- 
Asia Studies, vol. 52, no. 3,2000, p. 489. 
"' Azamat Sarsembayev, 'Imagined Communities: Kazak Nationalism and Kazakification in the 
1990s', Central Asian Survey, vol. 18, no. 3,1999, p. 336. 
119 Martha Brill Olcott, 'Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in Kazakhstan', in 
Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce 
Parrott, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 218. 
'20 Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstana, Almaty, Zheti Zharghy, 1996. 
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purposes in bi-national societies when the politicians in power manipulate the 
potential danger of interethnic violence in order to force the majority of the population 
to remain loyal to their 'centrist' presidents. 
Conclusions 
To conclude, the evidence provided in this chapter shows that the post-Soviet leadership 
of Tatarstan has used pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism in order to secure their 
political survival. During the Soviet era, the leadership of the TASSR had a national 
territory, but not the power to rule in this territory. The leadership of post-Soviet 
Tatarstan gained some power out of the power vacuum that emerged in the aftermath of 
the Soviet collapse to rule 'their' republic. Shaimiev and his entourage reacted to the new 
enviromnent by using the Soviet-era regional mechanisms of rule that they knew and 
understood. This entailed their taking control of resources, administering them on behalf 
of the population, and benefiting from the process. However, Tatarstan's leadership has 
been drawing on the Soviet institutional legacy not to defend socialism, but to secure 
their political survival under the post-Soviet conditions. 
In his search for a new source of legitimacy in the post-Soviet era, Shaimiev turned to the 
politics of nationalism in a manner that is very similar to the Soviet-era discourse of the 
'friendship of nations'. Shairniev has stayed on top by promoting neither the civic 
nationalism of participating citizens in Tatarstan nor the ethnic nationalism of the Tatar 
nation bound together by common culture and history, but pragmatic nomenklatura 
naflonalism which demands national autonomy for the Tatars as the only formula for 
securing regional stability against ethnic nationalisms of the Tatars and the Russians in 
Tatarstan. This involved the use of the major political forces of the republic against each 
other. Shaimiev has not only checked nationalist extremism, but has also managed to 
defuse much of the political opposition. His tactic was to absorb the opposition's most 
popular slogans -including sovereignty itself- into his platform. Shaimiev has often put 
opponents' ideas into action. After all, it is always a good idea to foster constructive 
criticism. Consequently, these strategies have been so successful that Shaimiev's 
opposition has been squeezed almost entirely out of Tatarstan's parliament. 
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The Tatarisation of the governing positions of Tatarstan elicited no significant 
backlash from the ethnic Russian people of Tatarstan for two reasons. The first is the 
existence of personalistic patronage networks and the second is the engineering of 
elections. The patronage networks resulted in the elimination of checks on Tatarstan's 
leadership. Shaimiev derives his power not from a political party but from his 
personal contacts in the state. In this sense, Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership has 
displayed a rent-seeking behaviour. It still is in Shaimiev's personal and family 
interests to manipulate their positions for privatising the oil industry, and to keep all 
power concentrated in his own hands. Shaimiev has the authority to issue decrees, 
which have force of law. He has the fight to appoint and dismiss the ministers. 
Likewise, there is no constraint of the legislature and courts on his executions since 
both legislatures and courts are far from being independent. This chapter has also 
shown that Shaimiev uses stability as a pretext for authoritarianism and 'gradual 
democratisation'. Although Shairniev appears to support the establishment of 
opposition parties, his discourse of 'constructive opposition' reveals that what he 
wants is an opposition that does not 'oppose'. In Tatarstan, the laws are so vague that 
they can provide legal bases necessary to close any organisation that authorities 
dislike. Mass media is under strict government control, and censorship is very tight. 
Another factor that makes any Russian backlash very difficult is Shaimiev's engineering 
of elections. In fact, Tatarstan's authorities have consistently rigged elections in Tatarstan 
through taking administrative measures to mobilise the electorates behind their 
candidates. This is similar to the Communist Party control of the electorate under the 
Soviet rule. The elections are not only non-competitive, their rules are also subject to 
change. Besides the limitations on citizens to influence government policies, citizens do 
not seem to be pressing for political freedoms. Just like Shaimiev's regime in Tatarstan, 
post-Soviet regimes in Bashkortostan, Chuvashiia and Kazakhstan have also pursued 
their own politics of nationalism in order to secure their political survival. 
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The next chapter will explore why and how Moscow accommodated Tatarstan's post- 
Soviet rulers and their politics of Tatar nationalism. In order to do so, Chapter Three will 
focus on the strengths and weaknesses of both Moscow and Tatarstan in the post-Soviet 
era. 
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3. Kazan and Moscow: The Clash of Two Kremlins 
In this chapter, we will explore Shaimiev's politics of nationalism in terms of its role in 
enabling Tatarstan's leadership to gain greater autonomy from Moscow. I will also 
examine the development of the policies and attitudes of the El'tsin regime towards 
Tatarstan between 1992 and 1999. This analysis could explain the absence of a backlash 
from the El'tsin administration to the Shain-liev leadership's policies of maintaining 
political power and gaining economic wealth. 
When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, the majority of the Tatars seemed to be 
united against Moscow. However, the 'seemingly united' Tatars had their own internal 
struggles for power. In opposition to the confrontational strategy of Tatar ethnic 
nationalist organisations, such as VTOTs and Ittifak, against Moscow, Tatarstan's 
leadership sought to manipulate the post-Soviet weakness of Moscow to secure its 
political survival in the Republic. Thus, Shaimiev pragmatically opted for negotiating 
with Moscow over the status of Tatarstan in 1992. These negotiations resulted in the 
signing of the Power-Sharing Treaty between Russia and Tatarstan on 15 February 1994. 
The Tatar leadership has hailed this Treaty, which granted so many privileges to 
Tatarstan, as the basis of Tatarstan's stability and a cure for ethnic nationalism in the 
Republic. 
The views of Tatarstan's leadership about its relations with Moscow have been largely 
taken for granted in the literature on Tatarstan's relations with Moscow and the Tatar 
ethnic nationalists in Tatarstan. For example, Alexei Zverev argued that Tatarstan's 
Treaty with Moscow has effectively marginalized the entire forms of Tatar nationalism in 
Tatarstan's political scene. According to this line of thinking, Mintimer Shaimiev 
manipulated ethnic nationalists to obtain specific concessions from Moscow. Moreover, 
having secured his objectives with the signing of the treaty, Shaimiev's priority in the 
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post-1994 period, for these scholars, became one of suppressing the Tatar ethnic ZD 
nationalists who accuse him of compromising Tatar national sovereignty. 
The chapter argues that Shaimiev's pragnmitic nonwnklatura nationalism has been one of 
the defining characteristics of his regime both before and after the signing of the Power- 
Sharing Treaty in 1994. In other words, Shaimiev has not pursued his pragmatic politics 
of Tatar nationalism temporarily until gaining some concessions from Moscow. Instead 
of siding with Moscow to suppress all forms of Tatar nationalism in the post-Treaty era, 
Shaimiev has indeed pitted Moscow and the Tatar ethnic nationalists against each other. 
This enabled Shaimiev to promote his politics of Tatar nationalism as the one and only 
way of securing political stability and interethnic peace in Tatarstan. Shaimiev's policies 
have contributed to the political survival of Tatarstan's leadership since Moscow 
supported the Shaimiev regime in order to contain the spread of Tatar ethnic nationalism. 
Besides, Shaimiev also succeeded in gaining more concessions from Moscow in 
exchange for Tatarstan's electoral support for the El'tsin regime during the Russian 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, these concessions have not 
prevented the Shaimiev leadership from promoting its own version of Tatar nationalism. 
When the relations between Moscow and Tatarstan became tense, as was the case 
between 1997 and 1998, Shaimiev started to politicise the national problems of the Tatars 
in order to pressurise Moscow into accommodating the interests of Tatarstan's leadership. 
The chapter begins by mapping out the negotiating positions of Moscow and Tatarstan's 
leadership concerning the status of Tatarstan in the post-Soviet era. Afterwards, we will 
explore how the Treaty with Moscow was finally negotiated. Next, the chapter will 
analyse what this Treaty says, and the reactions of the Russians and the Tatars to the 
Treaty. In the following section, Tatarstan's Treaty will be compared to the successes and 
failures of the non-Russian republics of Bashkortostan and Sakha as well as the Russian 
Sverdlovsk region in their own power-sharing treaties with Moscow. Shaimiev's politics 
of Tatar nationalism in the post-Treaty period will be explored by looking at Tatarstan's 
politics of electoral support for the El'tsin regime, Tatar diaspora and foreign economic 
relations. Furthen'nore, the worsening of relations between Moscow and Tatarstan 
1 Alexei Zverev, 'Qualified Sovereignty: The Tatarstan Model for Resolving Conflicting Loyalties', in 
Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia, eds. Michael Waller, Bruno 
Coppieters, and Aleksei V. Malashenko, London: Frank Cass, 1998, p. 139. 
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between 1997 and 1998 will be explored by discussing Moscow's econornic policies of 
controlling Tatarstan and Shaimiev's politics of Tatar nationalism. In the final section, 
the impact of Russia's 1998 financial crisis on Tatarstan will be explored in terms of 
Tatarstan's capacity to play a greater role in shaping the future of the Russian Federation 
both in economic and political spheres. 
Renegotiating the Imperial Relationship between Two Kremlins 
The Krernlin in Moscow, which represents the centre of Russian political activity, is not 
the only Kremlin in Russia. There is also a Kremlin in Tatarstan's capital city Kazan, 
representing Tatarstan's claims for sovereignty. During the Tsarist and Soviet periods, 
Moscow's Kremlin had been able to keep Tatarstan under its control. In the post-Soviet 
period, however, the Kren-din in Kazan challenged the authority of Moscow's Kren-din 
over Tatarstan, as the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1991 
deprived Moscow of the main instrument of its imperial control over Tatarstan. 2 It was in 
this context that Shaimiev's politics of Tatar nationalism enabled Tatarstan's leadership 
to renegotiate the terms of its subordination to Moscow. 
In the post-Soviet era, Russia's state power weakened enormously due partly to the fact 
that Russia's political elite was divided over the character of the new Russian state. In the 
absence of mass based parties or social movements, El'tsin concentrated on building a 
vertical system of Presidential power through the appointment of loyalists. Instead of 
using the Democratic Russia movement for building a broad social support for his 
reforms at the grassroots, El'tsin relied on his close advisors. His flexibility helped him to 
manoeuvre on the highly polarised Russian political scene. 3 Consequently, Russia's post- 
Soviet leadership rushed to gain economic wealth by using its political power. Instead of 
mobilising an anti-regime socialist or fascist movement, El'tsin's anti-revolutionary 
revolution generated a vicious cycle of uncertainty and instability. 4 Not surprisingly, as 
2 Yuri Zarakhovich 'A Clash of Kremlins', Time, 14 December 1998, p. 27. 
3 Liliia F. Shevtsova, 'Russia's Post-Communist Politics: Revolution or ContinuityT, in The New 
Russia: Troubled Transformation. ed. Gail W. Lapidus, Boulder, CO: Westview. 1995. pp. 5-6. 
4 Stephen E. Hanson, 'The Dilemmas of Russia's Anti-Revolutionary Revolution', Current History, 
vol. 100, no. 648,2001, p. 332. 
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James Hughes argued, Russia's post-Soviet transition came to be charactensed by intra- 
elite conflicts, pcrvasive corruption and rent seeking bchaviour. 5 
The post-Soviet weakness of Russian state institutions caused confusion in formulating 
Moscow's policy towards Tatarstan. In fact, the executive (the Presidency and the 
Council of Ministers) and legislative (the Congress of People's Deputies) organs of the 
Russian Federation were in conflict with each other even over the nature of the political 
regime in the Russian Federation. While the executive branch advocated a Presidential 
system, the legislature was in favour of a parliamentary system. 6 The power vacuum 
emerging out of this conflict provided the bureaucrats in the State Committee for 
Nationalities Affairs with the opportunity to determine Moscow's policy towards 
Tatarstan. The first Head of the Russian State Committee for Nationalities Affairs 
Rarnazan Abdulatipov argued that Moscow could accommodate Tatarstan's leadership 
by granting some autonomy for Tatarstan. For Abdulatipov, it was Tatar ethnic 
nationalists, rather than Tatarstan's leadership, who had a real interest in seceding from 
the Russian Federation. 7 In opposition to Abdulatipov's accommodative stance, Valerii 
Tishkov, who became the Head of the State Committee for Nationalities Affairs on 3 
March 1992, argued that Tatarstan's leadership promoted Tatar ethnic nationalism 
against Moscow. 8 Thus, for Tishkov, instead of accommodating Tatarstan's leadership, 
Moscow should promote a civic conception of Russian national identity among non- 
Russian, including Tatar, masses. According to Tishkov, aU citizens of Russia should 
enjoy the privileges of Russian nationality, irrespective of their ethnic background. For 
Tishkov, along with maintaining the Soviet-era ethnic republics, Moscow should also 
promote national-cultural autonomy. 9 
These institutional and policy divisions within the federal political leadership gave 
Tatarstan's leadership a golden opportunity to enlarge their privileges and autonomy. 
James Hughes, 'Transition Models and Democratisation in Russia', in Russia after the Cold War, eds. 
Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross, London: Longman, 1999, p. 25. 
6 For the conflict between the Russian presidency and parliament, see Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics 
and Society, 2" ed., London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 139-142. 
7 Ramazan G. Abdulatipov, Ofederativnoi i natsional'noi politike Rossiiskogo gosudarstva, Moscow: 
Slavianskii dialog, 1995, pp. 4-1 1. 
8 Valerii A. Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind 
Aflame, (hereafter, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict), London: Sage, 1997, p. 256. 
9 Valerii A. Tishkov, 'Kontseptual'naia evoliutsiia natsional'noi politiki v Rossii', Federalizm, vol-2, 
no. 3,1997, pp-71-108. 
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Unlike the federal leadership, Tatarstan's leaders had a united position towards Moscow. 
As explained in the second chapter, a Presidential system had already been adopted in 
Tatarstan, with the associates of Shain-ýev controlling the local Council of Ministers and 
the Parliament (Supreme Soviet). However, the main challenge for Tatarstan's leadership 
came from the collapse of the Soviet Union, which made it impossible for Tatarstan to 
achieve its original objective of achieving equality with the RSFSR through an 
institutional reform in the USSR. Thus, Tatarstan's leadership started to demand 'an 
associated membership in the Russian Federation on the basis of a bilateral treaty' rather 
than 'a union republic status in the USSR that was separate from Russia'. 10 Moreover, 
Tatarstan's leadership realised the need to distance themselves from Tatar ethnic 
nationalists, whose secessionist discourse could minimise their chances of negotiating a 
favourable bilateral treaty. 
Shairrkv's advisors Rafael Khakimov and Indus Tagirov played an active role in 
formulating Tatarstan's policy towards Moscow. Shaimiev's Chief Advisor Rafael 
Khakimov based Tatarstan's negotiating position on the ethnic distinctiveness of the 
Tatars. His following argument contradicts Tishkov's position, while clearly in fine with 
Abdulatipov's line on the nationalities question: 
Sometimes one can hear appeals to forget about ethnic origin and not to divide 
people according to this category. These appeals derived from the 
misunderstanding of the phenomenon. Ethnic features are not just wishful 
thinking, nor a devil's plot on the part of 'separatists'; they are destined from 
birth. " 
Indus Tagirov, who is Shaimiev's advisor on the nationalities question and the Tatar 
diaspora legitimated Tatarstan's policy of negotiating with Moscow over the status of the 
republic, rather than fighting for independence from Moscow, which was demanded by 
Tatar ethnic nationalists. During my interview with him, Tagirov argued that Tatarstan's 
leadership had the 'responsibility' of promoting the interests of Tatar diaspora in various 
parts of Russia. This required Tatarstan, for Tagirov, to establish at least a confederal 
relationship with Moscow. Tagirov said that: 
10 Radik Batyrshin, 'Mintimer Shaimiev - za. assotsiatsiiu s Rossiei', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 26 June 
1992. 
11 Rafael S. Khakimov, Sumerki imperii. K voprosu o natsii i gosudarstve, Kazan, Tatknizdat, 1993, 
P. 19. 
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The Tatars mainly live outside rather than inside Tatarstan. Most of the Tatar 
diaspora live in the Russian Federation. Because of its responsibility for 
promoting the rights, not only of Tatarstan's people, but also of the Tatars in 
Russia, Tatarstan should maintain working relations with Moscow. Thcrefore, 
the interests of all Tatars in the foreseeable future lie in forming a confederal 
type of relationship between Tatarstan and Moscow. '2 
During the negotiations, Boris El'tsin and Egor Gaidar headed the Russian negotiating 
team (Viktor Chemomyrdin replaced Gaidar in December 1992). Germadii Burbulis, 
Secretary of the Presidential Administration, was the key person at the technical level of 
these negotiations. His aides were two advisors to the Russian President (Sergei 
Stankevich and Aleksandr Granberg). Oleg Lobov and Sergei Shakhrai served in the 
team as Deputy Prime Ministers. Other members of the team included representatives 
from the Presidential Administration (Boris Milroshin and lurii Voronin), Supreme 
Soviet (lurii larov), and Ministries of Nationalities (Ramazan Abdulatipov and Valerii 
Tishkov), Defence (Valerii Mironov), Internal Affairs (Vitaiii Turbin), Finance (Boris 
Fedorov) and Economy (Magomed lussupov). 
Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shaimiev and Prime Minister Mukhammat Sabirov 
headed the Republican negotiating team. At the technical level of these negotiations 
Deputy Prime Minister Filzia Khamidullin and Deputy Chairperson of the Supreme 
Soviet, Farid Mukhametshin served as the key negotiators of Tatarstan. They were aided 
by two advisors to the Tatarstan President (Rafael Khakimov and Indus Tagirov). Other 
members of the team included Vice President Vasifii Likhachev, Deputy Prime Minister 
Farid Gazizulfin, Deputy Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet Zilia Valeeva, Ministries of 
Foreign Econon-dc Relations (Shaukat Arslanov), Finance (Dmitrii Nagumanov), Justice 
(Al'bert Salabaev), and the following heads of the standing committees of the Supreme 
Soviet; Gelii Kobelev, Aleksei Kolesnik, Rustem Khafizov and Fandas Safiullin. 
The negotiations over the status of Tatarstan yielded their first results on 22 January 
1992, when Russia's acting Prime Minister Egor Gaidar and Tatarstan's Prime Minister 
Mukhammat Sabirov signed an intergovernmental agreement on economic co-operation. 
Although the agreement recognised Tatarstan's claim to the ownership of land and 
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natural resources on its territory, it divided the ownership of Tatarstan's enterprises 
between Tatarstan and Moscow. It did not, however, specify exactly which enterprise 
belonged to which government and in which proportion. The exception was the oil 
industry, which was given to Tatarstan. Russia was to receive its share of oil through 
'mutually beneficial annual agreements'. The two governments also specified that export 
quotas for Tatarstan would be agreed to on a yearly basis. Finally, Kazan and Moscow 
agreed to provide financial support to Tatarstan's enterprises. 1 -1 
Tatar Referendum and Constitution 
In order to consolidate its position throughout the Russian Federation, the El'tsin regime 
started to pressurise Tatarstan into endorsing the Federation Treaty in March 1992. For 
this purpose, the Russian Ministry of Interior ordered that all heavy weapons in the 
possession of the local militia were removed from Tatarstan. In this way, Moscow 
implied that it could use military instruments to subdue the rebellious politicians in 
Tatarstan. 14 Despite the pressure, the Tatarstan leadership sought to hold a referendum on 
Tatarstan's political status, when Tatarstan's parliament reaffirmed its intention to 
proceed with the referendum on 16 March 1992. The language of referendum, however, 
was the subject of heated debate. Radicals, led by the parliamentary faction Suverenitet, 
demanded a straightforward vote on independence, while federalists, led by the pro- 
Russian faction Narodovlastie, were opposed to any referendum at all. Eventually, a 
compromise wording was proposed by Shaimiev as: 'Do you agree that the Republic of 
Tatarstan is a sovereign state, the subject of international law, forming its relations with 
the Russian Federation, other Republics and states on the basis of equal agreementsT 15 
The referendum proceeded peacefully on 21 March 1992. According to the referendum 
results, 61.4 percent of the voters approved the government's proposal against 37.2 
12 My interview with Prof Indus R. Tagirov, Chairperson of the World Congress of Tatars, Kazan, 3 
June 1998. 
13 Belaia kniga Tatarstana. Put' k suverenitetu 1990-1995 (Sbomik dokumentov), ed. Rafael S. 
Khakimov, Kazan: 11 ANT, 1995, pp. 34-37. 
14 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 7 March 1992. 
" Moscow News, 25 March 1992. 
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percent of the voters (See Table A3.5), 16 Fqually important, the turnout was very high at 
8 1.7 percent, meaning that over half of eligible voters approved the initiative. The 
support for the referendum was higher in predominantly rural areas (75.3 percent), while 
in urban areas, where there were higher concentrations of Russians, only 58.7 percent 
voted 'yes'. In particular, 51.2 percent of the electorate in Kazan voted 'no'. These results 
strengthened the position of the Republican leadership vis-A-vis both Russian and Tatar 
ethnic nationalists. The conduct of the referendum with the participation of international 
observers contributed to the legitimacy of the referendum, which deprived Moscow of 
one of the valuable arguments that could have been used against the Republican 
leadership. 17 
The referendum results strengthened the position of Tatarstan's leadership vis-A-vis its 
opponents in the Republic and Moscow. Shaimiev rejected the position of the 
chairperson of the VTOTs, Marat Muliukov, who asserted that Tatarstan was 'an 
18 independent state that deserved international diplomatic recognition' . For Shaimiev, 
Tatarstan should not break its centuries-old economic and cultural links to Russia. After 
the release of referendum results, Moscow was also speaking from a weak position. For 
example, Burbulis simply suggested that the Federal Treaty of March 1992 should be 
integrated into the new treaty with Tatarstan in order to assert Russia's sovereign rights 
over Tatarstan. However, strengthened by the referendum, Tatarstan's Supreme Soviet 
claimed 'fiscal sovereignty' of Tatarstan through the adoption of a law on a single- 
channel tax system on 21 May 1992. Relying on this law, Tatarstan stoppW virtually all 
payments to the federal treasury. 19 
Having established the legal and fiscal bases of Tatarstan's autonomy from Moscow, 
Tatarstan's leadership also sought to increase its autonomy from the Russians and the 
Tatars in the Republic. For this purpose, in May and June 1992, he sponsored two 
Congresses: the 'Congress of the Peoples of Tatarstan' (for gaining autonomy from the 
Russian ethnic nationalists) and the World Tatar Congress (for gaining autonomy from 
16 Izvestiia, 23 March 1992. 
17 For the report of observers from the United States see, The US Commission on CSCE, Report on the 
Tatar Referendum on Sovereignty, 14 April 1992, Washington, DC, 1992. 
18 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 24 March 1992. 
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the Tatar ethnic nationalists). Concerning the non-Tatar ethnic groups in Tatarstan, 
Shaimiev convened the 'Congress of the Peoples of Tatarstan', which was attended by 
the representatives of all ethnic groups of Tatarstan between 23-24 May 1992. The 
Congress reaffin-ned Tatarstan's sovereignty, identified the Republic's 'multinational 
people' as the bearers of that sovereignty, and asserted that stability in the Republic 
would have to be based on the constitution and laws of the Republic. The Congress also 
passed a resolution calling for the promotion of interethnic trust and civil harmony in 
Tatarstan. During his speech at this Congress, Shaimiev praised the multinational 
character of Tatarstan as follows: 
By virtue of its geopolitical location, Tatarstan and its capital, Kazan, have 
played the role of a connecting link between West and East. They have been a 
meeting place of different civilisations, cultures, and confessions. Having lived 
together for centuries, people have worked out their own form of multinational 
intercourse that has facilitated, and still facilitates, the mutual enrichment of 
languages and cultures and deep traditions of understanding and co- 
operation. 20 
It should be noted that although Shairniev's discourse of the multinational people of 
Tatarstan differentiates him from Tatar ethnic nationalists, it does not establish a basis for 
civic Tatar nationalism that is inclusive towards non-Tatar peoples of the Republic. This 
discourse, in fact, increases the autonomy of the Shain-tiev leadership from the Tatar and 
non-Tatar peoples of Tatarstan since it positions the Shaimiev leadership as the sole 
guardian of interethnic peace in the Republic. 
Concerning the Tatar ethnic nationalists, Shaimiev convened the World Congress of 
Tatars (Vsemirnyi Kongress Tatar - WCT) with more than a thousand participants 
including the members of the Tatar Diaspora in 19-21 June 1992. WCT supported the 
state sovereignty of Tatarstan. The Congress undermined the claims of the all-Tatar 
Kurultai of Tatar ethnic nationalists, which met in February 1992, over the national 
agenda of the Tatars. Meanwhile, in this meeting of WCT, Tatar Public Centre (TOTs) 
was renamed as All-Tatar Public Centre (VTOTs). 21 
'9 Edward W. Walker, 'Negotiating Autonomy: Tatarstan, Asymmetrical Federalism and State 
Consolidation in Russia', in Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration, ed. Metta Spencer, Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, p. 239. 
' Materialy S-ezda Narodov Tatarstana, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1992, p. 8. 
21 Boten Dunia Tatar Kongressy. Berenche chakyrylysh, Kazan: Tatar Ministr Kabinety, 1992. 
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Reflecting the growing self-confidence of Tatarstan's leadership, the Republican 
negotiators submitted its draft of the Treaty to the Russian negotiators on 15 August Z: ) 
1992. Implying a confederal framework for the relations between Tatarstan and Moscow, 
the draft defined the Republic of Tatarstan as a sovereign state, 'which independently 
executes all state powers'. According to the draft, Tatarstan also reserved the right to have 
an independent foreign policy and foreign economic relations, to establish its own 
military service and to distribute the Russian Federation's military units within 
Tatarstan. 22 When El'tsin and Shaimiev finally met on 15 September 1992, the Presidents 
did not endorse Tatarstan's draft of the Treaty due to their disagreements over Tatarstan's 
legal status, its obligations to the federal budget and the service obligations of Tatarstan's 
citizens in the Russian rnýititary. 
Disappointed with the draft of the Treaty, Moscow started to take a hard-liner stance 
towards Tatarstan. Replacing Valerii Tishkov, Sergei Shakhrai, an ethnic Cossack, 
became the chairperson of the State Committee on Nationalities Policy on 19 October 
1992. For Shakhrai, the main cause of the conflict between Tatarstan and Moscow was 
neither ethnicity nor the 'tragic errors of the past', but the discord among the authorities 
in Moscow. 23 He sought to reorient his Ministry's work away from searching for 'some 
abstract nationalities policy' to developing concrete measures to implement the 
Federation Treaty of 1992. Underlying Shakhrai's approach were the emphasis on 
preserving the integrity of the federation, heeding the interests of Russians throughout the 
federation, and stressing the primacy of the individual human fights of all citizens. Thus, 
when Shakhrai became also the Head of Russian team during negotiations with 
Tatarstan, he insisted that all 'elements of confederation' in the draft of the Treaty be 
replaced with the principles of Russia's Federation Treaty of March 1992. 
The Tatarstan side responded to the hard-line position of Moscow in kind when 
Tatarstan's Supreme Soviet ratified Tatarstan's Constitution on 6 November 1992. The 
constitution reaffirmed many of the principles expressed in the 1990 Sovereignty 
Declaration. Article I asserted that 'state sovereignty is an inalienable attribute of the 
22 'Proekt dogovora o vzaimnom delegirovanii (peredache) predmetov vedeniia i polnomochii 
gosudarstvennoi vlasti' in Belaia kniga Tatarstana. Put' k suverenitetu 1990-1995 (Sbornik 
dokumentov), ed. Rafael S. Khakimov, Kazan: 11 ANT, 1995, pp. 43-49. 
23 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 9 November 1993. 
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Republic of Tatarstan'. While article 59 stated that the laws ofthe Republic 'are supreme 
over all its territory if they do not contradict the international obligations' of the Republic, 
article 61 affirmed that the republic 'is a sovereign state and a subject of international law 
that is associated with the Russian Federation-Russia on the basis of a treaty on the 
mutual delegation of powers and jurisdictions'. Tatarstan's constitution reaffirmed the 
non-ethnic basis of the Republic's statehood. Article 4 identified both Tatar and Russian 
as the official languages of the Republic; and Article 19 provided for republican 
citizenship, adding that citizens of Tatarstan could also acquire citizenship of the Russian 
Federation. 24 
Apart from adopting its own post-Soviet constitution, Tatarstan also distanced itself from 
Moscow by establishing its own direct foreign relations. Although Tatarstan's 
international contacts with Lithuania, Hungary, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Ukraine were 
strictly economic relations, involving the sale of Tatarstan's oil in return for hard 
currency, Tatarstan's relations with the Crimean Republic in Ukraine went beyond the 
limits of econon& cooperation. This econorr& agreement with Crimea, apart from its 
clauses on the sale of Tatarstan's oil and different kinds of industrial products to Crimea, 
enabled Tatarstan to assist the Crimean Tatars in their cultural development. 25 
The Russian Constitution and the Road to the Power-Sharing Treaty 
From Moscow's point of view, Tatarstan's increasing assertiveness stemmed from the 
discord between President El'tsin and the Russian Parliament, the Congress of People's 
Deputies. To resolve this deadlock, El'tsin went to referendum on his policies on 25 April 
1993. This referendum was not valid in Tatarstan since only 21.7 percent of the eligible 
voters turned out. According to the results of the referendum, El'tsin won majority 
support on all four questions: 58.7 percent indicated that they supported the President; 
53.0 percent backed his social-economic policies; 49.5 percent voted for pre-term 
elections for the President, and 67.2 percent voted for pre-term elections for parliament 
24 'Konstitutsiia Respubliki Tatarstana', Sovetskaia Tatariia, 12 December, 1992, pp. 1- 16. 
25 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 2 March 1993. 
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(See Table A3.6 ). 26 These results gave El'tsin a major political victory against his 
opponcnts in the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) and the regions 
Sensing the growing power of El'tsin, Tatarstan's leadership rushed to sign several 
intergovernmental agreements with Moscow because the delay in signing these 
agreements would decrease the negotiating power of Tatarstan when time was on the side 
of Moscow. Initially, three intergovernmental agreements on higher education; the 
transportation of oil and petroleum products and environmental protection were signed on 
5 June 1993. Two weeks later, Moscow and Tatarstan signed three intergovernmental 
agreements on property, customs duties and defence industries on 22 June 1993. The first 
agreement reaffin-ned the division of assets in Tatarstan into federal, republican and joint 
property. The second agreement confinned that Tatarstan would apply the federal system 
of tariffs and duties. The third agreement established the joint control of Tatarstan's 
military-industrial complex between Moscow and the Republic. 27 
During the July 1993 constitutional conference of the Russian Federation, which was 
attended by Tatarstan as well as Russia's other republics, the Tatarstan delegation wanted 
fast to insert an article on special federal relations into the constitution, and then to 
negotiate the scope of bilateral relations. Moscow, however, wanted Tatarstan to join the 
federation first, and then to negotiate a treaty on the nature of federal relations. 28 When 
Moscow reacted to the Tatar position negatively, the Tatar delegation walked out of the 
constitutional conference. The delegates of other republics, however, continued their 
participation. In this way, El'tsin succeeded in isolating Tatarstan from other ethnic 
republics, which were Tatarstan's 'allies' against MOSCOW. 29 The Constitutional 
Conference ended with the endorsement of a new federal constitution by the 'yes' votes 
of 433 delegates against 62 'no' votes. However, it was noteworthy that only 8 of the 21 
ethnic republics voted for the draft. 
The final draft of the 1993 Russian Constitution had the potential of undermining the 
core principles of Shaimiev's politics of nationalism, since it gave priority to individual 
26 Rossiisskaia gazeta, 19 May 1993. 
27 Belaia kniga Tatarstana. Put' k suverenitetu 1990-1995 (Sbornik dokumentov), ed. Rafael S. 
Khakimov, Kazan: 11 ANT, 1995, pp. 65-73. 
28 Farid Kh. Mukhametshin, Respublika Tatarstan: Ot referenduma do dogovora, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 
1995, pp. 66-71. 
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nghts over collective ethnic riahts, and sought to prevent ethnic differences from Z-1 
becoming the foundation of local or central statehood. Moreover, as a significant break C!, t) 
with the 1992 Federation Treaty, the 1993 constitution equalised the status of all federal 
units, and made them subject to the laws and decisions of federal authorities (article 5). 
In terms of the division of powers between Moscow and the Republics, the final draft of 
the Constitution centralised most of the powers of the federal government at the expense 
of the privileges of republics. Moscow had jurisdiction over the continental shelf (article 
67), rights of indigenous n-dnorities (article 69), protection of human rights, establishment 
of citizenship, federal state institutions, the legal basis of a single market (articles 71,75), 
the federal budget, the energy system, foreign policy, international relations, defence and 
security, border controls, and the organisation of the court system (article 7 1). Republics 
were given the right to have a constitution, while other subjects were allowed to have 
only charters (ustav -article 66). The subjects of the federation might have their own state 
institutions, but article 77.2 viewed federal execufive bodies as a single system of 
authority. Moreover, it authorised the President to suspend the acts of the federal units if 
they contradicted the constitutional principles. 30 
This final draft of the Russian Constitution did not please the Shaimiev leadership, since 
it neither recognised the republics as 'sovereign states' nor recognised their special status. 
Shairniev argued that 'the new constitution would turn Russian into a unitary state 
'dressed up' like a federation'. 31 Shairniev argued that 
Today I believe that the constitution is more decoratively federal than real. If 
you carefully study it and start to live under it, it appears more like the 
constitution of a unitary state. I believe that if this constitution is not 
peacefully changed, it will always be internally strained.... if we are going to 
create a federation under conditions of a civilized society, we have to do it 
from the bottom up. We stuck by this position and proposed a treaty for 
mutual delegation of powers. 32 
29 Rafael S. Khakimov, 'Na konferentsh po konstitutsii', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 24 June 1993. 
3'0 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: luridicheskaia literatura, 1993, pp. 56-57. 
31 Segondia, 9 December 1993. 
32 Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev, 'Conflict Prevention and Management: The Significance of Tatarstan's 
Experience', in Preventing Deadly Conflicts: Strategies and Institutions, eds. Gail W. Lapidus and 
Svetlana Tsalik, New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998, p. 73. 
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Nevertheless, El'tsin still needed to get the draft of the constitution, which granted more 
powers to the presidency than to the parliament, approved by the Russian parliament. 
Being aware of the uncompromising position of the Russian parliament, El'tsin sought to 
solve this constitutional deadlock unilaterally to his own advantage by dissolving the 
Parliament through his decree (no. 1400) 'On Gradual Constitutional Reform in the 
Russian Federation' on 21 September 1993. However, El'tsin became able to defeat his 
opponents in the Russian parliament, who refused to comply with his decree, only by 
ordering the Russian army to ston-n the Supreme Soviet on 4 October 1993. During this 
conflict, Shaimiev was careful not to take sides. 
On 12 December 1993, Russia's electorate was asked to vote for the new draft 
constitution, the Federation Council and the State Duma for its 225 single mandate seats 
and the 225 places from party lists. 33 Reflecting their disapproval, Tatarstan's leadership 
minimised the turnouts for the referendum on Russian constitution and parliamentary 
elections in December 1993 to demonstrate that the popular support for Tatarstan's 
government was higher than the support for Moscow. In fact, the Russian constitutional 
referendum was declared invalid in Tatarstan, because the turnout was 13.9 percent. 34 
There were 71.9 percent 'yes' and 24.1 percent 'no' votes (See Table A3.7). Moreover, 
Tatar ethnic nationalists actively worked against the participation of people in Tatarstan 
in the 1993 elections, since, according to their propaganda, the high turnout could deny 
the sovereignty of Tatarstan. Only the Russian parties in Tatarstan (Soglasie, 
Ravnopravie i zakonnost' and Russia's Choice) had their candidates in the elections. in 
Naberezhno-Chelninskii electoral district, however, elections for the State Duma could 
not proceed because three candidates could not be found to run. In four districts where 
elections were held, the validation threshold of 25 percent was not reached (See Table 
A3.9). As a result, Tatarstan did not send a single representative to Russia's new 
legislature. 35 
33 Richard Sakwa, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 47, no. 2,1995, 
pp. 197-198. 
34 The 1993 constitution received support from only nine of the twenty-one republics. Seven republics 
(Adygeia, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Mordovia, and Tyva) rejected 
the constitution in the referendum on 12 December 1993. Chechnia did not participate at all. 
15 Respublika Tatarstan 14 December 1993. 
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At the federal level, however, the referendum on Russian constitution and parliamentary 
elections proceeded as Moscow planned. The majority of the voters (584 percent) 
endorsed the introduction of the Constitution. The turnout at the federal level was at 
54.32 percent, just above the 50 percent threshold-36 To defend the validity of the 
referendum in republics, including Tatarstan, where the turnout was below the 50 percent 
threshold (13.9 percent), Deputy Premier Sergei Shakhrai argued that 
(t]he constitution has been approved by citizens, not by the component units. 
As citizens have approved the constitution, it is now in force in all component 
parts of the Russian Federation. 37 
Just like the Russian constitutional referendum, the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections 
at the federal level constituted a setback to the centrifugal forces, which were dominant 
mainly in ethnic republics, including Tatarstan. After the elections, El'tsin's opponents 
lost their power in the parliament. According to the results of these elections based on 
party lists, two of the pro-systemic parties with no major systemic quarrels with El'tsin, 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (22.92 percent) and Russia's Choice (15.51 percent), 
fared better than the main anti-systen-tic party, the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation, which received just 12.40 percent of the votes (See Table A3.8). 
38 
The contradictory results of the 1993 Russian constitutional referendum and 
parliamentary elections at the Tatarstan and federal levels convinced both Moscow and 
Tatarstan about the value of a power-sharing treaty. Especially Shaimiev was worried that 
the increasingly nationalistic climate of Russian politics would jeopardise the entire 
prospect for a power-sharing treaty. Therefore, he found it necessary to make concessions 
to Moscow. In fact, the Tatar ethnic nationalist movement had already lost its popularity, 
and Tatarstan's economy was in a deep crisis. The lack of a strong nationalist movement 
and vibrant economy weakened Tatarstan's position vis-h-vis Moscow and forced its 
leaders to sign a less desirable power-sharing treaty. Tatarstan's leadership used the rise 
of Vladimir Zhirinovskii's ultra-nationalist party LDPR in the aftermath of the 1993 
16 Wendy Slater, 'Russia's Plebiscite on a New Constitution', RFEIRL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 3,21 
January 1994, pp. 1-7. 
37 Rossiia, 19 January 1994. 
38 The electoral turnout for the December 1993 elections and the referendum was very low so they were 
invalidated. Pauline J. Luong, 'Tatarstan: Elite Bargaining and Ethnic Separatism', in Growing Pains: 
Russian Democracy and the Election of 1993, eds. Timothy J. Colton and Jerry F. Hough, Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1998, p. 648. 
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elections as an excuse for such a settlement. They were able to pose as the saviour of the 
Tatar nation from the adverse effects of possible adventures of Russian and Tatar 
extremist ethnic nationalists. 
Taking this adverse climate into account, Shaimiev ensured the signing of the Treaty, 
when he let Vasilli Likhachev, ethnic Russian Vice-President of Tatarstan, revise the 
original draft through moderating Tatarstan's demands. As Valerii Tishkov, who was a 
member of the Russian negotiating team, pointed out that even the personal benefit 
expectation of the ethnic Russians in the Tatarstan delegation played a crucial role in the 
signing of the power-sharing treaty between Moscow and Kazan. Tishkov noted that 
Vasi1ii Likhachev, for example, asked me in private to approach Gennadi 
Burbulis and inquire about an opportunity for him to get a Russian 
39 
ambassadorial post in 'one of the European countries' . 
Consequently, the increasing powers of the ethnic Russians in the Tatarstan delegation 
led to the exclusion of Rafael Khakimov, Shaimiev's moderate nationalist advisor, Indus 
Tagirov, the chairperson of WCT and Fandas Saflullin, a nationalist leader from VTOTs, 
from the Tatar negotiation team. This gave a face-saving formula to these negotiators, 
since the final version of the treaty differed from Tatarstan's original draft, designed by 
them. 40 In this way, all of the remaining obstacles were removed from the road to the 
signing of the Power-Sharing Treaty between Moscow and Kazan. 
The 1994 Russian-Tatar Power-Sharing Treaty 
The Russian-Tatar Power-Sharing Treaty 'On the Delimitation of Jurisdictional Authority 
and the Mutual Delegation of Powers between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation 
and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan' was signed by El'tsin and Shaimiev as 
Presidents, and by Chernomyrdin and Sabirov as Prime Ministers of the Russian 
39 Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict, p. 45. Likhachev became the Deputy Head of the 
Council of the Federation in 1997, and later Ambassador to the European Union in 1998. See Chapter 
Two. 
40 Indus R. Tagirov, Beisezlek baskyChlary, Kazan: Tatar Kitap Neshriiaty, 1994, pp. 150-158. 
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Federation and Tatarstan on 15 February 1994 (the full text of' the treaty is available in 
Appendix 1.2 . ). 
4 1 The preamble of the Treaty defined Tatarstan as 
a state that is united with the Russian Federation according to the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and 
the Treaty on the Delimitation of Jurisdictional Authority and the Mutual 
Delegation of Powers between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and 
the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, and participates in international 
and foreign economic relations. '2 C, 
Tatarstan's 'state powers' are delineated in Article 2. Apart from Tatarstan's right to have 
its own Constitution and Legislation, Tatarstan was responsible for (1) the protection of 
human rights; (2) the republican budget and taxes; (3) jurisprudence; (4) the legal 
regulation of the administration, family, housing, environmental protection and the use of 
natural resources; (5) granting amnesty to individuals convicted by Tatarstan's courts; (6) 
property relations except for units of federal property in Tatarstan. (7) the state system of 
Tatarstan; (8) the republican citizenship; (9) alternative civil service in Tatarstan for 
citizens having the right to substitute their military service; (10) relations with the other 
subjects of the Russian Federation; (11) international affairs; (12) National Bank (13) 
foreign economic activity; (14) the questions of conversion for Tatarstan's enterprises; 
(15) the state awards of Tatarstan. It should be mentioned here that as compared to the 
Draft Treaty presented to Moscow, the number of areas in which Tatarstan has the right 
to legislate is reduced from 18 to 4 (family, residential, environmental, and administrative 
law) in the Treaty. 43 
Moscow's powers were delineated in Article 4. Accordingly, Moscow became 
responsible for (1) the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal 
laws as well as their implementation on the territory of the Russian Federation; (2) the 
protection of human rights; (3) the fon-nation of federal bodies of state authority; (4) the 
federal state property; (5) the federal development programmes; (6) the establishment of 
the legal basis for a common market and federal economic agencies, including federal 
41 Togovor Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Respubliki Tatarstan o razgranichenii predmetov vedenfia i 
vzairnnorn delegifovanii polnornochii mezhdu organan-d gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i 
organarni gosudarstvennoi vlasti Respubliki Tatarstana', in Belaia kniga Tatarstana. Put' k 
suverenitetu 1990-1995 (Sbornik dokumentov), ed. Rafael S. Khakimov, Kazan: 11 ANT, 1995, pp-86- 
92. 
42 Ibid., p. 86. 
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banks; (7) the federal fiscal system-, (8) the federal energy, transport and communication 
systems; (9) foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation and 
questions of war and peace; (10) foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation; 
(11) defence and security; (12) the defence of federal state borders; (13) the judicial 
system; (14) federal law of conflicts; (15) the meteorological service and the system of 
standards; ( 16) federal state awards; ( 17) federal state service. 
In addition to their exclusive powers, both parties acquired 23 items that are the subject 
of joint jurisdiction. According to Article 3, these joint powers include (1) the protection 
of human rights; (2) the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity; (3) the 
mobilization of the national economy and military equipment in Tatarstan as well as the 
conversion of defence industry; (4) the questions of citizenship; (5) international and 
foreign economic relations; (6) pricing policy; (7) funds for regional development; (8) 
monetary policy; (9) property relations; (10) the questions of meteorology and calendar 
system; (11) the consequences of disasters; (12) common energy, transport and 
communications systems; (13) duty-free regime for the transportation of vehicles, cargoes 
and products; (14) environmental protection; (15) the social policy; (16) the issues of 
social security; (17) personnel for justice and police enforcement agencies; (18) litigation 
questions; (19) police enforcement agencies; (20) organising the state bodies and local 
self-government; (21) administrative, labour, family, housing, land, and environment 
legislation; (22) the common use of natural resources; and (23) other matters established 
by mutual agreement. 
in order to clarify the specific issues of joint jurisdictions, Moscow and Tatarstan 
concluded intergovernmental agreements on foreign econornic des; banking, credit, and 
monetary policy; budgetary relations; and crime prevention on 15 February 1994. 
Another intergovernmental agreement was signed on military affairs on 5 March 1994. 
These agreements have a term of five years, and with the exception of the budgetary 
agreement, they are all automatically renewed. The Agreement on Budgetary Relations, 
which needs to be renewed annually, requires Tatarstan to send payments to the federal 
4' Hafeez Malik, 'Tatarstan's Treaty with Russia: Autonomy or Independence', Journal of South Asian 
and Middle Eastern Studies, no. 1,1994, pp. 14-17. 
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budget for the implementation of powers delegated to Moscow and for the fulfilt-nent of C5 
joint programmes. 44 C) 
The Treaty did not delineate the powers of Moscow and Tatarstan clearly. Instead, it 
created many ambiguities. According to the Treaty, Tatarstan was supposed to be 
governed by three legal documents: the Treaty of 15 February 1994 and the conflicting 
constitutions of the Russian Federation and Tatarstan. 45 The Russian constitution asserts 
that it is binding throughout the territory of the Federation, and that federal laws have 
priority unless they violate the federal constitution. However, these clauses contradicted 
Articles 59 and 61 of the Constitution of Tatarstan, which described Tatarstan as a 
4sovereign state' and declared the supremacy of Tatarstan's laws over those of the 
Russian Federation. The Treaty, on the other hand, left the questions of what sovereignty 
Tatarstan had and how it could be exercised unclear. 46 The treaty also created loopholes 
for Moscow's unilateral actions concerning the issues that fall within the joint 
competence of both Tatarstan and Moscow, such as the staffing of judiciary and police 
forces (Article 2.17). This contradicts with Articles 143,153 and 156 of Tatarstan's 
constitution that provide for the establishment of an autonomous judiciary and police to 
be elected, either directly or indirectly by republican or local legislatures. 
The most important confusion was on the nature of Tatarstan's relations with Moscow, 
VVWle Tatarstan's constitution asserts that Tatarstan is a subject of international law and 
'associated with' Russia on the basis of a treaty, the Treaty uses the term 'united with' 
and the Russian constitution describes Tatarstan as 'part of' the federation and identifies 
it as one of Russia's 21 republics. Tatarstan's claim to the associate state status, which is 
stated in the republican constitution, implied a confederal approach to Tatarstan's 
relations with the Russian Federation. Tatarstan's leadership could still insist that 
Tatarstan has an associate state status even after the signing of the Power-Sharing Treaty, 
since ob "edinenie is a Russian word meaning both association and unification. 
Moreover, there was no possibility of using assotsiatsiia (association), which is a foreign 
word, in the text of the Treaty. In fact, the signing of the treaty implied a formal equality 
44 Belaia kniga Tatarstana. Put' k suverenitetu 1990-1995 (Sbomik dokumentov), ed. Rafael S. 
Khakimov, Kazan: 11 ANT, 1995, pp. 57-85. 
45 Boris L. Zheleznov, Pravovoi status Respubliki Tatarstan, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1996, p. 205. 
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between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan. Accordingly, Tatarstan considers the 
Russian constitution binding on its territory only to the extent that it regulates the Russian 
State in using the specific powers assigned to it by the treaty. 47 
The problem with these ambiguities comes from the fact that the lack of stable 
mechanisms of conflict resolution could lead to serious legal deadlocks. In fact, the 
Russian Constitution authorised only the Federal Constitutional Court and the Court of 
Arbitration for resolving conflicts concerning the implementation of the Treaty. However, 
these federal courts are likely to be biased against Tatarstan. Therefore, to resolve such 
legal conflicts, the Treaty created a commission where federal and Tatar authorities have 
equal representation. This comi-rdssion was also to be responsible for harmonising the 
legislation of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. In practice, however, disagreements 
between Moscow and Tatarstan have been resolved mainly through informal personal 
contacts between El'tsin and Shairniev. 
Reactions to the Treaty 
Although the Treaty was well received by the politicians loyal to El'tsin and Shaimiev, 
their Russian and Tatar nationalist oppositions criticised it severely. The El'tsin 
leadership saw the Treaty with Tatarstan as an example in arriving at agreements with 
other republics, such as Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan and Chechnia. El'tsin 
himself appreciated the Treaty as a lasting formula that effectively eliminated the threats 
to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. For example, in his annual message 
to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on 16 February 1995 (the fun text of 
El'tsin's message is available in Appendix 2.1 . ), El'tsin stated that, 
The first steps toward the formation of true federalism, in particular the 
transfer of powers from the Centre to the regions, were perceived by many as a 
sign of the state's weakness, an encroachment on its sovereignty, and even a 
threat to its territorial integrity .... With very rare exceptions, the question of 
any territories' seceding from Russia did not arise. We had sufficient 
statesmanlike wisdom and responsibility for this. Treaties between the Russian 
46 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Suverenitet v sisterne federalizma', Nauchnyi Tatarstan, no. 1,1996, pp. 53- 
54. 
47 Elizabeth Teague, 'Russia and Tatarstan Sign Power-Sharing Treaty', RFEIRL Research Report, 
vol. 3, no 14,8 April 1994, p. 26. 
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Federation organs of state power and the organs of power of Tatarstan, C, C, 
Bashkortostan and Kabardino-Balkaria made it possible to raise the level of 
mutual understanding with those components of the Federation and to stabilise 
the political situation there. " 
Echoing El'tsin's position, Sergei Shakhrai, Deputy Prime Minister, who had 
participated in the last round of negotiations of the Treaty, hailed the Treaty as the sole 
constitutional way of removing contradictions between the federal constitution and the 
republican constitution . 
49 However, Germadii Ziuganov, leader of the Communist Party 
of the Russian Federation (CPRF) said that 'The Treaty with Tatarstan is unacceptable, 
since the Treaty means a creation of a confederation' . 
50 To Ziuganov, the mere fact of 
El'tsin negotiating with a member of the federation amounted to the loosening of 
Moscow's control. 
Just like El'tsin, Shaimiev considered the impact of the treaty on the internal situation in 
Tatarstan highly favourably. 
The treaty put everything in its proper place. Let us recall. The nationalist 
parties advocated the full independence of Tatarstan and secession from 
Russia. There were stormy rallies - extremists even burst into parliament. They 
pushed things to absurd lengths - banning mixed marriages. On the other hand, 
the 'federalists' were opposed to sovereignty - let Tatarstan remain as it was, 
an autonomy without fights. I always said that both approaches were 
unacceptable to us. I have always been a centrist, because I am convinced that 
only a centrist can unite people in such a situation. 51 
Shaimiev's pragmatic assessments could be considered realistic. In fact, a radical policy 
towards Moscow was not in the best interests of the Tatars, since this would destroy the 
interethnic: peace in Tatarstan, whose economy is dependent on the Russian economy. in 
addition, the Treaty was a blow to the Russian ultra-nationalists, who advocate 
transforming Russia into a unitary state. The fact that both parties have clearly recognised 
two constitutions gave Shaimiev a manoeuvring room for legally asking that certain 
articles of the Russian Constitution should conform to Tatarstan's Constitution. In fact, 
48 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 February 1995. 
49 Sergei M. Shakhrai, 'Tatarstan i Rossiia: lazyk druzhby perevoda ne trebuet', Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 
February 1994. 
50 Kommersant' Daily, 17 February 1994. 
" Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev, T nas miagkoe vkhozhdenie v rynok', Trud, 26 April 1995. 
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the outcomes of debates over these legal contradictions will determine the degree of 
autonomy that Tatarstan has come to possess. 52 
The pragmatic position of Shainiiev was also echoed by his advisors. Shain-iiev's advisor 
on nationalities question and the Chairperson of the World Congress of Tatars, Indus 
Tagirov, warned the Tatar ethnic nationalists about the dangers of pressing for an outright 
independence. He stated that; 
In certain circles there is an opinion that it is very simple to solve the question 
of the independence of Tatarstan. They believe that for this it is enough just to 
'form an army', 'become a member of the United Nations', 'open embassies in 
foreign countries' and 'print money'. Who on earth does not know this? Who 
does not wish it? The problem is how to achieve this. And if someone naively 
believes that all this is simple and easy, that person is deeply mistaken. This 
matter requires high professionalism and the presence of special conditions 
that are lacking today and will be lacking tomorrow. One would always 
remember this, since every mistake may spell a trag; edy for our nation and not 
for it alone. 53 
A criticism of the Treaty among Tatarstan's leadership, albeit in a moderate form, came 
from Shaimiev's Chief Advisor, Rafael Khakimov, who had participated in the 
negotiations with Moscow. This was not very surprising since Khakimov made this 
unusual public criticism of Shaimiev's policies when Shaimiev started to cool his 
relations with Khakimov in the aften-nath of the signing of the Treaty. Khakimov asserted 
that a better treaty could have been signed if Shaimiev had stuck to the objective of 
sovereignty. Moreover, Khakimov reiterated his well-known stereotypes about post- 
Soviet Russia's imperial mentality. He claimed that the Treaty was signed due to 
Tatarstan's 'fear of social and economic problems, fear of chauvinism appearing in 
Russia and political instability prevailing in that country'. 54 In addition to these 
criticisms, Khakimov also claimed that it would be better if the treaty was ratified by the 
parliaments of the Russian Federation and Tatarstan. However, Sergei Shakhrai had 
already argued that '[tlhis treaty does not require ratification, so as not to give the illusion 
15 
of its being an international legal document'. During my interview with Rafik 
Abdurakhmanov, Chairperson of the Volga-Ural Centre for Conflict Regulation, he 
52 Oktay F. Tanrisever, 'The Impact of the 1994 Tatar-Russian Power Sharing Treaty on the Formation 
of Post-Soviet Tatar National Identity', Slovo, vol. 13, no. 1,200 1, p. 54. 
53 Indus R. Tagirov, 'Natsional'noe dvizhenie: Ego proshloe, nastoiashchee i budushchee', Tatarstan, 
nos. 3-4,1995, p. 8. 
54 vatanim Tatarstan, 30 March 1994. 
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argued that the lack of ratification of the Treaty made '[tlhe Treaty a gentlemen's rather 
than a judicial agreement. Therefore, it was not ratified by the respective parliaments'. 56 
Unlike the Republican leadership, many Tatar ethnic nationalists viewed the Treaty as a 
betrayal of Tatar interests by the President of Tatarstan. 57 Tatar nationalists from radical 
Tatar ethnic nationalist party, Ittijýik, calling for outright independence of Tatarstan, to 
the moderate Tatar ethnic nationalist organisation, VTOTs, which calls for the highest 
possible autonomy for Tatarstan in the Russian Federation, branded Shaitniev as a traitor 
(The formation of these Tatar nationalist organisations was discussed in Chapter One. 
Their development and post-Soviet weaknesses will be discussed in Chapter Four). They 
nicknamed Shairyfiev as Shah Gali, the Kazan Khan who surrendered Kazan to the 
Russians in the sixteenth century. This Tatar nationalist position was evident in a letter by 
Zulfat Hakim, a Tatar writer, to Shaimiev: 
President, 
This treaty... will bring no blessings to the people of Tatarstan. On the 
contrary, tragically, it has confirmed the subjugation of Kazan to Moscow. 
It is the first time in our history that a document, legalizing the rule of Russia 
over Tatarstan, has been signed. It is a crime against our ancestors, a crime 
against the nation. To accept this yoke is a betrayal of our forefathers who 
fought to defend Kazan in 1552... 
President, if you do not have the strength to fight, if you are too old for the 
struggle, you must go. 58 
The ethnic Russian politicians in Tatarstan, such as Ivan Grachev, hailed the Treaty as a 
victory. Grachev stated that the Treaty normalised the political situation in the 
Republic. 5') In fact, the Tatar or Russian ethnic nationalist positions were not popular 
among the majority of the Tatars and the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan. Leokadia 
Drobizheva, in her survey of the attitudes of ordinary people towards the Treaty found 
that almost 60 percent of Tatars and nearly 70 percent of Russians approved of the Treaty 
in 1996. About 30 percent of Russians and slightly over 30 percent of Tatars could not 
55 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 18 February 1994. 
56 My interview with Rafik M. Abdurakhmanov, Chairperson of the Volga-Ural Centre for Conflict 
Regulation, Kazan, I June 1998. 
Kasym Fasakhov, 'Kem faidasyna? Shartname Rossiia - Tatarstan', Shehri Kazan, 5 April 1994. 
Quoted in Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, 'Tatarstan and the Tatars', in The Nationalities Question in the 
Post-Soviet States, ed. Graham Smith, New York: Longman, 2"' ed., 1996, p. 87. 
59 Ivan D. Grachev, 'Politicheskaia situatsiia v Respubliki Tatarstan razvivaetsiia normal'no', 
Nezavisimaia gazeta. 23 April 1994. 
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answer, and only 10 percent of Tatars and 2 percent of Russians disapproved. "" The 
weakness of ethnic nationalist movements in Tatarstan will he discussed in Chapter four. 
Comparisons with Bashkortostan, Sakha and Sverdlovsk 
The main difficulty in identifying the originality of Tatarstan's Treaty with Moscow 
stems from the tendency that scholars, such as Kathleen M. Dowley, have focused mainly 
on the similarities in regional government strategies of striking the federal bargain in 
Russia. 61 According to Daniel S. Treisman, just like Tatarstan's leaders, local leaders of 
other regions used the demands for greater autonomy as a smokescreen to maintain 
power or increase revenues. 62 Criticising the position of Treisman, Dmitry Gorenburg 
argues that ethnic leaders secretly pressed for ethnic revival programmes while openly 
stressing the economic dimension of their policies. 63 Yet, both scholars have not explored 
the differences in the politics of nationalism in Russia's regions. In fact, Moscow's 
treaties with various non-Russian and Russian regions have different motivations and 
nuances. These differences could be shown by comparing Tatarstan's position to the 
economically resource-rich non-Russian republics of Bashkortostan and Sakha as well as 
Sverdlovsk, which is an ethnically Russian region. 
Bashkortostan's rich natural resources and a strong industrial base permitted a high 
degree of economic self-sufficiency that could be used to press for sovereignty. However, 
as discussed in Chapter Two, ethnic Bashkirs were in too weak a position to publicly 
press claims for self-determination because of their demographic status as only the third 
largest ethnic group in the Republic. Therefore, Bashkortostan's Murtaza Rakhimov has 
not challenged Moscow as strongly as Shaimiev. Instead of relying on political demands, 
such as the realisation of an associated state status for BaShkortostan, as was the case 
6" Leokadia M. Drobizheva, et. al., Demokratizatsiia i obrazy natsionalizma v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 90- 
kh godov, Moscow: Mysl', 1996, p. 78. 
6' Kathleen M. Dowley, 'Striking the Federal Bargain in Russia: Comparative Regional Government 
Strategies', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 3 1, no. 4,1998, pp. 364-366. 
62 Daniel S. Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a 
Postcommunist Order', World Politics, vol. 41, no. 1,1997, p. 249. 
63 Dn-dtry Gorenburg, 'Regional Separatism in Russia: Ethnic Mobilisation or Power GrabT, Europe- 
Asia Studies, vol. 5 1, no. 2,1999, p. 269. 
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with Tatarstan's leadership, focused on increasing oil export quotas and hard currency 
revenues, and establishing a one-channel budget systern. 64 
Bashkortostan signed its bilateral treaty with Moscow six months after Tatarstan on 3 
August 1994. The Treaty recognises Bashkortostan as a 'sovereign state' inside the 
Russian Federation, with the right to conclude international agreements. Bashkortostan 
also secured several privileges in the collection of taxes, the exploitation of the 
Republican natural resources and the control of the oil industry. In exchange for being 
offered certain tax benefits in this Treaty, just like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan has 
abandoned its single-channel tax system (by which Bashkortostan could unilaterally halt 
the flow of taxes collected on their territory to the federal budget) in favour of a multi- 
channel system of taxation. 65 
As in Tatarstan, the Republican leadership depicted the bilateral treaty as its main 
achievement, which enabled Bashkortostan to develop its relations with foreign states 
and to preserve inter-ethnic peace in the republic. 66 After the signing of the Treaty, 
Bashkortostan's President Murtaza Rakhimov said that '[Un the end, we got even more 
power away from Moscow than Tatarstan did'. 67 Ironically, the greater sovereignty of 
Bashkortostan served the interests of both Bashkortostan's former conu-nunist 
nonwnklatura leadership and Moscow, which acted rationally by dividing its potential 
opponents (Tatarstan and Bashkortostan) by rewarding both sides in a way that they 
could counterbalance each other. Given the weakness of anti-Moscow nationalist 
movement among the Bashkirs and the Bashkir tendency to see Moscow as their tactical 
ally vis-A-vis Tatarstan (This position could be seen in the Bashkir support for and the 
Tatar criticism of the Soviet decision to create the Tatar ASSR and the Bashkir ASSR 
instead of a Tatar-Baskir Confederation where the Tatars were in majority in 1920), it 
becomes clear why Moscow treated Bashkortostan more positively than Tatarstan. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Togovor Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Respubliki Bashkortostan o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniia i 
vzaimnom delegirovanii polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i 
organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti Respubliki Bashkortostan', in Federalizin vlasti i vlast'jederalizrna, 
eds. Aleksandr N. Arinin and Mikhail N. Guboglo, Moscow: Inteltekh, 1997, pp. 259-264. 
66 11dus G. Ilishev, 'Russian Federalism: Political, Legal and Ethnolingual Aspects -A View from the 
Republic of Bashkortostan', Nationalities Papers, vol. 26, no. 4,1998, pp. 723-759. 
67 Segodnia, 4 August 1994. 
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Although Sakha (lakutiia) is Russia's largest federal component in ternis ofits area, it has 
not been as effective as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in using nationalism to gain more 
concessions from Moscow. Sakha's two main nationalist groups, the moderate umbrella 
group Sakha Oinuk (The Sakha People) and the more radical Sakha Keskile (Sakha 
Perspective), gave full support to Mikhail Nikolaev as the republic's first President. They 
backed Nikolaev as a co-ethnic (although his mother was Russian, Nikolaev considered 
himself a Sakha) who fulfilled the requirement that the President be able to speak 
Sakha . 
68 The federal and Salcha leaders seek to gain the control of Sakha's diamond 
industry, which produces 98 percent of Russia's diamonds. Sakha gained concessions 
from Moscow when El'tsin designated the Sakha government as the owner of the 
diamond mines in the republic. Additionally, in a treaty with Moscow, which was signed 
on 31 March 1992, Sakha won the right to export 20 percent of its diamond production. 
This money went into a special fund personally controlled by Nikolaev. Similar to the 
Tatarstan case, the essence of Sakha strategy has been to barter political support for 
El'tsin for increased autonomy and sovereignty. To this purpose, Nikolaev developed a 
strong relationship with El'tsin. Meanwhile, Nikolaev also played El'tsin off against the 
Russian parliament, thereby using the struggle in Moscow to maximise Sakha's role 
within the diamond industry. 69 
Just like Shain-dev, Nikolaev has used the Sakha ethnic nationalist movement to gain 
concessions from Moscow. In order to strengthen his position during Sakha's 
negotiations with El'tsin over the republic's status in the federation structure, Nikolaev 
stated that 'he acted under heavy pressure from Sakha Omuk and that some decisions of 
Sakha's parliament were made against his Will. 970 Sakha signed a power-sharing treaty 
and 15 separate agreements with Moscow on 29 June 1995. The Treaty treated Sakha 
relatively better than most other republics through special bilateral concessions. The 
Treaty granted Sakha the right to establish its own taxes and duties, and to create and use 
a fund for precious metals and stones (Article 1.1). Like Tatarstan, Sakha has the right to 
engage in external economic activity. The Sakha treaty is unique in that it establishes 
68 Marjorie Mandelstarn Balzer and Uliana Vinokurova, 'Nationalism, Interethnic Relations and 
Federalism: The Case of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia)', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 48, no. 1,1996, 
pp. 105-106. 
0 Daniel R. Kempton, 'The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of Centre-Periphery Relations 
in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 48, no. 4,1996, pp. 592-595. 
70 Anatoly M. Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of 
independent States, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995, p. 183. 
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joint federal and republic jurisdiction in developing budgetary federalism, creating 
special (budget and off-budget) programs and funds (Article 2.2), co-ordinating the 
creation of federal state reserves, agreeing on export quotas of precious metals and other 
strategic raw matefials, and developing and jointly using the resources of the continental 
shelf . 
71 
Sverdlovsk, which is located in the Urals, is an ethnically Russian region. It is one of 
Russia's most productive regions for the extraction and processing of metals, including 
iron, steel, aluminium, nickel and copper. The region produces around 5 percent of 
Russia's total industrial output. The governor of Sverdlovsk region in 1993 was Eduard 
Rossel, an ethnic German, who sought to use the greater autonomy as a safe haven for the 
econon-dc: and political actions of the local elite. However, when Rossel joined 
Sverdlovsk's regional parliament in officially proclaiming that the region became the 
'Ural Republic' on 27 October 1993, El'tsin not only dissolved this republic but also 
dismýissed Rossel on 9 November 1993. Rossel again became Sverdlovsk's governor by 
taking over 60 percent of the vote in the second round of Russia's first popular 
72 gubernatorial elections in August 1995. 
El'tsin's need for the support of Rossel's 'Transformation of the Urals Movement' in the 
upcoming Presidential elections in June 1996 played an important role in the signing of 
the power-sharing treaty between Moscow and Sverdlovsk on 12 January 1996. The 
treaty established that Moscow and Sverdlovsk would come to an agreement on the 
amount of revenue collected on the territory to be allocated for federal taxes. As a result, 
Sverdlovsk was able to reduce its tax burden to the centre from 75 percent to roughly 25 
percent. The Sverdlovsk treaty is the first case of Moscow's bilateral treaty with a 
Russian region seeking to acquire the same rights as the republics enjoy. For the first 
time, a Russian region was treated as privileged as a non-Russian republic, such as 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. In fact, the Sverdlovsk treaty contains a number of joint 
competences not listed in the federal constitution, such as the 'regulation of matters 
related to processing and use of precious metals, gems and their products in 
71 'Dogovor o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniia i polnornochii mezhdu organarni gosudarstvennoi 
vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organarni gosudarstvennoi vlasti Respubliki Sakha (lakutiia)', in 
Federalizm vlasti i vlast'federalizma, eds. Aleksandr N. Arinin and Mikhail N. Guboglo, Moscow: 
Inteltekh, 1997, pp. 270-276. 
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enterprises located in Sverdlovsk oblast', or the article on 'alternative forms of civil 
service' (as in the treaties with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan). 73 
This Treaty with Sverdlovsk shows that Moscow started to push for equalising the 
positions of Russian regions and non-Russian republics in 1996 not by downgrading 
the status of the republics, which would be very problematic given the weakness of 
Moscow in the post-Soviet era, but by upgrading the status of Russian regions. A 
unique provision of this treaty is the requirement that the oblast's laws be brought into 
conformity with the treaty. While the earlier treaties with republics were compensations 
for the loyalty of their republican leaders to Moscow, Sverdlovsk's treaty with Moscow 
actually legitin-dsed benefits received by the signatories, and led to an extra-constitutional 
74 change in the status of the Federation subjects . Although this trend could 
have moved 
Russia from being a constitutional federation to a treaty-based federation, Vladin-dr 
Putin's federal reforms of 2000, which are discussed in Chapter Five, have reversed these 
centrifugal trends, and centralised the federation structure. 
This comparative analysis shows that Moscow accommodated these republics for 
different reasons. Tatarstan gained more concessions from Moscow than any of these 
federal units because of its effective use of economic, political and ethnic factors in its 
negotiations with Moscow. Moscow granted more concessions to Bashkortostan than 
Sakha and Sverdlovsk not because of Bashkortostan negotiation skills but because 
Moscow wanted to establish good relations with this republic in order to counterbalance 
Tatarstan's influence in the Middle Volga region. Sakha's relations with Moscow seem to 
be characterised by the politics of diamond industry in Sakha, where Russians play the 
most important role. Moscow's Treaty with Sverdlovsk aimed to equalise the status of 
rich Russian regions with that of non-Russian Republics so that Russian regions could 
counterbalance the autonomy-minded republics, such as Tatarstan. Contrary to this 
calculation of Moscow, however, greater decentralisation of power from Moscow to 
72 Anatolii D. Kirillov, B. Kirillov and A. Ryzhkov, Vybory pervogo gubernatora sverdlovskoi oblasti, 
Ekaterinburg: Ural politicheskii, 1995, p. 5. 
73 Togovor o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniia i polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi 
vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organarni gosudarstvennoi vlasti Sverdlovskoi oblasti', in Federalizm 
Wasti i viast'federalizma, eds. Aleksandr N. Arinin and Mikhail N. Guboglo, Moscow: Inteltekh, 1997, 
pp. 313-319. 
74 Gerald M. Easter, 'Redefining Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation: Sverdlovsk 
Oblast', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 4,1997, pp. 628-633. 
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regions is in the interest of Tatarstan since this could weaken Moscow's capacity to Z-- 
check the behaviour of Tatarstan's leadership. 
Tatarstan's Support for El'tsin in Exchange for Greater Autonomy (1994-1996) 
After the signing of Tatarstan's Power-Sharing Treaty with Moscow, a new chapter was 
opened in Tatarstan's relations with Moscow. According to Shairtiiev, the signing of the 
Treaty was not the end of Tatarstan's drive towards greater autonomy for Tatarstan. On 
the contrary, it was just the beginning of a long process. He stated this point as follows: 
You know, when we signed the treaty, it was as if a weight fell from our 
shoulders. Nevertheless, I said: 'Boris Nikolaevich, Tatarstan will not stop at 
this'. The president looked at me in surprise: 'But we have just signed a 
treaty'. I explained: 'If we want Russia to be strong, we must set about 
decentralising the economy and give more rights to the localities'. The centre 
even now wants to keep everything in its own hands. " 
In the post-Treaty period, Tatarstan's strategy in its relations with Moscow was to give 
political support to El'tsin in return for gaining greater autonomy. In this atmosphere, 
Shaimiev agreed to sign the El'tsin-sponsored 'Civic Accord' on declaring loyalty to the 
Russian Constitution in April 1994. Meanwhile, Tatarstan's success in gaining a special 
status in the federation structure and the total defiance of the federal authority by 
Chechnia strengthened the hawkish politicians in Moscow. Consequently, Nikolai 
Egorov, an ethnic Cossack, who supported Moscow's Chechen policy strongly, replaced 
Sergei Shakhrai, as the Federal Minister of Nationality and Regional Policies on 16 May 
1994.76 
To develop the joint mechanisms for implementing the provisions of the Treaty, El'tsin 
visited Kazan from 30 May-I June 1994.77 Both Presidents agreed to create a bilateral 
commission for monitoring the implementation of the Treaty. According to the 
agreement, Shakhrai would head the Commission for Russia and Vice-President Vasilii 
" Mintinver Sh. Shaimiev, 'U nas miagkoe vkhozhdenie v rynok', Trud, 26 April 1995, p-3. 
76 The hawkish minister Egorov was replaced by Viacheslav Mikhailov, who favoured a peaceful 
settlement to the Chechen war, on 5 July 1995. 
77 Moscow Times, 31 May 1994. 
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78 
Likhachev would do the same for Tatarstan . It was also agreed that a 'Supervisory 
Committee for the Implementation of the Treaty' would be headed by Tatarstan's Prime 
Minister Sabirov and Russia's First Deputy Pfime Minister Oleg Soskovets. Meanwhile, 
Nail Aminov, Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Federation State Committee for 
Nationalities Affairs, becarne Tatarstan's plenipotentiary representative to the Russian 
Federation. Tatarstan's Moscow representative office was to employ 18 people; including 
two deputies, a business manager, and economic and foreign departments. 79 
Tatarstan's leadership took a concrete step in developing its relations with Moscow, when 
the elections for the federal legislature were held in Tatarstan on 13 March 1994 despite 
the Tatar nationalist calls for another boycott. The high turnout, which was at 58.5 
percent, demonstrated a remarkable endorsement of Tatarstan's leadership when 
contrasted with the 13.9 percent turnout in the December 1993 constitutional referendum 
and parliamentary elections. Shaimiev, with 91.2 percent of the valid ballots, and 
Tatarstan's Supreme Soviet Chairperson, Farid Mukhametshin, with 71.1 percent of the 
votes, became deputies to the Council of the Federation. The elections to the State Duma 
were held in all of the five districts. According to the results of the elections, two seats 
went to the candidates supported by Shaimiev's party Edinstvo i progress (Unity and 
Progress), two to the communists and only one seat went to the pro-Moscow local 
electoral bloc, Equal Rights and Legality (Ravnopravie i zakonnost'). In terms of their 
ethnic origins, of the five deputies elected to the Duma, three (Valentin Mikhailov, 
Gennadii Egorov and Oleg Morozov) were ethnic Russian, one was Tatar (Vladimir 
Altykhov) and one was Jewish (Gabdulvakhid Bagautdinov) (See Table A3.10). 80 
The growth in election turnout in Tatarstan should be underlined since it reflected the 
hold of Tatarstan's leadership over the electorate in Tatarstan. If we look at the previous 
elections, a similar pattern could be identified. When Sharniev was elected as Tatarstan's 
President on 12 June 199 1, the turnout was at 63.4 percent, which was clearly higher than 
the turnout for the 12 June 1991 Russian Presidential elections in Tatarstan, which was at 
78 Shakhrai was replaced by former First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Potanin in January 1997. 
Laura Belin, 'Potanin Appointed Head of Russian-Tatar Commission on Power Sharing', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 2, no. 4,29 January 1997. 
79 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 28 June 1994, p. 6. 
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36.59 percent (The Russia-wide turnout for the Russian Presidential elections was 74.66 
percent). During the referendurris on El'tsin's performance on 25 April 1993 and the 
Russian Constitution on 12 December 1993, the turnouts in Tatarstan were as low as 21.7 
and 13.9 percent respectively (The Russia-wide turnouts for these referendums were 64.5 
and 54.32 percent respectively). The conscious manipulations of Tatarstan's leadership 
concerning election turnouts in Tatarstan could be evidenced in Shaimiev's statement on 
18 January 1994. According to this statement the repeat elections for the Russian State 
Duma might take place on 13 March 1994, if prior to that date a power sharing treaty was 
signed. Having secured the Power-Sharing Treaty on 15 February 1994, the March 1994 
and December 1995 elections for the Russian State Duma were held with high turnouts, 
which rose to 58.5 and 58.7 percent respectively. The turnout levels have even become 
higher than the federal average gradually since 1996. In June- July 1996 Presidential 
elections, for example, the turnouts in Tatarstan were at 74 and 77 percent respectively as 
compared to the federal averages of 69.81 and 68.88 percent. The election turnout was 
also higher than the federal average of 61.68 percent in the 19 December 1999 State 
Duma elections, when the turnout in Tatarstan was at 72 percent (See Table A3.1). 81 
In the post-Treaty era, Tatarstan's leadership has continued to be able to consolidate its 
positions both in the Republic and in its relations with Moscow through Shaimiev's 
pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism. In order to weaken Shairniev, Moscow sought to 
undermine his hold over the electorate in Tatarstan by changing the electoral legislation 
in Tatarstan in accordance with the federal election law. The federal law, which was 
adopted in December 1994, required that local election observers have the right to 
demand and polling station commissions are obliged to provide the certified copies of the 
counting protocols. According to the law, local observers can also accompany mobile 
ballot boxes. However, local observers are often refused such protocols in Tatarstan on 
the grounds that this was not specified clearly in the Republican law. Also observers 
representing candidates are refused to be present during counting by electoral 
commissions at all levels in Tatarstan. Moreover, observers are not allowed to access to 
so Rashid Akhmetov, 'Tatarstan: The Post-Electoral Ethno-Political Situation', in Bulletin: Network on 
Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Conflict Management 
Group, 1995, pp. 53-54. 
81 Sergei A. Sergeev, 'Vybory i referendurny v Respublike Tatarstan, 1989-2000', in Osobaia zona: 
iýybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. 
Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, p. 302. 
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premises where votes are counted and the protocols of lower-level commissions are 
consolidated. Furthermore, elections without choice are allowed in Tatarstan. Finally, 
unlike the federal law, Tatarstan's law adopts the Soviet-era negative voting technique of 
crossing out the names of candidates against whom the voter wishes to vote. 92 
Relying on his success in electoral engineering mechanisms in Tatarstan, Shaimiev 
demonstrated that his support is vital to the performance of federal parties and politicians 
in Tatarstan. For example, in the December 1995 State Duma elections, Shaimiev 
supported Viktor Chernomyrdin's centrist party, Our Home is Russia (NDR), which 
received 28.62 percent of the votes in Tatarstan. This was well above the 10.1 percent 
vote that NDR received across Russia as a whole. In contrast, the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation (CPRF) received only 15.42 percent, which was below its overall 
performance at the federal level (22.3 percent). Finally, Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic 
Party of the Russian Federation (LDPR), which was not favoured by Tatarstan's 
leadership, scored badly with a mere 4.84 percent, which was less than its 11.1 percent 
federal average (See Table A3.1 1). 83 According to the election results in the five districts 
of Tatarstan, however, Shaimiev's influence was not clear. Only two of the five 
representatives of Tatarstan to the State Duma (Azat Khamaev and Gabdulvakhid 
Bagautdinov) were close to Shaimiev. The remaining three deputies, however, were very 
critical of Shaimiev (Oleg Morozov, Vladimir Altykhov, Sergei Shashurin [See Table 
A3.12]). 10 
Having been re-elected as Tatarstan's President for a second five-year tenn by getting 
97.1 percent of the vote on 24 March 1996 (See Table A3.13), Shaimiev demonstrated 
the value of his influence over the electorate in Tatarstan during the 1996 Russian 
Presidential elections by mobilising the Republican support for El'tsin against Gennadii 
Ziuganov. In the first round, El'tsin got 38.34 percent of the votes in Tatarstan, which 
was slightly ahead of Ziuganov's performance at 38.10 percent (The Russia-wide votes 
for El'tsin and Ziuganov in the first round were 35.79 and 32.49 percent respectively. See 
82 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Izbratel'noe zakonodatel'stvo i vybory v Tatarstane: Opyt regional'nogo 
pravovogo separatizma', in Osobaia zona: Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, 
Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi 
Assamblei, 2000, pp. 13-14. 
83 Moscow News, 29 December 1995, p. 2. 
Partamentskie vybory v Rossii. Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1996, p. 55. 
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Table A3.14). Thanks to the personal support of Shaimlev in the second round, the votes 
for El'tsM in Tatarstan rose to 61.45 percent while the votes for Ziuganov declined to 
32.31 percent (The Russia-wide votes for El'tsin and Ziuganov in the second round were 
54.39 and 40.73 percent respectively. See Table A3.15). In response to the falsifications 
claims of the CPRF, the Russian Supreme Court established on 10 July 1996 that in 
Tatarstan 'unidentified persons' had fabricated false documents concerning the first 
round of elections on 16 June 1996.85 The Court also identified that in the protocols of 
five districts in Kazan, not only the numbers of votes for several of the candidates 
differed, but also there were 'significant differences' between the signatures of election 
commýission members on different copies of the same protocols for one and the same 
district. 86 
Although El'tsin awarded Shaimiev with the 'Diploma of the Government of the Russian 
Federation' for his 'services to the Fatherland' in 1997, Tatarstan's leadership expected 
something more concrete, such as economic dividends, in return for the electoral support 
for El'tsin in Tatarstan. Shaimiev simply imitated the seven pro-El'tsin businessmen, 
who were also called 'the oligarchs' or 'the seven bankers' (semibankirshchina). These 
'oligarchs' supported El'tsin's Presidential election campaign at the federal level in return 
for shares in the large state-owned monopolies, profitable raw material export licences 
and some other economic assets. Moreover, Shain-tiev sought to cooperate with these 
oligarchs in establishing conunercial relations with the outside world. For example, he 
asked the President of the Russian Jewish Congress and Head of Most Bank, Vladimir 
Gusinskii, to attract foreign investment from Israel. 87 For Razil Valeev, a Deputy in 
Tatarstan's Parliament and a close associate of Shaimiev, the rise in foreign investment in 
Tatarstan could promote Tatarstan's autonomy from Moscow. During my interview with 
Valeev, he stated that: 
Our [the Tatars' -OFr] search for sovereignty should focus above all on the 
economic sovereignty of Tatarstan. It is mainly Tatarstan's economic 
85 Aleksandr V. Shtanin, 'Pobeda kazalas' neveroiatnoi. Uspekh na vyborakh v usloviiakh avtoritarnoi 
vlasti i fal'sifikatsii rezul'tatov', in Osobaia zona: Vyborv v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. 
Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi 
Pravozashchimoi Assamblei, 2000, p. I 10. 
86 John L6wenhardt, 'The 1996 Presidential Elections in Tatarstan', Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics, vol. 13, no. 1,1997, pp. 132-144. 
87 Laura Belin, 'Gusinskii in Tatarstan for Synagogue Reopening', Russian Regional Report, vol. 1, 
no. 17,18 December 1996. 
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dependence on Moscow that limits Tatarstan's autonomy. The only way out 
for us is to co-operate with the outside world and the rich Russian regions in 
creating a viable economy inTatarstan that could resist Moscow's pressures. "' 
In fact, Tatarstan's foreign economic relations developed as a result of Tatarstan's 
cooperative attitude towards Moscow, whose support was vital for getting official 
guarantees to foreign investors in Tatarstan. 89 Because of its strong industrial base, stable 
soclo-political environment and liberal legislative base, Tatarstan has been more 
competitive in attracting foreign capital as compared to other Russian regions. 90 
Tatarstan carries out its foreign relations through the Department for Foreign Affairs and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States. In addition, Tatarstan established its own 
representations in the United States, France, Ukraine, Turkey, Azerbaijan and 
Uzbekistan. Based on this institutional infrastructure, Tatarstan has developed its 
relations with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) notably 
the Turkic republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan. It has also constructed strong relations with Ukraine, Belarus, TaJikistan, and 
Moldova. 9t 
Shaimiev has expanded Tatarstan's foreign economic relations through his pragmatic 
politics of Tatar nationalism, in which the Tatar diaspora plays a significant role. In fact, 
the presence of the Tatar diaspora both within and outside the Russian Federation has 
influenced Tatarstan's relations with Moscow significantly. Nearly seven million Tatars 
five in the Russian Federation and the former republics of the Soviet Union. Smaller 
Tatar communities are also found in Turkey, Poland, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, China 
and the United States (See Table A4.3). 92 Tatarstan's relations with the Tatar Diaspora 
are co-ordinated by the World Congress of Tatars (WCT), which has been headed by 
Indus Tagirov. The WCT's main problem stems from the tension between the Tatar 
Diaspora outside Russia, who demand Tatarstan's greater autonomy from Moscow, and 
the Tatars inside Russia (but outside Tatarstan), who ask for a closer collaboration 
88 My interview with Razil 1. Valeev, Deputy of the State Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan and 
Chairperson of the National Library of the Republic of Tatarstan, Kazan, 2 June 1998. 
89 Neil J. Melvin, Regional Foreign Policies in the Russian Federation, London: RIIA, 1995, pp. 12-15. 
' Filzia G. Kharnidullin, 'Rynochnye reformy: Pervye itogi i sotsial'nye posledstviia', Nauchnyi 
Tatarstan, vol. 3, no. 3-4,1997, pp. 52-56. 
91 Gul'nara R. Shaikhutdinova, 'Dogovorno-pravovaia praktika Respubliki Tatarstan na sovremennom 
etape', Panorama-Forum, no. 2,1995, p. 20. 
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between Kazan and MOSCOW. 93 In order to bring the Tatars inside Russia under 
Tatarstan's influence, Tagirov advanced the idea of cultural autonomy for the Tatars. The 
cultural autonomy of the Tatars in the Volga region, where 75 percent of Russia's Tatars 
live, is very important, since the region's rich natural resources and advanced industrial 
94 base encourage Tatarstan to consolidate its role in the Republic . In the case of the 
Crimean Tatars, Tatarstan signed a bilateral agreement with Ukraine's Republic of 
95 Crimea to foster Tatarstan's active cultural links with the Crimean Tatars in July 1994. 
In Tatarstan's foreign economic policy, the relations with the United States are of great 
importance, since, according to Tatarstan's leadership, the United States as a superpower 
could use Tatarstan as a Trojan horse to weaken the federal centre. In fact, Shaimiev 
hinted that Tatarstan would become the engine of political decentralisation in Russia, 
during his keynote address at Harvard University on 6 October 1994 (the full text of 
Shairrtiev's speech is available in Appendix 2.2. ): 
As you all know, a number of independent states emerged following the 
disintegration of the USSR. However, though this is not your fault, most of 
you don't know that there is a Tatarstan, which plays an important role in 
reforming Russia today. Among the twenty former autonomous republics of 
the Russian Federation, Tatarstan was destined to lead the movement for 
reshaping the Russian Federation through both preventing the development of 
Russia along an imperial line and doing everything possible for benefiting 
from this historic opportunity to create a democratic Russian Federation. 96 
Alarmed by the Western interest in Tatarstan's role in Russian politics, the former Head 
of the State Committee for Nationalities Affairs, Valerii Tishkov, criticised Shaimiev's 
visit to the United States severely. 
The turning point in the difficult Russia-Tatarstan dialogue was not the signing 
of the treaty on the delimitation of power, which was a more or less a symbolic 
act. No, the decisive point was reached when President Shaimiev had 
92 Katherine E. Graney, 'The Volga Tatars: Diasporas and the Politics of Federalism', in Nations 
Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union, eds. Charles King 
and Neil J. Melvin, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, p. 157. 
93 Ibid., p. 170. 
94 Agdas Kh. Burganov, 'Budushchee tatarskoi diaspory v Rossii', Panorama-Forum, no. 3,1995, p. 23. 
95 John W. Slocum, 'A Sovereign State within Russia? The External Relations of the Republic of 
Tatarstan', Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations, vol. 13, no. 1,1999, 
pp. 49-76. 
96 Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev, 'The Future of the Russian Federation: A Look [sic] from Tatarstan', in 
Suverennyi Tatarstan, eds. Farid Kh. Mukhametshin and R. T. Ismailov, Moscow: Insan, 1997, p. 57- 
58. 
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accumulated enough authority and resources to mana, -,, e an intercontinental 
flight in his private plane to deliver a lecture at Harvard University and 
introduce Tatarstan's businessmen and politicians to useful and enjoyable 
97 outside world contacts . 
In fact, Tatarstan's relations with the United States yielded very fruitful results. During 
First Deputy Prime Minister Ravit Muratov's talks with the United States Vice-President 
Al Gore, the United States side agreed to invest 1.5 billion dollars a year in Tatarstan's 
agriculture, oil industry and the Elabuga auto plant between 1997 and 1999.98 
Tatarstan's relations with Turkey, a close ally of the United States, raised also concerns in 
Moscow that these relations would inflame pan-Turkist tendencies in the Russian 
Federation. Turkey signed an economic and cultural co-operation agreement with 
Tatarstan on 28 May 1995.99 This agreement paved the way for Tatarstan to open a 
mission in Ankara and for Turkey to open a consulate-general in Kazan-'00 In reality, 
Turkey's role in Tatarstan has been exaggerated by Moscow, since Turkey, which has its 
own deep economic problems, has a very limited economic influence in Tatarstan. For 
example, although Turkey is the fifth largest foreign investor in Tatarstan, its trade 
volume was around 5 percent of Tatarstan's overall trade. 101 
Deterioration of Economic Relations and Shaimiev's Politics of Nationalism (1997- 
1"8) 
Moscow became disillusioned with its inability to bring Tatarstan into line with other 
compliant regions in the aftermath of the signing of the Treaty with Tatarstan, because 
Tatarstan coped with Moscow's attempts to do so through pragmatic nomenklatura 
nationalism. This development was not foreseen by researchers like Sergei Kondrashov 
who argued that both the federal and Tatarstan authorities share an interest in denying the 
97 Tishkov, Ethnicit 
' v, 
Nationalism and Conflict, p. 45 
9' Natalia Gurushina, 'U. S. to Invest 4.5 Billion Dollars in Tatarstan', Open Media Research Institute 
DailY Digest, 19 September 1996. 
99 'Mezhpravitel'stvennye soglasheniia Respubliki Tatarstana s Turetskoi Respublikoi', Panorama- 
Forum, vol. 4, no. 1 1996, pp. 152-153. 
100 Turkey opened its general consulate, which is the first foreign diplomatic mission in Tatarstan, on 
II October 1996. Respublika Tatarstan, 12 October 1996. 
101 Liz Fuller, 'Turkish Government Delegation Visits Kazan', RFURL Newsline, 5 May 1998. 
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radical wing of the nationalists a pool of potential supporters. 102 However, as I pointed 
out in my review of his book, 
[t]he Tatar political establishment needs the survival of Tatar ethnic 
nationalism for the continuity of various privileges granted by Moscow. If 
Tatar ethnic nationalism was eradicated for good, then Moscow would not 
need to tolerate Tatarstan's exceptional autonomy in the Russian 
Federation. 1113 
Apart from Shaimiev's pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism, El'tsin's chronic poor 
health, frequent government reshuffles in Moscow and Russia's post-Soviet economic 
problems made it also difficult for the Kremlin to define and enforce a coherent policy 
toward Tatarstan. 
Moscow started to toughen its position against Kazan in 1997 since the distrust between 
Moscow and the Shaimiev leadership increased when Tatarstan concluded an agreement 
with the secessionist Chechen leadership on 21 May 1997. According to this agreement, 
Tatarstan promised to offer medical help and educational opportunities for the Chechens 
in Tatarstan. Moscow's policies were directed at undermining Tatarstan's economic 
power and independence from Moscow by creating tight checks over foreign aid, 
financial transactions, licences, quotas and subsidies. ' 04 
Moscow's strategy of undermining Tatarstan's autonomy was based on severing the 
Republic's foreign economic activities, which rely mainly on the oil, automotive and 
aviation industries. 105 Of these three, the oil industry constitutes the most important 
industrial sector. Tatneft is not only the largest oil company in Tatarstan but also Russia's 
fourth largest oil producer. Since it has been very difficult for Moscow to bring Tatneft 
under its influence due to the financial strength of the company, Moscow has focused on 
targeting Tatarstan's automotive industry. Tatarstan's Kam. AZ Company, which is 
located in Naberezhnye CheIny, is the largest truck manufacturing plant in the Russian 
102 Sergei Kondrashov, Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in Tatarstan, 1988-92: Origins and 
Development, London: Macmillan, 2000, p. 197. 
103 Oktay F. Tanrisever, Review of Sergei Kondrashov, Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in 
Tatarstan, 1988-92: Origins and Development, Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 79, no. 2, 
2001 p. 272. 
104 Rashid Akhmetov, 'Moscow Tightens the Screws on Kazan', Jamestown Foundation Prism, 7 
November 1997. 
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Federation. In spring 1997, the factory was more than a billion dollars in debt. However, 
Moscow refused to restructure Tatarstan's debts. Instead, the Russian government 
replaced the ethnic Tatar General Director of KamAZ, Nikolai Bekh, with an ethnic 
Russian, Ivan Kostin. '()6 The aviation industry is more dependent on Moscow than is 
Tatarstan's oil and automotive industries. Thus, the federal government effectively 
manipulated the industry's dependence on Moscow in order to bring Tatarstan's 
leadership under its own control. To this purpose, Moscow reduced its state purchase 
orders (goszakaU) to buy Tatarstan-made nfflitary and civilian aircrafts sharply. These 
measures were serious blows that worsened the Republican economy. 107 
However, Moscow's biggest blow to Tatarstan's economy was Gazprom's sudden 
cutback in gas supplies to Tatarstan in 1997. Tatarstan's debt to Gazprom, which 
supplies almost ninety percent of Tatarstan's need for natural gas, was about 4.3 trillion 
rubles in 1997. This amount was about one-third of Tatarstan's budget. Gazprorn initially 
demanded the shares in profitable enterprises of Tatarstan as a method of clearing off the 
debt. It was only after Shaimiev made an urgent phone call to Gazprom chairperson Rem 
Vialchirev that gas supplies were restored. According to their agreement, Tatarstan would 
pay off 70 percent of its debts to Gazprom on an accelerated schedule. 108 Shaimiev's 
success in defending some of Tatarstan's local industries from destruction could be 
explained by the fact that Moscow was worried about the collapse of the federal energy 
networks and eliciting popular protest in the Republic due to a potential bankruptcy of 
some local industries. 109 
Tatarstan's leadership responded to Moscow's economic pressures through revitalising 
its pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism in the fields of Tatarstan's citizenship law, the 
format of the federal passports, the adoption of the Latin alphabet for the Tatar language 
105 For Tatarstan's industrial base, see Marat R. Mustafin and Rashid G. Khuzeev, Vse o Tatarstane 
(Ekonomiko-geograficheskii spravochnik), Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1994, pp. 40-54. 
106 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'A Tale of Two Car Makers in Tatarstan', Russian Regional Report, vol. 3, 
no. 50,17 December 1998. 
" Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'is the Federal Government Cracking Down on Tatarstan? ' Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 2, no. 34,9 October 1997. 
108 Natalia Gurushina, 'Gazprorn Clamps Down on Debtors in Tatarstan', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 2, no. 9,6 March 1997. 
'09 David Woodruff, 'Barter of the Bankrupt: The Politics of Demonetization in Russia's Federal State', 
in Uncertain Transitions: Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World, eds. Michael Buraway 
and Katherine Verdery, Oxford: Rowman&Littlefield, 1999, p. I 11. 
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and the limitations on the authority of Russia's Supreme Muftiate in Tatarstan. To begin 
with, the Tatar leadership intensified its efforts to adopt its own citizenship law. Shairniev 
reminded Moscow that the Tatarstan constitution and the 1994 power-sharing treaty gave 
the citizens of Tatarstan a right to hold dual citizenship. The Tatar leadership discussed 
the introduction of passports of the Republic of Tatarstan as well. "O However, the bill on 
citizenship introduced to the State Council in February 1998 has met staunch opposition 
from Russian-speaking parliamentarians, while enjoying the solid support of ethnic 
Tatars. Its Article 6 states that the loss of Russian citizenship does not imply automatic 
loss of Tatarstani citizenship. By implication, a person holding Tatarstani citizenship but 
not Russian citizenship could enjoy all the rights of a citizen within the Republic, but 
without any of the obligations to the Russian Federation (such as serving in the 
military). 111 Although Tatarstan's right to institute its own citizenship is not contrary to 
the Russian Law on Citizenship, which recognises dual citizenship, Boris Zheleznov 
argued that '[tlhe notion of dual citizenship is coffect when we are talking about different 
states, but not when we are talking about the Federation and its subjects'. ' 12 
Apart from the citizenship law, Tatarstan's State Council passed a decree on 16 October 
1997, halting the distribution in Tatarstan of the new Russian passport, which bears the 
imperial Russian double-headed eagle on its cover, until the parliament makes a final 
decision. This decision of Tatarstan's parliament led to a pragmatic cooperation between 
Shaimiev's regime and Tatar ethnic nationalists. For example, to support the position of 
Tatarstan's parliament, some members of the VTOTs burned a model of the new Russian 
passport. A Tatar nationalist deputy in the State Council Fandas Saflullin, told the crowd 
that the introduction of a Russian passport with no entry for 'nationality' meant the 
beginning of Russian fascism. ' 13 Moscow's position on the issue of nationality was 
elaborated by Valerii Tishkov as follows: 
110 Liz Fuller, 'Tatarstan Adopts Land Code, Citizenship Law', RFFIRL Newsline, 16 April 1998. 
111 Nail M. Mukhariarnov, 'Khronika politicheskogo protsessa (1988-1998)', in Regiony Rossii: 
Khronika i rukovoditeli. Tom. 7, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato, Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, 
Hokkaido University, 2000, p. 102. 
112 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Debates Rage Over Tatarstani Citizenship', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 3, no. 11,19 March 1998. See also M. K Malikov, 'Grazhdanstvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii i 
grazhdanstvo ee sub"ektov', Gosudarstvo i pravo, no. 8,1997, pp. 21-24. 
I" Vremia i den'gi, 18 October 1997. Moscow has agreed with Bashkortostan and Tatarstan on 
resuming the issuance of passports, with the four-page insert, including republic symbols and 
information in national languages. Liz Fuller, 'Tatarstan, Bashkortostan Resolve Passport Dispute with 
Moscow', RFEIRL Russian Federation Report, vol. 2, no. 46,20 December 2000. 
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The view of the Institute of Ethnogaphy and Anthropology remains that C, 
nationality should be kept off the Russian Federation passports. It believes that 
if the government concedes this, Russia will spend the next 30 or 40 years 
arguing over state building, with unpredictable consequences. ' 14 
This way of justifying the decision to remove the line on nationality in the Russian 
internal passport naturally rang the alarm bells not only for Tatar ethnic nationalists, but 
also for Tatarstan's leadership. This explains why these groups opted for a pragmatic co- 
operation on this issue. 
In order to distance the Tatars from Russian culture, the Second World Congress of 
Tatars (WCT) decided on 30 August 1997 to replace the Cyrillic alphabet by the Latin 
alphabet for the Tatar language. In his speech to the Congress, Shaimiev criticised the 
Soviet decision to introduce the Cyrillic alphabet in 1939. Shairniev recalled how 
without any discussion, and without consulting the Tatar intelligentsia, the 
Tatars were forced to adopt the Cyrillic alphabet which, in large part, does not 
conform to the rules and spirit of Tatar speech. " 5 
The legitimacy of the decision, which affected the entire Tatar people, was based on the 
fact that the representatives of Tatar Diaspora were also present at the WCT, where the 
decision was taken. In order to soften criticisms, it was agreed that the transition would 
116 take place gradually in ten years, starting on I September 2001 . This decision was a 
challenge to Moscow's authority in Tatarstan, since the federal law stipulates that all 
names and personal details in federal documents must be written only in Cyrillic. 
Tatarstan's leadership also sought to distance Tatarstan's Islamic establishment from 
Moscow's influence. Talgat Tadjuddinov, Head of the Ufa-based Central Spiritual Board 
of Muslims of Russia (TsDUMR), has been loyal to Moscow and critical of Tatarstan's 
drive towards greater autonomy. However, Tadjuddinov has been accused of corruption 
and an antidemocratic style of work. In opposition to Tadjuddinov, Shaimiev supported 
114 Valerii A. Tishkov, 'New Russian Passports Must Silence Ethnic Rancour', Moscow Times, 9 
December 1997. 
"5 GuInara. Khasanova, 'Language and Sovereignty: the Politics of Switching to the Latin Alphabet in 
Tatarstan', Jamestown Foundation Prism, vol. 3, no. 16,10 October 1997. For the officially endorsed 
version of Latin alphabet for Tatar, see R. G. Valitova and S. G. Vagizov, Latin Khareflere belan yazu 
hem uku, Kazan: Magarif, 1997. 
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Tatarstan's Mufti Gusinan Iskhakov since February 1998. Relying on the backing of' 
Shaimiev, Mufti lskhakov has introduced new registration rules for the Islamic 
communities on the territory of Tatarstan, which has allowed him to impose his 
jurisdiction over the fortnerly Ufa-related Islamic communities. Although Tadjuddinov 
claims control over 470 Islamic communities in Tatarstan, 1200 Islamic communities are 
registered with the Muftiat of Tatarstan. 117 These registration requirements of Iskhakov 
limited the Moscow-backed Tadjuddinov's religious authority over the Muslim 
population of Tatarstan. 
Economic Crisis and the Tatar Factor in Russian Politics (1998-1999) 
Tatarstan's relations with Moscow were seriously effected by the outbreak of a financial 
crisis in 1998, which was triggered, according to Philip Hanson, by the increasing 
dependence of both the federal centre and the regions on foreign capital in order to 
finance their budget deficits. " 8 The 1998 financial crisis had a major impact on 
Tatarstan's relations with Moscow because some of Tatarstan's banks and joint-stock 
companies invested their funds in short-term federal government bonds before the crisis. 
Moscow's decision to freeze all of their funds created a shortage of funds in Tatarstan. 
Consequently, Tatarstan's relations with foreign investors have stopped. 
To overcome the short-term negative impacts of the economic crisis, Prime Minister 
Rustem Minnekhanov unveiled his measures on 10 September 1998. These measures 
included the introduction of fixed prices for basic products, the ban on their dispatch 
from the Republic and the introduction of commodity credits for local producers as well 
as for the purchase of medicine and other vital food products. Moreover, Tatarstan as the 
largest producer of vodka in Russia created a vodka monopoly, Tatspirtprom. In addition, 
Tatarstan reneged on its short-term bond obligations. Another financial measure was to 
force all companies in which the Republican government has a 25 percent stake to 
transfer their accounts to AkBars Bank, which is controlled by Shaimiev's associates. 
116 Sarah Karush, 'Tatars Leave Russian Alphabet Behind', Moscow Times, 14 October 1999. 
117 Galina M. Yernelianova, 'New Muftis, New RussiansT Jamestown Foundation Prism, vol. 5, no. 16, 
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AkBars Bank as the largest bank in Tatarstan was also authorised to hold the gold 
rescrvcs of Tatarstan. Besides, the National Bank of Tatarstan was given the task of 
maki ng Tatarstan's banks larger through merging some smaller banks. ' 19 
Overall, the financial crisis of 1998 demonstrated the economic dependence of Tatarstan 
on Moscow once again. The fiscal situation got worse for Tatarstan in 1999, when the 
Federal Ministry of Finance developed a new method to distribute subsidies which 
stipulated that thirteen regions, including Tatarstan, should receive no subsidies. 
Moreover, Moscow banks such as Sberbank gained leverage over the Tatarstan 
government by demanding conditions for restructuring Tatarstan's debt loads. The 
natural monopolies, Unified Energy System (which controls electricity generation and 
distribution), Gazprom (natural gas extraction and distribution), the Railroads Ministry, 
and Transneft (oil distribution pipeline), also increased their influence in Tatarstan's 
economy since they set prices for and control access to vital energy supplies or 
transportation routes. 
In the political field, Tatarstan's leadership started to develop good relations with the 
federal politicians in the aftermath of the August 1998 financial crisis. When El'tsin 
agreed to replace Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko, who had served just for six months, 
with Evgenii Primakov, who was favoured by El'tsin's opponents in the Duma on II 
September 1998, Tatarstan's leadership supported Primakov strongly. Primakov had a 
very positive approach towards Tatarstan too. For example, Primakov named Shairniev's 
close friend Ramazan Abdulatipov to run the Ministry for Nationalities Affairs on 25 
September 1998. Despite this, Tatarstan's leadership adopted itself easily to the changes 
in the federal leadership when Primakov was replaced by Sergei Stepashin in May 
1999.11, 
118 Philip Hanson, 'The Russian Economic Crisis and the Future of Russian Economic Reform', 
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Tatarstan's strategy of developing good relations with Moscow was necessitated by its 
need to renew the validity of the agreement on inter-budgetary relations for five years in 
1999. Although Tatarstan's leadership wanted to renew the agreement in its 1994 fonn, L, 
the political situation was not to its own advantage, because there were no strong anti- 
Moscow Tatar ethnic nationalist movement in the Republic, and El'tsin developed 
working relations with the Russian parliament. Furthen-nore, Tatarstan's leadership was 4n 
not able to build a coalition with other regional leaders in order to exert pressure on 
Moscow. Not surprisingly, the framework agreement on 'Budgetary Relations', which 
was signed by Shaimiev and Primakov on 17 March 1999, was on Moscow's terrns. 1 21 In 
order to pressurise Moscow into Vving more concessions to Tatarstan, Shaimiev 
underscored the value of having good relations with Tatarstan, which is a donor republic. 
Shaimiev even hinted that ethnic nationalism of the Tatars could also be used against 
Moscow. 
Tatarstan is a donor republic. It gives much more than it receives. If Russia did 
not prolong the treaty, our parliament would have refused to contribute to the 
central budget. I would not have liked to approve this scenario. The Tatars are 
the largest ethnic group in Russia. We do not like to say it, but we know it - 
and so does MOSCOW. 122 
Despite this rhetoric, however, Tatarstan simply bowed to the pressures of Moscow, 
which gained some more exclusive powers in fiscal matters including the authority to 
collect taxes in Tatarstan in April 1999. Moscow also increased its influence in 
Tatarstan's automobile industry, when the Federal Minister of Economics became the ex 
officio Chairperson of the Board of Directors of KamAZ. 
123 
In response to the growing power of Moscow, Tatarstan's parliament created the 
Republican Security Council in order to protect the Republican sovereignty, constitution 
and legal system as well as the human rights of Tatarstan's peoples. In addition, Shaimiev 
sought to become one of the key political figures at the federal level. For this purpose, he 
joined forces with Moscow Mayor lurii Luzhkov, St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir 
lakovlev and the former Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov for the December 1999 State 
Duma elections. Their coalition resulted in the formation of the Fatherland-All Russia 
121 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Shaimiev Overestimates Value of Agreement', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 4, no. 11,25 March 1999. 
122 Andrew Jack, 'Tatarstan: A Model Republic', Financial Times, 30 April 1999. 
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(OVR - Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiia) bloc against the Kremlin. 
' 24 Nevertheless, the OVR 
was unable to win the 19 December 1999 State Duma elections. According to the results 
of these elections, the Communists became the biggest party in the Russian Parliament by 
getting 24.29 percent of the votes, while the Kremlin-backed Unity (Edinstvo) came in 
second place overall with 23.32 percent of the votes, and the OVR alliance was third with 
13.33 percent (See Table A3.16). ' 25 
The Shaimiev factor could also be seen in this election in Tatarstan, where 40.1 percent 
of the electorate voted for the party of Shaimiev, the OVR bloc, while CPRF was second 
with 18.1 percent, to be followed by Unity that received 15.7 percent. labloko and 
LDPR's votes were below five percent (See Table A3.16). Three OVR candidates won 
the elections in three districts (Fandas Saftullin, Oleg Morozov and Fliura Ziiatdinova). 
Only the Communist candidate, Salimkhan Akhmetkhanov, and incumbent State Duma 
Deputy, Sergei Shashurin from Sergei Baburin's the Russian National Union, won the 
elections against the pro-Shaimiev candidates from the OVR (See Table A3.17). 
Needless to say the 1999 Russian parliamentary elections in Tatarstan were far from 
being democratic. Even though there is a Republican legislation prohibiting state 
agencies from collecting signatures in support of electoral blocs, parties or individual 
candidates in Tatarstan, the Kazan City Labour and Employment Centre collected 
signatures for the OVR because Shaimiev was one of OVR's leaders. 
El'tsin's decision to resign from the Presidency of the Russian Federation, and to 
nominate Vladimir Putin as the Acting President on 31 December 1999 constituted a 
turning point in Tatarstan's relations with Moscow. Although this thesis is limited to 
study the Eltsin period between 1992 and 1999, Chapter Five will explore Putin's 
policies towards Tatarstan in order to test the stability of the El'tsin era intergovernmental 
relations between Tatarstan and Moscow and interethnic relations between Russians and 
Tatars. 
123 Tatar-Inform, 5 April 1999. 
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Conclusions 
To conclude, Shaimiev's pragnuitic notnenklatura nationalism has played an important 
role in Tatarstan's relations with Moscow both before and after the signing of the Power- 
Sharing Treaty in 1994. We could argue that Shaimiev's pragmatic approach towards 
Moscow enabled Tatarstan's leadership to enlarge the autonomy of the Republic and to 
secure stability in Tatarstan. Moreover, Tatarstan's status in the Russian Federation was 
redefined to the advantage of the Republican leadership. Above all, due to this approach 
Moscow's concessions to Tatarstan enabled the Republican leadership to maintain their 
political power and to gain control of Tatarstan's economy. 
This chapter has also shown that when the Russian federal centre in Moscow started to 
renegotiate its relations with Tatarstan, it became evident that post-Soviet Russia, in 
contrast to the departing Soviet imperial power, lacked the imperial coercive force backed 
by the Tatar elites. It was therefore unable to impose its policies on Tatarstan unilaterally. 
In this post-imperial context, Tatarstan's leadership has succeeded in securing Moscow's 
accommodation of its pragmatic version of Tatar nationalism through the institutional 
arrangements of the 1994 Power-Sharing Treaty. 
The analysis of the 1994 Power-Sharing Treaty between Tatarstan and Moscow has 
demonstrated that the Treaty has made Tatarstan largely self-governing. Thanks to the 
Treaty, Tatarstan gained the formal right to define its own structure of government, to 
elect its own president and legislature, to adopt its own laws, to collect all taxes on its 
territory and to have economic and political links with other republics and regions and 
with foreign governments. Apart from the symbolic fact that the adjective 'state' precedes 
the name of every institution in Tatarstan, the Republic also benefits from the material 
advantages of the enhanced status of Tatarstan. For example, Tatarstan's main oil 
company Tatneft gains revenues from the Republican privilege in exporting oil, which 
was allowed by the Treaty. 
From the perspective of Moscow, however, the Treaty with Tatarstan demonstrated the 
weakness of the federal centre in extending the Russian state authority throughout Russia. 
Moscow admitted in this Treaty that the federal leadership had a limited control over 
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Tatarstan, which is formally a part of the federal territory and the Tatars, who constitute a 
part of Russia's polity. Moscow also admitted the fact that federal taxes that are collected 
in Tatarstan, may or may not make their way into the federal treasury depending on the 
goodwill of Tatarstan's leadership. These limitations of Moscow demonstrated the 
symptoms weakness of state capacity at the federal level. 
Concerning the ethnic nationalists in Tatarstan, Shaimiev's pragnuttic nonwnklatura 
nationalism played a crucial role in monopolising the discourse on Tatar national 
interests. Shaimiev's pragmatic approach to the nationalities question in Tatarstan 
enabled him to pose as the defender of not only the Tatars but also non-Tatar peoples of 
the Republic, while he was able to depict Moscow as too corrupt to make Tatarstan's 
leadership accountable. While radical Tatar ethnic nationalist movement is weak, 
Shaimiev emerged as the main person in Tatarstan that could check the growth of Tatar 
nationalism. Seeking to co-opt the loyal Tatar ethnic nationalists, the Shaimiev leadership 
succeeded in transforming the street protests of Tatar ethnic nationalists into a loyal 
parliamentary opposition with a nationalist agenda against the periodic pressures of 
Moscow. Shaimiev refrained from 'playing the ethnic card' against Moscow and the 
ethnic Russians in Tatarstan, as demanded by the Tatar ethnic nationalists, because this 
could very likely would have led to interethnic violence. Had significant violence broken 
out, it would have been difficult to contain, and might very well have provoked military 
intervention by Moscow. 
All in all, Shaimiev's pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism enabled Tatarstan's 
leadership to benefit from Moscow's post-Soviet weakness, which forced Moscow to 
accept considerable autonomy for Tatarstan. Apart from the weakness of Moscow, the 
weaknesses of Tatar and Russian ethnic nationalisms in Tatarstan also contributed to the 
relative success of the Shaimiev leadership in maintaining its political power and gaining 
economic wealth. 
In chapter four, we will examine the nature of society and culture in Tatarstan in order to 
account for the weak social support among the Tatars and the ethnic Russians in 
Tatarstan for edinic nationafism. 
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4. Society and Culture in Tatarstan: The Weakness of Ethnic 
Nationalist Movements 
Having examined Tatarstan's relations with Moscow in the previous chapter, we will now 
explore Tatarstan's socio-cultural characteristics that influence the level of the support for 
ethnic nationalist movements in Tatarstan. The study of the support for the Republican 
ethnic nationalist movements in Tatarstan is important, since it is the strength or the 
weakness of the support for ethnic nationalisms that determines the autonomy of 
Tatarstan's leadership from the ethnically-organised social forces in Tatarstan. While the 
strength of ethnic nationalism diminishes the autonomy of the Republican leadership, the 
weakness of ethnic nationalism increases their autonomy. Thus, the success of 
Shaimiev's Pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism necessitates that all ethnic groups 
should not rely on their own power or on Moscow, but rather on the Republican 
leadership for their survival. 
In this context, the study of the socio-cultural characteristics of the society in 
Tatarstan would enable us to investigate in what ways socio-cultural factors limit the 
social support for ethnic nationalism. ' The majority of the works in the literature on 
nationalist movements in Tatarstan have exaggerated the strength of ethnic 
nationalism, especially Tatar ethnic nationalism. Some scholars such as Marie 
Bennigsen-Broxup argued that the Tatars differed from the Russians in terms of 
religion and culture, and that this establishes the basis for ethnic polarisation in the 
Republic .2 
Bennigsen-Broxup seems to have exaggerated the ethnic mobilisation 
potential of the Tatars. In reality, however, inter-ethnic violence has never reached a 
significant level in Tatarstan. Moreover, not all of the Tatars are committed ethnic 
' Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, 'Introduction: From the Moment of Social History to the Work of 
Cultural Representation', in Becoming National, eds. Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996, p. 9. 
2 Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, 'The 'Internal' Muslim Factor in the Politics of Russia: Tatarstan and the 
North Caucasus', in Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domestic and 
International Dynamics, ed. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1994, 
p. 75. 
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nationalists, and significant numbers of the Tatars maintain a critical view of Tatar 
ethnic nationalism. In this respect, Valern Tishkov went further and even accused 
Tatarstan's leadership of promoting Tatar ethnic nationalism. Tishkov identified the 
ethnic nationalist credentials of Tatarstan's leadership as follows: 
The most striking example is the Republic of Tatarstan. Here the ruling elite 
employed Tatar ethnonationalism, radically expressed by ultra-nationalist 
organisations and local intellectuals, to establish a firm and indisputable 
political order based on titular representation. ' 
Tishkov appears to have n-tistakenly equated Tatarstan's leadership with the Tatar ethnic 
nationalists in the Republic. 
This chapter argues that the readiness of the Tatars and the Russians to be mobilised 
behind ethnic nationalist movements has been litnited enormously by the socio-cultural 
characteristics of Tatarstan, which could be related to the legacy of the Russian and 
Soviet imperial rule in Tatarstan. The organisational and ideological divides within the 
Tatar and Russian nationalist movements made them vulnerable to the manipulations of 
Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership, which has pursued a policy of divide and rule towards 
Tatarstan's population. Besides, the non-antagonistic character of the self/other 
perceptions of the Tatars and the Russians, the high levels of religious tolerance, 
bilingualism, mixed marriages and urbanisation as well as the state-dependent economy 
and a weak civil society have both undermined the institutional bases of ethnic 
mobilisation among the Tatars and the Russians in Tatarstan, and increased their 
dependence on Tatarstan's leadership for their socio-economic survival. 
To begin with, the chapter will examine the historical experience of the Tatars and the 
Russians under the Russian imperial and Soviet rules. Afterwards, we will explore the 
polarisation of the Russian 'democrats' against Tatar 'ethnic nationalists' in late Soviet 
Tatariia. Next, the weakness of ethnic nationalist movements in post-Soviet Tatarstan will 
be examined. Furthermore, the chapter will compare the Tatar and Russian ethnic 
nationalisms in Tatarstan with other nationalist movements in the post-Soviet world. In 
the remaining part of the chapter, we will analyse the sources of the weak support for 
3 Valerii A. Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind 
Aflame, (hereafter, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict), London: Sage, 1997, p. 242. 
182 
Tatar and Russian ethnic nationalisms in Tatarstan by focusing on the sell7other 
Nrceptions of the Tatars and the Russians, in addition to religion, language use, mixed 
marriages, urbanisation, economy and civil society. 
Historical Experience: The Tatars and the Russians under Russian Imperial and 
Soviet Rule 
The Tatars and the Russians in Tatarstan are both united and divided by their common 
historical experiences under Russian Imperial and Soviet rule. The Tatars have been 
living together with the ethnic Russians since the Russian conquest of the Kazan Khanate 
in 1552, a historic milestone that marks the beginning of Russian imperial expansion. 
The fact that Russia's territorial expansion was on land makes it very difficult for 
researchers to differentiate between an imperial ruling group and subject peoples. This 
sets the Russian Empire apart from the Western European maritime empires of the past in 
which the metropolis was clearly separate from the colonies. Furthen-nore, the Russian 
Empire not only incorporated the non-Russian elites into its nobility, but it also sent 
ordinary Russians to the newly conquered regions in order to mix the ethnic composition 
of the colonised society. In fact, lower-class Russians have felt the burden of Russia's 
imperial expansion as much as the Tatars, because ethnic Russian serfs lived in 
conditions that were for the most part worse than the living conditions of the Tatar 
peasants. It is basically this high level of Russian penetration into the Tatar community 
that prevents Moscow from pulling out and 'sailing away home' when it was faced with 
problems involving the Tatar ethnic nationalists. 4 
The development of the relations between Moscow, the Tatar elites and the Tatar masses 
shaped the Tatar historical experience in the Russian Empire. The Russian Empire 
justified the conquest of the Kazan Khanate and its Tatar population in terms of the 
Russian messianic ideology, which required the Russian rulers to convert the Tatars to 
Orthodox Christianity. In line with this ideology, the Tatar cultural symbols in Kazan 
including the Kul Sherif Mosque were destroyed. In 1556-1562, the Annunciation 
Cathedral was built in place of the Kul Sherif Mosque. Ivan the Terrible simultaneously 
Anatol Lieven, 'Nightmare in the Caucasus', Washington Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 1,2000, p. 145. 
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built the St. Basil's Cathedral on the Red Square in Moscow as a symbol of the victory of 
Russian Orthodoxy over the Tatars. 5 At the symbolic level, these developincrits can be 
said to have marked the cultural boundaries between the Tatars and the Russians, which 
created some symbolic material to be used by ethnic nationalists for ethnic mobilisation. 
The Russian imperial policies of mixing the Tatars with other ethnic groups and dividing 
them at the same time along territorial, ethnic and other cleavages made it easier for 
Moscow to rule the Tatars. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Tatar-speaking 
people had not yet adopted the Tatar ethnonym. In this period, the Tatars were confused 
with Turkic peoples, while being sub-divided into several groupings. The Russian Empire 
described these peoples as inoroday (those of another kin), while the Mongols and the 
6 Turkic peoples east of the fiver Volga were referred to as Tatars. Gradually, the label 
'Tatar' was extended to denote all those professing Islam, Turkic or non-Turkic, such as 
the peoples of the Northern Caucasus. In doing so, the Russian Empire effectively treated 
Muslims in Russia as if they constituted one single nation. 7 
Moscow's inability to differentiate the Tatars from the other Muslim peoples of the 
Russian Empire was partly due to the differences among the dialects spoken by the 
Tatars. Although the Middle (Kazan) Tatar was in literary use, there were also the 
Western (Misher) Tatar and the Eastern (Siberian) Tatar dialects. Apart from these 
groups, there were also Kasymov, Teptiar and Kriashen Tatars, who came into being as a 
result of historical development. The Kasymov Tatars were those Tatars who had 
migrated from the Kazan Khanate to Riazan under the leadership of Kasyrn Khan in the 
fifteenth century. Another Tatar group emerged as a result of migration in the sixteenth 
century, when the Russian conquest of the Kazan Khanate led the Teptiar Tatars to 
migrate to Bashkiriia. Finally, the Kriashen Tatars emerged when some Tatars converted 
5 Sahni Kalpana, Crucif0ng the Orient: Russian Orientalism and the Colonisation of Caucasus and 
Central Asia, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1997, pp. 3-18. 
6 John W. Slocum, 'Who and When were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the Category of "Aliens" in 
Imperial Russia', Russian Review, vol. 57, no. 2,1998, p. 174. 
7 Michael Khodarkovsky, "'Ignoble Savages and Unfaithful Subjects": Constructing Non-Christian 
identities in Early Modem Russia', in Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917, 
eds. Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 19. 
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to Christianity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Over time, the name 'Tatar' 
came to denote all of these ethnic groups. 8 Z) 
Both Russian and Tatar nationalisms started to take shape in the nineteenth century. The 
first systematic formulation of Russian nationalism, Slavophilism, is rooted in the desire 
to create an alternative to Western civilisation. Russian nationalism intensified with the 
abolition of serfdom in 1861 when the newly-emancipated ethnic Russian peasants 
started to bring their anti-outsider sentiments to cities. Consequently, the Russian 
Assembly (Russkoe Sobranie) was established in 1900, followed by the formation of the 
Russian Monarchist Party and the Union of the Russian People (also known as the Black 
Hundreds) in 1905.9 The rise of Tatar nationalism in the nineteenth century was a 
reflection of the Tatar resentment of their second-class status in the Russian Empire. 
Furthermore, the imperial shift towards a pan-Slavic ideology intensified the cultural 
divide between the Tatars and the Russians. ' 0 
Although the Tatar nationalists were unsuccessful in benefiting from the collapse of the 
Russian Empire in 1917, the Bolshevik revolution heightened the Tatar hopes for being 
treated equally. The Soviet ideology stressed that all Soviet nations were equal, and the 
Soviet Union attempted to justify its policies through achieving the political, economic 
and cultural equality of the Soviet nations. Soviet rule in Tatariia improved the material 
conditions of the Tatars as compared to their conditions under the Russian Empire, 
despite the Soviet suppression of any kind of political dissent of the Tatar elites. 
Soviet rule in the TASSR could be seen as an imperial, non-Russian and modernising 
rule. Soviet rule was imperial because the Soviet State subordinated the Tatar nation to its 
rule not through the voluntary participation of the Tatars but through the centralising 
8 The Volga Tatars are distinct from the Crimean Tatars, who have never lived together with the Volga 
Tatars under the same state structure since the collapse of the Golden Horde. Azade-Ayýe Rorlich, 
'One or More Tatar Nations'. in Muslim Communities Re-emerge: Historical Perspectives on 
Nationalit 
, 
v, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ed. Edward 
Allworth, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994, p. 62. 
9 Robert J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994, pp. 37-43. 
" Edward J. Lazzerini, 'Defining the Orient: A Nineteenth Century Russo-Tatar Polemic over Identity 
and Cultural Representation', in Muslim Communities Re-emerge: Historical Perspectives on 
Nationalit 
, 
y, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ed. Edward 
Allworth, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994, pp. 36-37. 
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institution ofthe CPSU. " Soviet rule cannot be considered as a version of Russian rule, 
since the dominant ideology was Soviet communism rather than the Russian imperial 
ideology. Finally, Soviet rule had a inodernising effect since the Soviet rulers not only 
improved the living conditions of the Tatars through promoting the processes of 
urbanisation and inclustrialisation in the TASSR, but also created an educated Tatar elite, 
and indeed provided mass education to the Tatars in Tatarstan in their own native 
language. 
Despite the material benefits of Soviet rule to the Tatars, Soviet rule has not eliminated 
the remaining socio-cultural basis for Tatar nationalism. According to Sergei 
Kondrashov, although the Soviet system was effective in eroding the boundaries of 
ethnic, class and territorial groups in Soviet Tatariia, the Tatars continued to perceive 
their status as being 'inferior' to the Russians. For Kondrashov, the rise of Tatar 
nationafism in the late 1980s is linked to the nature of the Soviet-era socio-cultural 
modernisation, which resulted from the complex processes of industrialisation, 
urbanisation and demography. 12 
The Soviet process of industrialisation in Tatariia started in the late 1920s and went 
through three stages. The first stage was between 1928 to 1946, when an industrial area 
was created in the mainly urban Russian-populated Kazan-Zelenodol'sk region for the 
industries of machinery, chemicals and power. The second stage started in 1946 with the 
discovery of oil in the Shugurovskoe region. The period between 1946 and 1965 
witnessed the development of an oil industry in the mainly Tatar-populated regions in the 
southeast and northeast such as the regions of AI'met'evsk and Bugulma. The final stage 
of industrialisation started in 1965 and covered the period up to the present when the 
mainly Tatar-populated Nizhnekamsk-Naberezhnye Chelny region was formed with the 
construction of the largest heavy truck manufacturing plant in the USSR, KamAZ, in the 
city of Naberezhnye Chelny. ' 3 
11 Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Imperiia Kremlia: Sovetskii tip kolonializma, Vilnius: IM01,1990, 
pp. 149-153. 
12 Sergei Kondrashov, Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in Tatarstan, 1988-92: Origins and 
Development, (hereafter, Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in Tatarstan), London: 
Macmillan, 2000, p-50- 
13 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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The process of urbanisation in Tatarila also contributed to the nioderrusation of' the 
Republic. The data on the dynamics of urbanisation between 1920 and 1989 show that in 
1920,16.1 percent of the urban population was composed of Tatars, 78.6 percent of 
Russians while others constituted the remaining 5.3 percent. In 1989, Tatars formed 42.2 
percent of the urban population, while Russians formed 50.8 percent with others forming 
7.0 percent. 14 In general, Tatars were significantly less urbanised than Russians, who had 
an 86 percent level of urbanisation as compared to 63 percent among Tatars. 15 
In his analysis of the dynamics of the ethnic composition of Tatarstan between 1920 and 
1989, Damir Iskhakov shows that the immigration of Russians and Ukrainians, especially 
after the discovery of oil in 1946, led to a slight fall in the proportion of ethnic Tatars in 
Tatariia. Between 1926 and 1989, the percentage of the Tatars declined from 48.9 to 48.5 
16 
while the percentage of the Russians increased from 43.2 to 43.3 . Moreover, the 
population growth among the Tatars was not high compared to the other nationalities, the 
Tatar share of the total Soviet population declined from 2.4 percent to 2.3 percent. 17 
These ethno-demographic trends led to the integration of the ethnic Tatars into the 
Russian society in Tatariia, since they undermined the system of ethnic segregation. For 
example, between 1972 and 1989, more than 65 percent of the Tatars in Tatarstan had 
achieved a higher social status than their parents. 18 Although the Tatars relatively 
benefited from the Soviet modernisation, uneven econornic development in Tatariia and 
the existence of a socio-cultural order in which the Russians were more privileged as 
compared to the Tatars sowed the seeds of modem Tatar nationalism. Kondrashov 
believes that there has been no significant reaction on the part of the Tatars against this 
inequality, since most urban Tatars found it in their best interests to accept their second- 
rate status. 19 Kondrashov's analysis echoes Michael Hechter's argument that 
modernisation and the emerging inequalities between the regions in a country relegate 
peripheral regions to an inferior position, leaving the core region dominant. In such a 
" Damir M. Iskhakov, 'Sotsial'naia statistika', in Sovremennye natsional'nye protsessy v Respublike 
Tatarstan, eds. Damir M. Iskhakov and Rozalina N. Musina, Kazan: HaLll KNTs RAN, '1992, p. 129. 
15 Marat R. Mustafin, 'Natsional'nyi vopros v zerkale statistiki', Sovetskaia Tatariia, 16 March 1990. 
16 Iskhakov, 'Sotsial'naia statistika', p. 128. 
17 Damir M. Iskhakov, Tatary Populiarnyi ocherk etnicheskoi istorii i demografti, Naberezhnye 
Chelny: KamAZ, 1993, pp. 18-2 1. 
18 Vladimir Shlapentokh, Munir Sendich and Emil Pain, The New Russian Diaspora: Russian 
Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994. p. 47. 
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situation of internal colonialism, a cultural division of labour emerges among ethnic 
groups, with the core group occupying the best class positions and the peripheral groups 
20 
the inferior positions . 
The Soviet socio-economic order in Tatariia started to experience its own crisis of 
legitimacy after the mid-sixties when the post-Second World War processes of integration 
started to be reversed. In this period, some of the urban white-collar Tatar elites achieved 
status equality and demanded greater benefits for themselves. In fact, as indigenous 
expectations rise, a growing sense of relative deprivation becomes more likely. 21 These 
developments contributed to the growth of Tatar national awareness. Venera lakupova 
stated this as follows: 
It is very easy for a Tatar to become a nationalist in the USSR. One just need 
to attend history classes at school, when, at the description of the horrors of 
the Tatar-Mongol invasion, the whole class turns to look at you; watch films in 
which glorious Russians perish at the hands of savage Tatars; get used to the 
idea that the Volga is the Great Russian river, that it is Russian woods that 
surround you; take part every year in the festivals of seeing off the Russian 
winter... What can a Tatar can be proud of? Squalid Kazan? KamAZ which 
was built by the whole country? Where is that something to be proud of, to 
love? Of the musical treasures of the Tatars only the garmoshka (accordion) 
has survived, of the national dress - only the tiubeteika, of the literature - only 
22 books that nobody can read . 
Meanwhile, as with Tatar nationalism, there was also a rise in Russian nationalism in the 
post-Stalin era, as some Russian intellectuals started to air their dissatisfaction with the 
burden of the Soviet Empire. The Soviet attempts to harness Russian national identity to 
the official communist ideology through the journals Veche, Molodaia gvardiia, Moskva 
and Nash sovremennik were largely ineffective in curbing the popularity of non-Soviet 
Russian national identity, which was seen by John Dunlop as a challenge to the 
23 monopoly of national Bolsheviks. Dunlop identified the vozrozhdentsy, who called for 
the revival Russian culture against the domination of the Soviet culture, and the National 
Bolsheviks, who believed in the strength of the Soviet state as the two main tendencies in 
19 Kondrashov, Nationalism and the Drive for SovereigntY in Tatarstan, pp. 44-46. 
20 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536- 
1966, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. 
21 Rasma Karklins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspectivefrom Below, Boston: Allen&Unwin, 
1986, p. 150. 
22 Venera A. lakupova, 'Pokushenie na intematsionalizm', Komsomolets Tatarii, 2 September 1990. 
23 John B. Dunlop, The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1983, pp. 242-273 
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Russian nationalism. Alexander Yanov, however, argued that both anti- and pro-Soviet 
versions of Russian nationalism could degenerate into aggressive chauvinism. 24 Stephen C, 
Carter combined these two positions, and categofised Russian nationalists in terms of 
their views of democracy. Carter argued that since Russian nationalism is full of diverse 
traditions, the process of democratisation could have a divisive impact on the Russian 
nationalist movement. 25 
In fact, the process of democratisation, which was initiated by Gorbachev's reforms, 
resulted in the growth of both Russian and Tatar national consciousness outside the 
control of Moscow. Although the Tatars resented the inferior status of their community 
and culture, for the translation of their cultural symbols into resources of ethnic 
mobilisation, they needed to have their own political organisations. In fact, the 
development of Tatar nationalism can be better understood by looking at the interplay 
between the elites and the masses as mediated by the existing political institutions. 
Russian 'Democrats' vs. Tatar 'Ethnic Nationalists' in Late Soviet Tatariia 
Although openly ethnic-based nationalist movements were difficult to form in the Soviet 
Union, this does not signify an absence of interethnic conflict especially since such 
conflicts did emerge and often took the form of gang fighting in Soviet Tatariia. For 
example, the Tiap-Liap gang, whose participants engaged in the killings of several store 
managers and other representatives of the black market, was formed in the late 1970s. 
Each gang group had its own clearly delineated spheres, especially in Kazan's working- 
class districts of Teplokontrol and Zhilploshchadka. These gang fightings became very 
serious after the start of Gorbachev's reforrns in the late 1980S. 26 Walter L. Hixson, who 
was an eyewitness of the ethnic situation in Kazan during the Gorbachev period, 
described the significance of these gang fightings in his book, Witness to Disintegration 
(1993) as follows: 
24 Alexander Yanov, The Russian New Right: Right Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR, 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988, pp. 1-20. 
25 Stephen K. Carter, Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, London: Pinter, 1991, 
pp. 119-146. 
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After years of' relative calm in Kazan. perestroika and then the political 
disintegration of the USSR ignited long dormant ethnic tensions between 
Tatars and Russians. So far, those tensions have been expressed non-violently 
for the most part -some clashes have occurred but nothing like the conflicts in 
the Caucasus between Azerbaijanis and Armenians or Georgians and 
Ossetians. Nevertheless the renascent Tatar-Russian tensions are unsettlincy to 
both groups, especially in Kazan where they must live and work together in 
roughly equal numbers. 27 
The process of ethnic mobilisation in Soviet Tatafiia started to gain momentum with the 
perestroika reforms. The national problems of the Tatars provided some Tatar activists an 
opportunity to back their Republican leaders and to air their grievances against Moscow. 
The Tatar ethnic mobilisation started to take shape when perestroika reforms allowed a 
variety of informal (nefonnal'nye) political organisations to appear. Gorbachev expected 
that these organisations could mobilise civic support for perestroika reforms. The Tatar 
Popular Front for Perestroika channelled these protests into demands for greater openness 
in the Soviet system. 28 Although the Front aimed to unite the pro-reform groups, both 
Tatar and Russian, in the TASSR against the conservatives in Moscow, the common 
ground between Tatars and Russians quickly eroded, as the ethnic Russians started to 
focus on the democratisation of the Soviet Union, while the ethnic Tatars embarked on 
defending their ethnic fights. This disagreement set the Russian 'democrats' against the 
Tatar 'ethnic nationalists'. 
Initially, the target of the Russian 'democratic' social mobilisation was the environmental 
problems of Tatariia. For this purpose, two environmentalist groups, Druzhina and 
Ekologicheskii klub, were formed in Kazan during 1987. The battle against the Tatar 
Atomic Energy Station whose construction began in 1983 was very important for the 
environmentalists. While the station was located over 100 kilometres from Kazan in the 
town of Karnskaia Poliana, the environmentalists led by Albert Garapov were active 
mainly in Kazan. Recognising the popularity of the anti-nuclear movement, the Tatar 
Supreme Soviet issued a decree on 4 October 1989 calling on the USSR authorities to 
discontinue the construction of the Tatar Atomic Energy Station. Bowing to these 
26 Vladimir Sotnikov, Glavari banditskikh klanov, Minsk: Literatura, 1997, pp. 427-441. 
27 Walter L. Rixson, Witness to Disintegration: Provincial Life in the Last Year of the USSR, Hanover, 
NH: University Press of New England, 1993, p. 116. 
u 'Narodnogo Fronta TASSR v podderzhki perestroiki', Vecherniaia Kazan, 30 November 1988. 
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pressures, the Soviet authorities agreed to this call and decided to convert the facility into 
a conventional heating station. 29 
Gradually, the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan started to ally with the 'democrats' in 
Moscow, who were united around Boris El'tsin. They established the Tatar branch of 
Nikolai Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia. In its first Congress, the delegates elected 
Rashit Akhmetov as the Chairperson of the Tatarstan branch of the Democratic Party of 
Russia in 1990. Aleksandr Salagaev formed the Grazhdanskii soiuz (Civic Union) in ZD 
order to unite the other small-scale Russian 'democratic' organisations with the 
Democratic Party of Russia. The most powerful of these small-scale organisations was 
the Tatarstan branch of the People's Party of Free Russia, which was chaired by Vladimir 
Beliaev. Another Russian umbrella organisation was the Movement for Democratic 
Reforms of Tatarstan (Dvizhenie denwkraticheskikh refonn Tatarstana). Its principal 
constituent, in addition to a number of other liberal oriented small-scale Russian 
organisations, was Soglasie (Accord). 30 
Apart from these 'democratic' ethnic Russians, there were also Russian ethnic nationalist 
groups in Tatarstan. Their organisations included the Slavic Club (Slavianskii klub) and 
Vladimir Zhifinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, whose chairperson in 
Tatarstan was Valerii Gordeev. These Russian ethnic nationalist organisations focused 
their activities on promoting Russian culture in Tatarstan, while opposing the rise of 
Tatar ethnic nationalism in the Republic. 31 
The 'democratic' agenda of the Russian movements was not attractive for the Tatar 
activists who were mainly interested in forging a movement for greater autonomy for the 
Republic. The fact that the Tatar elites were influential in cultural organisations, 
universities and the local state gave them access to cultural resources for ethnic 
mobilisation. Gradually, Tatars began to complain about the treatment of the Tatar 
draftees in the Soviet military, about the lack of opportunity for Tatar children to be 
educated in their native language and about the under-representation of the Tatars in the 
29 Jane 1. Dawson, Eco-Nationalism: Anti-nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, 
and Ukraine, Durham, NC: Duke UniversitY Press, 1996, pp. 137-140. 
30 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, et. al., Politicheskaia sistema Respubliki Tatarstan, Kazan: KGU, 1995, 
pp. 29-30. 
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USSR Council of' Nationalities and other Soviet institutions in Moscow. '2 In addition to 
the Tugan Yak (Motherland), the Marti-liani Society and the Saj4slain (Pure Islam) carne 
into existence in this period. These or-amsations, however, were too small to become the 
ý3 basis for a popular movement. 
The Tatar intellectuals formed TOTs (Tatar Public Centre) in September 1988 in order to 
unite the communist and nationalist Tatar factions under a national front. At its first 
congress in February 1989, Marat Mullukov, a historian at Kazan University, was elected 
as the first chairperson of TOTs. Although it was claimed that the TOTs gained a 
membership of 100,000 in a very short span of time, this figure seems to be exaggerated 
given the lack of a strong popular support for Tatar ethnic nationalism among the Tatars 
34 in Tatarstan . The 
intellectuals constituted over half of the delegates at the first two 
congresses of TOTs. The founders of TOTs were mainly based at the Tatar Branch of the 
USSR Academy of Sciences and the Kazan State University. The cultural intelligentsia 
joined the movement because they believed that the Tatar culture was in decline and that 
this decline could be reversed through a nationalist mobilisation. They targeted mainly 
the urban population, particularly those living in Kazan and Naberezhnye Chelny, as their 
potential support base. 
Modelled on the 'popular front' organisations in the Baltic republics, TOTs was moderate 
in its program demanding greater economic autonomy (a self-financing economy), the 
establishment of formal political links with the Tatar Diaspora and the use of Tatar 
language in schools. It also demanded greater protection for Tatar culture and that 
Tatarstan be made a union republic. 35 
In March 1990, a radical nationalist group, the Ittifak (Alliance) National Party, was 
established and began to challenge TOTs for leadership of the nationalist movement. 
After being organised in ten cities and fourteen villages in Tatarstan, Ittifak and its youth 
31 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
Rafael F. Mukhanunetdinov, 'Demokratizatsiia nachinaetsia S dekolonizatsii', Vecherniaia Kazan, 6 
August 1988. 
33 Nadir Devlet, 'The Tatars and Bashkirs after Glasnost', Journal of Institute of Muslim Minority 
Affairs, vol. 10, no. 2,1989, p. 465. 
34 'Tezisy k podgotovke platformy Tatarskogo obshchestvennogo tsentra', Central Asian and 
Caucasian Chronicle, vol. 8, no. 2,1989, pp. 5-9. 
35 Damir M. Iskhakov, 'TOTs Programma i deistviia', Kommunist Tatarii, no. 7,1990, pp. 38-44. 
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organisation, Aýwdvk (Freedom) held their founding conferences in October 1990. At this 
conference. Rafael Mukhameddinov became the founding chairperson of the party. 36 
IttijWs version of Tatar ethnic nationalism took shape when the first Congress (Kurultai) 
held in April 1991 adopted the party progranu-ne. At this congress, Fauziia Bairamova 
became lttijýWs chairperson. This programme insisted that Tatar be made the Republic's 
sole state language and that Russians be denied citizenship, and it articulated Tatar 
territorial claims on Bashkifiia and Perm and Ul'ianovsk oblasts. The programme defined 
'Tatarstan' as a neutral and independent state, which would have a standing army to be 
created from Azatlyk members. Moreover, the immigration of the Tatar Diaspora to 
Tatarstan was strongly advised to change the delicate ethno-demographic balance in 
favour of Tatars. 37 Ittifak claimed that cultural rninority rights rather than full citizenship 
should be granted to the Russian inhabitants of Tatarstan. It called for the adoption of a 
common alphabet for all Turkic peoples and strong popular support for Islam. Ittifak also 
demanded an end to mixed marriages. 38 
The leader of Ittifak, Fauziia Bairamova, was born on 5 December 1950 in the village of 
Sabai in Tatarstan. She graduated from Kazan University's Department of Philology in 
1989. Her hunger strike from 13-27 May 1991 in Kazan was the first major victory of the 
Tatar national movement as it succeeded in preventing the holding of Russian 
Presidential elections on the territory of Tatarstan . 
39 At that time, Bairamova's followers 
seemed to be ready for an armed struggle against Moscow if Russia re ected their 
demands for independence. Bairamova's version of Tatar nationalism was not confined 
to the borders of Tatarstan. It also called for the annexation of the Russian territories that 
are populated by the Tatar diaspora to Tatarstan: 
Half of Russia's territory is Tatar lands.... The time has come to raise the 
question of annexing to Tatarstan the lands that belonged to the Tatars of old 
lands where they now dwell - the lands of Simbirsk, Saratov, Samara, 
Astrakhan, and Orenburg, the expanses of the Ufa plateau and all of the Urals' 
36 Rafael Kh. Mukharnetdinov and Fauziia A. Bairamova, 'Chto takoe Ittifak? ', Komsomolets Tatarii, 
13 May 1990. 
31 'Programma Tatarskoi Partii Natsional'noi Nezavisimosti (TPNN) Ittifak', Panorama, vol. 2, no. 6, 
199 1, pp. 15-25. 
38 F. Abdullin, Azatlyk Sakhifelere (1988-1996 ellar) Dokumental'povest', Chally: Islam Nury, 1997. 
39 For the biography of Fauziia A. Bairamova, see Nail M. Mukhariarnov, 'Politicheskaia elita 
Tatarstana: Biograficheskie svedeniia', in Regiony Rossik Khronika i rukovaditeli. Tom-7, ed. 
Ki mitaka Matsuzato, Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2000, pp. 145-146. 
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western slope. The Siberian Tatars and the Sergach Mishars are a special 
question: their lands are alsoTatar lands. 4" 
in opposition to these ethnic nationalist organisations, some 200 delegates came to Kazan 
from Moscow, Kiev, Astrakhan, Orenburg and Ul'ianovsk, and founded the Bulgar 
National Congress under the leadership of Gusman Khalilov in 1990. The Congress 
advocated that the Volga Tatars should be called 'Bulgars', and Tatarstan should be part 
41 
of the Russian Federation . 
The Weakness of Ethnic Nationalist Movements in Post-Soviet Tatarstan 
The success of the Shaimiev regime in maintaining the control of Tatarstan in the post- 
Soviet era through its pragmatic nomenklatitra nationalism without relying on the 
support of any specific nationalist movement weakened ethnic nationalist movements in 
the Republic. It is possible to identify this trend in the Tatar and Russian ethnic 
nationalist organisations. 
There has been a sharp decline in the popularity of Tatar ethnic nationalist movements in 
the post-Soviet period. The internal divisions within the Tatar ethnic nationalist 
movement played an important role in their weakness in the post-Soviet era. Ittifak and 
VTOTs (As noted in Chapter Three, Tatar Public Centre [TOTs] was renamed as All- 
Tatar Public Centre [VTOTs] in 1992) represented the main rival groups in the Tatar 
ethnic nationalist movement. Their struggle for the leadership of Tatar nationalism 
diluted the movement, while creating further internal divisions within their own 
organisations. 42 
This could be seen clearly in the internal divisions of VTOTs, which has been a key 
player in the nationalist agitation of the Tatars in the early 1990s. The divide between the 
radical and moderate elements of VTOTs became very visible after the disintegration of 
40 Kazanskie vedomosti, 25 November 1991. 
41 Damir A Iskhakov; 'Neformal'nye ob"edineniia v sovremennom Tatarskom obshchestve', in 
Sovremennye natsional'nye protsessy v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Darnir M. Iskhakov and Rozalina N. 
Musina, Kazan: HaLll KNTs RAN, 1992, pp. 27-28. 
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the Soviet Union in 1991. The VTOTs branches in Nizhnekarnsk, Al'nietievsk and 
Elabuga were polansed into two competing groups of the centrists and the hard-liners. 
The centrists, headed by Fandas Saftullin, turned to sanctioned opposition to the regime, 
which gave them a licence to criticise the government for insufficient nationalism. The 
pro-Shaimiev elements in VTOTs sought to promote a moderate version of Tatar ethnic 
nationalism. Whilst often still sharply critical of the official policy, some VTOTs 
members no longer see the organisation as being in direct opposition to Tatarstan's 
authorities. As Nazip Galeev, chief editor of Izvestiia VTOTs, explains: 
I would speak about alternative organisations. I do not like the word 
I opposition' because we are a national movement. To be reasonable, we 
cannot say that we are an opposition. I would not take such a position because 
we should work together with the state authorities. The national movement 
aims to revive the Tatar state by civilised means, not through armed struggle 
but on the basis of International law. 43 
Some members of VTOTs, particularly those based in the city of Naberezhnye Chelny, 
are more radical than those members in Kazan. For example, Zinnur Agliullin, Head of 
the Naberezhnye Chelny Branch of VTOTs, has been advocating radical ethnic 
nationalism since his election to his post in 1993. Reshat Safin, one of the leading figures 
of the radical wing of VTOTs, emphasised that the 'Russian idea' and the 'Tatar idea' are 
two irreconcilable concepts as the former is rooted in an ideology of colonialism and the 
latter was nurtured by anti- colonialism. 44 His analysis underscored the need for 
independent statehood and democratic institutions given the resilience of the Russian 
imperial mentality. There is a need for the state to protect the nation. The Tatar Diaspora 
should be supported to make Tatarstan a model of justice and economic prosperity and 
the fatherland (vatan) of all Tatars. All the Tatar Diaspora could defend it as a cradle of 
support for themselves, as this would make it possible for all Tatarstani citizens to 
embrace it as their motherland, take pride in their citizenship and defend the country's 
sovereignty and peace. 45 
42 Damir M. Iskhakov, 'Natsional'nye dvizheniia Tatarstana: Bor'ba za liderstvo', Sovetskaia Tatariia, 
4 August 1992. 
41 As cited in Howard Davis, Philip Hammond and Lilia Nizamova, 'Media, Language Policy and 
Cultural Change in Tatarstan: Historic vs. Pragmatic Claims to Nationhood', (hereafter, 'Media, 
Language Policy and Cultural Change in Tatarstan'), Nations and Nationalism, vol. 6, no. 2,2000, 
p. 216. 
44 Reshat Safin, a retired Lieutenant-Colonel, is also known as 'Tatar Dudaev' since he attempted to 
create the 'National Guard' of Tatarstan as the military arm of the Tatar nationalist movement in 1992. 
45 Rashid Safin, 'Tatar ideiase', Tatarstan, no. 6,1996, p. 13. 
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Internal divisions also took place in Ittifak, the most radical Tatar ethnic nationalist party. 
During its Congress in December 1997, almost half of its members deserted the party C) 
leader Fauziia Bairamova. Meanwhile, Bairamova and Aidar Khalim (the pen name of 
Boris Khatimov), editor of the pro-Tatar nationalist literary magazine Argainak, differed 
46 
over the Party prograrrune . 
Consequently, the more radical wing of Ittifak led by 
Bairamova dominated the Party. For example, Ittifak's main document, Kanunname (the 
Tatar codex), which was approved on 28 January 1996, radicalised the position of the 
Tatar ethnic nationalists by advocating the unity of the Tatars and the Bashkirs: 
The first condition of achieving national freedom is to achieve the unity of the 
Turkic peoples of the North rather than striving for ethnic hegemony. This 
group include the Bashkirs and the Tatars. 47 
Ittifak in its 1997 Congress proclaimed itself the only defender of national independence. 
The party sees the terms of Tatarstan's relationship with Moscow as being highly 
disadvantageous, denouncing the Republic's government as a 'dictatorship'. During the 
Congress, the party's leader, Fauziia Bairamova criticised the Republican authorities for 
their decision to adopt the Latin alphabet, and demanded a greater role for Islam: 
If Tatars connect their future with Islarn, with life according to the Koran, then 
their alphabet should be the same as it was for a thousand years, narnely 
Arabic graphics. 49 
During my interview with Rafael Mukhammetdinov, the founder of Ittifak, he 
systernatised the ideology of Tatar ethnic nationalism as follows: 
The national ideology of the Tatars should involve forming a Tatar state for 
ethnic Tatars. This ideology can be formulated as an eclectic combination of 
Tatarism, Islamism, and modernism (Tatarcylyk Islawylyk, and 
Chagdashcylyk). 49 
The hard-liners, though they continue to pursue their radical agenda, have been 
effectively marginalized. For example, Fauziia Bairamova joined forces with the very 
46 Aidar Khalim, Ubit'imperiiu, Naberezhnye Cheiny: Kalkan, 1997. 
47 Tatar Kanunu - Kanunnama, Kazan: Tatar Khalkynyn Milli Medzhlisi, 1996, p. 16. 
48 Fauziia A. Bairamova, 'Islam i tatarskaia natsiia', Madani Zhomga, 19 December 1997. 
49 My interview with Rafael F. Mukhammetdinov, the founder of the Tatar National Independence 
Party - Ittifak, Kazan, I June 1998. 
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Communists who advocated the restoration of the USSR within a movement called Onto 
(Hope) under the leadership of the ex-Mufti of Tatarstan Gabdulla Galiulla in December 
1998. 
The divides within the Tatar ethnic nationalist organisations have been partly related to 
the pressures of the Republican authorities over the radical elements of the Tatar ethnic 
nationalist organisations. After strengthening its political and economic domination in 
Tatarstan with the active support of the Tatar ethnic nationalists, the Republican 
leadership has turned against the Tatar national movement who viewed the Power- 
Sharing Treaty of 1994 as a betrayal of the national interests of the Tatar people. In 1994, 
the Republican authorities asked Ittifak, Milli Mejlis and VTOTs to leave their 
comfortable premises in Kazan's city centre. At the same time, legal proceedings were 
initiated against soine radical members of Ittifiak and Milli Mejlis. During the 1995 
elections to Tatarstan's parliament, the State Council, the Republican authorities 
succeeded in removing Fauziia Bairamova, the leader of Ittifiak, from the parliament by 
supporting the moderate nationalist Talgat Abdullin, who was the President of Ak Bars 
Bank. Not surprisingly, Abdullin won the elections. 
During my interview with Akhdas Burganov in 1998, he clarified the lack of unity 
arnong the Tatar intelligentsia and Tatarstan's leadership as follows: 
Today, Tatar nationalism is a form of inteHigentsia rather than nomenklatura 
nationalisrn- The support of Tatarstan's leadership is necessary for the success 
of the national movement since they could play a moral leadership to resist 
Russian chauvinists. 50 
The Republican authorities also sought to co-opt the moderate elements of the Tatar 
ethnic nationalist organisations into the political establishment. For instance, Rafael 
Khakimov, one of the former leaders of VTOTs, was appointed as the Chief Advisor of 
Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shaimiev and the Director of the Institute of History at 
the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan. Another VTOTs activist Fandas 
Safiullin was 'elected' to Tatarstan's Parliament with the open support of the Shaimiev 
leadership. Tatarstan's leadership has also elicited the support of some ordinary Tatar 
' My interview with Prof Akhdas Kh. Burganov, the Department of History at the Russian State 
Humanities University, Moscow, 28 July 1998. 
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nationalists due to its policies in such areas as language, education, culture and religion Z: ) Z' 
(these policies are discussed in Chapter Two). Besides, the Shaimiev government 
sponsored the forniation of the All-Tatar World Congress, headed by Indus Tagirov, to 
co-ordinate Tatar activities all over the world, such as the creation of Tatar national 
schools and the organisation of national festivals in the areas where Tatars live. 51 
Similar to the trends among the Tatars, the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan have been unable 
to fonn a united front against Tatarstan's leadership and the Tatar ethnic nationalists in 
Tatarstan. Likewise, their moderate groups have also been co-opted by Tatarstan's 
leadership. Leokadia Drobizheva's warning that post-Soviet Russia could take advantage 
of the nationalist feelings of the Russians within the republics has not been borne out so 
far in Tatarstan. 52 
In fact, the Russian ethnic nationalists in Tatarstan have been divided within themselves. 
These divisions, to a large extent, have been caused by the differences in the way that the 
Russian views towards the sovereignty of Tatarstan have ranged from active hostility to 
passive resistance and loyalty. Instead of trying to slow down or to discourage attempts to 
distance themselves from the Russian 'motherland', it appears that the majority of 
Russians tend to support the process of sovereignitisation. In fact, under El'tsin's 
Presidency between 1992 and 1999, the decisions made by Tatarstan's authorities were 
more important to the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan than the decrees emanating from 
Moscow. 53 Rafael Khakimov attempts to explain the lack of Moscow's support for the 
ethnic Russians in Tatarstan in terms of Moscow's colonial mentality. Khakimov says 
that: 
Neither in its foreign, nor in its domestic policy does Russia act as a guarantor 
of the rights of the Russians and this is why the Russian people will have to 
look for support wherever they are, in the republics. 54 
" Rustam Gibadullin, Tatarskoe natsional'noe dvizhenie: Politicheskaia deiatel'nost' i vliianie v 
Tatarstane (1988-1992), Kazan: KGU, 1998, pp. 88-115. 
52 Leokadia M. Drobizheva, 'Russian Ethnonationalism', in Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World, 
eds. Leokadia M. Drobizheva, et al., Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, p. 145. 
53 However, since VladiiTfir Putin's rise to Russian Presidency in 2000, the situation has changed 
significantly to the advantage of Moscow. This will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
'4 Rafael S. Khakimov, Sumerki imperii. K voprosu o natsii i gosudarstve, (hereafter, Sumerki imperii), 
Kazan, Tatknizdat, 1993, p. 18. 
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Nevertheless, it is very difficult to confirm that many ethnic Russians share this view. It is 
more likely that the lack of Moscow's support for the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan steins 
from its post-Sovie( weakness. Trapped without any support from Moscow, the ethnic 
Russians in Tatarstan continued to promote the values of internationalism, as was the 
case during the Soviet period, and avoided radicalism in order to protect themselves from 
the negative effects of the potentially aggressive Tatar ethnic nationalism. In the end, 
however, the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan rely on the goodwill of Tatarstan's authorities 
rather than on the Tatars or on Moscow. 
Comparisons with the Nationalist Movements in the Former Soviet Republics 
The rise and fall of Tatar nationalism and the position of the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan 
could be compared to the successes and failures of other nationalist movements, and to 
the positions of the Russian Diaspora in the former Soviet republics. 
The Tatar nationalist movement developed along a very different path than that taken by 
the nationalist movements in the former Soviet republics, except Belarus, the Russian 
Federation and the Central Asian republics. These union republics, which include 
Ukraine, Moldova and the republics in the Baltics and Transcaucasus gained their 
independence as a consequence of the existence of a number of factors such as a popular 
movement, a split within the republican elite and international support. However, no such 
coincidental combination of factors was available for the Tatar ethnic nationalist 
movement. These nationalist movements, unlike Tatar nationalist movements, advocated 
both national and democratic goals and were united in their opposition to the Soviet 
central government led by Gorbachev at the time. In Tatarstan, the Communists and the 
nationalists were united since they saw a cornmon enemy in El'tsin rather than in 
Gorbachev. Furthermore, there was no direct international interest in the independence of 
Tatarstan. Consequently, the nationalist movement waned. 55 
Similar to the fate of the Tatar nationalists, the nationalist movements in Belarus, the 
Russian Federation and the Central Asian republics have been extremely weak. In fact, 
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Belarus and the Central Asian republics gained independence by default as the USSR fell 
apart. The Belorussian nationalists, for instance, ultimately failed in their efforts to 
i-nobilise the Belorussian population. When the Belorussian population was finally 
mobilised in large numbers in spring 1991, it was primarily in terms of an independent 
trade union movement expressing outrage over price increases rather than around 
nationalist demands. Similar trends were also observable in other nationalist movements 
in the Russian Federation and Central Asia. There has not been a strong Russian or non- 
Russian nationalist mobilisation in the Russian Federation, except the Chechen 
nationalist movement. Nationalist mobilisation was remarkably weak in the countries of 
Central Asia, except in Uzbekistan where the nationalist movements of Birlik and Erk 
were noteworthy, but ultimately proved ineffective in tak-ing control of the republic. 56 
The passivity of the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan could be compared to the similar 
attitudes of the Russian Diaspora in the post-Soviet states. Ethnic Russians living in the 
Baltic States are largely abandoned by Russia, with Moscow's attempts to draw attention 
to their plight lacking any real assistance. Mostly economic colonialists sent by Moscow 
in the post-Second World War era to Russify the Baltics, ethnic Russians found 
themselves as foreigners living in foreign lands expected to learn the local languages after 
the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. The strict language requirements have left some 
150,000 people in Estonia and 300,000 in Latvia without citizenship. In Lithuania, all 
permanent residents received full political rights, since the Lithuanians, comprising 
almost four-fifths of Lithuania's population, see no threat to their ethnic distinctiveness. 
Moreover, Lithuania adopted its citizenship law in November 1989, before its declaration 
of independence from the Soviet Union. 57 
In Ukraine, the government did not take such harsh measures against its Russian 
minorities. Ukraine pursues an inclusive, if not civic (since Ukraine has many 
shortcomings in instituting a working democratic system), nation-building policy towards 
the Russians in Ukraine. Ukraine's total population of 52 million includes the Russian 
55 Mary McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty, (hereafter, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 54. 
56 Martha Brill Olcott, 'The New Nations of Central Asia', in The Successor States to the USSR, ed. 
John W. Blaney, Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1995, pp. 215-216. 
57 Neil J. Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity. London: Pinter/RIIA, 
1995, pp. 125-129. 
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Diaspora of' 11,355,000 ethnic Russians and 16,898,000 Russian-speaking Ukrainians. 5, 
The Ukrainian politics of nation-building seeks to achieve a rapprochement between the 
Ukrainians and the local Russian speakers. Western Ukraine, which was incorporated 
into the Ukrainian SSIR during World War 11, became a hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism. 
Although the Ukrainian proclamation of sovereignty in 1990 spoke not in the name of the 
Ukrainian ethnos but rather on behalf of all 'the people of Ukraine', the 1992 law on 
national minorities, which was adopted by President Leonid Kravchuk, distinguishes 
between ethnic Ukrainians and 'mýinofities'. Besides, Ukrainian became the sole state 
language. Kravchuk's successor, Leonid Kuchma, has further reinforced the 'inclusive' 
nation-building policy since being elected in the summer of 1994.59 However, it should 
be noted that although the closeness of Russians and Ukrainians works against the 
scenario of ethnic polarisation and political extremism in Ukraine, it is likely to serve as a 
basis for a potential re-union of Russia and Ukraine rather than for a 'civic' Ukrainian 
national identity. 
Unlike Ukraine, Moldova pursued exclusive policies towards the Russians in this 
republic in the aften-nath of the Soviet collapse in 1991. In reaction to this Moldavian 
nationalism, Transdniestria, the Slav-don-finated enclave on the east bank of the Dniester 
River, waged a successful war of secession against Moldova in 1992 with crucial help 
from the Russian troops stationed in the area. In order to accommodate the Russians in 
Transdniestria, Moldova had to adopt a more inclusive perspective towards 
Transdniestria, and to shelve the idea of uniting with Romania. Apart from adopting 
conciliatory overtures to woo back Transdniestria, Moldova also granted territorial 
autonomy to the Turkic-speaking Gagauz in the south. 60 These policies have served to 
accornmodate the Russians in Moldova. 
Unlike the Russian Diaspora in these states, the ethnic Russians in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus chose to immigrate to the Russian Federation not because of hostile state 
policies but rather because of the deteriorating ethnic and socio-econonfic situation in 
58 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 2" ed., London: Routledge, 1996, p. 345. 
59 Anatol Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry, Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1999. 
60 Anatol Lieven, 'Non-Russian Perceptions of Russia', in Rethinking Russia, eds. Madhavan K Palat 
and Geeti Sen, New Delhi: India International Centre, 1994, p. 243. 
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these re-lons. In total, one third of the ethnic Russians in these re-ions immigrated to the 
Russian Federation. 61 
This comparative analysis shows that although the Russian diaspora has not been treated 
very well by many of the newly emerging states in the post-Soviet space, this has not led 
to any strong Russian nationalist mobilisation for the purpose of protecting the Russian 
diaspora, except in Moldova. Anatol Lieven points out the absence of a strong Russian 
ethnic identity and the lack of institutions capable of providing the basis for mass 
mobilisation as factors explaining the weakness of Russian nationaliSM. 62 Anatol Lieven 
explained the weakness of Russian national identity among the Russian diaspora as 
follows: 
'Russian diaspora' is not really ethnic Russian at all, but rather an ethnically 
mixed Russian speaking Soviet population of relatively recent migrants who 
have not yet had time to develop a real sense of rootedness, community, or 
local identity. 63 
However, despite the current weakness of Russian national identity, there is still a danger 
that as Russia loses its role and its self-perception as the leader of other nations, it could 
develop a reactionary form of patriotism among the Russian diaspora. This form of 
Russian national identity is likely to be very resentful, closed and ethnically-based. 64 
The Weakness of the Support for Ethnic Nationalism in Opinion Polls and Its 
Causes 
Popular support for nationalism is very crucial in the success of nationalist mobilisation. 
Anatol Lieven elucidated this point as follows: 
From a practical, non-academic point of view, therefore, it is of secondary 
importance where nationalist ideas and national passions come front, how 
61 Neil J. Melvin, 'The Russians: Diaspora and the End of Empire', in Nations Abroad: Diaspora 
Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union, eds. Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, pp. 39-4 1. 
62 Anatol Lieven, 'The Weakness of Russian Nationalism', Survival, vol. 41, no. 2,1999, pp. 55-60. 
63 Lieven, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nationT, p. 20. 
64 Astrid S. Tuminez, Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy, 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp. 341-342. 
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genuine or artificial they may be, or how recend they were generated. The y 
test is: Do they worV Do they succeed in mobilizing and holding together the 
community to which they appeal'? In the past, and in all too many parts of the 
world today, there is an even simpler test: Do they make people willing to fight 
and die'. Y's 
Samuel Huntington argues that ethnic mobilisation will be strong when two ethnic groups 
66 belonging to different civilisations share the same territory . However, Tatarstan with its C, 
four iWIllon inhabitants composed mainly of Russians and Tatars proved that it was not a 
fertile ground for a 'clash of civilisations'. tn fact, the opinion poll results presented 
below show that the members of the Tatar and Russian ethnic groups could have multiple 
identities and preferences that are flexible, changeable and adaptive to a variety of 
circumstances. 
In 1993, the Institute of Ethnography and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences conducted sociological surveys in all the republics of the Russian Federation, 
including Tatarstan, in order to deten-nine the level of support for civic and ethnic 
identities among the Russians and non-Russians. This survey found that there is low 
support for ethnic nationalism. In this survey, 52 percent of the Tatars professed only a 
Tatarstani identity, 34 percent claimed to have both Tatarstani and Russia identities, and 
3 percent had only Russian identity with a further II percent who declined to answer. In 
contrast, 15 percent of the Russians claimed only a Tatarstani identity, 49 percent had 
both Tatarstani and Russian identities, and 28 percent only felt Russian with a further 8 
percent who preferred not to answer this question (See Table A4.9). In terms of the 
perceptions of 'motherland' in Tatarstan in 1993, in response to the question 'of what 
state do you consider yourself to be a citizenT (the USSR, Russia, ethnic republic of 
residence within the Russian Federation), the majority of the Tatars (74 percent) 
considered themselves first of all to be citizens of the republic of residence, 18 percent as 
the citizen of the Soviet Union, 4 percent as a citizen of Russia, with 4 percent giving no 
answer. Among the Russians, the answers were equally divided: 29 percent as a citizen of 
the Soviet Union, 31 percent as a citizen of Russia, 36 percent as a citizen of Tatarstan, 
while 4 percent gave no answer (See Table A4.1 1). in terms of Soviet identity, 30 percent 
of the Tatars viewed the break up of the USSR positively while 48 percent had negative 
65 Anatol Lieven, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Scholarly Debate and the Realities of Eastern Europe', 
National Interest, Fall 1997, p. 16. 
66 Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of CivilizationsT, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3,1993, p. 25. 
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views with 22 percent providing no answer. In contrast, 17 percent of the Russians 
viewed the break up of the USSR positively while 68 percent had negative views with 15 
percent giving no answer (See Table A4.10). 
According to an opinion poll taken in 1994 by Leokadia Drobizheva among the Tatars 
and the Russians in Tatarstan, the ethnic Russians and the Tatars assess interethnic 
relations in the republic differently. As compared to 18.6 percent of the Russians, 21.5 
percent of the Tatars responded positively to the question of 'Have you experienced a 
violation of your rights because of your nationalityT Given the fact that 9.7 percent of the 
Tatars as compared to 4.2 percent of the Russians declined to answer this question, it is 
difficult to reach an accurate conclusion about the nature of ethnic discrimination in the 
Republic on the basis these figures. However, one could conclude that the ethnic 
Russians in Tatarstan are more internationalist in their orientation towards other nations 
as compared to the Tatars in the Republic. For example, to the question of 'Are you 
willing to accept a person of another nationality as a citizen of your republic', 83.7 
percent of the Russians responded positively while 77 percent of Tatars answered 
similarly. While 47.7 percent of the Russians stated that they were open to the idea of 
interethnic marriage, only 25.7 percent of the Tatars shared the same view. Although the 
ethnic Russians are largely positive in their orientation towards other ethnic groups at the 
personal level, they are not equally positive about the nature of interethnic relations at the 
group level. While 80.5 percent of the Tatars responded positively to the question of 
'How do you estimate inter-ethnic relations in your republicT, only 73 percent of the 
Russians were positive in their answers. Similarly, as compared to 7.6 percent of the 
Tatar respondents, 15.1 percent of the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan stated that interethnic 
67 relations were tense (See Table A4.12). 
Although Tatarstan's policies of nation-building are presented by the Republican 
leadership as 'civic', especially the ethnic Russians of working age in Tatarstan tend to 
perceive these policies as being discriminatory. According to the opinion poll conducted 
by Donna Bahry among the working age population in Tatarstan, North Ossetiia and 
Sakha in 1997-1998, a majority of the Russians expressed that other nationalities 
(Tatars) are favoured for good jobs (63.9 percent) and for government posts (72.3 
67 Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict, pp. 112-113 
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percent) (See Table A4.8). This perception is confirmed by the responses of' the Tatars 
in Tatarstan. In the same opinion poll, a minority of Tatars replied that non-Tatars are 
favoured for good jobs (2.0 percent) and for government posts (4.1 percent). 611 
Although some Russians may argue that the post-Soviet process of Tatarisation aims to 
discriminate against the Russians in the Republic because of their nationality, this 
opinion poll does not support such claims. According to Bahry's opinion poll, few ethnic 
Russians expressed that they experienced ethnic discrimination (9.5 percent) or hostile 
treatment due to their nationality (16.6 percent). 69 This shows that although the post- 
Soviet process of Tatarisation in Tatarstan has been resented by some ethnic Russians 
for economic reasons, it is not widely seen by the population in the Republic as an 
ethnic nationalist policy of the Republican leadership against the local ethnic 
Russians. 
Although some of the ethnic Russians of working age in Tatarstan have been very 
resentful about the increasingly limited job opportunities for themselves in the Republic, 
they do not want to emigrate from Tatarstan. For example, a poll taken among the 
Russians in Tatarstan in the summer of 1992 showed that the desire of ethnic Russians to 
emigrate from Tatarstan was quite low at only 6 percent compared to, for example, 37 
percent that wished to leave Chechnia . 
70 According to the results of a poll conducted in 
Tatarstan in 1995, only two percent of ethnic Russians expressed the desire to leave the 
Republic .71 According to Dmitry 
Gorenburg, this could be explained by the fact that the 
majority of Tatarstan's residents are against Tatar ethnic nationalism. In his opinion poll 
among Tatarstan's residents, 59 percent of the respondents replied negatively to the 
question of 'Should Titular Language be Sole Official Language', while the positive 
responses formed the 29 percent of the answers. 72 It should be stated, however, that the 
results of opinion polls in Russia are not entirely reliable, since different polls seem to 
prove contradictory points. 
68 Donna Bahry, 'Ethnicity and Equality in Post-communist Economic Transition: Evidence from 
Russia's Republics', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54, no. 5,2002, p. 690. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 31 July 1992. 
71 Rozalina N. Musina and Rafael Tagirov, 'Etnicheskoe samosoznanie cherez prizmu sotsiologii', 
Nauchnyi Tatarstan, no. 4,1995, p. 59. 
72 Dmitry Gorenburg, 'Nationalism for the Masses: Popular Support for Nationalism in Russia's Ethnic 
Republics', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 53, no. 1,2001, p. 80. 
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The support for nationalist mobilisation is also weak among the Russians, who were 
surprised in the post-Soviet cra by the sudden decline in their privileged positions, which 
they used to take for granted in the Soviet period. In reality, however, the Russians had no 
privileges but rather 'advantages' in the Soviet Union, since a Communist Russian who 
enjoyed 'advantages' owed them to his or her communism and not to his or her 
Russianness. 73 Despite this, ethnic Russians have largely expressed their regret over the 
break-up of the Soviet Union since 1992, since the transition process, which resulted in 
an increase in poverty, crime and a decline in health services and life expectancy, has 
been painful to large segments of the Russian population . 
74 The post-Soviet crisis of 
Russian national identity is evident in the following response of Iurii Afanas'ev to a 
question concerning his own Russian identity: 
This is difficult to say. I am Russian, certainly. I have been educated and 
brought up as a Russian. But I am more a Soviet, perhaps even a European, 
because it does not seem either necessary, useful, comfortable or even polite to 
be in the first place a Russian. 's 
Because of the nostalgia towards the 'stable' years of the Soviet Union, the 'Soviet' 
consciousness is still alive among the Russians. It is striking that only 'national' 
responsibility has weakened considerably in the post-Soviet era. According to the 
findings of a survey conducted by Iurii Levada and Michel Vale on the change in the 
social consciousness of post-Soviet peoples, the Russians mentioned the family, job and 
citizenship more as objects of pride rather than the country in which they lived in. 76 
The strength of the support for ethnic nationalist goals depends strongly on how 
connected its members feel to the rest of their ethnic group. The use of one's native 
language, the practice of traditional customs and the holding of strong religious beliefs 
determine the strength of an individual's sense of cultural identity. It can be said that 
there is a limited potential for the mobilisation of ethnic differences in Tatarstan given the 
absence of institutions that could channel ethnic differences into ethnic claims. In this 
73 John B. Dunlop, 'Russia: In Search of an Identity', in New States, New Politics: Building the Post- 
Soviet Nations, eds. Ian Bremmer and Roy Taras, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 3 1. 
74 David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 308-312. 
75 Cited in Roman Laba, 'How Yeltsin's Exploitation of Ethnic Nationalism Brought Down an Empire', 
Transitions, no. 2,12 January 1996, p. 7. 
76 lurii A. Levada, "Chelovek sovetskii' piat' let spustia: 1989-1994', Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye 
peremeny: monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia, no. 1,1995, pp. 9-14. 
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sense, the factors impeding the growth of Tatar ethnic nationalism include the self7other 
perceptions of the Tatars and the Russians, the dominance of religious secularism, the 
widespread acceptance of bilingualism, mixed marriages and cosmopolitan urban culture. 
Moreover, the weaknesses of the market economy and civil society deprive the Tatar and 
the Russian ethnic nationalists of the instruments for mobilising the masses in Tatarstan. 
The Tatar Perceptions of Themselves and the Russians in Tatarstan 
Before analysing the Tatar and the Russian perceptions of themselves and each other, it 
should be stated here that these perceptions do not represent anything concrete. They are 
symbolic constructions made up of national myths. George Sch6plin defines myth as 'a 
set of beliefs, usually put forward as a narrative, held by a community about itself' . 
77 
These myths include the myths about foundation, antiquity, territory, election, civilising 
mission, redemption and rebirth. 
There are various competing Tatar perceptions of themselves and the Russians in 
Tatarstan. The majority of the Tatars, including some moderate Tatar nationalists, do not 
see themselves in direct opposition to the ethnic Russians in the Republic. The minority 
view which is shared only by some extreme Tatar nationalists is that the Tatars - patient, 
industrious, humifiated by Moscow, willing to live an independent life - were in direct 
opposition to Russia - thriving for suppression, plunder and colonisation. Even for these 
Tatar nationalists, the axis of opposition lies, to a large extent, not between the two 
nations - Tatar and Russian - but rather between Tatars and the power structures of 
Moscow. 78 
Tatar ethnic nationalists see their conceptions of the Tatar nation's collective past and 
future as integral parts of their self-definition. In line with this position, many of Tatar 
historians tend to glorify the supremacy of the Tatars over Russians under the Golden 
Horde as the golden age of the Tatar nation. 79 . In 1944, the Central Committee Of the 
7' George Sch6pflin, Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe, London: Hurst & Co., 
2000, p. 80. 
78 Azade-Aylx Rorlich, 'History, Collective Memory and Identity: The Tatars of Sovereign Tatarstan', 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 32, no. 4,1999, p. 384. 
" Uli Schamiloglu, 'The Formation of a Tatar Historical Consciousness: Sihabaddin Mercani, and the 
Image of the Golden Horde', Central Asian Survey, vol. 9, no. 2,1990, p. 43. 
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CPSU condemned the idealisation of the Golden Horde by Tatar historians. Instead, the 
Soviets called for a 'scientific' investigation of Tatar history. The USSR Academy of 
Sciences in Moscow and its Branch in Kazan held a joint conference in Moscow in 25-26 
April 1946. It was concluded that the identification with Mongol Tatars was an error. The 
Tatars were a mixture of Finno-Ugric peoples and Turkic-speaking Bulgars. 80 According 
to the Bulgar thesis of Alfred Khalikov, the genealogical origins of the Tatars go back to 
the Bulgar State. 81 Many leaders of the TASSR shared this position. For example, Fikrat 
Tabaev, the First Secretary of the Tatar Obkom of the CPSU, complained that, 
A big mistake was made in the 1920s. We should have named our new 
republic 'Bulgar' and its peoples 'Bulgars' to avoid unpleasant association 
with the epoch of Tatar Mongol rule of Russia. 82 
However, these attempts at backdating Tatar national consciousness to the Bulgar period 
are not convincing since the collective consciousness of the people in the Middle Volga 
region at that time was tribal, dynastic and religious rather than ethnic. 
83 
Some of the Tatar nationalist intellectuals describe their nationalist activities as a form of 
self-defence against the ethnic discrimination to which they have been subjected for 
decades, during which they were forced to remain silent on the issue. According to them, 
the Tatars have been colonised by Moscow, and therefore have the moral right to be 
invested with national autonomy in Tatarstan. The idea of Tatarstan as the land of the 
Tatars is widespread among the Tatars in the Republic. In a textbook entitled Tatarstan 
Tarikhynnan Khikeyaler (Stories from the History of Tatarstan), recommended by the 
Ministry of Education for use in the fifth and sixth grades, Saliarn Alishev argued that, 
Tatarstan's land is the Tatar people's ancient homeland. Our people's history 
is very deep and ancient. On this land many other peoples have made the 
Republic of Tatarstan their second homeland from other places. During the 
centuries the Tatar people have worked together with Russians, Chuvash, 
Ukrainians, Bashkirs, Mari, Mordvins and Udmurts to make our homeland 
very beautiful. 84 
80 Viktor A. Shnirelman, Who Gets Past? Competition for Ancestors among Non-Russian Intellectuals 
in Russia, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1996, p. 24. 
8' Al'fred Kh. Khalikov, Kto my - Bulgary ili Tatary, Kazan: lzd-vo Kazan, 1992, pp. 1-5. 
12 As cited in Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict, p. 18. 
" Edward J. Lazzerini, 'Ethnicity and the Uses of History: The Case of the Volga Tatars and Jadidism', 
Central Asian Survey, November 1982, pp. 61-63. 
84 Saliam Alishev, Tatarstan TarikhYnnan Khikeyaler, Kazan: Magarif, 1993, p. 3. 
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In this passage, Tatars are pictured as the indigenous population of the land. Meanwhile, 
the 'other peoples' in Tatarstan are described as mere 'settlers' on that land, contributing 
to the propagation of Tatarstan as the 'Tatar' homeland. To reinforce this understanding 
of national teintory, Tatarstan's government has been organising celebrations for the 
85 Tatar cultural events, such as Sabantui . 
However, the Tatars blame not only the Russians but also the Tatars for their subjugation 
by Moscow. For instance, Fauziia Bairamova wrote that, 
The most appalling tragedy is that the nation is not ready for a sovereign state. 
The Tatars have lost pride in their nation, and this is a real tragedy. 86 
In the same manner, Tufan Mingnullin criticised the lack of unity among the Tatars and 
their docility and servility: 
Today as well, Tatars are not united. This is why their opinion is not taken into 
account. I do not blame the Russians at a1l for what we are. Only we are to 
blame. Those who lack self-respect are not respected. A docile slave is beaten 
more often. 87 
The problem of collaborators forms the cornerstone of the Tatar nationalist discourse. 
Ferit Yakhin's poem 'Ber Sharekh' is a very lucid example of this: 
For so long, if asked 'where is your landT 
Through sighs, a Tatar would say: 'Russians took it! ' 
Why not say it as it was? 'I gave it to them! ' 
And generations to come would know who was who. 88 
The problem of 'collaborators' is related to the assimilation of the Tatars into the Russian 
culture, which was elaborated in the legend of Mankurtism which comes from the Turkic 
words man (brain) and kurt (wonn) meaning a person whose brain is eaten up by worms. 
According to this Turkic legend, inhumane treatment by the Russians has eliminated the 
idea of 'self from the Tatar consciousness, thereby turning them into obedient slaves - 
mankurt. In the legend, the mother of a mankurt man tries to save him from this state of 
85 R. D. Sharafetdinov, Sabantui-Khaýyknyn yasheeshe, Kazan: GasyrIar Mazy, 1997. 
96 Sovetskaia Tatarfia, 22 October 199 1. 
87 Tufan Mingnuffin, U dnevnikov. Kto kogo ne liubit? Eshche raz o tatarakh i tatarstve', Tatarstan, 
no. 3,1996, p-55. 
8' Farid Yakhin, Ter Sharekh', Elluki, 6 June 1997, p. 7. 
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unconsciousness. However, the nuinkurt man kills his mother, as he perceives her as a 
threat to his survival. In the nationalist discourse of Tatars, the nuinkurts, the traitors of 
the Tatar nation, are seen as victims of Russification and a threat to Tatarisation. Fauziia 
Bairamova bestows the Tatar mother with a political responsibility in eliminating the 
influence of nuinkurtism among the Russified Tatars: 
If a mother is a mankurt, the nation disappears. To give the nation a future, the 
mother has to become a nationalist, a foster-mother of the nation 
[milletperver]. She must become clever, competent and religiously and 
politically mature. '9 
Indeed, the Russian culture is highly respected by most Tatars. Even Robert Batulla, a 
nationalist author, stresses his affinity for Russian as well as Tatar culture: 
MY teachers were Sergei Obraztsov, Professors Gladkov and Smimov in 
Moscow, Viktor Rozov in drama. I am grateful to them. I am grateful to 
Karamzin, Chernyshevskii, Tolstoi, Sakharov, Khudiakov, Gumilev. 90 
David C. Lewis explains this affinity between the Tatars and the Russians in Tatarstan by 
a Russian proverb, which says that 'scratch a Russian and underneath you'll find a 
Tatar. '91 
The Russians in Tatarstan have generally been seen by the Tatars in the Republic as 
people sharing the common destiny of the Tatars. Rafael Khakimov's following 
statement demonstrates how some Tatars perceive the tension between the Russian State 
and the Russian people: 
The Russian nation has become split into two 'nations' - that of capital-based 
officialdom, which seeks to retain the function of the centre of an empire, 
without which Moscow would even be unable to feed itself in the coming 
years, and the provincial, colonial nation living in another world and having 
different interests, often firmly linked with 'nationality' territories by kinship 
and economic ties. 92 
89 As cited in Kondrashov, Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in Tatarstan, p. 84. 
90 As cited in Davis, Hammond and Nizamova, 'Media, Language Policy and Cultural Change in 
Tatarstan', p. 218. 
9' David C. Lewis, 'Ethnicity and Religion in Tatarstan and the Middle Volga Region', Central Asian 
Survey, vol. 16, no. 2,1997, p. 217. 
92 Khakimov, Sumerki imperii, p. 66. 
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The popularity of such views among some Russians and Tatars, which I personally 
noticed during my Fieldworks in Tatarstan both in 1996 and 1998, shows that the Tatar 
perceptions of themselves and the Russians in Tatarstan cannot be explained in terms of a 
simple binary opposition of the self and the other. Those who see themselves, and are 
seen by others, as being members of the Tatar nation share certain things with some 
Russians. To what extent this analysis is valid for the Russians in Tatarstan could he 
established by looking at their perceptions of themselves and the Tatars in Tatarstan 
The Russian Perceptions of Themselves and the Tatars in Tatarstan 
The self-perception of the Russians in Tatarstan and their attitudes towards the Tatars are 
also not entirely conducive to manipulation by Russian or Tatar ethnic nationalists either. 
The Russians view themselves as being culturally advanced, non-ethnic-nationalists who 
care for the Tatars who are in turn pictured as being culturally backward ethnic 
nationalists prone to Islamic fundamentalism. 
Russian historians have generally had mixed views concerning the Mongol rule over the 
Russians. One strand of Russian history-writing seeks to account for Russia's 
'backwardness' relative to the West in terms of the despotic influences of the 'Tatar yoke' 
on the Russian soul. Although the Russian Empire adopted some of the administrative 
and military techniques of the Tatars, Russian historians have generally blamed 'the Tatar 
yoke' for their separation from the cultural development of the Western Slavic nations. 
However, the evidence provided in Chapter I shows that the relations between the 
Muscovite and Tatar nobles were very close and pragmatic until Ivan IV's capture of the 
Kazan Khanate in 1552. On the other hand, another strand of Russian historians has 
generally evaluated the Russian rule over the Tatars positively. They argued that after 
becoming a part of the Russian Empire, the Tatars were saved from extermination by 
other nomadic tribes in the Eurasian landmass as they came under the influence of the 
progressive Russian CUItUre. 93 
9' Charles J. Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian 
History, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 63. 
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Russians have a long history of living together with the Finno-Ugric and Turkic peoples Z; ý 
of the Volga. In fact, Tatarstan can be claimed to be a historical centre of Russian culture 
94 
as well as Tatar culture with some justification . After all, in addition to being the capital 
of Tatarstan, Kazan is the city of a well-known Russian scientist Nikolai Lobachevskii 
and novelist Maksim Gorkii. It is also the city where both Vladimir Lenin and Lev 
Tolstoi went to university. 95 
Russians' superior view of themselves prevents them from adopting an ethnic nationalist 
agenda, which is, in the Russian view, more suitable for the less modem Tatars. Some 
Russian ethnic nationalists assert that foreigners (non-Russians or non-Orthodox people) 
were to some extent to blame for the rnisfortunes that befell Russia, that non-Russians 
enjoyed too many rights in Russia or abused the opportunities offered them. This reflects 
a pathological response to the disintegration of the foundations of Soviet society as well 
as a pathological adaptation to new econornic and geopolitical realities. 
There are two irreconcilable views regarding the relations between Russians and 
Tatarstan's mainly-Tatar leadership. One view maintains that thanks to the multinational 
approach of Shaimiev towards the nationalities issue, Russian language and culture is 
still very dominant in the Republic whereas another view contends that there is virtually 
no cultural provision for the Russian-speaking citizens of Tatarstan. The second view is 
shared by those Russians who resent the underdevelopment of the Russian culture in 
Tatarstan. In May 1998,1 personally witnessed a Russian cultural festival where some 
participants complained about the decline in Russian culture in the Republic. For this, 
they blamed the Republican authorities that mainly support the Tatar culture, 
In the post-Soviet period, the ethnic Russians have felt threatened by the prioritisation of 
the Tatar culture and the more forthright expressions of Tatar nationalism in Tatarstan. A 
significant number of ethnic Russians and some Russian-speaking Tatars are worded that 
a process of 'Tatarisation' is increasingly marginalizing them. They would prefer to live 
not in the independent nation-state of Tatarstan but in 'Tatariia', a province of Russia. 
94 Evgenii Busygin, 'Russkie v mnogonatsional'nom povolzh'e', in Ia4vk i natsionalim v 
postsovetskikh respublikakh, ed. Mikhail N. Guboglo, Moscow: lEA RAN, 1994, pp. 45-48. 
95 Marat R. Mustafin and Rashid G. Khuzeev, Vse o Tatarstane: Ekonomiko-geograftcheskii 
spravochnik, (hereafter, Vse o Tatarstane), Kazan: Kazanskoe Knizhnoe Izd-vo, 1994, p-88. 
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Those people who regret the break-up of the USSR and people who feel closer to Russian 
culture support this view. 96 The vice-chairperson of the Society of Russian Culture, lurii 
Scheglov, emphasises the importance of a specifically regional Russian culture: 'The part 
of Russian culture concentrated in the Republic has an independent significance; it 
should be preserved and should develop here' . 
97 Similarly, Roman Beliakov argued that, 
Slogans which were quite understandable in the period of the strug le for C19 
sovereignty so called romantic nationalist ones, could be harmful in a later 
period. Tatarstan's politics should not be run according to the publicist clichd 
that Russia is an empire of evil. "' 
For Beliakov, the Russians in Tatarstan are not likely to develop active hostility or loyalty 
to Tatarstan's sovereignty. It is probable that they could demonstrate passive resistance to 
Republican sovereignty and to Tatar's position as a state language. Beliakov explains the 
passivity of the Russians to the outright expressions of Tatar nationalism as a product of 
the 'post-imperial' reorganisation of the Russian people. In his opinion, the disintegration 
of the USSR and the crisis of the post-Soviet Russia have caused confusion and 
uncertainty among Russians about their future. 99 Rozalina Musina supported Beliakov's 
argument as follows: 
Despite the fact that some Russians continue to display an imperial mentality 
and exhibit an 'elder brother' demeanor, many Russians have demonstrated an 
understanding of Tatar concerns. According to a 1989 survey, 78 percent of 
urban Tatars and more than 40 percent of urban Russians prefer to have their 
children educated in schools providing instruction in both Russian and 
Tatar. '00 
Vladimir Beliaev, the leader of the Soglasie (Accord) movement of the ethnic 
Russians in Tatarstan, views the emergence of Tatar ethnocracy as the main problem 
that aggravates the relations between the Russians and the Tatars in Tatarstan. In his 
interview with Leokadia Drobizheva, Beliaev stated that, 
96 Gulnara Khasanova, 'Russian Identity: The View from Tatarstan', The Jamestown Foundation 
Prism, 6 March 1998. 
97 As cited in Davis, Hammond and Nizamova, 'Media, Language Policy and Cultural Change in 
Tatarstan', p. 221. 
9' Roman Beliakov, 'Russkii vopros' v natsional'noi politike Tatarstana', in Mezhetnicheskie i 
mezhkonfessional'nye otnosheniia v Respublike Tatarstana, ed. Damir M. Iskhakov, Kazan: Apparat 
Prezidenta RT, 1993, p. 5 1. 
" Ibid. 
100 Rozalina N. Musina, 'Contemporary Ethnosocial and Ethnopolitical Processes in Tatarstan', in 
Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World. - Case Studies and Analysis, eds. Leokadia M. Drobizheva et 
al., Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, p. 202. 
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Today, 90-95 or tOO percent of Tatarstan's leadership is composed of the 
Tatars. Nevertheless, we do not demand the formation of a Russian 
nomenklatura. If the leaders are good people, this is completely fine for us. 
However, we are talking about the fact that appointments to the leadership 
positions in Tatarstan are not done in accordance with the merit system. "" 
Being aware of the political weakness of the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan in challenging 
Tatarstan's leadership, Beliaev calls for Moscow to scare the Republican leadership into 
bringing Republican law into confon-nity with the federal laws. In this way, he hopes that 
Tatarstan's residents regardless of their ethnic background could enjoy more democracy 
in the Republic. 102 
The lack of strong interethnic polarization between the Russians and the Tatars in 
Tatarstan shows that both the Tatar and Russian perceptions of the self and the other 
do not form a suitable basis for nationalist mobilization. These perceptions result from 
the existence of religious tolerance, the high levels of bilingualism, interethnic 
marriages and urbanization in addition to the state-dependent nature of Tatarstan's 
economy and the underdevelopment of civil society. It is useful to explore these 
factors in detail in order to draw a realistic picture of the culture and society in the 
Republic. 
Religious Tolerance 
Among other factors, the high level of religious tolerance in Tatarstan undermines the 
basis for interethnic polarisation between the Tatars and the Russians in Tatarstan. In 
addition to the Soviet policies of secularisation, the Tatar and the Russian conceptions of 
religion contributed to the weakness of religious polarisation, which was desired by 
ethnic nationalists of both sides. 
Islam was not a major component of Tatar national identity when Tatar ethnic 
nationalism started to take shape in the late 1980s, since the 70 years of Soviet rule 
secularised the society in the Republic. According to a survey carried out by Susan 
'0' Leokadia M. Drobizheva, 'Interv'iu s V. A. Beliaevorn', in Govorit elita respublik Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, ed, Leokadia M. Drobizheva, Moscow: REA RAN, 1996, p. 26. 102 Ibid., p. 27. 
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Goodrich Lehmann in 1993, active religiosity among the Tatars was primarily confined 
to old and rural women with low levels of education. In general, Muslims in Tatarstan are 
not practising Islam regularly. While 26 percent of the Tatars believe and practice Islam, 
30 percent only believe whereas 15 percent are equivocal and a further 29 percent are 
tolerant atheists with another I percent ready to fight against religion. Concerning the 
religious orientation of the Russians, Goodrich-Lehmann found that while 9 percent of 
the Russians believe and practice Orthodox Christianity, 28 percent only believe whereas 
19 percent are equivocal with 43 percent being tolerant atheists and another I percent 
ready to fight against religion (See Table A4.13). 103 
It is the collapse of the communist ideology and the rise of nationalist movements that 
enabled Islam to play a bigger ideological role in Tatarstan. The first major public 
appearance of Islam came at the Russia-wide Congress of Islam in Tatariia's capital 
Kazan on 24 May 1988. Moreover, Tatariia hosted the celebration of the eleventh 
centennial of the adoption of Islam by the Volga Bulgars in August 1989. This became an 
occasion for the Tatar nationalists to speak of an Islamic revival. Moreover, a crescent 
was erected on the top of the tower of Suiumbike on 10 August 1989. In this period, 
several mosques including the prestigious Azimov Mosque in Kazan were reopened. In 
the post-Soviet era, the radical nationalists shifted their emphasis from ethnic nationalism 
to religious nationalism to deepen the divide between the Tatars and the Russians. One 
particular newspaper, Iman (Belief), plays a significant role in the dissemination of this 
type of radical Islamist propaganda in Tatarstan. These Islam-based Tatar nationalists 
promote their activities also in Tatarstan's 630 mosques and 9 Islamic seminaries. 104 
In reality, however, the fundamentalist position is popular neither among Tatarstan's 
leadership nor among the ordinary Tatars, since religion needs to be secular in order to be 
able to unite all Tatars regardless of the nature of their religious belief. It could be argued 
that, for the majority of the Tatars, Islam has virtually become an ethno-religion. The 
leader of VTOTs, Safin argued that 
103 Susan Goodrich-Lehmann, 'Islam and Ethnicity in the Republics of Russia', Post-Soviet Affairs, 
vol. 13, no. 1,1997, p. 83. 
104 Dmitry Tramifov, 'The Friday Mosques and Their Imams in the Former Soviet Union', Religion, 
State & Society, vol. 24, nos. 2/3,1996, pp. 214-217. 
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Our religion has to be a Tatar Islam; if Islam is to save us from Russification, a C, 
Tatarised Islam will safeguard us from assimilating into [other] Turkic and C, 
Muslim people. And this is Jadid Islam, and religious observance in Tatar""' C, 
The Tatar reform movement in Islam, which is known as Jadidism, could be seen as the 
Islamic analogue of the Reformation in Medieval Europe. Whilst maintaining a strong 
sense of Tatar identity, the Jadidist Islam focuses less on the past, more on the future; less 
on religion, more on language and culture. 106 
Religious fanaticism is not popular among the Orthodox Christians in Tatarstan either. 
Orthodox Christianity is practiced by not only by the Russians in Tatarstan, but also by 
the Chuvash, Mari and Udmurt peoples living in the Republic as well as a small group of 
the Tatars. Archbishop Anastasy has been the representative of the Russian Orthodox 
Church in Tatarstan since 1993. Members of the Russian Orthodox Church complain 
about the lack of funds provided by the Republican authorities. When I visited Raifskii 
Bogoroditskii Monastery in 1998, one of the monks told me that Russian Orthodoxy was 
discriminated against by the Republican authorities, who publicly claim the equality of 
two confessions (Islam and Russian Orthodoxy), but in practice provide generous 
financial assistance only to the Islamic establishment. 
In addition to the weakness of religiosity among the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan, which 
was discussed above, the loss of the monopoly of the Russian Orthodox Church over the 
Christian community in Tatarstan has been an important factor in the moderation of 
inter-confessional relations in Tatarstan. When the missionaries from the West started to 
disseminate information about non-Orthodox versions of Christianity after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the monopoly of the Russian Orthodox Church over the Christian 
community in Tatarstan was weakened. For example, a group of Argentinean priests 
came to Kazan in 1991 to establish a Roman Catholic community in Tatarstan. Apart 
from the Roman Catholics, the Russian Orthodox Old-Believers' Church, the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and the Baptists have also been active in their competition with the 
Russian Orthodox Church. All of this missionary activity, combined with the disregard of 
Russians towards religion in general, suggests that Orthodox Christianity is not playing 
any significant role among Russians in antagonising them against the Tatars in Tatarstan. 
105 Safin, 'Tatar ideiase', p. 13. 
106 Damir A Iskhakov, Fenomen tatarskogo dzhadidizma: Kazan: Iman, 1997, pp. 5-8. 
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Apart from Islam and Christianity, there is an influential Jewish community in Tatarstan. 
1. Gorelic heads the Republican Jewish community, which is concentrated mainly in 
Kazan and Naberezhnye Chelny. The communities of these two cities are members of the 
Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia. Berl Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia, has 
visited Tatarstan several times, and established good relations with the Shaimiev 
leadership. Based on these observations, it could be concluded that the peaceful 
coexistence of thrice religions in Tatarstan limits the capacity of ethnic nationalists to 
manipulate religious differences. 
Bilingualism 
Another social factor that limits the social support for ethnic nationalism is the 
widespread acceptance of bilingualism among the Tatars. 107 As Dmitry Gorenburg 
argues, ethnic nationalists view bilingualism as an obstacle to their movements. That is 
why the Tatar ethnic nationalists have been critical of the Russian-speaking Tatars who 
cannot speak Tatar. In general, the Russian-speaking Tatars have not been interested in 
belonging to the Tatar high culture, because they could neither partake of Tatar culture 
nor contribute to it. In the early 1990s, such notable writers as Dias Valeev and Akhat 
Mushinskii were criticised in the Tatar press for writing only in Russian. 108 Meanwhile, 
in the post-Soviet period, the f6flowing poem of Abdullah Tukai, the national poet of the 
Tatars, calling the Tatar people to learn their native language has become very popular 
among the Tatar ethnic nationalists: 
'Tugan tel' 
0 you mother tongue, you fair tongue, father's, mother's tender word! 
By your means I learned so many things and people in the world. 
Times ago in that language mummy sung a lullaby, 
My grandmother told her stories, as nightfall was passing by. 
0 my mother tongue, forever do I need succour of yours, 
Since a child I came to know you're my pride and my remorse. 
0 my tongue, in your fair glamour for the first time I besought: 
'Please, forgive me and my parents all our sins and errors, God! "09 
107 Dmitry Gorenburg, 'Not With One Voice: An Explanation of Intragroup Variation in Nationalist 
Sentiment', World Politics, vol. 53, no. 4,2000, p. 135. 
108 Mirfatykh Z. Zakiev, Tatary: problemy istorii i iazyka, Kazan: HaLl ANT, 1995, pp. 144-145. 
109 Ravil Bukharaev's translation. Ravil Bukharaev, The Model of Tatarstan under President Mintimer 
Shaimiev, London: Curzon, 1999, p. 90. 
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Statistics on the language use of the Tatars show the level of the assimilation of the Tatars 
into the Russian culture. There has been a significant decrease in the number of the only 
Russian-speaking Tatars between 1979 and 1989. According to the 1979 census results, 
out of 6,317,000 Tatars, 13.2 percent declared Russian as their native language, while 
68.9 percent declared themselves bilingual both in Russian and Tatar. Only, 17.9 percent 
of the Tatars were not assimilated into the Russian culture, as they did not speak 
Russian. "O According to the 1989 census results, only 3 percent of the Tatars were 
attitudinally integrated declaring Russian as their native language, while 81 percent of the 
Tatars were functionally integrated declaring themselves bilingual in Russian and Tatar. 
Although the Tatars in Tatariia had a very high rate of native language retention (96.6 
percent), the same rate among the Tatars outside the Republic was lower (83.2 percent). 
Although most of the Tatars could speak Russian, very few Russians in the Republic 
bothered to leam Tatar (I. I percent in 1989). ' 11 
However, it would be mistaken to interpret the widespread use of the Russian language as 
a symbol of the total Russification of Tatarstan. In reality, in Tatarstan, as elsewhere in 
the USSR, the Russian language worked as a lingua franca and a medium of 
Sovietisation rather than Russification. Moreover, Russians and Tatars have spoken 
Russian equally well. As a result, the Tatar language, which had been Sovietised rather 
than Russified under the Soviet rule, does not appear to be a divisive factor in mobilising 
the Tatar masses against the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan. 
Interethnic Marriages 
Interethnic marriages constitute another factor weakening the support for the Tatar and 
Russian ethnic nationalisms, since individuals in ethnically mixed families often 
experience difficulty in defining their own ethnic identity or that of their children. This 
110 Chislennost' i sostav naseleniia SSSR: Po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1979 goda, 
Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1984, p. 73. 
"' Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia SSSR: Po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda, 
Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991. 
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may lead to 'cosmopolitanism', which by definition implies a weak identification with all 
ethnic groups. 
Being aware of this, the Tatar ethnic nationalists perceived the high rate of intermarriage 
between Tatars and Russians (one-fourth of all marriages) as a threat to their national 
survival. Supporting this position, Aidar Khalim, editor of Argamak, in his article entitled 
as Sovremennye smeshannye braki, i1i kol'tso bezowetstvennosti (Contemporary Mixed 
Marriages, or a Ring of Irresponsibility) deplored the mixed marriages as 'destructive' to 
the Tatar national culture. 
In old times, Tatars were constantly entering marriages with representatives of C, 
other ethnoses. Such marriages, being based, as a rule on real love, improved t, 
the gene fund and refreshed the blood of the nation. That kind of marriage 
differs from current interethnic marriages as day differs from night. In those 
times, they were like 'tein in tea', a microscopic ingredient in a body of ethnos 
not destroying its essence, and existed as an isolated phenomenon. What do 
we see now? Mixed families, encouraged by the state policy of nation- 
merging, serve now to deprive the people of their national features, to impose 
impersonality, and to cause genetic decline. ' 12 
In fact, interethnic marriages only serve to promote Tatars and Russians with multiple 
identities. This may not necessarily mean the one-sided Russification of the Tatars, since 
these marriages contribute to the Tatarisation of the Russians as well. In fact, such rnixed 
families could help to promote both the Russian and the Tatar cultures equally. 113 
During my field study visit to Tatarstan in 1996,1 was hosted by the ethnically mixed 
Ledoversii family, in which Viktor, the husband, is an ethnic Russian, Neliia, the wife, is 
an ethnic Tatar and their daughter Rada is a Russian speaking Tatar. There was tolerance 
and respect for both cultures in the family. Viktor was positive about the fact that Neliia 
maintained her links to the Tatar culture. They even registered Rada, their daughter as a 
Tatar, even if she developed no interest in Tatar culture and language. This shows that 
one's official ethnic identity may not be the one held by that person in informal contexts. 
Moreover, it is not surprising that all members of the family were united in their reaction 
to the Tatar and Russian versions of ethnic nationalism. Given the popularity of mixed 
112 Aidar Khalim, 'Sovremennye smeshannye braki, ili kol'tso bezotvetstvennosti', Argamak, no-2, 
1993, pp. 4-5. 
113 Guzel Stoliarova, 'Mezhetnicheskie sem'i v Tatarstane', in Iazyk i natsionalim v postsovetskikh 
respublikakh, ed. Mikhail N. Guboglo, Moscow: lEA RAN, 1994, p. 180. 
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maniages in Tatarstan, it would not be entirely mistaken to believe that the attitudes of 
the Ledoversii family exemplify the attitudes of most Russians and Tatars in such mixed 
maiTiages. 1 
14 
A Tale of Two Cities 
Another factor that determines the strength of support for ethnic mobilisation is the 
existence or the absence of cosmopolitan and ethnically segregated urban populations. It 
should be stated that the process of urbanisation and ethnic make-up of the populations 
of cities are different for each of Tatarstan's 19 cities. Kazan is the most populous city 
with its 1.2 million population, whereas the population of the second major city, 
Naberezhnye CheIny, is only half that at 600,000. Ethnic Russians are in the majority in 
Kazan, Zelenodol'sk, Bugulma, Chistopol, Elabuga, Tetiushi and Bulgar districts, while 
Tatars are in the majority in AI'met'evsk, Aznakaevo, Agryz, Buinsk and Mamadysh 
districts. 11 5 
The high level of urbanisation in Tatarstan, where the urban population constitutes 73.6 
percent of the Republican population, has contributed to the weakening of the support for 
ethnic nationalists. The Russians and the Tatars in the urban parts of Tatarstan have more 
internationalist and cosmopolitan views of other nationalities as compared to those in the 
rural parts of the Republic where villages are ethnically organised. Villages are either 
predominantly Tatar or Russian or Chuvash. In Aznakaevo town, all the population, even 
including the Russians, tends to speak Tatar in public life, while the overwheh-ning 
majority of the Tatars in Bugulma tends to speak mostly Russian. ' 16 
In the capital city of Kazan, there is a cosmopolitan ethno-demographic structure. The 
Tatars in the city are supportive of Shairniev's policies, given that the support for Tatar 
nationalism is weak. The main demographic reason for this could be the fact that ethnic 
Russians outnumber Tatars in Kazan. In fact, in 1989, Russians made up more than 50 
"' During my field work in Tatarstan, I stayed with this fan-dly, and had the chance of observing their 
orientations towards the Tatar and the Russian cultures during our long 'kitchen conversations'. 
"5 Mustafin and Khuzeev, Vse o Tatarstane, pp. 18-19. 
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percent of the population in the city while Tatars formed only 37 percent of the city 
population. Although Tatars and Russians live side-by-side in central Kazan, the outskirts 
of the city have been divided into Tatar and Russian parts. The city centre seems to be a 
base for pro-Russian Tatar elites, while Tatar ethnic nationalism has some popularity in 
the Tatar sections of the city. Although there are many Islamic symbols in Kazan, 
religious fanaticism is not visible in the city. 'Kazan' in Tatar means 'cauldron' which 
reflects the multi-confessional nature of the city with 23 mosques, 16 Orthodox churches, 
a Catholic chapel and a Jewish synagogue. In Kazan, most Tatars prefer to speak 
Russian, and there are numerous mixed marriages. All of these characteristics of Kazan 
lity9t the support for Tatar or Russian ethnic nationalisms. ' 17 
In contrast to Kazan, where ethnic nationalist movements are weak, Naberezhnye Chelny 
is a base for Tatar ethnic nationalism. Although Naberezhnye Chelny's demographic 
structure is not very different from Kazan, the development of nationalist movement in 
118 this town is mainly related to the Naberezhnye Chelny's huge car industry. Moscow 
controlled the company and its decisions effectively under the Soviet command economy. 
Rais Balaev, the Mayor of Chelny from 1969 to 1985, worked with the KamAZ 
leadership to build the town. Between 1969 and 1989, the population of Naberezhnye 
Chelny grew from 38,000 to 300,000, with people migrating to the city from the outside 
and the rural areas. In the post-Soviet era, 40.6 percent of the local population is made of 
Tatars while 48.7 percent are ethnic Russians. 119 The general director's office and the 
management of the KamAZ Company, highly-qualified specialists, were non-Tatars, and 
came from other parts of the former Soviet Union. The Tatars came mainly from 
neighbouring rural districts and were employed in unskilled labour. Between 1972 and 
1978, the city witnessed an increase in the number of Tatar workers, which rose from 
15.2 to 27.1 percent while the number of Russian workers declined from 70.0 to 58.2 
percent. 120 
116 Ravil Bukharaev, The Model of Tatarstan under President Mintimer Shaimiev, London: Curzon, 
1999. 
117 Mustafin and Khuzeev, Vse o Tatarstane, p. 85. 
118 McAuley, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty, pp. 91-94. 
119 Rustam Gibadullin, Tatarskoe naselenie Naberezhnykh Chelnov v tsifi-akh etnosotsiologii, 
Naberezhnye Chelny, 1993. 
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Naberezhnye Chelny's municipality is controlled by Tatars led by the mayor of 
Naberezhnye Chelny, Rafgat Altynbaev, while the company is controlled by Russians led 
by Nikolai Belch, the Head of Karn. AZ. In the city administration, there are fourteen 
Tatars and thirteen ethnic Russians. KamAZ has been performing several social 
functions, such as transport, health education and culture, for the people of the city as 
well as for its 150,000 workers. However, the privatisation of the company and its 
previous public services worsened the conditions for the Tatars and the city 
administration. 121 
As a result of the combination of all these factors, Naberezhnye Chelny subsequently 
became the centre of the radical wing of the Tatar national movement. In the early 
nineties, the leader of the Tatar independence party Ittifak, Fauziia Bairarnova, moved 
from Kazan to Naberezhnye Cheiny. Radical Tatar nationalists held meetings demanding 
that a Tatar be appointed to head the KamAZ factory. Russian flags were burned in 
Naberezhnye Cheiny on numerous occasions and considerable humanitarian aid was sent 
to Chechnia from the City. 122 
State-Dependent Economy 
The state-dependent nature of Tatarstan's economy has also limited the social basis for 
interethnic polarisation between the Tatars and the Russians in Tatarstan. Unlike Russia's 
federal state, the state has continued to be the major player of the economic system of 
post-Soviet Tawstan. The Republican authorities control the oil industry, which is the 
main source of income for the Republic. Moreover, Tatarstan's strategy of soft entrance 
to the market economy in 1991 was aimed at avoiding the high rates of unemployment 
resulting from the neo-liberal policies of economic restructuring, because this could lead 
to a situation in which the costs of reform would be born disproportionately by Tatars. 123 
120 lagfar Garipov, 'Sotsial'no-etnicheskaia struktura rabotnikov i mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniia na 
KamA. Ze', in Sovremennye natsional'nve protsessy v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Dan-ýr M. lskhakov 
and Rozalina N. Musina, Kazan: llaLlI KNTs RAN, 1992, p. 76. 
121 Rashid Akhmetov, 'The Kama Automobile Factory Clinically Dead at the Age of 29', The 
Jamestown Foundation Prism, 17 April 1998. 
122 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'A Tale of Two Car Makers in Tatarstan', Russian Regional Report. vol. 3, 
no. 50,17 December 1998. 
123 Mordii A. Nugaev and Renat M. Nugaev, Kontseptual'nye osnovy issledovaniia Tatarstanskoi 
modeli sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia, Kazan: KGU, 1997, p. 201. 
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Unlike Russians, who were over-represented in management positions, Tatars were over- 
represented in blue-collar jobs, the most likely positions to suffer from major cutbacks. 124 
The dependency of the population on the state has been very effective in curbing the 
support for ethnic nationalism in rural areas. In this respect, kolkhoz (collective fann) 
workers were reluctant to support nationalism out of traditionalist sentiment and fear of 
reprisals by kolkhoz chairmen. In general, even those rural inhabitants who voiced 
support for nationalist views remained largely passive. The villagers in Tatarstan mainly 
vote for officially approved candidates in local elections. Khasbulat Shamsutdinov, editor 
of Vecherniaia Kazan, noted that 'Shairrfiev doesn't have to worry about the rural 
population. These people will vote for whomever the chairperson of the collective farm 
tells them to% 125 
For differing reasons, most economic actors have to maintain good relations with the 
Republican authorities. The dependence of the people in Tatarstan on the Republican 
authorities for their economic survival, however, deprives them of the financial resources 
needed for ethnic mobilisation. During my interview with Damir Iskhakov, he resented 
this fact stating that, 
Today, there is an economic dependence on Russia. Privatisation did not result 
in the formation of a bourgeois class. 126 
Due the dependence of Tatarstan's economic elite on the Republican leadership for their 
survival, most Tatar members of the economic elite refrain from supporting the Tatar 
ethnic nationalists in order not to annoy the Shaimiev leadership. Thus, only very few 
rich Tatars give financial support to the Tatar nationalist movements. For example, the 
Kashapov family are closely involved in the activities of the VTOTs' Naberezhnye 
Chelny branch. The family, which receives its earnings from its petrol stations, car parks 
and shops, sponsored the publication of books on Tatar culture, language and religion. In 
fact, Rafts Kashapov even became the chairperson of the VTOTs branch in Naberezhnye 
Chelny. He was able to elicit some support to Tatar ethnic nationalism through using his 
124 Rashid Akhmetov, 'Tatary i Russkie: Trudovaia mobil'nost', Tatarstan, no. 2,1997, p. 19. 
125 Sarah Karush, 'Tsar of Tatarstan', Moscow Times, 23 October 1999. 
126 My interview with Damir M. Iskhakov, Ethnologist, The Institute of History, Academy of Sciences 
of the Republic of Tatarstan, Kazan, 4 June 1998. 
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financial resources and organisational base at the VTOTs. 127 This casts some light also on 
the previous section about why Naberezhnye Chelny is more nationalistic than Kazan. 
Underdevelopment of Civil Society 
The underdevelopment of civil society (grazhdanskoe obshchestvo), which refers to a 
self-organising society, in Tatarstan constitutes the last but not the least factor that 
impedes the growth of Tatar and Russian ethnic nationalisms in Tatarstan. Soviet 
totalitarian rule destroyed or greatly weakened its nascent civil institutions. Under the 
Soviet Union, pluralistic politics in Tatarstan was limited to interest groups like the 
industrial and agricultural managers competing for scarce resources allocated by the 
central administrative system. Under such a system, the promotion of diverse social 
interests is made dependent upon the approval of the state. The institutional heritage of 
this Soviet practice had unden-nined the scope for autonomy of social groups in post- 
Soviet Tatarstan. Consequently, social links in Tatarstan's 'civil society' have primarily 
remained vertical, between a group and the government, rather than horizontal, between 
groups themselves. 
Accordingly, the Shairniev regime has faced a society without stable collective 
instrumentalities of its own devising in the post-Soviet era. In Tatarstan, just like in the 
other parts of the Russian Federation, the development of civil society requires a highly 
organised middle class, not an all-embracing state. The fact that economic wealth is 
controlled by a small group of businessmen and by the state monopolies limits 
possibilities for the development of a powerful middle class. Indeed, it was this very 
absence of a viable middle class that led to the predon-tinance of the state over the 
society. 128 
Despite these limitations, there are several non-governmental organisations in Tatarstan 
The multi-ethnic civil society organisations, in Tatarstan include business organisations, 
trade unions, environmentalist organisations and feminist organisations. The main non- 
127 GuInara Khasanova, 'Chally TPC Gets Eviction Notice', RFE. IRL Tatar-Bashkir Report, 15 June 
2001. 
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, governmental 
business organisation ofthe Republic is the Union of Entrepreneurs of the 
Republic of Tatarstan, which was founded in 1992. There is also the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, which is headed by Aleksandr Tarkaev. The workers are 
organised into the Trade Union Federation of Tatarstan under the leadership of Farida 
Gainullina. Since the Shaimiev regime has close relations with these 'non-govemmental 
organisations', they are mainly under the control of the government of Tatarstan. 
Tatarstan's leadership has not been worried by the activities of the non-governmental 
organisations that focus strictly on social problems. For example, the Association of Tatar 
Women, Ak Kayýiq, is the most influential feminist organisation in Tatarstan. It maintains 
very good relations with the Republican authorities. Its chairperson Roza Tufittulova, 
who is the editor of the Women's magazine, Suiumbike (former Azat Hatin) has been 
supportive of Shairniev's policies. The Independent Con-u-nission for the Protection of 
Women's Rights, which is chaired by Alsu Nasirova, and Taianich headed by T. 
Mironova are the other influential organisations for the protection of women's rights. 
There are other non-governmental organisations for the protection of youth, children and 
disabled peoples, such as the youth organisation, Upravlenie budushchego, the children 
organisation Bala and Nika for the disabled persons. In general, the Republican 
authorities have treated them positively. 
The Republican authorities have displayed n-dxed attitudes towards these human rights 
organisations, in which Tatarstan's ethnic Russians are more active than the Tatars. 
Tatarstan's leadership has been doing nothing against the Committee of Soldier's 
Mothers in Tatarstan and the Union of Veterans of Afghan War in Tatarstan. The main 
reason for this could be the fact that these organisations have been critical of the policies 
of Moscow rather than those of Tatarstan. 
Tatarstan's leadership has been critical of those civil society organisations that seek to 
promote human rights in the Republic. The Conunittee for Protection of Human Rights is 
the first such non-governmental civil society organisation to be. registered with the 
Tatarstan Ministry of Justice in February 1996. Headed by Dmitrii Vokhmianin, this 
128 Zinaida T. Golenkova, 'Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo v Rossii', Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, no. 3, 
1997, pp. 35-36. 
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orgarusation co-operates with several Western civil society orgamsations, including the 
National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Institute, and the Eurasia 
Foundation in the United States and the BEARR Trust Foundation in Britain. With the 
participation of the International Helsinki Group and the Westminster Foundation in 
Kazan, the Committee for Protection of Human Rights created the Association of Human 
Rights Organisations in Tatarstan in May 1997. Although Tatarstan's human rights 
organisations have not yet exercised much influence over Tatarstan's leadership 
concerning the human fights violations in the Republic, they could make a potentially 
very significant contribution to interethnic stability in Tatarstan. 
Conclusions 
To conclude, in its attempt to explore the socio-cultural dynamics behind the weak 
support for ethnic nationalist movements in Tatarstan, this chapter identified that the 
polarisation of the Russians as 'democrats' and the Tatars as 'ethnic nationalists' during 
the late eighties has not led to a significant nationalist mobilisation in the post-Soviet era. 
In fact, actual incidence and potentiality of ethnic violence in Tatarstan is largely 
overestimated. 
The failure of both Tatar and Russian ethnic nationalisms in attracting significant levels 
of social support for their causes is not surprising in the context of Tatarstan. In fact, the 
performance of the Russian and Tatar ethnic nationalist movements in Tatarstan confirms 
Ernest Gellner's assertion that '[tlhe number of potential nationalisms which failed to 
bark is far, far larger than those that did' . 
129 Relying on our observations thus far on the 
ethnic nationalist movements in Tatarstan, we should also add that even when 
nationalisms do 'bark', it is far from certain that they will bite and, even if they do snap a 
bit, that the bite will find its intended target. 
The Tatar and Russian ethnic activists were unable to produce a profound ethnic 
polarisation among the multi-ethnic population of Tatarstan following the collapse of the 
CPSU, the centralising organisation of the Soviet Union, in 1991, because the collapse of 
129 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983, p. 43. 
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the centrallsing institution is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for ethnic 
mobilisation. In fact, the pluralistic nature of Tatarstan's post-Soviet society works 
against a scenario of interethnic polarisation in the Republic. 
One of the main factors that prevent the Tatars and the ethnic Russians from getting 
mobilised against each other is their 'self' and 'other' perceptions. Although the Tatar 
ethnic nationalists like to view Moscow as the only barriers to their cause, the Tatar 
perception of themselves as having common values and interests with the ethnic Russians 
in the Republic weakens the support for the nationalist objectives, which entail an 
interethnic polarisation. The long history of the 'collaboration' between the Tatar elites 
and Moscow, and the fact that the history of Soviet internationalism, which appears to 
have drawn these ethnic groups closer, make the Tatar and Russian ethnic nationalist 
arguments less popular and less convincing. 
All the same, apart from the fact that Russians make up almost as large a percentage of 
the Republican population as do Tatars, a number of socio-cultural factors rnilitate 
against radical nationalism in Tatarstan. The secular conception of religion, the 
widespread use of Russian, the common practice of mixed marriages between the 
Russians and the Tatars, the existence of a cosmopolitan urban culture, the state- 
dependent economy and the underdevelopment of the civil society prevent the Tatars and 
the Russian ethnic nationalists from pitting the ordinary population against each other in 
the name of nationalist causes. 
In sum, the interethnic relations between Tatars and Russians have been relatively good, 
as evidenced by the above-mentioned factors and the very low incidence of violence 
between Tatar and Russian communities in the Republic. 
The next chapter will explore the implications of the weaknesses of Tatar and Russian 
ethnic nationalisms vis-A-vis the elites in Tatarstan and Moscow on the development of 
Russian federalism in general. 
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5. The I Tatarstan Model' of Russian Federalism: A Magic 
Formula for Containing Nationalist Movements? 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate how the post-Soviet experience of Tatarstan fits into 
the developments in the Russian Federation as a whole. For this purpose, I will explore 
what the Tatarstan example says about the nature of Russian federalism and Moscow's 
capacity to accommodate the demands for regional autonomy. I will also discuss how 
stable the post-Soviet constitutional, political and economic arrangements between Kazan 
and Moscow are by focusing on whether Shaimiev and his successors will be able to keep 
a tight grip on Tatarstan's politics, and whether Tatars or Russians could potentially 
develop successful radical nationalist movements in the Republic. 
The post-Soviet politics of Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism has been seen 
mainly through non-native lenses in the related literature. Rafael Khakimov, Chief 
Advisor of Shain-fiev and the Director of the Institute of History at the Academy of 
Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan, pictures the leadership of Tatarstan as 'civic' and 
the engine of 'democratic federalism' in Russia. In addition, Khakimov considers the 
centralisation of power and the imperial control of its non-Russian peoples as the 
defining characteristics of Russian statehood. According to Khakimov, the emergence of 
sovereign Tatarstan has been a means of dismantling the state structures of 'the empire. 
Khakimov describes Russia as follows: 
The peculiarity of Russia is that democratic laws have rarely been adopted 
there, and even when, they have been adopted they have never been observed. 
Two points are important for understanding the political situation in Russia: 
(1) Russian society has traditionally been undemocratic, and (2) the existing 
constitution and laws have usually been ignored. ' 
Conversely, the current Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology Valerii 
Tishkov, who was the Head of the Russian State Committee on Nationalities in March- 
1 Rafael S. Khakimov, 'Prospects of Federalism in Russia: A View from Tatarstan', Security Dialogue, 
vol. 27, no 1,1996, p. 69. 
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November 1992, is very critical of Shaimiev's politics of Tatar nationalism and its 
outcorne: the 'Tatarstan model' of Russian federalism. Tishkov has also been the main 
advocate of a 'civic' definition of the Russian national identity. For Tishkov, the 
formation of a civic Russian nation is hindered by the pragmatic non-Russian politicians, 
such as Shaimiev, who manipulate ethnicity to promote non-Russian 'ethnic 
2 nationalism' . 
Contrary to these non-native positions, this chapter argues that the 'Tatarstan model' of 
Russian federalism signifies neither the formation of democratic federalism in Russia by 
the 'civic' leadership of Tatarstan nor the obstruction of a 'civic' Russian national 
identity by the 'ethnic nationalist' leadership of Tatarstan. Instead, this model constitutes 
a pragmatic solution to Russia's post-Soviet crisis of centre-periphery relations, which 
prevented any kind of Russian and non-Russian national identity, be it civic or ethnic, 
from fully developing. Although the federal leadership has been too weak to enforce 
federal laws and collect federal taxes in the regions, it was able to gain the support of 
regional leaders in fixing elections peacefully in return for asymmetrical concessions to 
them. Indeed, the 'Tatarstan model' of Russian federalism is an example of post-Soviet 
politics of survival in Russia, which is based on a formal constitutional order in which 
rent-seeking federal and local leaders hold real power on the ground. 
The chapter starts with an analysis of the so-called 'Tatarstan model' and its impact on 
the development of asymmetrical federalism in Russia. Afterwards, I win discuss why 
Russia is not disintegrating. Next, the Russian Federation will be compared with the 
following democratic federations: the United States, Canada, Germany, Spain and 
Belgium. In the following section, the stability of intergovernmental relations between 
Moscow and Tatarstan will be discussed by exarnining the diverging views of Moscow 
and Kazan on federal reforms in terms of their centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. In 
the final section, the stability of interethnic relations between Russians and Tatars will be 
analysed by focusing on the orientations of Russian and Tatar nationalisms. 
2 Valerii A. Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind 
Aflame, London: Sage, 1997, p. ix. 
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The 'Tatarstan Model' and the Development of Asymmetrical Federalism in Russia 
Tatarstan's asymmetrical relations with Moscow could serve as a prism for analysing the 
post-Soviet development of the Russian Federation, which was originally a highly 
centralised unitary state in 1992 .3 To establish the 
legal basis for its post-Soviet federal 
structure, Moscow signed three treaties with its federal subjects in March 1992. The first 
treaty, which is known as the Federation Treaty, was signed with the republics. The 
second one was signed with the administrative-territorial. units of regions (oblasts), 
territories (krais) and the federal- cities of Moscow and St Petersburg. The last one was 
signed with the national-territorial areas of districts (okrugs) and the Jewish Autonomous 
Oblast. According to the Federation Treaty, the republics could have their own 
constitutions, democratic elections, parliaments, constitutional tribunals, and even 
presidents. Although the Treaty described the repubfics as being sovereign, it made no 
reference to their right of secession. 4 It is important to mention that the Treaty did not 
downgrade the status of the non-Russian republics to that of the Russian regions. On the 
contrary, the republics are treated better than other federal units. 
Unlike the Federation Treaty of 1992, the Russian Constitution of December 1993, which 
was adopted two months after the decision of El'tsin to disband the Russian Parliament, 
prescribed a centralised form of government, with limited room for federalism. The 
Constitution grants extensive powers to the Presidency that eclipses all the other political 
institutions. Furthermore, it also gives the federal government an extraordinary amount of 
power to determine the structure of regional governments. For example, Article 77.2 
refers to executive agencies forming a 'unified system of executive power in the Russian 
5 Federation'. According to this constitutional framework, federal executive authorities 
can demand that regional administrations implement federal laws, federal constitutional 
law, presidential decrees and even the resolutions and directives of the government. This 
demonstrates that before the signing of Tatarstan's treaty with Moscow, the Russian 
Federation had a very centralised federal structure. 
3 Jean-Robert Ravieaux, 'Tatarstan v tsentre sozdaniia federal'noi struktury Rossii: Inventsfia 
suvereniteta-soiuza', Panorama-Forum, no. 11,1997, p. 292. 
4 Tederativnyi Dogovor', Etnopoliticheskii Vestnik Rossii, no, 1,1992, pp. 17-32. 
5 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: luridicheskaia literatura, 1993, pp. 56-57. 
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Tatarstan's power-sharing treaty with Moscow, which was signed on 15 February 1994, 
was the first departure from the federal model prescribed by the Federation Treaty of 
1992 and the Russian Constitution of 1993. Vasilii Likhachev, Vice-President of 
Tatarstan between 1990 and 1995, hailed the 'Tatarstan model' as a successful example 
of peaceful conflict resolution in the post-Soviet space. He stated that, 
[t]he Russia-Tatarstan model of interrelations has gained the world-wide C, 
recognition just because it secures the course to compromise, peaceful solution 
of controversies, cooperation, the regime of respect for human rights and Cý 
rights of nationalities, balance of interests between the centre and a specific 
republic. 6 
However, the reality behind the 'Tatarstan model' is different from the rosy picture drawn 
by Likhachev. In fact, the particular arrangement that Tatarstan has worked out with 
Moscow is made possible by the existence of a number of specific prerequisites. The first 
prerequisite is that the federal centre should be willing to share some of its key federal 
powers with a specific region. 7 Tatarstan, which claimed its own state sovereignty in 
1990 and refused to sign the Federation Treaty of 1992, challenged the authority of 
Moscow in Tatarstan by adopting its own constitution in 1992 as the basis of legislation. 
Thus, the 'Tatarstan model' requires the wil-lingness of Moscow, as was discussed in 
Chapter Three, to recognise the capacity of Tatarstan to legislate on specific federal 
matters, which are controlled generafly by the federal centre, such as foreign economic 
relations. In this sense, the 'Tatarstan model' reflects the characteristics of both 
confederal and federal type of intergovernmental relations .8 
Nail Aminov, Tatarstan's 
representative to Moscow, underlined the inter-state character of the Treaty between 
Moscow and Tatarstan as follows: 
The Treaty is of an inter-state character. This is reflected not only in its title 
(The Treaty of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan) but also 
in its content, starting with the Preamble. The system of rights and duties 
embodied in it, and the mechanisms of resolving disputes, making 
amendments and interpretations, and responsibilities of complying with its 
6 Respublika Tatarstan, 17 February 1998. 
7 Nail M. Moukhariamov, 'Tatarstan Model: A Situational Dynamic', in Beyond the Monolith: The 
Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia, eds. Peter J. Stavrakis, Joan DeBardeleben and Larry 
Black, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 230. 
' Alexei Zverev, 'Qualified Sovereignty: The Tatarstan Model for Resolving Conflicting Loyalties', in 
Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia, eds. Michael Waller, Bruno 
Coppieters and Aleksei V. Malashenko, London: Frank Cass, 1998, pp. 132-134. 
231 
norms, are binding equally on the Russian Federation and the Republic of C, 
Tatarstan in the person of their state bodies. 9 
The second prerequisite is that both the Russian and non-Russian ethnic nationalism 
should be weak and highly fragmented. In fact, as discussed in Chapter Four, both the 
Tatar and the Russian ethnic nationalist movements in Tatarstan have been too weak to 
prevent Tatarstan's leadership from signing a power-sharing treaty with Moscow. 
Tatarstan's Prime Minister Mukhammat Sabirov, who signed the Treaty in 1994, 
admitted that the Republican leadership pragmatically manipulated the ethnic card when 
they were aware that Tatar ethnic nationalism was very weak. He stated this point as 
follows: 
It would have been a sin not to seek benefit from using the demonstrations of 
the nationalists and their endless protests. However, I always understood that 
there were very few such people in reality. 10 
The final prerequisite of the 'Tatarstan model' is that there should be a high level of 
pragmatism among the federal and regional leaders. In this respect, Shaimiev's pragmatic 
nomenklatura nationalism, as discussed in Chapter Two, have played an important role 
in achieving a higher status for Tatarstan in the Russian Federation rather than full 
independence for the Republic. Indeed, Tatarstan's leadership ignored the concerns of 
Tatar ethnic nationalists and the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan when it employed Tatar 
pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism in order to secure its political survival and gain 
concessions from Moscow. Tatarstan's 'special' autonomy in the Russian Federation has 
enabled the Shaimiev leadership to control the Republican economic resources and the 
local industries through its own controversial programme of privatisation. Furthermore, 
the Shaimiev leadership gained autonomy in the collection of taxes, the conduct of 
foreign economic relations and the control of the oil industry. During my interview with 
Prof. Leokadia Drobizheva, Chairperson of the Political Anthropology Department at the 
Institute of Anthropology and Ethnology, the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, 
she stated that Tatarstan's leadership promoted a variant of economic nationalism, which 
involved the use of the ethnic card to gain econon-tic benefits. Drobizheva argued that, 
9 Nail Aminov, 'Tatarstanskaia model': K godovshchine podpisaniia dogovora mezhdu Rossiiskoi 
Federatsiei i Respublikoi Tatarstan', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 18 February 1995. 
'0 Vremia i den'gi, 12 February 1999. 
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The Tatarstan model is based on the recognition of two state languages and t, C, 
Tatarstan's control of oil and machine industries. It was this formula that 
accommodated the rent-seeking leadership of Tatarstan. 11 C, 
Danýr Iskhakov, a well-known ethnologist in Tatarstan's Institute of History, is not as 
straightforward as Drobizheva in his analysis of the 'Tatarstan model'. For Iskhakov, the 
pragmatic nature of this model creates both advantages and disadvantages for the Tatar 
ethnic nationalists. On the one hand, the 'Tatarstan model' improves the existing imperial 
relationship between Moscow and the Tatars through broadening the autonomy of 
Tatarstan. On the other hand, for Iskhakov, this model cannot satisfy the Tatar nation 
since the state organs of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation created it. Because of its 
elite-centric focus, the model ignored the promotion of civil society in Tatarstan, which is 
essential for the development of Tatar nationalism. 12 
The Treaty between Tatarstan and Moscow has been presented by some scholars, such as 
Laurence S. Hanauer, as a model of coping with the threat of separatism in the post- 
Soviet space. 13 In 1995, officials from Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova met the 
leaders of 'their' respective 'autonomy-seeking' regions (Tatarstan from Russia, Crimea 
from Ukraine, Abkhazia from Georgia, and Transdneister and Gagauzia from Moldova) 
in The Hague. Although Bruce Allyn, Head of the Conflict Management Group, which 
organised this meeting, hailed the Tatarstan model as a success of preventive diplomacy 
in keeping ethnic nationalism from turning violent, it is not very easy to use such a model 
for solving the other ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space. 14 After all, the central 
authorities in these cases are not ready to grant the level of autonomy enjoyed by 
Tatarstan to 'their' breakaway regions. 
While rewarding the Shaimiev regime in February 1994 for its conciliatory and pragmatic 
approach to the relations with Moscow, El'tsin rushed to punish the Dudaev regime in 
11 My interview with Prof Leokadia M. Drobizheva, Chairperson of the Political Anthropology 
Department at the Institute of Anthropology and Ethnology, the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
Moscow, 24 June 1998. 
12 Damir M. Iskhakov, 'Model' Tatarstana: Za i protiv', in Tatarskaia natsiia: Proshloe, 
nastoiashchee, budushchee, ed. Rafael S. Khakimov, Kazan: 11 ANT, 1997, pp. I 1- 15. 
" Laurence S. Hanauer, 'Tatarstan's Bid for Autonomy: Tatarstan as a Model for the Devolution of 
Power in the Russian Federation', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 12, no. 1, 
1996, p. 77. 
14 Bruce Allyn, 'Gaagskaia initsiativa', in Mezhdunarodnyi opyt uregulirovaniia etno-politicheskikh 
konfliktov, ed. Rafael S. Khakimov, Kazan: Panorama-Forum, 1996, p. 147. 
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Chechnia, which defied Moscow's authority categorically. 
15 During the Chechen conflict, 
ShairMev tried to persuade both Dudaev and El'tsin about the benefits of a political 
settlement. When Moscow finally sent troops to Chechnia in December 1994, Shairniev 
described the Chechen War as a political disaster not only for Chechnia but also for 
Moscow. 16 Indeed, Shaimiev, as the leader of the most prominent non-Russian republic 
in Russia, was well-placed to mediate the talks with Chechnia., 
7 Nevertheless, both 
Moscow and Groznyi passed over the possibility of using Shaimiev to facilitate a 
compromise between their respective governments. 
Tatarstan's leadership pictured itself as the creator of asYmmetrical federalism in 
Russia. '8 Shaimiev argued that the asymmetrical nature of Moscow's federal relations 
with its subjects was a product of Tatarstan's struggles for the rights of the republics in 
the Russian Federation. He also advised those regions without much autonomy, 
especially the ethnic Russian regions, to demand greater autonomy from Moscow: 
I always express support for equal rights for all subjects of the Federation. The 
rights are there, but they have to be realized. When someone does not know 
how to realise his rights, he starts to complain that others have more rights. 
However, to be realistic, all the regions will never be equal. 19 
FoHowing the signing of the Treaty with Tatarstan in 1994, Moscow started to give more 
autonomy to the regions based on individual rather than coflective deals. Moscow offered 
special deals mainly to the more powerful regions in order to lure them away from 
forming regional coalitions against Moscow. 20 This approach of Moscow can be termed 
as 'asymmetrical federalism', in which different subjects of the federation can enjoy 
different privileges particularly in the realms of tax col-lection, natural resources and 
regional electoral laws. For Mikhail Alexseev, Moscow adopted asymmetrical federalism 
" Boris N. El'tsin, 'Ob ukreplenii Rossiiskogo gosudarstva', Rossiiskaia gazeta, 25 February 1994, p. 4. 
16 Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev, 'Put' vybrannyi Tatarstanom, mozhet byt' priemlimyrn i dlia Chechni', 
Respublika Tatarstan, 10 September 1996. 
17 Emil A. Pain, Tatarstanskii dogovor na fone chechenskogo krizisa: Problemy stanovleniia 
jederalizma v Rossii, Moscow: Respublika, 1995, p. 164. 
18 Rafael S. Khakimov, 'Asimetrichnost' Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Vzgliad iz Tatarstana', in 
Assimmetrichnost'federatsii, ed. Andrei A. Zakharov, Moscow: Tacis, 1997, p. 69. 
19 Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev, 'Conflict Prevention and Management: The Significance of Tatarstan's 
Experience', (hereafter, 'Conflict Prevention and Management'), in Preventing Deadly Conflicts 
Strategies and Institutions, eds. Gail W. Lapidus and Svetlana Tsalik, New York: Carnegie Corporation 
of New York, 1998, p-77. 
20 Steven L. Solnick, 'The Political Economy of Russian Federalism', Problems of Post-Communism, 
vol. 44, no-6,1996, pp. 16-20. 
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in order to make its federal relations more flexible. " The asymmetry is evident in the 
terminology used for each republic in these power-sharing treaties. For example, the 
treaty with Tatarstan describes the Republic as 'a state joined with the Russian 
Federation' while Bashkortostan is described in its treaty as 'a sovereign state within the 
Russian Federation'. Although the treaty with Sakha labelled the republic as 'a state 
conforming to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the 
Republic of Sakha within the Russian Federation', Buriatiia is cited as 'a republic (state) 
-a full subject of the Russian Federation', while Udmurtiia is called merely 'a republic'. 
22 
Similarly, even in violation of the federal constitution, the constitutions of non-Russian 
republics have granted varying levels of autonomy to these republics in the Russian 
Federation. For example, although the constitutions of Sakha and Tyva proclaimed the 
promýinence of their republican laws over the laws of the Russian Federation, the right of 
these republics to the ownership of the natural resources on their territory and their right 
to design and implement their own internal and foreign policy, the constitutions of some 
republics, such as Mari, have not gone very far in that direction. 
23 The resulting defacto 
asymmetrical autonomy has arisen in large measure because the centre has defaulted on 
many of its jurisdictional responsibilities, leaving regions to fill the empty policy space. 
24 
Until January 1996, Moscow signed bilateral treaties only with the republics. The first 
bilateral treaty to be signed by the federal centre was with one of the resource-rich 
Russian regions, Sverdlovsk region, on 12 January 1996 (See Chapter Three). Poorer 
republics, such as Dagestan, Chuvashiia and Tyva, had to wait longer than Russian 
regions. 25 It should also be noted that El'tsin signed many of these bilateral treaties 
21 Mikhail A. Alexseev, 'Asymmetric Russia: Promises and Dangers' in Center-Periphery Conflict in 
Post-Soviet Russia: A Federation Imperiled, ed. Mikhail A. Alexseev, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1999, p. 276. 
22 James Hughes, 'Moscow's Bilateral Treaties Add to Confusion', Transition, vol. 2, no. 19,20 
September 1996, pp. 4243. For the texts of the treaties and agreements signed on the delimitation of 
powers by the federal centre with the various subjects of federation, see Sbornik dogovorov i 
soglashenii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii o razgranichenii 
predmetov vedeniia i polnomochii, Moscow: lzdanie Gosudarstvennoi Durny, 1997. 
23 lrina Sarycheva, 'Raspolzanie pravovoi sistemy - ugroza konstitutsionnoi bezopasnosti RossiF, 
Federalizm, vol. 2, no. 4,1997, pp. 124-127. 
24 ViWii V. lvanov, Rossiiskii federalizm i vnutri-gosudarstvennaia dogovornaia politika, 
Krasnoyarsk: lzd-vo KGU, 1997, pp. 77-91. 
25 Mikhail N. Guboglo, 'Federalizm vlasti i vlast' federalizma', in Federalizm vlasti i vlast' 
federalizma, eds. Aleksandr N. Arinin and Mikhail N. Guboglo, Moscow: Inteltekh, 1997, p. I 10. 
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during his electoral campaign in 1996 . 
26 El'tsin made these concessions to specific 
regions as a way of securing the loyalty of their leaders during the elections. Besides, the 
election of governors across Russia since 1996 has increased the devolution of power 
away from Moscow further. 17 
Nevertheless, El'tsin's policy of asymmetrical federalism resulted in the weakening of 
Kren-din's grip on the regions since the regional leaders had already created their own 
regional institutions, and accumulated the necessary power to defy the orders from 
Moscow. 28 In response, El'tsin appointed Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, as his 
regional policy aide in 1998. El'tsin ordered Putin to collect detailed information on how 
governors spent federal subsidies in order to use this information to put pressure on non- 
compliant regional leaders. However, regional leaders forced El'tsin to replace Putin, who 
was appointed as the Head of the FSB in July 1998, with former Samara Mayor Oleg 
Sysuev, a less intrusive aide. 29 This demonstrated the strength of regional leaders vis-A- 
vis Moscow. 
The fiscal collapse of August 1998 further weakened the federal centre vis-A-vis the 
regions since it deprived Moscow of the econon-fic resources for keeping regional leaders 
in line. 30 In this atmosphere, the process of decentmlisation initiated by El'tsin through 
the power-sharing treaties was seen as responsible for the problems in placing the centre- 
periphery relations on a predictable footing. In order to streamline the regions, the Duma 
started to demand that new treaties would need to be ratified by both the federal and 
regional parfiaments rather than by the executive branches, and that existing treaties 
would need to be brought into compliance with the federal constitution within six 
months. In tine with this policy, Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov put an end to the 
practice of signing bilateral treaties in September 1998. When Boris El'tsin signed the 
26 By the end of 1999,46 bilateral treaties had been signed. The last one was signed by the city of 
Moscow on 16 June 1998. 
27 Steven L. Solnick, 'Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 14, no. 1, 
1998, pp. 48-80. 
28 Vladimir Ia. Gel'man, 'Regional'naia vlast' v sovremennoi Rossii: Instituty, rezhimy i praktiki', 
Politicheskie issledovaniia, vol. 7, no. 1,1998, pp. 87-88. 
29 Natan Shklyar, 'Economic Crisis Strengthens Governors', Russian Regional Report, vol. 3, no. 51,22 
December 1998. 
ý' Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, 'Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 15, 
no. 1,1999, p. 94. 
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federal law on power-sharing treaties on 30 June 1999, the Kremlin gained the legal right cý I 
to bring existing treaties in line with the Russian Constitution by 2002.31 
In order to take advantage of the dernise of El'tsin's political power vis-A-vis the State 
Duma, several regional leaders formed Vsia Rossiia bloc under the leadership of 
Shairniev. Vsia-Rossiia became an important player in Russian politics when it forged an 
alliance with Moscow Mayor lurii Luzhkov's bloc Fatherland in August 1999 in order to 
create the Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiia (OVR) bloc, which was led by former Prime Minister 
Evgenii Primakov, Luzhkov and Shaimiev. Against this bloc, the Kren-din promoted 
Vladimir Putin who replaced Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin in August 1999, as its 
candidate. Putin was able to neutralize the OVR's influence during the 1999 State Duma 
election campaign by co-opting a broad coalition of other regional leaders into the 
Edinstvo (Unity) bloc. Consequently, the OVR bloc was unable to win enough seats in 
the December 1999 elections for the State Duma that would be necessary for 
transforming the Russian Federation into a more confederal type of state in which 
regional leaders would play a greater role than the federal centre. 32 
Since replacing El'tsin as President on 31 December 1999, Putin has targeted the 
privileges granted to specific regions under Boris El'tsin. In his campaign against 
asymmetrical federalism, Putin's argument was that asymmetrical federalism has 
undermined the Russian Federation's legal, constitutional and economic integrity. He 
elicited a strong support from the majority of Russian regions and some poor non- 
Russian republics, which have not benefited from the privileges of asymmetrical 
federalism. In fact, the status quo of asymmetrical federalism was in favour of very few 
regions, such as Tatarstan. This served to alienate Tatarstan from Russian regions and 
some non-Russian republics. Consequently, Tatarstan has gradually become marginalized 
in Russian politics. Tatarstan's strengths and weaknesses in resisting Putin's drive 
towards a centralised federation structure will be explored below under the section on the 
stability of intergovernmental relations between Moscow and Kazan. 
31 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 30 June 1999. 
32 Danielle Lussier, '1999 State Duma Results Communist Power on the Decline, OVR Could be the 
Swing', Russian Regional Report, vol. 4, no. 48,22 December 1999. 
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Why is Russia not Disintegrating? 
Many feared that the asymmetrical relations between Moscow and the units of the 
Federation would lead to the disintegration of Russia. However, this did not happen. 
Mikhail Filippov and Olga Shvetsova argued that asymmetrical bilateral bargaining in 
the Russian Federation has always been a part of Russian political tradition and was in 
33 fact 'effectively instituted before Russia's independence' . The 
bilateral treaties provide 
an institutional recognition of these defticto asymmetries. Charles D. Tarlton argues that 
the capacity of federalism in coping with separatist trends depends on the relative 
strength of the forces demanding the unity of the federation. 
To what extent can 'federalism' be expected to sustain the stimulus to and the 
need for unity in the face of the pressures of separatism? The answer, plainly, 
is: To the extent that the forces of unity are dominant. Unless there is some 
factor or set of factors which clearly and inexorably push in the direction of 
commonality, then the pressures of asymmetry will increasingly present 
themselves, making continued federal existence nearly impossible. 34 
The fact that the Russian Federation is not disintegrating under the pressure of nationalist 
separatist movements is mainly due to two factors. The first factor is that the masses 
show no strong support for the nationalist movements in Russia. The other factor is the 
dominance of pragmatic leaders in Moscow and in non-Russian republics. These two 
factors, indeed, represent what Tarlton describes as 'the forces of unity' in the Russian 
Federation. 
The main factor limiting the support for non-Russian secessionist movements is the 
demographic composition of ethnically-defined federal units. According to the 1989 
census, out of a total population of 147 "Ilion, 108 million (73.5 percent of the total 
population) ethnic Russians were living outside the ethno-federal units, while 11.8 
million (8.03 percent of total population) were living in the ethno-territorial units of some 
other nationality. Moreover, out of the 27 million non-Russians, only 10 million (7.02 
percent) were living in their titular republics. 35 Only five republics (Chechnia, 
33 Mikhail Filippov and Olga Shvetsova, 'Asymmetric Bilateral Bargaining in the New Russian 
Federation -A Path-Dependence Explanation', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 32, no. 1, 
1999, p. 63. 
34 Charles D. Tarlton, 'Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: Theoretical Speculation', 
Journal of Politics, vol. 27, no. 11,1965, p. 874. 
35 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 2"d ed., London: Routledge, 1996, p. 177. 
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Chuvashila, Tyva and Kabardino-Balkariia) had titular populations as a majority. 
Although Kalmyks, Tatars and Kabardins form the largest groups in their titular 
republics, they do not constitute the majority of the population (See Table A4.1 ). 36 
However, the lack of ethnic concentration did not stop some republics, such as Karehia, 
Khakassia and Komi, from being in the forefront of the so-called 'parade of 
sovereignties' in 1990-1991. Among the non-Russian republics of the Russian 
Federation, only Chechnia, Tatarstan, Tyva and Dagestan have historical traditions of 
independent statehood. Furthermore, their secession would be viable only if they had 
external borders. However, only Buriatiia, Kareliia, Sakha, Tyva, Dagestan, Chechnia 
and North Ossetiia have external borders. Another factor that weakens the drive towards 
secessionism is that poor regions in the margins of the Russian Federation depend on 
Moscow while rich regions in the heartland lack external borders. 37 
Although non-Russian nationalist movements find it very difficult to attract strong social 
support, factors beyond their control play a much more important role. Donald Horowitz 
made this point as follows: 
Whether a secessionist movement will emerge at all is determined by domestic 
politics, by the relations of groups and regions within the state. Whether a 
secessionist movement will achieve its aims, however, is determined largely by 
international politics, by the balance of forces that extend beyond the state. 38 
Among the factors that are beyond the control of nationalist movements, we could 
mention the lack of international support for ethnic nationalist movements in Russia. In 
fact, the majority of international actors do not support anti-Russian nationalist 
movements because the idea of supporting such movements in post-Soviet Russia, which 
is ideologically very different from the Soviet Union, is not attractive for most states. 
After all, some these states also have their own secessionist movements. 
36 Ibid., p. 34. 
37 Marjorie Mandelstarn Balzer, 'From Ethnicity to Nationalism: Turmoil in the Russian Mini Empire', 
in Social Legacy of Communism, eds. James R. Millar and Sharon L. Wolchik, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994, pp. 86-88. 
38 Donald Horowitz, 'Patterns of Ethnic Separatism', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
vol. 23, no. 2,1981, p. 167. 
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The policies of the pragmatic politicians in Moscow and in the non-Russian republics 
constitute the other factor that is beyond the control of nationalist movements. 39 El'tsin's 
policy of granting concessions to the republican leaders deepened the divide between 
non-Russian nationalist movements and their republican elites. The co-optation of non- 
Russian regional leaders was facilitated by the fact that El'tsin's team of prot6gds and 
clients established informal political arrangements with non-Russian republican leaders. 
Such short-term political alliances have been central to federal coalition building taking 
into account the extremely fragile elite networks in the centre-periphery relations. 40 
El'tsin's pragmatic politics of coalition building with the 'oligarchs' and the regional 
leaders permitted private interests and state institutions to become highly interwoven, 
creating a system of privileges that precluded equal rules for all political actors. The 
system of privileges that has significantly characterised the post-Soviet Russian politics 
and economy encourages the post-Soviet Russia's political and econon-dc actors to adopt 
rent-seeking as a dominant form of behaviour. William Tompson gives a very persuasive 
explanation of rent-seeking behaviour in Russia's banking system, which is, I think, valid 
for Russia's federal system too, as follows: 
[t1he transition rents associated with the system that emerged in 1992-98 still 
seem more attractive to most of the players than the uncertain and long-term 
benefits associated with the development of real intermediation, a project 
which at present has no 'sponsors' on the political scene. 41 
Likewise, Russia's federal and regional elites enjoy the privileges of the emerging federal 
structures at the federal centre and the regions. The short-term interests of these elites in 
the continuity of existing privileges prevent them from instituting formal rules of federal 
bargaining that could make Russia's centre-periphery relations more predictable in the 
long run. Because of its practice of granting privileges to regional elites, Vladimir 
Shlapentokh likens Russian federalism to the early feudal system, which involves the 
39 Mikhail A. Alexseev, 'Decentralization Versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia's Endurance', 
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 38, no. 1,2001, p. 102. 
4(' John P. Willefton, 'Post-Soviet Clientelist Norms at the Russian Federal Level', in Elites and 
Leadership in Russian Politics, ed. Graeme Gill, London: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 36-39. 
41 William Tompson, 'Financial Backwardness in Contemporary Perspective: Prospects for the 
Development of Financial Intermediation in Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 52, no. 4,2000, p. 620. 
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hierarchical organization of society, the privatisation of public office and the 
42 fragmentation of national markets . 
El'tsin's political strategy sought to ensure the alliance of the federal and regional 
nomenklatura. He permitted regional elites to control the key aspects of the privatisation 
process in the expectation of political support. The strategy worked to keep the El'tsin 
administration in power, because regional elites and oligarchs supported El'tsin during 
his re-election as Russian President in 1996. In return, El'tsin named Vladimir Potanin as 
First Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic reform and Boris Berezovskii as 
the Deputy Head of the Security Council. Anatol Lieven explained the success of the 
strategy of the El'tsin administration as follows: 
The lack of civil institutions and traditions is, of course, a grave weakness for 
contemporary democracy in Russia and most of the other former Soviet 
republics. It helps to maintain the rule of deeply corrupt, self-serving elites 
who neither fell nor show any responsibility towards the people who 
theoretically elected them. 43 
Despite the success of the El'tsin regime in controlling the state power, as Richard Sakwa 
argues, post-Soviet Russia suffers from 'weak institutionalisation, legal arbitrariness and 
declining state capacity'. 44Moscow's failure to develop an institutionalised form of 
governance has made federal relations personalistic, and led to confusions in the 
divisions of power between Moscow and the regions. Daniel Treisman, analysing 
El'tsin's policy of 'selective fiscal appeasement' towards Russia's regions, found that 
El'tsin transferred large amounts of finances to those regions that had stood against 
Moscow in order to secure their loyalty. For example, the Kremlin had used the Federal 
Fund for Regional Assistance to buy off Moscow's opponents as federal transfers were 
made conditional on the compliance of regions. Besides, three republics, Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan and Sakha virtually transferred no taxes to the federal treasury in this 
period. 45 
42 Vladimir Shlapentokh, 'Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia', Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 48 no. 3,1996, pp. 392-393. 
4' Anatol Lieven, 'The Weakness of Russian Nationalism', Survival, vol. 41, no. 2,1999, pp. 54-55. 
44 Richard Sakwa, 'Russian Political Evolution: A Structural Approach', in Rethinking the Soviet 
Collapse: Sovietology, the Death of Communism and the New Russia, ed., Michael Cox, London: 
Pinter, 1998, p. 198. 
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Nevertheless, El'tsin's accommodation of the regions, especially the ethnic republics 
(with the exception of Chechnia), owed less to his commitment to democratic federalism 
than to political and economic expediency. El'tsin described himself as a 'civic' 
politician by pointing at the fact that he accommodated Russia's ethnic republics. 
However, the accommodation of regional elites does not mean the existence of an 
46 inclusive democratic political order in Russia. In fact, El'tsin turned a blind eye to those 
regional leaders who engaged in fraud and other undemocratic means to maintain their 
power as long as they supported his own political aspirations. 47 Moreover, the 
Constitutional Court, the legal body charged with adjudicating infringements of the 
constitution, has also failed to serve as a strong check on the regional calls for autonomy 
due to its low level of legitimacy in the eyes of non-Russian regional leaders. Besides, 
federal political parties, with the exception of the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation, are not fully organised at the regional level . 
4' Finafly, Presidential 
Representatives, who were authorised in the oversight of the federal budget, property and 
personnel at the regional level, were equally ineffective in dealing with regional non- 
compliance. 49 Such institutional weaknesses made it possible for Moscow to come up 
with pragmatic arrangements with the regions that worked to secure their loyalty to the 
centre . 
50 Nevertheless, these arrangements cannot be described easily as a form of 
democratic federalism. In this respect, it is useful to compare the Russian Federation with 
democratic federations. 
" Daniel S. Treisman, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia, Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999, pp. 47-80. 
46 Boris N. El'tsin, Zapiski Prezidenta, Moscow: Ogonek 1994, pp. 57-143. 
47 Peter Kirkow, Russia's Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation Versus Local Autonomy?, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 138-140. 
48 John T. lshiyama, 'The Russian Proto-parties and the National Republics: Integrative Organisations 
in a Disintegrating WorldT, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 29, no. 4,1998, p. 409. 
49 Nikolai Petrov, 'The President's Representatives: "Moscow's Men" in the Regions', Jamestown 
Foundation Prism, vol. 4, no. 7,3 April 1998. 
50 Gordon B. Smith, 'State-Building in the New Russia: Assessing the Yeltsin Record', in State- 
Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge of the Future, ed. Gordon B. Smith, New 
York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 14. 
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Comparisons with Democratic Federations: The United States, Canada, Cermany, 
Spain and Belgium 
Before comparing the Russian Federation with democratic federations, it is necessary 
to discuss the capacity of democratic federations in containing nationalist movements. 
Concerning the relationship between federalism and nationalism, some scholars, such 
as Hudson Meadwell, argue that federations may stimulate nationalism because they 
provide potential nationalist leaders with patronage and other institutional resources 
that can be mobilised for nationalist ends. 5' Nevertheless, it is very difficult to make 
such a generalisation concerning the relationship between federalism and nationalism 
since the federal practice of policy making might develop in authoritarian as well as 
democratic systems. Their impact on the development of nationalist movement could 
differ from case to case. 
There have been two types of non-democratic federations: socialist federations and the 
Third World federations. In these federations, the central elites have instituted a federal 
political structure pragmatically in order to elicit the loyalty of regional elites to their 
authoritarian regimes. Due to the structural difficulties of harmonising the interests of 
regional elites with the federal centre's overarching state ideology and party control, the 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia disintegrated under the pressures of 
democratisation. 52 
Likewise, authoritarian federations in the Third World are also ineffective in coping with 
regional separatism. With the exception of India, which can be considered as a 
democratic federation, the Third World federations maintain their territorial integrity due 
to the authoritarian practices of their central elites. It is remarkable that 27 of the 44 
modem federations in the Third World have failed either by breaking apart or by 
becoming fully centralised unitary states. Even where a federal solution is successfully 
53 legitimated, such as Malaysia and Nigeria, it takes a centrally-dominated form. On the 
51 Hudson Meadwell, 'The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec', World Politics, vol. 45, no. 2,1993, 
p. 221. 
52 Carol Skalnik Leff, 'Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the 
Communist Federations', World Politics, vol. 5 1, no. 2,1999, p. 23 1. 
53 Philip Mawhood, 'The Politics of Survival: Federal States in the Third World', International 
Political Science Review, vol. 5, no. 4,1984, p. 521. It should be stated here that China has instituted 
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other hand, the democratic nature of Indian federalism shows that the key to success or 
failure in coping with regional separatism is not ethnic homogeneity, which India does C, 
not have, but democratic federalism and workable institutions. 
Is the Russian Federation a democratic federation? Although Article I of the Russian 
Constitution states that 'Russia is a federal democratic rule of law state with a republican 
form of government', the democratic credentials of Russian federalism can be established 
by comparing it with democratic federations such as the United States, Canada, 
Germany, Spain and Belgium, instead of making such legal declarations. 54 In making 
such a comparison, each case will be considered as a pragmatic adaptation of the federal 
55 idea to meet the specific circumstances of a given country. 
A well-known example of democratic federation is the United States of America, which 
became a federation in 1776. In The Federalist Papers, the founding fathers of American 
federalism, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, argued that American 
federal government should be strong enough to guarantee stability, but also sufficiently 
56 controlled not to threaten personal liberty. Thus, a defining characteristic of American 
federalism is that ethnicity is not a defining characteristic of the federal components, but 
an attribute of individuals. This characteristic of American federalism is very attractive to 
the Russian politicians seeking to abolish non-Russian ethnic republics. In the absence of 
an American-style liberal democracy in Russia, this model could be used to discriminate 
ri 57 against non-Russian nationalities. Besides, Arne can federalism is very flexible. 
Without exploring how the USA's flexible system of federalism works in practice, 
Tatarstan's leadership sometimes uses the example of Puerto Rico, which became a 
possession of the United States through a Treaty in 1975, in order to back its desire to 
federalism since 1979 mainly for the economic purpose of attracting foreign investment to its special 
economic zones rather than for the political purpose of sharing the central power, which is controlled 
by the Communist Party of China, with its federal units. Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian and Barry 
R. Weingast, 'Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China', World 
Politics, vol. 48, no. 4,1995, p. 53. 
54 Midkhat Kh. Farukhshin, Sovremennyi federalizm: Rossiiskii i zarubezhnyi opyt', Kazan: KGU, 
1998, pp. 4-12. 
55 Ivo D. Duchacek, 'Comparative Federalism: An Agenda for Additional Research', in Constitutional 
Design and Power-Sharing in the Post-Modern Epoch, ed. Daniel J. Elazar, Lanham: Maryland: 
University Press of America, 199 1, p. 25. 
56 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, eds. Charles R. Kesler 
and Clinton Rossiter, New York: Mentor, 1999, p. 165. 
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gain an associated state status in the Russian Federation. For example, Rafael Khakimov, 
Chief Advisor of Shaimiev, supports this argument actively. For Khakimov, 
[T]he closest analogy would seem to be the status of Puerto Rico, whose 
relations with the USA are set out in the 'Bill to approve the compact of 
permanent union between the United States and Puerto Rico (1975)'. 
Tatarstan, however, has certain peculiarities that make it different ftorn Puerto 
Rico, These peculiarities are the result of Russia's post-empire traditions and 
Tatarstan's enclave situation. 58 
However, Khakimov seems to be unaware that the level of autonomy enjoyed by Puerto 
Rico, which is very limited as compared to Tatarstan's autonomy in post-Soviet Russia, 
may not satisfy the current leadership of Tatarstan. Ignoring this very important 
difference, Khakimov assumes that the main difference lies somewhere else. Khakimov 
asserts that Tatarstan is different from Puerto Rico, because Tatarstan is an enclave 
within Russia, which is, for Khakimov, still dominated by imperial rather than federal 
culture. 
Canada, which was formed by the British North America Act of 1867, is an example of 
democratic federation where ethnicity is a defining characteristic of the components of 
the federation. Unlike the federal units of the Russian Federation, however, Canada, s 
federal units enjoy legally guaranteed autonomy. Canadian federalism is executive 
federalism, since it is based on intergovernmental bargaining between the centre and the 
peripheries . 
59 Although Moscow considers executive federalism positively due to the 
executive's dominance in Russian politics, Tatarstan's leadership is more sympathetic 
towards Canadian federalism than Moscow. Just like the Tatars in Tatarstan, 
francophones in Quebec, the most outspoken component of Canada, view themselves as 
a separate nation, and the Quebec regional state as the guardian of that nation. In its 
relations with the federal centre, Quebec, just like Tatarstan, has attracted many 
57 Franz Gress, 'Interstate Co-operation in the USA and the FRG', in Evaluating Federal Systems, ed. 
Bertus DeVilliers, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 415-419. 
58 Khakimov, 'Prospects of Federalism in Russia: A View from Tatarstan', p. 76. 
59 D. Brown, D. Cameron, et. al., 'Comparative Analysis', in Russia-Canada Collaborative Federalism 
Project: Federalism-Structures and Practices, eds. V. Benevolenskii and D. Brown, Moscow: Moscow 
Branch of Russian Science Foundation, 1996, pp. 95-120. 
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concessions from Ottawa precisely because of its credible independence movement. 60 
Nevertheless, the level of Canadian democracy is missing both in Tatarstan and Moscow. 
Another democratic federation that could be compared to the Russian Federation is 
Germany. The niain characteristic of the German system is that in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, it was deliberately devised by the Allied Powers to preclude the 
centralisation of power and the resurgence of Gennan nationalism. Similarly, Russian 
federalism is legitimised as a method of precluding the resurgence of Soviet communism 
as well as the possibility of totalitarian re-centralisation of power. Unlike the Russian 
Federation, however, Gennany is geographically small, and therefore, lacks comparable 
regionally-based national identities, divergent economic structures or distinctive political 
traditions. It is also characterised by cultural and linguistic homogeneity and is less 
threatened by centrifugal forces . 
6' Although the politicians in Moscow would be more 
than happy to turn Russia into a federation organised into territorial divisions based on 
the German Onder model, non-Russian regional leaders, including Shairniev, criticise 
Gen-nan federalism for its weakness in securing the privileges of ethnic minorities. 62 
The Russian Federation can also be compared to Spain, which is not formally a 
federation yet, in terms of the role of decentralisation in forming democratic regimes. The 
post-Franco Spanish Constitution, which was adopted in 1978, granted autonomy to 
Spain's seventeen autonomous regions. 63 According to the Spanish Constitution, there 
are six co-official languages. Just like the Russian Federation, the Spanish system is 
asymmetric in the fields of public order and international economic ties. For example, the 
Basque Country with its elected parliament and President alone among the seventeen 
autonomous communities has its own police force (subject to oversight from Madrid) . 
64 
Tatarstan is similar to Catalonia rather than the Basque Country, where some militant 
60 Ramsay Cook, Canada, Quebec, and the Uses of Nationalism, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1986, pp. 48-59. 
61 Joan Price Boase, 'Faces of Asymmetry: German and Canadian Federalism', in Evaluating Federal 
Systems, ed. Bertus DeVilliers, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, p. 99. 
62 Elizabeth Teague, 'Center-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation', in National Identity and 
Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Roman Szporluk, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994, 
p. 31. 
63 Robert Agranoff and Juan Gallarin, 'Toward Federal Democracy in Spain: An Examination of 
intergovernmental Relations', Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 27, no. 4,1997, pp. 1-3. 
64 Alistair Hennessy, 'The Renaissance of Federal Ideas in Contemporary Spain', in Federalism and 
Nationalism, ed. Murray Forsyth, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1989, p. 22. 
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Basque ethnic nationalists (IETA), unlike Tatar ethnic nationalists, have actually used 
violence to achieve their goals. Just like Tatarstan's leadership, the leadership of 
Catalonia presses for autonomy while seeking to maximise its influence in Spanish 
national politics. 65 
Belgium, which transfon-ned itself from a unitary state into a federation in 1993, 
resembles the Russian Federation. In fact, Moscow started its process of federalisation 
only in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was a federation only in 
name. Unlike the Russian Federation where the party system is very weak, and the 
parliament is dominated by the Presidency, the existence of a democratic party system 
and the parliamentary system contribute to the strength of Belgian democratic federalism. 
Belgium has separate parliaments for Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. The three regions 
hold primary responsibility for economic development, public works, transportation and 
foreign trade. The functions of the federal government include defence, foreign affairs, 
social security, management of the public debt, and the criminal court system. 66 In March 
1999, the Flemish Community Parliament adopted five resolutions that would create a 
confederal system. In response, all the francophone political parties threatened to block 
the formation of a new federal government. It was an alliance of the francophone and 
Flemish wings of the free-market right, the socialist left and the ecologists that secured 
the unity of Belgium in the June 1999 elections, when the conservative parties were 
defeated by this coalition. 67 This shows the role of democratic federalism in coping with 
secessionism. 
Despite some similarities on the surface between the Russian Federation and several 
democratic federations, the Russian Federation differs substantially from democratic 
federations, which, in principle, achieve political unity in cultural diversity. 68 Besides, 
democratic federalism involves a clear and guaranteed defirnitation of responsibilities 
between the federal centre and the regions. In fact, only constitutional democracies could 
provide credible guarantees and the institutionally embedded mechanisms, which help 
65 Michael Keating, Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia 
and Scotland, London: Macmillan, 1996, p. 16 1. 
66 Patrick Peeters, 'Federalism: A Comparative Perspective - Belgium Transforms from a Unitary to a 
Federal State', in Evaluating Federal Systems, ed. Bertus DeVilliers, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 195-197. 
6' Tony Judt, 'Is There a BelgiumT New York Review of Books, vol. 46, no. 19,1999, pp. 49-53. 
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69 
ensure that the law-inaking prerogatives of the sub-units will be respected . In this C, ZT, 
respect, although Moscow tolerates regional diversity and regional asymmetries of socio- 
economic development and of legal status, the Russian Federation's reluctance to give a 
stable legal recognition to these asymmetries makes it less democratic. 70 
Furthen-nore, although the Russian Federation incorporates regional units electorally into 
the federal decision-making structure through representation in both the Federation 
Council and the State Duma chambers of the Federal Assembly, it does not secure the 
democratic representation of Russia's ethnic minorities. Even if the Russian Parliament 
accurately reflected the country's population, which is 82 percent Russian, 
representatives of ethnic groups would be in a clear minority and hence unable to 
influence decision-making. The more the representatives of the republics feel 
marginalized from power at the federal level, the more they could insist on dominating 
the power positions in their regions .71 As a consequence, the resulting 
low level of the 
representation of Russians in the administration of ethnic republics constitutes a source 
of tension with the local Russian populations. 
The existence of federal institutional arrangements in Russia does not mean that Russia 
has instituted democratic federalism fully. Edward W. Walker claims that Russian 
Constitution does not create a reliable basis for democratic federalism since it granted 
extensive powers to the Presidency. 72 Besides, Russia's limited experience with 
democracy and lack of traditions of compromise and consensus go against democratic 
federalist culture, which involves loyalty to, respect for and participation in both the 
regional and the federal levels of government. Although Moscow concludes attractive 
power-sharing treaties, problems crop up in actually honouring treaty obligations. This 
shows the underdevelopment of democratic federalist political culture in Russia. It seems 
that it could take a very long time to institute a democratic federation fully in Russia. In 
6' Peter King, Federalism and Federation, London: Croom Helm, 1982, p. 143. 
69 For a detailed analysis of the fundamental yardsticks of federalism, see lvo D. Duchacek, 
Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Federalism, New York: University Press of 
America, 1987, pp. 207-208. 
70 Alfred Stephan, 'Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 16, no. 2, 
2000, p. 134. 
71 Graham Smith, 'Ethnopolitics of Federation without Federalism', in Russia in Transition: Politics, 
Privatization and Inequality, ed. David Lane, London: Longman, 1995, pp. 21-23. 
72 Edward W. Walker, 'Federalism-Russian Style: The Federation Provisions in Russia's New 
Constitution', Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 43, no. 4,1995, p. 3. 
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order to develop such a democratic federation, Moscow needs to maintain, above all, its 
stability. Paradoxically, however, the underdevelopment of a democratic federalist culture 
in Russia endangers the stability of the Russian Federation both at the intergovernmental 
and at the interethnic levels. 73 
The Stability of Intergovernmental Relations between Moscow and Kazan 
The stability of federations, as Geoffrey Sawer argues, depends on 'the existence of a 
degree of guaranteed autonomy for geographically distributed governments operating 
directly on the citizen'. 74 Therefore, the federal stability is closely related to the federal 
centre's relations with the regional government and citizenry. In this respect, the stability 
of Tatarstan's federal arrangements with Moscow is contingent on the stability of the 
intergovernmental relations between Moscow and Tatarstan and the maintenance of inter- 
ethnic peace between Russians and Tatars. 
According to Gail W. Lapidus, the main problem in Moscow's intergovernmental 
relations with the federal subjects, including Tatarstan, stems from the lack of a 
fundamental agreement over the general rules of Russian federalism, because this leads to 
conflicts over jurisdiction and resource allocation. 75 This can be explained by the fact that 
federal and regional leaders understand federalism in strategic terms as a means of 
preserving the privileges of political elites in both the centre and the regions. It is not 
generally understood as a means for making Russia's political institutions more 
76 accountable and democratic. Consequently, federal relations in Russia have become far 
from being open and transparent, and there is very little trust between the federal centre 
and the regions. 77 
73 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Tederalizm i demokratiia: Slozhnyi balans', Politicheskie issledovaniia, 
vol. 8, no. 6,1997, pp. 170-173. 
74 Geoffrey Sawer, Modern Federalism, Victoria, Australia: Pitman, 1976, p. 152. 
75 Gail W. Lapidus, 'Asymmetrical Federalism and State Breakdown in Russia', Post-Soviet Affairs, 
vol. 15, no. 1,1999, pp. 76-80. 
76 Nicholas J. Lynn Alexei V. Novikov, 'Refederalizing Russia: Debates on the Idea of Federalism in 
Russia', Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 27, no. 2,1997, p. 187. 
77 Vladimir Shlapentokh, Roman Levita and Mikhail Loiberg, From Submission to Rebellion: The 
Provinces versus the Center in Russia, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997, p. 8. 
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Since no general consensus exists on federal norms, the leadership factor has becorne the 
defining characteristic of the intergovernmental relations between Moscow and Tatarstan. 
Emil Pain, Advisor of Boris El'tsin on ethnic relations, pointed out the unique nature of 
Tatarstan's Treaty with Moscow, and the difficulties of renegotiating such a treaty again. 
Pain argued that, 
What I shall not recommend to anyone is a replay of the process of concluding 
such a Treaty. Not because it is bad, but because many of its aspects are 
unique and cannot be repeated. The fact is that if there were no Shairniev in 
Tatarstan, there would be no Treaty... Much in the process of preparing such 
treaties depends not only on working groups and experts, but also on personal 
gentlemanly agreements, when the leaders meet in private. In order to secure a 
positive outcome, personal trust is required. In this regard, the personal 
relationship between El'tsin and Shaimiev played its role. "' 
In fact, Tatarstan's stability depends on Mintimer Shaimiev. It is unclear what would 
happen when Shairniev steps down or dies. In October 1999, the federal government 
adopted a law, which limits the terrns of regional leaders in office to two 5-year tenns. 
Article 108 of Tatarstan's constitution, however, does not require such term lin-dts for 
Tatarstan's President . 
79 A potentially destabilising conflict between Moscow and 
Tatarstan was avoided when it was ruled that the federal law would not come into effect 
until October 2001. This ruling allowed Shairnýiev to be re-elected for a third term as the 
President of Tatarstan at the age of 64 on 25 March 2001. According to the election 
results, Shaimiev received 79,29 percent of the votes, clearly ahead of his opponents: 
Sergei Shashurin (5.84 percent); Ivan Grachev (5.54 percent); Robert Sadykov (4.47 
percent) and Aleksandr Federov (0.49 percent). 80 
The significance of informal factors confirms that Tatarstan's problematic relationship 
with Moscow requires a considerable degree of pragmatism. Confrontational politics in 
Moscow or Kazan could have a negative effect on the negotiations that are required to 
manage their complicated relationship. Out of the 57 items of authority enumerated in the 
Treaty, Russia acquired power over 42 items, including 17 exclusive items and 25 joint 
items, while Tatarstan retained jurisdiction over 15 items of power. If a strong nationalist 
" Emil A. Pain, 'Opyt vzaimootnoshenii Tatarstana i Rossii', in Mezhdunarodnyi opyt uregulirovaniia 
etno-politicheskikh konfliktov ed. Rafael S. Khakimov, Kazan: Panorama-Forum, 1996, pp. 15-16. 
'9 Anna Paretskaya, 'Tatarstan's Constitution Amended', Russian Regional Report, vol. 1, no. 15,4 
December 1996. 
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government were to come to power in Tatarstan, the joint authority could easily become a 
source of friction between Moscow and Tatarstan. However, if a compliant regime 
existed in the Republic, Tatarstan's control over 15 items of authority would pale into 
insignificance. 
In this respect, the stability of intergovernmental relations could easily be endangered by 
the diverging views of Moscow and Kazan on federal reforms. While Moscow's 
proposals for federal reform seek to strengthen the centripetal dynamics, Tatarstan's 
position on the question of federal reform tends to promote centrifugal dynamics in the 
Russian Federation. 
Moscow, Federal Reforms and Centripetal Dynamics 
Moscow's attempts at carrying out federal reforms are oriented towards empowering 
centripetal dynamics in the Russian Federation. This involves unilateral attempts by the 
federal centre at revising Tatarstan's power-sharing Treaty with Moscow in a more 
centralising direction. Under the leadership of Boris El'tsin between 1992 and 1999, 
Moscow viewed federal reform as a mechanism of equalising the level of autonomy of 
Tatarstan with the rest of the federation. El'tsin explained his understanding of federalism 
in his election programme of 1996 as follows: 
What do I mean by real federalism? Real federalism is the territorial form of 
democracy; the democratisation of public life in Russia requires the 
federalisation of relations between the centre and the regions. It is the strict 
delin-dtation of functions and ownership between the federal and regional 
authorities; but it is not a 'divorce' between them - rather it is a guarantee of 
close co-operation for the good of all Russia's citizens. Federalism is the 
guarantee of the state's integrity, since the regions have no reason to seek to 
secede from Russia if their independent development is already guaranteed. At 
the same time federalism is the means of constructing a unified state, not a 
confederation, because special measures are here envisaged to guard against 
the federation's being shaken apart into some kind of union of autonomous 
states. Finally, federalism is the flexible combination of three levels of power: 
federal, regional, and local, in which a special role is assigned to local self- 
government, without which neither federalism itself nor true democracy can 
exist. " 
go Gulnara Khasanova, 'Shain-dev Overwhelmingly Reelected', RFEIRL Tatar-Bashkir Daily Report, 26 
March 200 1. 
" Rossiiskie vesti I June 1996. 
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El'tsin's understanding of federalism underscores the need to carry out federal reforms 
that could re-centralise the power in the Russian Federation. However, as discussed 
above, Moscow was not strong enough to implement the federal reforrns that could harm 
the interests of regional leaders. That is why El'tsin deemed it better to appease regional 
leaders through making concessions from the centralising federal reforrns. 
The centralising federal reforms gained momentum in 2000 when Vladimir Putin, a 
former KGB officer, replaced El'tsin as the President of the Russian Federation. Putin's 
war in Chechnia, which re-started in 1999, has already sent a message to non-Russian 
regions, such as Tatarstan, that secession was not an option. Putin scored a major triumph 
in his campaign to reassert federal supremacy during a trip to the republics of Tatarstan 
82 and Bashkortostan in 22-23 March 2000. Relying on the support coming from the 
security services and his popularity in the eyes of the Russians, Putin started to carry out 
his centralising federal reforms in May 2000. He sought to weaken the regional leaders 
first by creating seven macro regions as new layers of authority between Moscow and the 
federal units for dealing with regional problems. These macro regions and their capitals 
are as follows: Central (Moscow), Northwestern (St. Petersburg), Southern (Rostov na 
Donu), Volga (Nizhnii Novgorod), Ural (Ekaterinburg), Siberia (Novosibirsk) and Far 
Eastern (Vladivostok). 83 Moreover, Putin changed the composition of the Council of the 
Federation through replacing the elected regional leaders with their appointees. 
Furthermore, Putin gained a de facto power to appoint 'temporary' presidential 
appointees as governors if the Supreme Court removes a governor guilty of two or more 
violations of federal legislation. In addition, Putin eliminated the financial influence of 
regional governments over the local law enforcement bodies through financing the courts 
and the police directly from the federal budget. 84 
Putin's federal reforms seem to create a new bureaucratic structure that is completely 
subordinate to the President and to transfer the powers of the old federal bureaucracy to 
82 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 24 March 2000. 
83 Viktor Kistanov, Federal'nye okruga Rossii: Vazhnyi shag v ukreplenii gosudarstva, Moscow: 
Ekonomika, 2000, pp. 18-30. In line with Putin's decision to create seven federal districts, the law on 
the admission to the Russian Federation and creation of new subjects in the Federation was ratified by 
the State Duma in 2001. This law provided for the merger of Federation subjects as well as the 
entrance of foreign territories (such as Abkhazia, which is a breakaway republic in Georgia) into the 
Russian Federation. 
84 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 16 May 2000. 
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the new one over time. As William Tompson argues, these measures carries the risk of 
creating more bureaucracy in federal relations and there is no guarantee that Putin's zn 
regional representatives act in line with his wishes locally. Furthen-nore, Putin's 
centralising reforrns make it difficult for Moscow to gain the co-operation of local elites, 
since these reforms are likely to undermine Moscow's authority in the eyes of some 
autonomy-minded regional elites, such as those in Tatarstan . 
85 Robert Orttung supports 
Tompson's points by underscoring Putin's inability to shape the outcomes of the more 
than 50 gubernatorial elections that have taken place between December 1999 and March 
2001.86 
In this context, Moscow finds it better to change the overall system in Tatarstan through 
changing laws rather than just attacking specific individuals, such as Shaimiev, in 
Tatarstan. For this purpose, Moscow pressurises Tatarstan's leadership into bringing 
republican laws into confon-nity with the federal laws. In line with this policy, the 
Russian Constitutional Court ruled that Tatarstan's declaration of sovereignty was 
unconstitutional and illegal on 27 June 2000. However, the capacity of Moscow to 
change the overall system in Tatarstan is limited by the determination of Tatarstan's 
leadership to pursue its own confederal version of federal reform through promoting 
centrifugal dynamics throughout the Russian Federation. 
Kazan, Federal Reforms and Centrifugal Dynamics 
In opposition to Moscow's centralising federal reforms, as was discussed in Chapter 
Three, Tatarstan has been in favour of a confederal-type of federation where the regions 
should play a greater role than the federal centre. 87 A confederal approach is visible in the 
arguments of Tatarstan's leadership concerning the question of bringing regional 
constitutions and legislation into line with the Russian constitution and federal 
legislation. Tatarstan's leadership maintains that the republican laws should take 
precedence over the federal laws since Tatarstan's laws are more liberal than the federal 
85 William Tompson, 'Russia: Putin's Power Plays', World Today, vol. 56, no. 7,2000, p. 16. 
86 Robert Orttung, 'The Hard Road to Federal Reform', Moscow Times, 28 March 2001. 
87 Engel R. Tagirov, Tatarstan: Natsional'no-gosudarstvennye interesy, Kazan: lzd-vo KFEI, 1996, 
pp. 19-23. 
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laws. Concerning Putin's federal reforms, Shaimiev suggested that federal districts 
should concentrate exclusively on the co-ordination of economic relations. Besides, 
Tatarstan's parliamentary speaker Farid Mukhametshin, a close associate of Shaimiev, 
claimed that Putin's federal reforins are undemocratic, and could provoke protests from 
the radical Tatar opposition. 8" Relying on these arguments, Tatarstan greatly exceeded the 
19 October 2001 deadline the federal government had given regions to bring their 
constitutions and legislation into line with federal norms. 89 
After long discussions between Moscow and Tatarstan, a provisional compromise was 
reached in February 2002. According to this compromise, Moscow succeeded in 
removing the following clauses from Tatarstan's Constitution: 'Tatarstan is the subject of 
international law', 'the Republic is associated with Russia on the basis of a treaty' and 
'republican laws are superior to federal laws in the Republic'. After the revision, Article I 
of Tatarstan's Constitution states that Tatarstan is a 'fun subject of the Russian 
Federation' and 'united with Russia'. ')o In order to resist Moscow's demands on 
eliminating Tatarstan's 'sovereign republic' status, Tatarstan's parliament passed a 
constitutional amendment on 3 April 2002 under which the Republic's status can be 
changed only in accordance with a Republic-level referendum. 9' 
As discussed in earlier chapters, Tatarstan's capacity to maintain its post-Soviet 
sovereignty and privileged status in Russia's federal structure has largely depended on its 
ability to manipulate the tensions between the Kremlin and its opposition in Moscow and 
the tensions between the Russian and the Tatar masses in the Republic. It is unclear, 
however, how long Shain-tiev can accommodate all of Tatarstan's Russian and Tatar 
factions simultaneously. In this respect, the main challenge comes from some of 
Tatarstan's ethnic Russians, who feel that they are being gradually marginalized by the 
Republican policies that make it easier for Tatars to receive influential posts. A potential 
alliance of the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan with Moscow could limit the manoeuvring 
space of Shaimiev. In fact, Shaimiev's capacity to pursue his pragmatic nomenklatura 
88 Republika Tatarstan, 20 May 2000. 
89 Katherine E. Graney, 'Ten Years of Sovereignty in Tatarstan: End of the Beginning or the Beginning 
of the End', Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 48, no. 5,2001, pp. 37-39. 
90 Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 'Tatarstan Prepares to Amend Constitution', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 7, no. 7,20 February 2002. 
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nationalism is contingent on fragmenting his opponents, be it Moscow or the ethnic C, 
nationalist movements in the Republic, as much as possible. Putin's federal reforms 
could make it increasingly more difficult for Shaimiev to pursue his pragmatic politics of 
Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism. 
Given the significance of the leadership factor in Tatarstan's intergovernmental relations 
with Moscow, the indispensability of Tatarstan's leadership both to Moscow and to the 
ethnic Tatars prevents any political personality from challenging Shaimiev's regime and 
his violations of democratic principles and human rights in Tatarstan. 
Democratic Federalism as a Missing Variable in the Relations between Moscow and 
Kazan 
Given the lack of consensus over what needs to be refortned. in Moscow's relations with 
its federal subjects, including Tatarstan, a well-defined and just federal regime embedded 
in a constitution seems very unrealistic. 92 That is why ambiguity has been a very useful 
tool for the stability of intergovernmental relations in the short-term. In particular, 
ambiguity enables both Moscow and Tatarstan to side-step the legal issues that are too 
contentious to tackle, and to concentrate on mutual interests. 93 Although this pragmatic 
understanding of federalism makes intergovernmental relations relatively stable in the 
short-term, it creates serious problems for Russian federalism. Apart from causing 
uncertainty in federal relations, pragmatic policies of the federal centre and regional 
leaders undermine the basis for democratic federalism in the long-term. 
Since Vladimir Putin's rise to the Russian Presidency in 2000, Moscow seems to have 
gained the upper hand in its intergovernmental relations with Kazan. However, Putin's 
re-centralisation of power could have some negative effect on the prospects for 
democratic federalism in Russia, since this would motivate Russia's regional leaders to 
91 Gulnara Khasanova, 'Tatarstan to Maintain Status Set by 1992 Referendum', RFEIRL Tatar-Bashkir 
Daily Report, 4 April 2002. 
92 Graham Smith, 'Russia, Multiculturalism and Federal Justice', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 8, 
1998, p. 1393. 
93 Elizabeth Teague, 'Russia and the Regions: The Uses of Ambiguity', in Transformation from Below. - 
Local Power and the Political Economy of Post-Communist Transitions, eds. John Gibson and Philip 
Hanson, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996, p. 30. 
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be accountable more to Moscow than the local people. Robert Orttung and Peter 
Reddaway make this point clearly as follows: 
The central dilemma regarding the regional dimension of Russian state- 
building is how to hold the governors accountable to the people and the law (as 
such it is), without at the same time giving the Kremlin carte blanche to 
interfere wherever it sees f1t. 94 
Similarly, Steven Fish considers the state-led policies ineffective in democratic systems. 
Fish argues that, 
Whatever specific forms intermediary institutions take, the state alone will not 
be able to structure interest representation and guide the country through the 
onerous and uncertain transition to capitalism - at least not without reverting 
to some form of authoritarianism and deferring the question of democracy 
indefinitely. 95 
Moscow's re-centralisation of power carries some other risks too. It is likely that when 
the republican authorities can no longer maintain their autonomy, they could rely more on 
the pragmatic politics of nationalism. Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shainiiev clarified 
the significance of the politics of nationalism in managing Tatarstan's intergovernmental 
relations with Moscow as follows: 
What worries me? This is a transitional period, and the centre can live with an 
asymmetrical federalism and treaty-based relations. I do not consider myself a 
naive person, and I think that when the political and economic situation 
stabilises, this question will arise in full force and we will move toward a 
symmetrical federation. Voices will arise calling for a democratic but uniform 
federalisrn- We have to be ready for this; it is a reality of life. Only politics that 
takes reality into consideration is real politics. But for this we need a well 
thought-out nationalities policy. Like it or not, we need a nationalities policy 
for Russia. A conception of a nationalities policy has been confirmed by the 
President but it is mostly to quiet the society and republics for the next year 
and a half or two. It cannot satisfy a multinational Russia. "6 
In this statement, Shairniev recommended Moscow to adopt a liberal nationalities policy, 
which is accommodative towards the Tatars and other non-Russian minorities. In the 
following section, we will explore the dynarnics of interethnic relations in Russia. 
94 Robert Orttung and Peter Reddaway, 'Russian State-Building: The Regional Dimension', The Russia 
Initiative, Carnegie Corporation of New York, March 2001, p. 1 10. 
95 M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 230. 
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The Stability of Interethnic Relations between Russians and Tatars 
Interethnic relations between the Tatars and the Russians play an important role in the 
functioning of Tatarstan's arrangements with Moscow, because Tatarstan's leadership 
has made the stability of intergovemmental relations dependent on the accommodation of 
Shainfiev's version of pragnuitic nomenklatura nationalism. This requires Moscow to 
impede the growth of Russian as well as non-Russian ethnic nationalist movements. 97 
However, Russia's imperial heritage complicates the stability of interethnic relations in 
the federation. As Geoffrey Hosking says, the Russian Federation is not a nation-state, 
but rather a 'bleeding hulk of empire'. In the Russian language, the word 'Russian' has 
two meanings. In its russkii sense, the word 'Russian' denotes ethnic Russian people, 
language and culture, but in its rossfiskii sense it refers to the multi-national Russian state 
(Rossiia) and its citizens. These meanings form the basis for ethnic (russkii) and 
territorial (rossiiskii) versions of Russianness. 98 Igor Torbakov thinks that the territorial 
version of Russian national identity has generally been used by the rulers of Russia in 
order to promote the statist rather than the civic version of Russian national identity. 99 In 
line with this observation, Vera Tolz argues that there are few advocates of civic 
nationalism in Russia, since 'voluntary membership of a nation, so central to civic 
nationalism, is still alien to the majority of intellectuals'. 100 Instead of civic nationalism, it 
is basically the dominance of the state over the society in Russia that impeded the growth 
of Russian and non-Russian nationalisms. Thus, in the post-Soviet era, as Richard Sakwa 
argues, 'the Russian nation is not substituting for the Russian state'. 101 
The influence of the imperial Russian national identity could be seen in the Russian 
citizenship law, which was adopted on 28 November 1991. By this citizenship law, all 
citizens of the USSR living outside the Russian Federation on I September 1991 were 
96 Shaimiev, 'Conflict Prevention and Management: The Significance of Tatarstan's Experience', p. 74. 
97 Anatolii F. Zotov, 'Federalizm v kontekste sporov o "russkoi natsional'noi idee"', Sotsiologicheskie 
issledovaniia, vol. 7, no. 2,1996, p. 85. 
98 Geoffrey Hosking, 'Can Russia Become a Nation-StateT, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 4, no. 4, 
1998, p. 45 1. 
99 Igor Torbakov, 'The "Statists" and the Ideology of Russian Imperial Nationalism', RFEIRL. 
Research Report, II December 1992, p. 12. 
100 Vera Tolz, 'Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia', 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 6,1998, p. 10 17. 
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entitled to obtain Russian citizenship, provided that they did not possess the citizenship 
of another newly independent statc. Since this provision did not require fon-ner USSR 
citizens to move to Russia, many of the post-Soviet republics have accused Moscow for 
continuing its imperial approach to the question of national identity. 102 Furthermore, the 
1993 Russian Constitution defines Russians neither in ethnic nor in civic terms. The 
Constitution described Russians as the 'multinational people of the Russian Federation' 
(nwogonatsional'nyi narod Rossiiskoi Federatsii). 103 These examples show that the 
imperial version of Russian national identity continues to exert its influence in the post- 
Soviet era. 
Boris El'tsin admitted the negative impact of the Soviet nationalities policy on interethnic 
relations in Russia as follows: 
Young Russia inherited many problems from our previous nationalities policy. 
To these were added new problems triggered by the disintegration of the 
totalitarian state. 'O' 
However, despite El'tsin's recognition of the problems in interethnic relations, Moscow 
has not yet been able to define a civic nationalities policy that could satisfy the core 
concerns of Russia's ethnic minorities. For example, the official concept of Russian 
nationalities policy, which was adopted in June 1996, prescribes that all individuals with 
non-Russian ethnic background should be integrated into the Russian society (rossiiskoe 
obshchestvo). 105 However, as Aleksandr Ossipov says, this approach prioritises; the 
individual rights of Russia's non-Russian citizens over their rights sternming from their 
membership of an ethnic group. 106 The lack of collective rights for non-Russian 
minorities in this document signifies an inclination towards the imperial, rather than 
civic, form of Russian national identity. 
10' Sakwa's emphasis. Richard Sakwa, 'Russian Nationalism and Democratic Development', in Russia 
after the Cold War, eds. Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross, London: Longman, 1999, p. 219. 
102 It was the protests from Estonia and Ukraine that necessitated Moscow to introduce a residence 
requirement in June 1994. Vera Tolz, 'Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in 
Post-Communist Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 6,1998, p. 1008. 
'0' Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Moscow, 1993, p. 3. 
'04 Rossiiskie vesti I June 1996. 
105 'Kontseptsiia gosudarstvennoi natsional'noi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Rossiiskaia gazeta, 10 
July 1996. 
106 My interview with Aleksandr Ossipov, Ethnologist, Chairperson of the Centre for Ethnic Studies at 
the International Institute for Humanities and Political Studies, London, II December 1996. 
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Given the fact that the stability of interethnic relations in Russia has been secured 
through promoting the imperial. rather than civic or ethnic, Russian national identity, it is 
important to ask whether Russians or Tatars could potentially develop successful ethnic 
nationalist movements. In order to answer this question, it is essential to explore the 
orientations of Russian and Tatar ethnic nationalist movements towards each other. 
Russian Nationalism4 Russian Messianism and Non-Russian Minorities 
It is very obvious that the orientation of Russian nationalism towards Russia's non- 
Russian, especially Muslim, minorities is very important for the stability of interethnic 
relations between Russians and Tatars. The discourse of Russian nationalism has 
generally been constructed around the 'Russian idea', which is defined by Tim McDaniel 
as 'the conviction that Russia has its own independent, self-sufficient and eminently 
worthy cultural and historical tradition that both sets it apart from the West and 
guarantees its future flourishing'. 107 This Russian idea has its roots in the messianic 
tradition of Russian nationalism, which is defined by Peter J. S. Duncan as the view that 
the Russian people are 'the chosen people'. '08 This view has been important in defining 
the Russian orientation towards the Muslim minorities including the Tatars, because 
Russian nationalists have generally seen these minorities as people waiting to be 
enlightened by themselves as well as potential allies in Russia's rivalry with the West. 
There have been mainly two versions of Russian messianism in the post-Soviet era: one is 
represented by Boris El'tsin's 'reform movement' and the other is represented by the anti- 
Western coalition of communists and nationalists. '09 In this respect, the Communist Party 
of the Russian Federation and its leader Germadii Ziuganov have played the leading role 
in spreading the second version of Russian nwssianic views in the post-Soviet era. For 
Ziuganov, El'tsin's anti-national regime is incapable of providing a national idea since 
the liberals highlighted individualism as prime value, and ignored what the masses are 
107 Tim McDaniel, The Agony of the Russian Idea, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 10- 
il. 
108 Peter J. S. Duncan, Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and After, London: 
Routledge, 2000, p. 6. 
'0' 'Politicheskaia deklaratsiia levoi i pravoi oppozitsii', Sovetskaia Rossiia, 22 September 1992. 
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actually thinking about them. ''() Ziuganov accuses also the El'tsin regime for being a 
puppet of the West, which, in his opinion, seeks to undermine Russia through 'the 
propaganda of debauchery and anti-religious sects. ' 11 1 The marginal supporters of this 
version of Russian inessianism include the Russian National Assembly, the Russian 
National Unity, the National-Republican Party, the National Salvation Front, the 
National-Bolshevik Party and the Russian Officers' Union. II, 
Concerning interethnic relations between Russians and non-Russians, there is no widely 
accepted ideological framework. Nevertheless, Eurasianism, which seems to have some 
popularity among the Russian 'national-patriots', seeks to brings under one political roof 
representatives of all ma or religious confessions and ethnic groups. Eurasianism, which 
was first articulated by Count Nikolai Trubetskoi in the 1920s and then developed by 
anthropologist Lev Gumilev in the 1960s, claims that Russia has a special role to play for 
Eurasian states and peoples who live harmoniously together. According to this ideology, 
there is an irreconcilable difference between Eurasia and the West, which can be removed 
only by the victory of one side over the other. The son of a KGB officer Aleksandr Dugin 
has popularised these views in his journal Elementy: Evraziiskoe Obouenie, which 
started its publication in July 1992. In his book, Osnovy geopolitiki (The Basics of 
Geopolitics), Dugin revised Eurasianism by arguing that instead opposing the West as a 
whole, Russia should now form an alliance with Europe against the Atlantic powers of 
Britain and the United States. ' 13 Dugin still continues to advocate a rebirth of the Soviet 
Union/the Russian Empire in a modem form. 
The viability of the Eurasianist project necessitates the stability of the relations between 
Russian Orthodoxy and other religions, especially Islam, in Russia. Although secularism 
is a constitutional norm as stated in Article 14 of the 1993 Russian Constitution, 
conservative Russian nationalists seek to use the Russian Orthodox Church against the 
"0 Gennadii A. Ziuganov, Rossiia - Rodina moia, Moscow, Informpechat, 1996, pp. 1-9. 
111 Gennadii A. Ziuganov, Derzhava, Moscow, Informpechat, 1994, p. 132. 
112 Politicheskie partii sovremennoi Rossii i natsional'nyi vopros (Sbornik dokumentov), eds. V. A. 
Babintsev and A. F. Berdnikov, Moscow: Klub 'Realisty', 1996, pp. 27-92. 
H3 Aleksandr G. Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki. Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii, Moscow: Arktogeia, 
1999. See also Dmitry Shlapentokh, 'Eurasianism: Past and Present', Communist and Post-Communist 
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growing influence of the Western culture in Russia. ' 14 In fact, Patriarch Aleksil 11, who 
became the Head of the Rqssian Orthodox Church on 7 June 1990, has not done much to 
reform the Russian Orthodox Church. Besides, Aleksii 11 refused to recognise the 
independence of the Ukrainian, Moldavian and Latvian Churches. For instance, when the 
Metropolitan Fitaret of Kiev wanted complete independence from Moscow, Aleksh H 
diluted this drive by installing pro-Moscow Metropolitan Volodyinii. ' 15 Reflecting this 
trend, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, which was founded by Father Gleb 
lakunin and Viktor Aksiuchits, has also been unable to bring the Russian Christian 
Democrats closer to the Christian Democrats in Europe. As Richard Sakwa observes, the 
Russian Christian Democrats are even unable to achieve the core goal of any political 
movement, namely organisational. survival! 16 
There is a tendency in Russia to draw Russian Orthodoxy and Islam closer to each other 
in order to minimise the influences of 'foreign religions and sects' in Russia. The law on 
the 'Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations', which was signed by El'tsin 
on 26 September 1997, granted top recognition to Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism 
and Buddhism as traditional confessions of Russia. This law discriminated against the 
confessions 'foreign to Russia'. This group included Catholics, Protestants, Baptists, 
Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Scientists and 
various new age beliefs. 117 
There are different, sometimes conflicting views about Islam among Russian nationalists, 
since Russia faces the unique position of close proximity to Muslim nations, and has a 
large Muslim minority! 18 It should be noted here that the knowledge (and practice) of 
Islamic rituals is very limited among Russia's Muslim minorities owing to the 
114 Vladimir Wozniuk, 'In Search of Ideology: The Politics of Religion and Nationalism in the New 
Russia', Nationalities Papers, vol. 25 no. 2,1997, p. 202. See also Jane Ellis, The Russian Orthodox 
Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness, London: Macmillan. 1996, pp. I 1- 12. 
115 John B. Dunlop, 'The Russian Orthodox Church as an Empire-Saving Institution', in The Politics of 
Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Michael Bourdeaux, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
1995, p. 28. 
116 For a deeper analysis of the Russian Christian Democrats, see Richard Sakwa, 'Christian 
Democracy and Civil Society in Russia', Religion, State and Society, vol. 22, no. 3,1994, pp. 273-303. 
117 'Federal'nyi zakon o svobode sovesti io religioznykh ob"edineniiakh', in Vo chto verit Rossiia: 
Religioznye protsessy v postperestroechnoi Rossii, ed. Aleksandr V. Shchipkov, St. Petersburg: Izd-vo 
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secularisation under the Soviet rule. Moreover, since there are no reliable official 
statistics on the confessional affiliation of Russia's population, the number of adherents 
of Islam in Russia is generally determined by adding together the numbers of traditionally 
Muslim ethnic groups. Naturally, being a member of such ethnic groups does not 
necessarily mean being a practising Muslim. 
The contrasts in the attitudes of Russian nationalists towards Islam are evident especially 
in the views of Aleksandr Prokhanov and Vladimir Zhirinovskii. Prokhanov argues that 
there is a need for an Orthodox-Islamic as well as a Slavic-Turkic alliance. For 
Prokhanov, 
The World Zionist circles are slowly but steadily pushing Moscow towards a 
violent confrontation with the Muslim world. Such a confrontation (the 
El'tsin-Grachev-Kozyrev scenario) will inevitably lead to the break-up of 
Russia. "9 
Unlike Aleksandr Prokhanov, Vladimir Zhirinovskii unequivocally places Islam beyond 
the pale of Russian civilisation and agrees to put up with Islam while striving for a 
divorce from it. Zhirinovskii also renounces Islam and highlights the possibility of using 
it in the name of Russia's interests. He recognises fundamentalism and Islam as natural 
for the other non-Orthodox peoples outside the Russian Federation with which Russians 
can have pragmatic dealings. Zhirinovskii makes this point as follows: 
Let there be Muslim regimes from Kabul to Tashkent... In Tashkent we 
should build more mosques, while the aircraft works should be evacuated to 
Russia. 120 
Zhirinovskii's views about Muslims have found some audience mainly in Moscow where 
nearly one million Muslims live. Among the worst treated of the Muslims in Moscow, the 
Chechens are especially prone to being rounded up for violating the propiska system 
(residence requirement) since 1993. In a poll by Moskovskii ko"Isomolets, on the views of 
the Russians in Moscow on minorities in January 1993,53 percent of Russians had 
viewed the Tatars positively, (behind Ukrainians and Jews) while II percent had 
expressed negative views (behind Ukrainians, Moldavians, Latvians and Jews) (See 
119 Zavtra, no. 49, December 1994. Cited in Malashenko, 'Russkii natsionalizm i Islam', p. 18. 
120 Ibid., p. 12. 
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Table A4.16). 12 'A similar trend was identified in another poll by VA10M in October 
1993. In this poll, more negative views were expressed towards Chechens, G psies, and Z71 Y 
Azerbaijanis. Tatars, Ukrainians and Russians, on the other hand, were positively 
conceived. The negative view of the Tatars rose to 13 percent behind the Ukrainians, 
while positive views increased to 71 percent behind the Ukrainians, with do not knows 
declining from 36 percent to 16 percent (See Table A4.17). 122 The hate against the 
Chechens reached its climax when the federal authorities blamed them for a series of 
bombings in Moscow in 1999. These evidence demonstrates that Russian views of the 
Muslims are not based on religious prejudices but on the strength of non-Russian ethnic 
nationalist movements. 
Nevertheless, Russia's federal authorities are increasingly worried by potential of 
Islamophobia, the perception of Islam as an aggressive sociocultural religious system, in 
setting the ethnic Russians and Muslim minorities against each other. 123 Such a 
development could destabilise the interethnic relations between Russians and Tatars. 
Thus, Sergei Panarin believes that, 
In general, Islamophobia that seerns to have been bom arnong ethnic Russians 
in the North Caucasus and Central Asia threatens to grow into a deeply 
entrenched feature of the Russian ethnos as a whole. 124 
Aleksei Malashenko agrees with Panarin in that Islamophobia could have a negative 
impact on Russia's stability. Malashenko believes that it is wholly unacceptable 'to 
succumb to various "phobias" merely because we often do not understand the nature of 
our differences'. "5 
In response to the treat of Islamophobia to the stability of interethnic relations in Russia, 
the federal leadership attempts to secure the loyalty of the Muslims through promoting a 
pro-Moscow version of Islamic identity. To this purpose, two political organisations, the 
Nur (Light) and the Russian Muslim Union, were formed in 1995. Fortner member of 
121 Moskovskii komsomolets, 12 January 1993. 
122 'Ierarkhiia emicheskikh stereotipov naseleniia', in Intertsentr VTsIOM Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nve 
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Zhifinovskii'. s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Akhmed Khalidov was one of 
the founders of the Russian Muslim Union and Akhmed Yakhin, an assistant to LDPR 
State Duma Deputy Aleksei Mitrofanov, was at the top of the Nur election slate for the 
1995 parliamentary elections. 126 Moscow's support to these organisations shows that 
imperial version of Russian nationalism could accommodate Muslims on the condition 
that Muslims refrain from politicising Islam to achieve ethnic mobilisation against 
Moscow. 
Tatar Nationalism, Tatar Jadidism and Westernisation 
Similar to Russian nationalists, who seem to be divided over the relations of Russians 
with non-Russian, mainly Muslim, minorities, Tatar nationalists appear to be divided into 
two factions over the ways of reviving Tatar culture. The radical faction of Tatar 
nationalists suppose that Tatar nationalism could develop through the politicisation of 
Islamic identity since this could polarise the Tatars and the Russians in Tatarstan against 
each other. On the other hand, the moderate faction of Tatar nationalists think that the 
support for Tatar nationalism could grow through the secularisation of Islamic identity 
since this could bring the Tatars closer to the Western culture, and emancipate the Tatars 
from the hegemony of Russian culture, in which Tatars developed their process of 
modernisation. until the present time. This division plays an important role in preventing a 
successful Tatar nationalism from consolidating itself, and emerging as a credible 
alternative to Shaimiev's regime. 
The significance of Islam increased gradually for radical Tatar nationatists since the early 
years of the post-Soviet period. Criticising Shaimiev's ideology of multinationalism for 
its inability to win national sovereignty for the Republic, Rashid Amirkhanov, one of the 
ideologues of radical Tatar nationalism, suggested that it could be useful to propagate a 
militant view of Islam for increasing the popularity of Tatar ethnic nationaliSM. 127 
Initially, Islam had been used to promote pan-Turkism. Rafael Mukhametdinov founded 
126 Dmitrii Mikulskii, 'Muslims and Their Organisations in Russia', Religion in Eastern Europe, vol. 16, 
no. 4,1996, pp. 23-29. 
127 Rashid M. Amirkhanov, 'Islam in Tatar National Ideology and Policy', in The Christian - Muslim 
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the Assembly of the Turkic Peoples in 1991. In its second congress in Kazan in 19-21 in 
April 199 1, the Assembly of the Turkic Peoples of the USSR called for greater 
democratisation, a revival of religion, and greater economic and cultural co-operation 
among Turkic societies. 128 
Radical Tatar ethnic nationalists also revitalised the idea of uniting the Turkic republics 
of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, which are separated from Kazakhstan by some 37 
kilometres of the Orenburg Oblast's territory, which is populated mainly by Tatars and 
Bashkirs, in a confederation called Idel-Ural. In fact, such a confederation is a very 
remote possibility. After all, if a confederation between Tatarstan and Bashkortostan were 
to take shape, the Bashkirs would become a minority under the Tatar rule, as there are 2 
million Russians, 1.2 million Tatars and 900,000 Bashkirs in Bashkortostan. 129 Being 
aware of this danger, the Bashkir leadership adopted a language law on 21 January 1998, 
which does not recognise Tatar as a state language along with Russian and Bashkir. 
Besides, the VTOTs was banned in Bashkortostan on 10 January 1999.130 
Having been disillusioned with the pan-Turkist projects, Radical Tatar ethnic nationalists 
focused more on politicising Islam to mobilise the Tatars against Moscow. For example, 
Ittifak (Alliance) Party and its youth organisation Azatlyk (Freedom) promote such a 
rr0itant understanding of Islam. 131 Ramai Yuldashev, the chairperson of Azatlyk says 
that, 
It was so beautiful to watch Chechen troops marching and chanting, 'La ilaha 
illallah! ' (There is no God but Allah). They have a mullah assigned to each 
unit of their army too! Their Islam is strong, which is why they are fighting so 
well. 
132 
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In the saine spirit, Fauzia Bairamova the leader of Ittifak, said that '[w]e've tried to stir 
up pan-Turkism as a unifying factor for all Turkic peoples of Russia, but this approach 
has failed. Now I realize only Islam may work. ' 133 
These radical Tatar ethnic nationalists have gradually increased their financial and 
doctrinal dependence on Middle Eastern sources. This dependence has led to a slight 
increase in the popularity of the Wahhabi movement which seeks to 'purify' Islam of the 
'alterations' that had occurred over time. 134 It is important to note that 'Wahhabism' is 
used in Russia often to describe any radical Islamic religious movement. 
The moderate Tatar nationalists believe that the Westernisation of Tatar culture could 
secure the survival of Tatar nationalism in the long term. Therefore, the secularisation of 
Islam and the revival of Tatar Jadidism, which is discussed in Chapter One, constitute the 
main pillars of moderate Tatar national revival in the post-Soviet period. Among the 
Tatar Muslim masses, the secular view of Islam, which is also known as Tatar Ja&dism, 
is more popular than radical Islarnic views. Apart from Tatarstan's leadership, the highly 
educated segments of the Tatars strongly oppose the Islam-based radical nationalism. The 
following views of Rafael Khakimov represent the mainstream view among the secular 
wing of Tatar nationalists: 
Tatar Islam, which is also known as Jadidism, is Eurolslam. It differs from the 
Islam practised in the Middle East. In addition, the Russian culture has lost its 
cultural and moral supremacy in Tatarstan. Therefore, we adopted the Latin 
alphabet to be nearer to the Western culture. "5 
Apart from secularism, Jadidism advocates also the westernisation of Tatar culture. That 
is why most of the secular Tatar intellectuals consider Eurasianism as 'a new ideological 
framework of Russian imperialism' that aims to keep Tatars under Russian rule. "' 
During my interview with Uli Schamiloglu in the United States, Schamiloglu criticised 
the view that the closeness of Russians and Tatars in Tatarstan establish some basis for 
133 Ibid. 
134 Galina M. Yemetianova, 'Islam and Nation Building in Tatarstan and Dagestan of the Russian 
Federation', Nationalities Papers, vol. 27, no. 4,1999, p. 622. 
135 My interview with Rafael S. Khakimov, Tatarstan's Chief Presidential Advisor on Political Affairs, 
Presidential Palace, Kazan, 2 June 1998. 
136 Damir M. Iskhakov, Problemy stanovleniia i transformatsii tatarskoi natsii, Kazan: Master Lain, 
1997, p. 148. See also Mirza 1. Makhmutov, 'Evraziiskii proekt - Vzgliad iz Tatarstana', Tatarstan, 
nos. 7-9,1995, pp. 3-13. 
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Eurasianisni. Schanifloglu argued that 'the Tatar understanding of Islam is very Z__ C1 
Europeanised. That is why Tatars seek to promote their process of westemisation without 
confronting the West in the name of Eurasianism or confronting Russia in the name of 
Islam'. 1 37 After all, there is no possibility for Tatars to exist without ties with the Russians 
and the neighbouring Finno-Ugric peoples of Udmurts, Maris and Mordvins in the 
Middle Volga. It must also be noted that 68 percent of all Tatars live in other parts of 
Russia outside Tatarstan. That is why Tatars and Russians need to establish a mutual 
understanding. 138 All these factors make the secularisation of Isla"c identity the most 
attractive mechanisms for reviving Tatar culture. 
Pragmatic Accommodation of Tatar Nationalism through Russian Federalism 
So far, it was shown that both Russian and Tatar nationalists have been divided over how 
to promote their national cultures. It was also demonstrated that neither civic nor ethnic 
versions of both Russian and Tatar nationalisms have developed fully in the post-Soviet 
era. Although the basis for civic nationalism is weak, there is no strong basis for ethnic 
nationalism in post-Soviet Russia either. However, some authors, such as Bruce Clarke, 
exaggerate the danger of Russian ethnic nationalism, especially after the Chechen war in 
1994.139 The analogy of Weimar Germany (1918-1933), where an unsuccessful attempt 
to secure democracy was followed by the rise of a fascist dictatorship, has been widely 
used by such scholars. Similarities can be enumerated as follows. First, many Germans 
were scattered over neighbouring countries. Second, the regime was dependent on 
financial support from Western powers. Lastly, the fascist opposition manipulated 
democratic mechanisms to gain political power. 140 However, there are very significant 
differences, which are ignored in such comparisons. To begin with, unlike Germany, 
Russia did not surrender in a major war. Moreover, Russia does not have elites who are 
unhappy with the government and worried about their survival. By contrast, the Russian 
elites and masses are deeply divided. Last but not least, the imperial character of Russian 
137 My interview with Uli Schamiloglu, Chairperson of the Department of Languages and Cultures of 
Asia, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA, 30 September 2000. 
138 Sergei Filatov, 'Tatarstan: at the Crossroads of Islam and Orthodoxy', Religion, State and Society, 
vol. 26, no. 3/4,1998, pp. 265-277. 
139 Bruce Clarke, An Empire's New Clothes: The End of Russia's Liberal Dream, London: Vintage, 
1995. 
140 Aleksandr L. lanov, Posle El'tsina: Veimarskaia Rossiia, Moscow: KRIK, 1995, pp. 34-48. 
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national identity and the serious undenuining of Russian institutions by the Soviet Union Z-1 
set Russia apart froin the Weirnar casc. 141 
The existence of pragmatic uses of Russian nationalism as a mechanism for political 
survival substantiates the fact that Russia is not likely to experience the fate of Weimer 
Gen-nany. To begin with, the El'tsin leadership refrained from promoting Russian 
nationalism systematically, since this could undermine the social cohesion in Russia 
further through provoking tensions not only between Russians and non-Russians, but also 
between pro-reform and anti-reform social forces. As Michael Urban argues, post-Soviet 
Russian leadership, unlike post-Soviet non-Russian leaders who held the Russians 
responsible for their underdevelopment, lacked such an image of 'the other' except for 
communism itself in order to achieve the social cohesion in Russia. However, the 
exclusion of the corrimunists from the public life necessitated the adoption of policies that 
are not compatible with El'tsin's 'liberal' policies. 142 Taking the advantage of this 
weakness of the El'tsin leadership, Russian communists have pragmatically appropriated 
the symbols of Russian national identity in order to secure social support for their 
policies. The manipulation of Russian nationalism by the communists even led Boris 
El'tsin to complain about the lack of a 'Russian Idea' in his speech on 12 July 1996: 
In Russia's history in the twentieth century, there have been various periods - 
monarchism, totalitarianism, perestroika, and finally, the democratic path of 
government. Each epoch had its own ideology. Now we do not have one. And 
that is bad'. 143 
At the local level, local politics plays an important role in the pragmatic politics of 
Russian national identity. For example, regions such as Novgorod link regional historical 
archetypes to the service of economic and political reforms. By systematically contrasting 
Novgorod's heritage as a medieval trade centre and the cradle of Russian democracy to 
Moscow's heritage of political and economic centralisation, Novgorod's local elites have 
141 Aleksei Kara-Murza, Mezhdu imperiei i smutoi, Moscow: IFRAN, 1996, p. 128. 
142 Michael Urban, 'The Politics of Identity in Russia's Post-Communist Transition: The Nation 
Against Itself', Slavic Review, vol. 53, no. 3,1994, p. 733. 
143 Mikhail Lantsman, 'Prezident poluchil doverennym litsarn naiti natsional'nuiu ideiu', Segodnia, 13 
July 1996. 
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defined reform as a return to the 'real' values of a more prosperous Russian traclition. '-" 
Novgorod Govemor Mikhail Prusak has argued that 
If we turn to our past, we will see that in Russian history Velikii Novgorod was 
a city that could unite democracy, a free market, and other achievements of 
national civilisation with Russian traditions ... 
In contrast to the strongly 
centralised model, which Muscovite Rus inherited from Kiev, adding 
absolutist tendencies to it, the Novgorod model is distinguished by great 
openness and democracy. "' 
The diversity of trends in Russian nationalism is also reflected in the opinion polls on 
Russian views of secessionist movements and the defining characteristics of Russianness. 
According to a poll conducted in 1992 by the Institute of Applied Politics, the Russian 
attitudes to secessionist movements in the Russian Federation differed from case to case. 
To the question of 'should the republics demanding independence be allowed to secedeT, 
the Russians responded that they could accept the independence of Chechnia more than 
the independence of Tatarstan. While 23 percent was in favour of unconditional 
independence of Tatarstan, 33 percent was in favour of conditional independence and 25 
percent was in favour of preventing the independence of Tatarstan, with 19 percent being 
undecided. While 33 percent was in favour of unconditional independence of Chechnia, 
32 percent was in favour of conditional independence and 16 percent was in favour of 
preventing the independence of Chechnia (See Table A4.15). 146 These figures show that 
the Russians are very keen on preventing the secession of the Tatars rather than the 
Chechens, whom they consider very alien to the Russian culture. In an opinion Pon 
conducted in February 1995 by Igor Kliamkin and Viktor Lapkin, it was observed that to 
love Russia and view it as a homeland was a key defining characteristic of Russianness 
for the majority of respondents (See Table A4.14). 147 
Although the dominance of pragmatism in Russian attitudes towards the question of 
national identity makes it easier for Shairniev's version of pragmatic nomenklatura 
nationalism to accommodate itself with Russian federalism, Putin's rise to Russia's 
Presidency in 2000 has narrowed Shaimiev's room for manoeuvre. Under El'tsin, 
144 Nicolai Petro, 'The Novgorod Region: A Russian Success Story', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 15, no. 3, 
1999, pp. 235-261. 
145 Mikhail Prusak, Rossiia na rubezhe - Strategiia vlasti, Novgorod, 1998, p. 1. 146 Cited in Matthew Wyman, Public Opinion in Post-Communist Russia, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1997, p. 170. 
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Tatarstan's leadership effectively blackmailed Moscow, claiming that if they lost their 
privileges, they would not be able to hold back a rising wave of ethnic and religious 
violence. When Putin came to power, he started a campaign against nationalist and 
religious extremism, first in Chechnia and then in Russia in general. Especially after the 
horrendous terrorist attacks in the United States on II September 2001, Putin sought to 
become the main guarantor of ethnic and religious peace in Russia. Under these changing 
circumstances, Shaimiev started to express his concerns about lslanwphobia in the 
Russian Federation, which could provoke a clash between Christians and Muslims. 
According to Shaimiev, the majority of Tatarstan's residents practise the most tolerant 
forms of Islam, which is also known as Jadidism. 148 He also pointed out that Tatarstan's 
law on 'Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations' is based on the secular 
principle of separating the state from religion and seeks to promote freedom of 
conscience and tolerance among religious associations. 149 Relying on these arguments, 
Shaimiev asks the federal government to give the Republic the opportunity to develop 
along its own path. This shows that Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership is able to adapt its 
politics of Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism pragmatically to the changing 
political conditions. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the experience of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation between 1992 and 
1999 demonstrates the difficulties of establishing a working democratic federalism in 
Russia where both the federal and regional leaders are mainly concerned with their self- 
interest rather than the principles of federalism. Moreover, Russia's post-Soviet crisis of 
centre-periphery relations prevents any kind of Russian and non-Russian national 
identity, be it civic or ethnic, from fully developing. In fact, post-Soviet Russia has held 
together, to a great measure, precisely because the federal institutions and ideologies, be it 
liberalism or nationalism, have been weak. This weakness convinced the regional leaders 
that it is beneficial for them to settle their differences with Moscow in return for 'special 
147 Igor A Kliamkin and Viktor V. Lapkin, 'Russkii vopros v Rossii', Politicheskie issledovaniia, 
vol. 6, no. 5,1995, p. 87. 
148 Julie A. Corwin, 'is "Islarnophobia" Spreading in the RegionsT, RFEJRL Russian Federation 
Report, vol. 3, no. 31,7 November 2001. 
149 Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan o svobode sovesti io religioznvkh organizatsiiakh, Kazan: Iman, 1999. 
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concessions'. However, the existence of conflicting rules and the lack of the criteria for 
dispute resolution between the centre and the regions challenge the viability of the 
Russian Federation. 
It could be argued that the El'tsin regime was mainly challenged by pragmatic regional 
elites especially in the rich regions rather than Russian and non-Russian separatist ethnic 
nationalist forces. These elites sought to increase their political autonomy and to defend 
their local economic interests from what they described as 'exploitation by the centre'. 150 
In reality, however, El'tsin's federal policies often involved nothing more than seeking to 
collect taxes from the rich regions in order to boost the image of his regime through 
redistributing some wealth to the poorer areas of the federation. 
In comparative terms, the Russian Federation differs significantly from democratic 
federations in the West. In fact, unlike democratic federations, Russian-style federalism, 
which is not wholly accountable to the masses, lacks a consistent, credible and financially 
sensible line of authority between the centre and the regions. In general, the centre- 
periphery relations in the Russian Federation are governed by political expediency. The 
inability of the federal authorities to check the power of wealthy clients and the regional 
elites has harmed the institutionalisation of democracy throughout Russia. El'tsin 
empowered regional elites through the Federation Council because he mainly sought to 
elicit support for the legitimacy of his policies in light of his precarious social support. A 
popular President, like Vladimir Putin, could reinforce some of the centralising 'federal' 
non-ris since such a leader may not need to make such concessions to increase his 
popularity. 
The weakness of the federal centre in the Russian Federation in general and the fragile 
nature of the arrangements between Moscow and Tatarstan in particular put the stability 
of intergovernmental relations between Moscow and Kazan and interethnic relations 
between Russians and Tatars in question. At the intergovernmental level, the differing 
views of Moscow and Kazan on federal reform could lead to legal and institutional 
tensions. Legally, Moscow seeks to bring all laws of Tatarstan into line with the Russian 
1 50 Cameron Ross, 'Federalism and Regional Politics', in Russia after the Cold War, eds. Mike Bowker 
and Cameron Ross, London: Longman, 1999, p. 85. 
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Constitution, which is highly anti-federalist in its approach towards the republics. 
Institutionally, the federal leadership under El'tsin has significantly succeeded in 
reducing the level of centre-pefiphery conflict by granting exceptional autonomy to 
Tatarstan. This served to condone the Tatafisation of the governing positions of 
Tatarstan. That is why Moscow's attempts at transforming Tatarstan into an ordinary 
subject of the Russian Federation could destabilise the intergovernmental relations by 
provoking the protests of the Tatar elites. From this point of view, intergovernmental 
relations between Tatarstan and Moscow look like a zero-sum game, in which gains of 
one side are perceived by the other side as something that threatens its vision of 
sustainable federal relationship. 
Concerning the stability of interethnic relations between Russians and Tatars, this chapter 
identified that pragmatic forms of Russian and non-Russian nationalisms rather than their 
civic or ethnic forms prevail in the Russian Federation. Moreover, the underdevelopment 
of Russia's civil society that might have led to ethnic competitive mobilisation, rather 
than the 'civic' leaderships of Tatarstan or Russia, has been the key to a relatively 
peaceful 'federalisation' of Russia. Concerning the pragmatic politics of nationalism in 
Tatarstan, religious polarisation is something that needs to be avoided for the stability of 
interethnic relations between Russians and Tatars. The secular conception of Islam, 
which is known as Tatar Jadidism or Euro-Islarn as some of my interviewees called it, 
could serve to improve the inter-confessional relations between Muslim and non-Muslim 
Tatars and other peoples in Tatarstan. 
In the concluding chapter, I will bring together the conclusions of each chapter to discuss 
the competing explanations of the politics of Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism in 
the post-Soviet era. 
272 
Conclusion 
This thesis intended to examine how Tatarstan's leadership has succeeded in 
maintaining political power and gaining economic wealth without provoking a 
backlash either from Moscow or from the local Russian population between 1992 and 
1999. The thesis also aimed to explore how stable the authority of Tatarstan's 
leadership is over the Republican population and the arrangements of Tatarstan's 
leadership are with Moscow. In particular, the aim was to examine the validity of the 
commonly held hypotheses that the type of nationalism promoted by Tatarstan's post- 
Soviet leadership could be characterised as a civic or an ethnic form of nationalism. 
Although both Russian and Tatar leaderships depicted themselves as civic nationalists 
and labelled their opponents as ethnic nationalists, the evidence provided in this 
research work demonstrates that during the period under examination, Tatarstan's 
post-Soviet leadership under Mintimer Shaimiev has promoted a Tatar version of 
pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism both within Tatarstan and in Tatarstan's 
relations with Moscow through employing ethnic and civic elements selectively to 
maximise its political power and economic wealth. This pragmatic nomenklatura 
nationalism asserts that granting national autonomy for the Tatars was the only 
formula for securing regional stability against ethnic nationalisms of the Tatars and 
the Russians in Tatarstan and the adverse regional effects of the federal policies. 
The present work clearly demonstrates that both civic and ethnic Tatar nationalism 
arguments are not warranted in the light of the evidence provided. This stems from the 
mistaken assessment of the cases of nationalism in Russia against an idealised view of 
4civic nationalism'. In the Russian context, generally, one ethnic group controls the 
state, but labels this as 'civic' nationalism that is confronted by ethnic nationalists., 
This view, however, discriminates against the marginalized versions of nationalism in 
Tatarstan and Russia, which may not necessarily be less democratic than the dominant 
version of nationalism. 
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It is remarkable that the version of Tatar nationalism promoted by Tatarstan's post- 
Soviet leadership succeeded in accommodating itself w1th Russian federalism, which 
has a long tradition of centralised authoritarian rule, and suppressed non-Russian 
nationalisms to maintain its territorial integrity. It is also puzzling that the sudden end 
of the Soviet empire, the subsequent political vacuum and weak institutional capacity 
have not resulted in the rise of Tatar or Russian ethnic nationalism in Tatarstan. The 
success of Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership in promoting its own version of 
pragnmitic nomenklaturct nationalism explains partly the relatively peaceful 
redefinition of the intergovernmental relations between Moscow and Tatarstan as well 
as the interethnic relations between the Tatars and the Russians in the Republic. This 
conclusion supports Dominic Lieven's following observation: 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia's path has led 
through impoverishment, uncertainty and bloodshed. By the standards of 
other collapsing empires, however, history thus far has been extremely 
kind. 2 
Thus, it could be argued that although Tatarstan's pragmatic nomenklatura 
nationalism has not contributed to the creation of a democratic and efficient state 
system both at the federal level and at the level of Tatarstan, it has not resulted in 
intergovernmental disorder or interethnic violence. Yet, the post-communist transition 
in Tatarstan, in specific, and in the Russian Federation, in general, encounter 
problems caused by Russia's Tsarist and Soviet authoritarian heritage and the specific 
transition strategies adopted by the elites in the post-Soviet era. 
The evidence provided in Chapter One shows that the historical formation of the Tatar 
elites has considerably influenced the post-Soviet leadership of Tatarstan. The Tatar 
elites originated from the ruling elites of the Bulgar State, the Golden Horde and the 
Kazan Khanate. Ivan IV's capture of the Kazan Khanate on 15 October 1552 marked 
the loss of Tatar statehood tradition. From this point onwards, Moscow tried to gain 
the allegiance of the Tatar nobility through granting privileges to compliant Tatar 
elites and through purging the non-compliant ones. Chapter One discerned that when 
' Rogers Brubaker, 'Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism', in The State of the 
Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, ed. John Hall, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, pp. 298-30 1. 
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Moscow was strong, the co-opted Tatar elites were submissive and when Moscow was 
weak, they sought to enlarge their autonomy. Their method of reviving Tatar culture 
has been one of demanding institutional reform rather than independence. In fact, the 
reformist atmosphere under Catherine 11 and in the aftermath of the 1905 revolution 
led to calls for equal treatment for the Tatars, rather than to a fully-fledged 
independence- minded Tatar nationalist movement. 
During the Soviet period, the Bolsheviks instituted an imperial rule over the Tatars 
through creating the TASSR within the RSFSR. Apart from subordinating the 
Republic to the Russian centre in Moscow, the Soviet centre in Moscow established 
its control over the TASSR through the CPSU's party discipline. In order to enlarge 
their scope of autonomy from Moscow, the Tatar elites adopted 'national 
communism', which refers to a national route towards the construction of 
communism. Under the Soviet rule, 'national communism' was seen as the only way 
to ensure popular participation. Nevertheless, Moscow succeeded in controlling Tatar 
national communism through purges during the 1930s and through the clientalistic 
co-optation of Tatariia's leaders during the 1970s. The main flaw in the strategies of 
Tatar national communists lay in the fact that their success required the survival of the 
USSR, albeit in a reformed form. Therefore, the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
eliminated the remaining possibilities, if any, for the success of this strategy. 
The analysis in Chapter Two demonstrated that Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership 
succeeded in achieving its political survival through eliminating the room left for 
democratic change in Tatarstan. In the post-Soviet period, Tatarstan's leadership 
faced uncertain political conditions emanating from Moscow's policies of post-Soviet 
'transition' and the activism of local nationalist movements. In this context, 
Tatarstan's pragmatic nomenklatura nationalist elites viewed nationality, which was 
the simplest form of identity that had been preserved in totalitarian Soviet society, as 
an 'instrument' for acquiring and keeping political power. Tatarstan's leadership has 
largely succeeded in getting rid of its opponents both in Moscow and in Tatarstan 
through turning the discontent of the people toward the sources of regional instability, 
2 Dominic Lieven, 'The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities', Journal of 
Contemporary History, vol. 30, no. 4,1995, pp. 628-629. 
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with which Tatarstan's leadership identified their opponents. Their strategy involved 
the manipulation of interethnic conflicts in Tatarstan in such a way that only they 
could guarantee interethnic compromise and regional stability. 
Contrary to the claims concerning the nature of Shaimiev's version of Tatar 
nationalism, the evidence provided in Chapter Two fails to support the arguments that 
Tatarstan's leadership promoted a civic or ethnic form of Tatar nationalism. 
Shaimiev's idea of Tatar nationalism is not civic because, in his conception, 
nationality is not identical to citizenship. A civic type of nationalism is not likely to 
develop in Tatarstan since Shaimiev's version of Tatar nationalism does not appeal to 
and serve the interests of wide sectors of the population and the emerging influential 
groups in Tatarstan. Shaimiev's type of Tatar nationalism, which serves the interests 
of the Republican leadership intent on preserving its status, cannot be considered as a 
version of Tatar ethnic nationalism, since it does not justify itself through the 
exclusive claims of the Tatar nation bound together by common culture and history. It 
justifies itself through a discourse of multinationalism in a manner that is very similar 
to the Soviet-era discourse of the 'friendship of nations' (druzhba narodov). In fact, 
Shaimiev's clientelistic policy of co-opting moderate politicians in the Republic has 
weakened both the Tatar and Russian ethnic nationalist movements considerably due 
to its divisive effects on these movements. 
Chapter Two demonstrated that Shaimiev's pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism 
conforms to John Breuilly's definition of nationalism in that it represents a political 
movement seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with the 
following assumptions: First, there exists a Tatar nation with an explicit and peculiar 
character. Second, the interests and values of the Tatar nation take priority over all 
other interests and values; otherwise regional stability might be endangered. Finally, 
the Tatar nation must be as independent as possible, which involved, in Shaimiev's 
case, the attainment of political sovereignty. 
Having characterised Shaimiev's discourse as a form of nationalism, it should be 
noted that the Tatar members of Tatarstan's post-Soviet leadership have been 
nationalists of convenience rather than of conviction. They pragmatically combined 
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the civic and ethnic types of nationalism in order to promote their own specific elite 
interests. Through playing the nationalists of different types against each other, 
Tatarstan's leadership claimed that it is only their version of nationalism that could 
ensure the stability of Tatarstan in the face of the destabilising forms of nationalism. 
As a former communist politician, Mintimer Shaimiev utilised his considerable 
manoeuvring skills to accommodate and pacify the nationalist forces in Tatarstan. 
Chapter Two explored Shaimiev's nation-building policies through examining ethnic 
privileges in legal documents and nation-building policies in the fields of language, 
education, science, mass media and religion. Tatarstan's language policies expanded 
the job opportunities for Tatar-language teachers, and increased the proportion of 
Tatars within the intelligentsia in Tatarstan. Moreover, the constitution required the 
President of Tatarstan to know both Tatar and Russian, virtually ensuring that only 
Tatars would hold that office in the foreseeable future (article 108). As a consequence 
of these nation-building policies, Tatarstan's leadership became much more Tatar- 
dominated than it had ever been. It was also clearly shown in Chapter Two that Tatars 
are over-represented in legislative and executive bodies of Tatarstan. 
Another conclusion that is supported by this research is that Shaimiev's politics of 
Tatar nationalism has led to widespread corruption and nepotism in Tatarstan. 
Shaimiev has filled the strategic positions in the Republic with people who are loyal 
to himself personally. In this atmosphere, Shaimiev's elose friends succeeded in 
controlling Tatarstan's post-Soviet wealth. The evidence presented in Chapter Two 
demonstrates that there has been a systematic process of Tatarisation of Tatarstan's 
political, economic and cultural elites in the post-Soviet era. Shaimiev paid a special 
attention to getting the Republican oil industry under his control. Although it is very 
difficult to produce a convincing evidence of personal corruption involving Shaimiev 
due to the closed nature of Shaimiev's own business relations, the fact that his two 
sons Airat and Radik Shaimiev have become very rich because of their positions in 
the oil industry shows that at least some members of his family benefit from the 
political influence of Mintimer Shaimiev in the Republic. Besides, just like the other 
parts of the Russian Federation, there has not yet been a systematic drive of the 
Republican leadership to root out corruption in Tatarstan. 
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It is also concluded that due to the weakness of democratic institutions in Tatarstan, 
the masses in the Republic do not play an active political role other than voting in 
elections. The absence of any Russian backlash to the massive process of Tatafisation 
in post-Soviet Tatarstan can be explained by looking at the patronage networks and 
elections without choices in the Republic. These two factors Prevented Moscow and 
the local opposition groups in Tatarstan from producing a viable alternative to 
Shaimiev's regime. Empowered by the electoral system, Tatarstan's leadership has 
generally been able to fix elections in accordance with its own calculations. In fact, 
the election of candidates outside Shaimiev's patronage networks is very unlikely. 
Consequently, Shairniev emerges as a politician who rule with a 'strong hand' in order 
to maintain social peace and order. Politics of nationalism similar to those in 
Tatarstan could be observed also in the non-Russian republics of Bashkortostan and 
Chuvashiia and the independent state of Kazakhstan. 
The thesis has identified that the ability of the post-Soviet leadership of Tatarstan to 
promote its pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism depends on the weaknesses of the 
federal centre in Moscow and the capacity of Tatarstan's leadership to keep ethnic 
nationalist movements in Tatarstan under its control. The existence of these two 
conditions have largely enabled Tatarstan's leadership to get what it wanted in the 
post-Soviet era. In order to illuminate the bases of Shaimiev's pragmatic politics of 
Tatar nationalism, Chapter Three explored the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
Moscow vis-A-vis Tatarstan, and Chapter Four examined the level of social support 
for the ethnic nationalist forces in Tatarstan. 
The evidence provided in Chapter Three indicates that Tatarstan's leadership has used 
Tatar nationalism pragmatically in its relations with Moscow. Tatarstan, which 
claimed its own state sovereignty in 1990 and refused to sign the Federation Treaty of 
1992, challenged the authority of Moscow over Tatarstan by adopting its own 
constitution in 1992 as the basis of legislation. Furthermore, according to the results 
of the referendum on the status of Tatarstan, which took place on 21 March 1992, 
61.4 percent of the voters approved that Tatarstan is a 'sovereign state, the subject of 
international law, forming its relations with the Russian Federation, other Republics 
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3 
and states on the basis of equal agreements' . However, 
despite these achievements, 
Tatarstan's leadership became worried about the increasingly nationalistic climate of 
Russian politics after the 1993 Russian constitutional referendum and parliamentary 
elections, because the rise of Russian nationalism could have jeopardised the entire 
prospect for a power-sharing treaty with Moscow granting privileges to Tatarstan's 
leadership. Therefore, Shaimiev found it necessary to make concessions to Moscow. 
After all, the Tatar ethnic nationalist movement had already lost its popularity, and 
Tatarstan's economy was in a deep crisis. 
This explains why the Power-Sharing Treaty between Moscow and Tatarstan in 
February 1994 produced mixed results for Tatarstan's leadership. In this treaty, 
Tatarstan was not referred to as 'sovereign', but rather as 'a state united with the 
Russian Federation'. Moreover, the treaty, which guarantees 'the preservation of the 
territorial integrity of Russia', declined to recognise Tatarstan as a 'subject' of 
international law. Accordingly, Tatarstan could not conclude treaties with foreign 
states, but only agreements with the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Although Tatarstan is to have its own citizenship, questions of citizenship are to be 
regulated jointly with Moscow. Certain provisions of the treaty and agreements 
preserve an appearance of sovereignty, but with little substantive content. For 
instance, Tatarstan's customs service is considered as a branch of the Russian 
customs service, and quotas for Tatarstan's oil exports are similarly set by the 
Ministry of Fuel and Energy in Moscow. One area in which Tatarstan received a good 
deal was that of property and finances. According to the Treaty, Tatarstan gained the 
right to levy and collect its own taxes and to keep the proceeds of excise duties on oil, 
gas and liquor. With the exception of military enterprises and railroads, Tatarstan 
became the owner of all productive assets and natural resources on its own territory. 
This enabled Tatarstan to carry out privatisation in its own way to the benefit of the 
Republican leadership, and to keep out the Russian oligarchs. 
It was also concluded in Chapter Three that Moscow's treaties with various non 
Russian and Russian regions such as Bashkortostan, Sakha. and Sverdlovsk, just like 
the treaty with Tatarstan, granted special concessions to them in return for their 
3 Moscow News, 25 March 1992. 
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mobilisation of local support for El'tsin. On the other hand, Moscow's Treaty with 
Tatarstan differs significantly from its treaties with these regions in the level of its 
self-goveminent. 
The evidence provided in Chapter Three shows that Tatarstan's pragmatic position 
was dictated mainly by the fact that Tatarstan's economy depends on the existence of 
close ties both with Russia and with nearly all the other states of the former Soviet 
Union. Tatarstan's rich oil reserves and industrial base make the Republic 
economically powerful. The fact that Tatarstan is situated at the crossroads of Russian 
communications also attaches economic and political importance to the Republic. At 
the same time, apart from the enclave position of Tatarstan, the existence of a Tatar 
diaspora in the post-Soviet states and mainly in the Russian Federation (68 percent of 
the Tatars) necessitates a pragmatic orientation towards the Russian Federation. 
In the post-Treaty period, Tatarstan's strategy in its relations with Moscow relied on 
giving political support to El'tsin in return for gaining greater autonomy since 
Tatarstan's leadership has a considerable influence over the Republican electorate. In 
addition, Shaimiev's pragmatic nomenklatitra nationalism benefited from El'tsin's 
chronic poor health and the frequent government reshuffles in Moscow. Russia's post- 
Soviet economic problems also made it difficult for the Kremlin to define and enforce 
a coherent policy toward Tatarstan. In this context, the informal and personal relations 
between El'tsin and Shaimiev have influenced Tatarstan's relations with Moscow 
considerably. 
In order to describe how the people in Tatarstan are responding to Shaimiev's politics 
of Tatar nationalism, Chapter Four focused on the society and culture in Tatarstan. 
The Chapter discerned that Tatar nationalist movements developed along a very 
different path than that taken by the aggressive nationalist movements in the former 
Soviet republics, except for the ones in Belarus and the Central Asian republics. 
Similarly, the passivity of the ethnic Russians in Tatarstan could be compared to the 
similar attitudes of the Russian Diaspora in the post-Soviet states. Both Tatar and 
Russian ethnic nationalists lack the following factors which are vital for the success of 
any social movement: First, an effective organisation that links leadership with the 
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masses; second, adequate human and financial resources, third, a common interest 
defined through a discourse of nationalism; and last, the existence of a political 
opportunity, such as the crisis of the federal state, which could be used to mobilize 
support and to build coalition with other movements. 
The analysis in Chapter Four demonstrates that it was the success of Tatar elites in 
addressing problems in the areas of language, education and culture that deprived 
ethnic nationalists of the cultural resources necessary for mobilising the masses 
around nationalist objectives. This shows the divisive impacts of the nation-building 
policies of Tatarstan's leadership on Tatar ethnic nationalists. Moreover, the internal 
divisions within the Tatar ethnic nationalist movement played an important role in 
their post-Soviet weakness. Both Ittifak and VTOTs represented the main rival groups 
in the Tatar ethnic nationalist movement. Their struggle for the leadership of Tatar 
nationalism diluted the movement, while creating further internal divisions within 
their own organisations. The moderate wing, represented by the VTOTs, focuses on 
the conditions of a broad-based political consensus among various Tatar nationalists, 
whereas the radical wing represented by the Ittifak party employs the rhetoric of 
Islamic fundamentalism. 
Chapter Four's argument that there is a weak social support for ethnic nationalism in 
Tatarstan was warranted by several opinion polls. For example, according to the 
sociological survey of the Institute of Ethnography and Anthropology of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, there was a very low level of support for ethnic nationalism in 
1993. According to the results of this survey, 52 percent of the Tatars advocated only 
a Tatarstani identity, 34 percent claimed to have both Tatarstani and Russian 
identities, and 3 percent had only Russian identity with a further II percent who 
declined to answer. In contrast to the Tatars, 15 percent of the Russians claimed only 
a Tatarstani identity, 49 percent had both Tatarstani and Russian identities, and 28 
percent only felt Russian with a further 8 percent who preferred not to answer this 
4 question. 
4 Valerii A. Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind 
Aflame, London: Sage, 1997, p. 262. 
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In Chapter Four, it was shown that there is a limited potential for the mobilisation of 
ethnic differences in Tatarstan given the absence of institutions that could channel 
ethnic differences into a nationalist movement. In this sense, the factors impeding the 
growth of Tatar ethnic nationalism include the self/other perceptions of the Tatars and 
the Russians, the popularity of religious tolerance, bilingualism, mixed marriages and 
cosmopolitan urban culture. Moreover, the weaknesses of the market economy and 
civil society deprive the Tatar and the Russian ethnic nationalists of the instruments 
for mobilising the masses in Tatarstan. Yet, Tatarstan's society and culture 
demonstrate unique characteristics, since the presence of these same factors did not 
prevent ethnic struggles elsewhere in the post-Communist space. For example, high 
rates of intermarriage did not keep the Croats, Serbs and Bosnians from fighting a 
brutal interethnic war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Relying on the findings of the previous chapters, the analysis in Chapter Five 
demonstrates that the 'Tatarstan model' of Russian federalism signifies neither the 
formation of democratic federalism in Russia by the 'civic' leadership of Tatarstan 
nor the obstruction of a 'civic' Russian national identity by the 'ethnic nationalist' 
leadership of Tatarstan. Instead, this model constitutes a pragmatic solution to 
Russia's post-Soviet crisis of centre-periphery relations, which prevented any kind of 
Russian and non-Russian national identity, be it civic or ethnic, from fully 
developing. Indeed, the 'Tatarstan model' of Russian federalism is an example of the 
post-Soviet politics of survival in Russia, which is based on a formal constitutional 
order in which rent-seeking federal and local leaders hold real power on the ground. 
Although the federal leadership has been too weak to enforce federal laws and collect 
federal taxes in the regions, it was able to gain the support of regional leaders with a 
capacity to mobilise their local masses for fixing elections peacefully in return for 
asymmetrical concessions to these leaders. 
In this sense, the politics of Tatar nationalism and Russian federalism reflect the 
weakness of post-Soviet Russian federalism, and could explain what went wrong in 
the implementation of democratic federalism in Russia. As Damir Iskhakov, an 
ethnologist in Tatarstan's Institute of History, argues, the pragmatic nature of this 
model creates both advantages and disadvantages for the Tatar ethnic nationalists. The 
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'Tatarstan model' enhances the existing imperial relationship between Moscow and 
the Tatars through broadening the autonomy of Tatarstan. Nevertheless, this model 
cannot satisfy the Tatar ethnic nationalists since the state organs of Tatarstan and the 
Russian Federation created it. Because of its elite-centric focus, the model ignored the 
promotion of civil society in Tatarstan, which is essential for the development of Tatar 
5 ethnic nationalism . Although Tatarstan's nomenklatura 
leadership benefited from its 
stabilising role against the 'threat' of ethnic nationalism in the short term, Moscow's 
construction of a highly statist, non-competitive and non-transparent federal system 
modelled on the power-sharing treaty with Tatarstan works against Tatarstan's long- 
term interests since it limits the Republic's manoeuvring space vis-4-vis Moscow. 
Chapter Five also concluded that unlike the United States, Canada, Germany, Spain 
and Belgium, the Russian Federation cannot be considered a fully democratic 
federation in comparative terms since only a democratic system can build a relatively 
stable federal system. In fact, only constitutional democracies can provide credible 
guarantees and the institutionally embedded mechanisms that help ensure that the 
law-making prerogatives of the sub-units will be respected. Although Moscow 
tolerates the regional diversity and the regional asymmetries of socio-economic 
development and of legal status, the Russian Federation's reluctance to give a stable 
legal recognition to these asymmetries makes it less democratic. Moreover, in less 
democratic federations, such as the Russian Federation, the centre and the regions 
share all powers, whereas in democratic federations, some powers are reserved either 
to the centre or to the regions. 
The analysis in Chapter Five shows that Russian federal practices are not governed 
only by formal rules, but more importantly also by informal rules. The precedence of 
the rule by men over the rule by law hinders the development of democratic 
federalism in Russia where federal policies are shaped mainly by the executive 
branches of the federal centre and the regions. The poor level coordination with other 
institutions of the state undermines the effectiveness of these federal policies. 
Consequently, the outcome of federal relations in Russia depends on personal 
5 Darnir A Iskhakov, 'Model' Tatarstana: Za i protiV, in Tatarskaia natsiia: Proshloe, nastoiashche, 
budushchee, ed. Rafael S. Khakirnov, Kazan: II ANT, 1997, pp. I 1- 15. 
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negotiations between regional leaders and the President. In such a context, it is highly 
difficult to institute the separation of powers between the president and the 
parliament, a party system, the rule of law and a civil society that are the traditional 
components of democratic federalism. 
Russian federalism under the El'tsin regime could be characterised by asymmetrical 
federalism, which reflects Russia's ethnic heterogeneity and 'historical compromises' 
with its minorities. Thus, the asymmetrical nature of the Russian Federation serves to 
strengthen Russia's territorial integrity. This, however, does not mean that 
asymmetrical federalism has not caused problems for the development of democratic 
federalism in Russia. In fact, Russia's post-Soviet experience has been highly 
anarchic as both the federal and regional elites sought to enrich themselves without 
being accountable to the masses. One could even make a historical analogy between 
Tatarstan's experience in the Russian Federation and the feudal system. However, 
unlike feudalism, a formal system of contractual legal relations and mutual obligations 
backed by religion and culture is missing in Russia .6 Thus, it can be said that post- 
Soviet federal problems are not restorations of familiar Tsarist patterns but rather 
direct responses to the new initiatives produced by post-Soviet conditions. In this 
sense, the politics of Russian federalism is profoundly anti -institutional since a 
tightly-knit group of individuals continue to mould and remould the institutional 
design according to their will. 
The institutional problems of Russian federalism seem to be produced by the 
decisions of self-serving federal and regional leaders in a context characterised by a 
high level of uncertainty. Russia's asymmetrical federal system has created a path to 
power for the regional leaders that does not require the mobilization of local ethnic 
nationalism. Besides, the federal centre's concessions to individual regional leaders 
have undermined the legitimacy of federal law and the federal constitution, weakened 
the protection of civil rights and undercut any potential economic benefits that 
federalism might be expected to deliver. Even more significantly, the desire to defend 
6 Vladimir Shlapentokh, 'Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia', Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 48 no. 3,1996, pp. 394-397. 
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these asymmetrical deals has contributed to the development of national institutions 
like the parliament, electoral system and treasury in the regions. 
The final conclusion of Chapter Five is that Russian federalism is unstable due to the 
fragile nature of the i ntergovern mental and interethnic relations in the Russian 
Federation. Given the shaky nature of the federal arrangements between Moscow and 
Tatarstan, the stability of i ntergovern mental relations could easily be endangered by 
the diverging views of Moscow and Kazan on federal reforms. While Moscow's 
proposals for federal reform seek to strengthen the centripetal dynamics, Tatarstan's 
proposals of federal reform tend to promote centrifugal dynamics in the Russian 
Federation. In this respect, the stability of the Russian Federation depends not on how 
much power the centre holds vis-A-vis the regions, but on its ability to live with 
regional diversity and to nurture a necessarily slow, ground-up evolution of formal 
and informal institutions that mediate centre-periphery grievances and disputes. 
Vladimir Putin's centralising federal reforms that were adopted in 2000 could have a 
destabilising impact on the development of Russian federalism as well as the relations 
between Moscow and Tatarstan. In creating a 'stronger Russian state', Putin 
undermines the Russian-Tatarstan accommodation achieved under El'tsin because the 
stability of Tatarstan's relations with Moscow requires the continuity of Tatarstan's 
special privileges. From this point of view, the strengthening of the Russian state 
under Putin has been accompanied by a weakening of Russian federalism, since the 
state that is to be strengthened does not seem to be in the service of regional interests, 
including those of Tatarstan's leadership. It should be noted that Moscow has not yet 
displayed a capacity to dictate its will fully over the regions. This shows that there are 
several interesting topics for the researchers of Tatar nationalism and Russian 
federalism under Putin. The researchers could explore the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the Shaimiev regime and Tatar nationalism in coping with Putin's 
centralising federal reforms. 
In this context, the stability of interethnic relations constitutes a key concern of the 
Russian federal leadership since Russian federalism has institutionalised nationalism 
through its ethno-federal structure. Thus, the main challenge facing the Russian 
285 
Federation in regulating interethnic relations steins from the necessity of impeding the 
growth of Russian as well as non-Russian ethnic nationalist movements. In this 
respect, it should be stated that despite the existence of ethnic nationalists, there is a 
strong basis for interethnic peace in Tatarstan, which is ensured by the reformist 
understanding of Islam among the Tatars, Jadidism. Thanks mainly to this secular 
conception of Islam, there has not been any serious religious conflict between the 
Tatars and the Russians in the post-Soviet period. This argument conveys a very 
important message against religious fanaticism, which has become a very dangerous 
threat to international stability as well as to the stability of Russia's interethnic 
relations especially after the horrendous terrorist acts in the United States on II 
September 2001. To the dismay of the radical fundamentalist groups, the popularity of 
Jadidism in Tatarstan show that cultural and religious differences may not necessafily 
lead to fanaticism, but to a multicultural world if the religious identities undergo a 
serious process of secularisation. 
The analysis developed in this thesis helps us combine what have been relatively 
segmented stories about the politics of post-Soviet nationalism. Instead of trying to 
label the existing forms of post-Soviet nationalism as 'civic' or 'ethnic', it is more 
fruitful to focus on the pragmatic 'uses' of these nationalisms, which produce novel 
consequences for the organisation of political landscape in post-Soviet space. 
Moreover, this study carries a cautionary note for the students of post-communist 
federalism in demonstrating how post-Soviet Russian federalism differs from the 
Western notions of democratic federalism. In fact, the empirical reality shows that the 
federal and regional politicians in Russia have been guided mainly by pragmatism 
rather than democratic principles. The overall conclusion of this thesis can be drawn 
that Tatarstan's leadership has managed to accommodate its version of Tatar 
pragmatic nomenklatura nationalism with post-Soviet Russian federalism. 
Nevertheless, it should be added that Shaimiev's pragmatic policies resulted in the 
growth of Tatar nationalism at the intergovernmental level, if not at the interethnic 
level, even though this was not the intended outcome. 
286 
Bibliography 
Note on Sources 
The sources used in this thesis are categorised into primary and secondary sources. 
The primary sources include the following sub-categories: documents; census and 
election results, opinion polls and reports; memoirs, testaments and newspaper 
articles; newspapers consulted and interviews with participants. My interviews with 
specialists are listed at the end of the section for secondary sources. 
Primary Sources 
Documents 
Belaia kniga Tatarstana. Put' k suverenitetu 1990-1995 (Sbornik dokumentov), ed. 
Rafael S. Khakimov, Kazan: 11 ANT, 1995. 
Boten Dunia Tatar Kongressy. Berenche chakyrylysh, Kazan: Tatar Ministr Kabinety, 
1992. 
'Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the RSFSR', in Perestroika in the Soviet 
Republics: Documents on the National Question, eds. Charles F. Furtado, Jr. 
and Andrea Chandler, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992, pp. 325-326. 
'Deklaratsiia o gosudarstvennorn suverenitete TSSR', in Belaia kniga Tatarstana. 
Put' k suverenitetu 1990-1995 (Sbornik dokumentov), ed. Rafael S. 
Khakirnov, Kazan: H ANT, 1995, p. 5. 
'Dogovor o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniia i polnornochii mezhdu organarni 
gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organarni gosudarstvennoi vlasti 
Respubliki Sakha (lakutiia)', in Federalizin vlasti i vlast'jederalizina, eds. 
Aleksandr N. Arinin and Mikhail N. Guboglo, Moscow: Inteltekh, 1997, 
pp. 270-276. 
'Dogovor o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniia i polnornochii mezhdu organarni 
gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organarni gosudarstvennoi vlasti 
287 
Sverdlovskoi oblasti', in Federalizni vlasti i vIast'ftderajj, 7. nui, eds. Aleksandr 
N. Arinin and Mikhail N. Guboglo, Moscow: Inteltekh, 1997, pp. 313-319. 
'Dogovor Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Respubliki Bashkortostan o razgranichenii 
predmetov vedeniia i vzairnnorn delegirovanii polnomochii mezhdu organalill 
gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennol vlasti 
Respubliki Bashkortostan', in Federalizin Wash i vlast' federalizitui, eds. 
Aleksandr N. Afinin and Mikhail N. Guboglo, Moscow: Inteltekh, 1997, 
pp. 259-264. 
'Dogovor Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Respubliki Tatarstan o razgranichenii predmetov 
vedeniia i vzaimnom delegirovanii polnomochii mezhdu organami 
gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti 
Respubliki Tatarstana', in Betaia kniga Tatarstana. Pitt' k suverenitetit 1990- 
1995 (Sbomik dokumentov), ed. Rafael S. Khakirnov, Kazan: 11 ANT, 1995, 
pp. 86-92. 
'Federal'nyi zakon o svobode sovesti io religioznykh ob"edineniiakh', in Vo chto 
verit Rossiia: Religioznye protsessy v postperestroechnoi Rossh, ed. 
Aleksandr V. Shchipkov, St. Petersburg: Izd-vo RkhGI, 1998, pp. 277-296. 
'Federativnyi Dogovor', Etnopoliticheskii Vestnik Rossii, no. 1,1992, pp. 17-32. 
Gosudarstvennaia simbolika Respubliki Tattirstan, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1997. 
Konstitittsiia Respubliki Bashkortostana, Ufa: Bashkortostan, 1995. 
Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstana, Almaty, Zheti Zharghy, 1996. 
'Konstitutsiia Respubliki Tatarstana', Sovetskaia Tatarfia, 12 December, 1992, pp. 1- 
16. 
Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: luridicheskaia literatura, 1993. 
'Kontseptsiia gosudarstvennoi natsional'noi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii', 
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 10 July 1996. 
'Kontseptsiia razvitiia tatarskogo obrazovaniia', Panorama, no. 8,1991, pp. 15-30. 
Materialy S"ezda Narodov Tatarstana, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1992. 
'Mezhpravitel'stvennye soglasheniia Respubliki Tatarstana s Turetskoi Respublikoi', 
Panorama -Forum, vol. 4, no. 1 1996, pp. 152-153. 
'Narodnogo Fronta TASSR v podderzhki perestroiki', Vecherniaia Kazan, 30 
November 1988. 
Obrazovanie Tatarskoi ASSR: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 
1963. 
Osnovnye zakony i polozheniia po privatizatsii v Respublike Tatarstan, Kazan: 
Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Tatarstan, 1994. 
288 
'Otkrytoe pis'mo deiatelei nauki i kul'tury Tatarstana Prezidentu M. Shaillilevu', 
Kris, 17 May 1996. 
'Politicheskaia deklaratsiia levoi i pravoi oppozitsii', Sovetskaia Rossiia, 22 
September 1992. 
Politicheskie parth sovremennoi Rossii i natsional'nyi vopros (Sbomik dokumentov), 
eds. V. A. Babintsev and A. F. Berdnikov, Moscow: Klub 'Realisty', 1996. 
'Proekt dogovora o vzaimnom delegirovanii (peredache) predmetov vedeniia i 
polnornochii gosudarstvennoi vlasti' in Belaia kniga Tatarstana. Put' k 
suverenitetu 1990-1995 (Sbomik dokumentov), ed. Rafael S. Khakimov, 
Kazan: 11 ANT, 1995, pp. 43-49. 
'Programma Respublikanskoi Partii Edinstvo i Progress', Izvestiia Tatarstana 15 
December 1993. 
'Programma Tatarskoi Partii Natsional'noi Nezavisimosti (TPNN) Ittifak', Panorama, 
vol. 2, no. 6,199 1, pp. 15-25. 
'Programma zashchity realizatsii gosudarstvennogo suvereniteta Tatarstana', 
Panorama, no. 5,1991, pp. 9-18. 
Sbornik dogovorov i soglashenii mezhdu organami gosudarst-vennoi vlasti sub'ektov 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniia i polnomochii, 
Moscow: lzdanie Gosudarstvennoi Durny, 1997. 
Tatar Kanunu - Kanunnama, Kazan: Tatar Khalkynyn Milli Medzhlisi, 1996. 
'Tezisy k podgotovke platformy Tatarskogo obshchestvennogo tsentra', Central Asian 
and Caucasian Chronicle, vol. 8, no. 2,1989, pp. 5-9. 
'Zakon o iazykakh Respubliki Chuvashiia', Sovetskaia Chuvashiia, 27 October 1990. 
Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan o iazykakh narodov Respubliki Tatarstan. 
Gosudarstvennaia programma Respubliki Tatarstan po sokhraneniiu, 
izucheniiu i razvitiiu iazykov narodov Respubliki Tatarstan, Kazan: Izd-vo 
Gosudarstvennyi Sovet Respubliki Tatarstan, 1996. 
Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan o svobode sovesti io religioznykh organ izatsiiakh, 
Kazan: hnan, 1999. 
Census and Election Results, Opinion Polls and Reports 
Chislennost' i sostav naseleniia SSSR: Po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 
1979 goda, Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1984. 
Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia SSSR: Po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 
goda, Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 199 1. 
289 
etnicheskikh stereotipov naseleniia', in Intertsentr VTSIOM 
Ek-onoinicheskie i sotsial'nye perenteny, no. 1,1994, pp. 17-19. 
Parlamentskie vybory v Rossii, Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1996. 
The US Commission on CSCE, Report on the Tatar Rejýrendwn on Sovereignty, 14 
April 1992, Washington, DC, 1992. 
Vybory v Gostidarsivennyi Sovet Respubliki Tatarstan, 5 Marta 25 April /995 g. 
Dokumenty, niaterialy, rezul'taty, ed. M. A. Sigaev and N. V. Naryshkin, 
Kazan: lzd-vo Gosudarstvennyi Sovet Respubliki Tatarstan, 1995. 
Memoirs, Testaments and Newspaper Articles 
Abdulatipov, Ramazan G., 0 federativnoi i natsional'noi politike Rossiiskogo 
gosudarstva, Moscow: Slavianskii dialog, 1995. 
Aminov, Nail, 'Tatarstanskaia model': K godovshchine podpisaniia dogovora mezhdu 
Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Tatarstan', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 18 
February 1995. 
Bairamova, Fauziia A., 'Bez ni ochen karshy? ', Sotsialistik Tatarstan, 6 March 1991. 
Bairamova, Fauziia A., 'Islam i tatarskaia natsiia', Madani Zhomga, 19 December 
1997. 
Drobizheva, Leokadia M., 'Interv'iu s V. A. Beliaevom', in Govorit elita respublik 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ed. Leokadia M. Drobizheva, Moscow: REA RAN, 
1996, pp. 26-27. 
El'tsin, Boris N., 'Ob ukreplenii Rossiiskogo gosudarstva', Rossiiskaia gazeta, 25 
February 1994, p. 4. 
El'tsin, Boris N., Zapiski Prezidenta, Moscow: Ogonek 1994. 
Faseev, K., Na putiakh proletarskogo intematsionaliznw, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 197 1. 
Filippov, Vasilii, 'Interview with Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 6, no. 3,24 January 2001. 
Gorbachev, Mikhail S., Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego 
mira, Moscow: Politizdat, 1988. 
Khakimov, Rafael S., 'Asimetrichnost' Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Vzgliad iz Tatarstana', 
in Assimmetrichnost' federatsii, ed. Andrei A. Zakharov, Moscow: Tacis, 
1997, pp. 61-76. 
Khakimov, Rafael S., 'Avtonomnaia respublika-politicheskii anakhronizm9', 
Kornsoinolets Tatarii, 10 September 1989. 
290 
Khakimov, Rafael S., 'Na konferentsh po konstitutsil', Nezavisintaia gazeta, 24 June 
1993. 
Khakimov, Rafael S., 'Prospects of Federalism in Russia: A View from Tatarstan', 
Security Dialogue, vol. 27, no 1,1996, pp. 69-80. 
Khakimov, Rafael S., 'Uroki strannogo putscha', Komsomolets Tatarstana, 27 
September 199 1. 
Khakimov, Rafael S., Wopros o pozitsii Prezidenta Shaimieva vo vremia perevorota, 
Vecherniaia Kazan, 23 August 1991. 
Khakimov, Rafael S., Sumerki imperii. K voprosu o natsii i gosudarstve, Kazan, 
Tatknizdat, 1993. 
Kuteinitsyn, Aleksandr and Viktor Churilov, 'Interv'iu s M. Sh. Shaimievorn', 
Delovaia zhizn', nos. I 1- 12,1992, p. 6. 
Mukhametshin, Farid Kh., Respublika Tatarstan: Ot referenduma do dogovora, 
Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1995. 
Mukhammetdinov, Rafael F. and Fauziia A. Bairamova, 'Chto takoe Ittifak? ', 
Komsomolets Tatarii, 13 May 1990. 
Mukharnmetdinov, Rafael F., 'Demokratizatsiia nachinaetsia s dekolonizatsii', 
Vecher-niaia Kazan, 6 August 1988. 
Mukharnmetclinov, Rafael F., Zarozhdenie i evoliutsiia tiurkizma, Kazan: Zarnan, 
1996. 
Prusak, Mikhail, Rossiia na rubezhe - Strategiia vlasti, Novgorod, 1998. 
Salagaev, Aleksandr L., 'Russkie v Republike Tatarstan', Kris, 5 March 1997. 
Shaimiev, Mintimer Sh., 'Conflict Prevention and Management: The Significance of 
Tatarstan's Experience', in Preventing Deadly Conflicts Strategies and 
Institutions, eds. Gail W. Lapidus and Svetlana Tsalik, New York: Carnegie 
Corporation of New York, 1998, pp. 68-77. 
Shaimiev, Mintimer Sh., 'Dialog religii, dialog kul'tur', in Islamo-Khristianskoe 
pogranich'e: Itogi i perspektivy izucheniia, ed. Ia. Abdullin, Kazan: flal-11 
ANT, 1994, pp. 1-3. 
Shaimiev, Mintimer Sh., 'Nasha pozitsiia ostaetsia neizmennoi, no suverenitet 
respubliki Tatarstan ne budet imet' natsional'noi okraski', Rossiiskaia gazeta, 
17 August 1991. 
Shaimiev, Mintimer Sh., 'Put' vybrannyi Tatarstanom, mozhet byt' priemlimym i dlia 
Chechni', Respublika Tatarstan, 10 September 1996. 
291 
Shainuev, Mintimer Sh., 'The Future of the Russian Federation: A Look [sicj from 
Tatarstan', in Stiverenn N? i Tatarstan, eds. Farid Kh. Mukhametshin and R. T. 
Ismailov, Moscow: Insan, 1997, pp. 53-58. 
Shaimiev, Mintimer Sh., 'U nas miagkoe vkhozhdenie v rynok', Trud, 26 April 1995. 
Shakhrai, Sergei M., 'Tatarstan i Rossiia: lazyk druzhby perevoda ne trebuet', 
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 February 1994. 
Tagirov, Indus R., 'Natsional'noe dvizhenie: Ego proshloe, nastoiashchee i 
budushchee', Tatarstan, nos. 3-4,1995, p. 8. 
Tagirov, Indus R., Beisezlek baskychlary, Kazan: Tatar Kitap Neshriiaty, 1994. 
Tishkov, Valerii A., 'Forget the "Nation": Post-Nationalist Understanding of 
Nationalism', Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 23, no. 4,2000, pp. 625-650. 
Tishkov, Valerii A., 'Kontseptual'naia evoliutsiia natsional'noi politiki v Rossii', 
Federalizm, vol. 2, no. 3,1997, pp. 71-108. 
Tishkov, Valerii A., 'New Russian Passports Must Silence Ethnic Rancour', Moscow 
Times, 9 December 1997. 
Tishkov, Valerii A., Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet 
Union: The Mind Aflame, London: Sage, 1997. 
Vladina, Kira, 'InterViu s M. Sh. Shaimievom', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 February 
1994. 
Ziuganov, Gennadii A., Derzhava, Moscow, Informpechat, 1994. 
Ziuganov, Gennadii A., Rossiia - Rodina moia, Moscow, Informpechat, 1996. 
Newspapers Consulted 
Izvestiia 
Kazanskie vedomosti 
Kommersant' Daily 
Literatumaia gazeta 
Moscow News 
Moscow Times 
Moskovskie novosti 
292 
Moskovskii komsoinolets 
Nezzavisitnat"a ga_7eta 
Pravda 
Respublika Tatarstan 
Rossiia 
Rossiiskaici gazeta 
Rossiiskie vesti 
Segodnia 
Sovetskaia Tataria 
Vatanim Tatarstan 
Vecherniaia Kazan 
Vremia i den'gi 
Zavtra 
Interviews with Participants 
Khakimov, Rafael S., Chief Advisor to the President of Tatarstan and the Director of 
the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of 
Tatarstan, Presidential Palace, Kazan, 2 June 1998. 
Mukhammetdinov, Rafael F., the founder of the Tatar National Independence Party - Ittifak, Kazan, I June 1998. 
Tagirov, Indus R., Chairperson of the World Congress of Tatars, Kazan, 3 June 1998. 
Valeev, Razil I., Deputy of the State Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan and 
Chairperson of the National Library of the Republic of Tatarstan, 2 June 1998. 
293 
Secondary Sources 
Abdullin, F., Azatlyk Sakhiftlere (1988-1996 ellar) Dokutnental' povest', Chally: 
Islam Nury, 1997. 
Agranoff, Robert and Juan Gallarin, 'Toward Federal Democracy in Spain: An 
Examination of Intergovernmental Relations', Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism, vol. 27, no. 4,1997, pp. 1-38. 
Akhmetov, Rashid, 'Elita Tatar. K postanovke problemy', in Sovremennye 
natsional'nye protsessy v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Damir M. Iskhakov and 
Rozalina N. Musina, Kazan: lIaLll KNTs RAN, 1992, pp. 119-127. 
Akhmetov, Rashid, 'Moscow Tightens the Screws on Kazan', Jamestown Foundation 
Prism, 7 November 1997. 
Akhmetov, Rashid, 'Presidential Elections in Chuvashia - Martial Arts, Eastern- 
Style', Jamestown Foundation Prism, 20 February 1998. 
Akhmetov, Rashid, 'Tatarstan: The Post-Electoral Ethno-Political Situation', in 
Bulletin: Network on Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of 
Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Conflict Management Group, 1995. 
Akhmetov, Rashid, 'Tatary i Russkie: Trudovaia mobil'nost', Tatarstan, no. 2,1997, 
pp. 17-2 1. 
Akhmetov, Rashid, 'The Kama Automobile Factory Clinically Dead at the Age of 29', 
The Jamestown Foundation Prism, 17 April 1998. 
Akiner, Shirin, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union, London: Kegan Paul 1983. 
Alexseev, Mikhail A., 'Asymmetric Russia: Promises and Dangers' in Center- 
Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia: A Federation Imperiled, ed. Mikhail 
A. Alexseev, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999, pp. 247-279. 
Alexseev, Mikhail A., 'Decentralization Versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia's 
Endurance', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 38, no. 1,2001, pp. 101-106. 
Alishev, Saliam, Tatarstan Tarikhynnan Khikeyaler, Kazan: Magarif, 1993. 
Allyn, Bruce, 'Gaagskaia initsiativa', in Mezhdunarodnyi opyt uregulirovaniia etno- 
politicheskikh konfliktov, ed. Rafael S. Khakimov, Kazan: Panorama-Forum, 
1996, pp. 147-150. 
Arnirkhanov, Rashid M., 'Islam in Tatar National Ideology and Policy', in The 
Christian - Muslim Frontier: Chaos, Clash or Dialogue?, ed. Jorgen S. 
Nielsen, London: L. B. Tauris, 1998, pp. 67-81. 
Asylov, D., 'Boris El'tsin Mostekyil' iasheiacheksez', Sotsialistik Tatarstan, 8 August 
1990. 
294 
Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhrnan, Imperiia Kreinlia: Sovetskii tip kolonializina, Vilnius: 
IM01,1990. 
Bahry, Donna, Outside Moscow: Power Politics and Budgetary Policy in the Soviet 
Republics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 
Bahry, Donna, 'Ethnicity and Equality in Post-communist Economic Transition: 
Evidence from Russia's Republics', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54, no. 5,2002, 
pp. 673-699. 
Bairamova, Luiza, 'Ravnopravie iazykov neitralizuet konflikty', Nauchnyi Tatarstan, 
vol. 3, no. 2,1997, pp. 8-12. 
Balzer, Marjorie Mandelstam and Uliana Vinokurova, 'Nationalism, Interethnic 
Relations and Federalism: The Case of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia)', 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 48, no. 1,1996, pp. 10 1- 12 1. 
Balzer, Marjorie Mandelstam, 'From Ethnicity to Nationalism: Turmoil in the Russian 
Mini Empire', in Social Legacy of Communism, eds. James R. Millar and 
Sharon L. Wolchik, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, pp. 56-88. 
Baskakov, Nikolai, Russkie Jamilii tiurkskogo proiskhozhdeniia, Moscow: Nauka, 
1979. 
Batyrshin, Radik, 'Mintimer Shaimiev - za assotsiatsiiu s Rossiei', Nezavisimaia 
gazeta, 26 June 1992. 
Beissinger, Mark R., 'Elites and Ethnic Identities in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics', 
in The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR, ed. 
Alexander J. Motyl, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, pp. 141-169. 
Beissinger, Mark R., 'State-Building in the Shadow of an Empire-State: The Soviet 
Legacy in Post-Soviet Politics' in The End of Empire? The Transformation of 
the USSR in Comparative Perspective, eds. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, 
New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, pp. 157-185. 
Beliakov, Roman, 'Russkii vopros' v natsional'noi politike Tatarstana', in 
Mezhetnicheskie i mezhkonfessional'nye otnosheniia v Respublike Tatarstana, 
ed. Damir M. Iskhakov, Kazan: Apparat Prezidenta RT, 1993, p. 5 1. 
Belin, Laura, 'Gusinskii in Tatarstan for Synagogue Reopening', Russian Regional 
Report, vol. 1, no. 17,18 December 1996. 
Belin, Laura, 'Potanin Appointed Head of Russian-Tatar Commission on Power 
Sharing', Russian Regional Report, vol. 2, no. 4,29 January 1997. 
Bennigsen, Alexandre and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the 
Soviet Union, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. 
Bennigsen-Broxup, Marie, 'After the Putsch, 1991', in The North Caucasus Barrier: 
The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World, ed. Marie Bennigsen 
Broxup, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 219-240. 
295 
Bennigsen-Broxup, Marie, 'Tatarstan and the Tatars', in The Nationalities Question 
in the Post-Soviet States, ed. Graham Smith, New York: Longman, 2"d ed., 
1996, pp. 75-93. 
Bennigsen-Broxup, Marie, 'The 'Internal' Muslim Factor in the Politics of Russia: 
Tatarstan and the North Caucasus', in Central Asia and the Caucasus after the 
Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics, ed. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, 
Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1994, pp. 75-98. 
Bierce, Ambrose, The Devil's Dictionary, New York: Dover, 1958. 
Bigi, Musa, Islahat Esaslari, Petrograd, n. a., 1917. 
Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism, London: Sage, 1995. 
Boase, Joan Price, 'Faces of Asymmetry: German and Canadian Federalism', in 
Evaluating Federal Systents, ed. Bertus DeVilliers, Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 90-1 10. 
Breuilly, John, Nationalism and the State, 2d ed., Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1993. 
Brown, Bess, 'Tatarstan Adopts Independence Resolution', RFEIRL Research Report, 
24 October 199 1. 
Brown, D., D. Cameron, et. al., 'Comparative Analysis', in Russia-Canada 
Collaborative Federalism Project: Federalism-Structures and Practices, eds. 
V. Benevolenskii and D. Brown, Moscow: Moscow Branch of Russian 
Science Foundation, 1996, pp. 95-120. 
Brown, David, 'Are There Good and Bad NationalismsT, Nations and Nationalism, 
vol. 5, no. 2,1999, pp. 281-302. 
Brubaker, Rogers, 'Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism', in The 
State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, ed. John 
Hall, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 272-306. 
Brubaker, Rogers, 'National Minorities, Nationalising States, and External 
Homelands in New Europe', Daedalus, vol. 124, no. 2,1995, pp. 107-132. 
Brubaker, Rogers, 'Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and 
Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account', Theory and Society, vol. 23, 
no. 1,1994 pp. 47-78. 
Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Gerwwny, Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992. 
Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in 
the New Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 'Post-Connnunist Nationalism', Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no-5, 
1990, pp. 1-25. 
296 
Bukharaev, Ravil, The Model (ýf Tatarstan tinder President Mintimer Shaintiev, 
London: Curzon. 1999. 
Bunce, Valerie, 'Should Transitologists Be GroundedT, Slavic Review, vol. 54, no. 1, 
1995, pp. II 1- 127. 
Burganov, Agdas Kh., 'Budushchee tatarskoi diaspory v Rossii', Panorama-Fortim, 
no. 3,1995, pp. 17-24. 
Busygin, Evgenii, 'Russkie v mnogonatsionat'nom povolzh'e', in lazyk i natsionalizm 
v postsovetskikh respublikakh, ed. Mikhail N. Guboglo, Moscow: [EA RAN, 
1994, pp. 35-57. 
Carter, Stephen K., Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, London: 
Pinter, 1991. 
Clarke, Bruce, An Empire's New Clothes: The End of Russia's Liberal Dream, 
London: Vintage, 1995. 
Coalson, Robert, 'Tatar Unity Summit Deepens Moslem Schism', Moscow Times, 17 
February 1998. 
Cohen, Ariel, Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis, Westport, CT: Preager, 
1996. 
Connor, Walter, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994. 
Connor, Walter, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
Conquest, Robert, The Nation Killers, London: Macmillan, 1970. 
Cook, Ramsay, Canada, Quebec, and the Uses of Nationalism, Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1986. 
Corwin, Julie A., 'is "Islamophobia" Spreading in the RegionsT, RFEIRL Russian 
Federation Report, vol. 3, no. 31,7 November 2001. 
Davis, Howard, Philip Hammond and Lilia Nizamova, 'Changing Identities and 
Practices in Post-Soviet Journalism: The Case of Tatarstan', European Journal 
of Communication, vol. 13, no. 1,1998, pp. 77 -97. 
Davis, Howard, Philip Hammond and Lilia Nizamova, 'Media, Language Policy and 
Cultural Change in Tatarstan: Historic vs. Pragmatic Claims to Nationhood', 
Nations and Nationalism, vol. 6, no. 2,2000, pp. 203-226. 
Dawson, Jane I., Eco-Nationalism. Anti-nuclear Activism and National Identity in 
Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996, 
pp. 137-140. 
297 
Deviet, Nadir, 'The Tatars and Bashkirs after Glasnost', Journal of* histitute of' 
Muslim Minority Affifirs. vol. 10, no. 2,1989, p. 465. 
Devletshin, Tarnurbek, Sovetskii Tatarstan, London: Our World Publishers, 1974. 
Dowley, Kathleen M., 'Striking the Federal Bargain in Russia: Comparative Regional 
Government Strategies', Communist and Post- Communist Studies, vol. 31, 
no. 4,1998, pp. 359-380. 
Doyle, Michael W., Empires, Ithaca, NY: Comell University Press, 1986. 
Drobizheva, Leokadia M., 'Comparison of Elite Groups in Tatarstan, Sakha, Magadan 
and Orenburg', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 15, no. 4,1999, pp. 387-406. 
Drobizheva, Leokadia M., 'Russian Ethnonationalism', in Ethnic Conflict in the Post- 
Soviet World, eds. Leokadia M. Drobizheva, et al., Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
1996, pp. 129-147. 
Drobizheva, Leokadia M., et. al., Demokratizatsiia i obrazy natsionalizma v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii 90-kh godov, Moscow: Mysl', 1996. 
Duchacek, Ivo D., 'Comparative Federalism: An Agenda for Additional Research', in 
Constitutional Design and Power-Sharing in the Post-Modem Epoch, ed. 
Daniel J. Elazar, Lanham: Maryland: University Press of America, 1991, 
pp. 23-40. 
Duchacek, Ivo D., Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of 
Federalism, New York: University Press of America, 1987. 
Dugin, Aleksandr G., Osnovy Geopolitiki. Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii, 
Moscow: Arktogeia, 1999. 
Duncan, Peter J. S., 'Russia: Accommodating Ethnic Minorities', in The Politics of 
Multinational States, ed. D. N. MacIver, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 63-84. 
Duncan, Peter J. S., 'The Nationality Factor in Soviet Stability: Western Scholarship 
Revisited', The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 74, no. 2,1996, 
pp. 259-269. 
Duncan, Peter J. S., Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and 
After, London: Routledge, 2000. 
Dunlop, John B., 'Russia: In Search of an Identity', in New States, New Politics: 
Building the Post-Soviet Nations, eds. Ian Bremmer and Roy Taras, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 29-95. 
Dunlop, John B., 'The Russian Orthodox Church as an Empire-Saving Institution', in 
The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Michael 
Bourdeaux, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995, pp. 15-40. 
Dunlop, John B., Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of Separatist Conflict, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
298 
Dunlop, John B., The I-'aces of Conteniporarý, Russian Nationalism, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983. 
Easter, Gerald M., 'Redefining Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation: 
Sverdlovsk Oblast', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 4,1997, pp. 617-636. 
Elazar, Daniel J., Exploring Pederalistn, Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama 
Press, 1987. 
Eley, Geoff and Ronald G. Suny, 'Introduction: From the Moment of Social History to 
the Work of Cultural Representation', in Becoming National, eds. Geoff Eley 
and Ronald G. Suny, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 3-37. 
Ellis, Jane, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalisin and Deftnsiveness, 
London: Macmillan. 1996. 
Faizrakhmanov, Gabdulbar, 'Istoriia tvoritsia na nashikh glazakh', Tatarstan, no. 7, 
1997, pp. 4-12. 
Farukhshin, Midkhat Kh., Sovremennyi ftderalizm: Rossiiskii i zarubezhnyi opyt', 
Kazan: KGU, 1998. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'A Tale of Two Car Makers in Tatarstan', Russian Regional 
Report, vol. 3, no. 50,17 December 1998. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Debates Rage Over Tatarstani Citizenship', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 3, no. 11,19 March 1998. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Federalizm i demokratiia: Slozhnyi balans', Politicheskie 
issledovaniia, vol. 8, no. 6,1997, pp. 164-173. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Is the Federal Government Cracking Down on TatarstanT 
Russian Regional Report, vol. 2, no. 34,9 October 1997. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Izbiratel'noe zakonodatel'stvo i vybory v Tatarstane: Opyt 
regional'nogo pravovogo separatizma', in Osobaia zona: Vybory v Respublike 
Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat 
Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 
2000, pp. 10-24. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Kazan Sorry to See Primakov Go, Backs Stepashin', 
Russian Regional Report, vol. 4, no. 19,20 May 1999. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Politicheskaia elita v Tatarstane: vyzovy vremeni i trudnosti 
adaptatsii', Politicheskie issledovaniia, vol. 5, no. 6,1994, pp. 67-79. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Regional Boss in Tatarstan Builds Local Empire', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 2, no. 35,16 October 1997. 
Farukshin, Mid1chat Kh., 'Shaimiev Family Benefits From Tatneft Ties', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 2, no. 36,23 October 1997. 
299 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Shainuev Overestimates Value of Agreement', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 4, no. 11,25 March 1999. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Shairniev Supporters Fill Out Tatarstan Legislature', 
Russian Regional Report, vol. 4, no. 12,1 April 1999. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Suverenitet v sisterne federalizma', Nauchnyi Tatarstan, 
no. 1,1996, pp. 49-54. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Tatarstan Elites Oblivious To People's Plight', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 3, no. 39, I October 1998. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Tatarstan Launches Haphazard Anti-Crisis Measures', 
Russian Regional Report, vol. 3, no. 36,13 September 1998. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Tatarstan Prepares to Amend Constitution', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 7, no. 7,20 February 2002. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Tatarstan President Knows Who His Deputies Will Be', 
Russian Regional Report, vol. 4, no. 47,14 December 1999. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Tatarstan: Economy Shrinks, Bureaucracy Grows', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 3, no. 23, II June 1998. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Tatarstan's Government Reshuffle Lacks Transparency', 
Russian Regional Report, vol. 3, no. 29,30 July 1998. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Tatarstan's Leadership Reshuffle Shows Incipient 
Pluralism', Russian Regional Report, vol. 3, no. 22,4 June 1998. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., 'Tatarstan's Oil Has Already Been Divided Up', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 2, no. 38,6 Novpmber 1997. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., et. al., Politicheskaia sistema Respubliki Tatarstan, Kazan: 
KGU, 1995. 
Fasakhov, Kasym, 'Kern faidasyna? Shartname Rossiia - Tatarstan', Shehri Kazan, 5 
April 1994. 
Filatov, Sergei, 'Tatarstan: at the Crossroads of Islam and Orthodoxy', Religion, State 
and Society, vol. 26, no. 3/4,1998, pp. 265-277. 
Filippov, Mikhail and Olga Shvetsova, 'Asymmetric Bilateral Bargaining in the New 
Russian Federation -A Path-Dependence Explanation', Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, vol. 32, no. 1,1999, pp. 61-76. 
Filippov, Vasilii, Etnopoliticheskaia situatsiia v Chuvashii, Moscow: IEA RAN, 
1994. 
Fish, M. Steven, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New 
Russian Revolution, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
300 
Fuks, Karl, Kazanskie Tatarv v statisticheskom i etnograficheskoin otnosheniiakh, 
Kazan, 1844. 
Fuller, Liz, 'Tatarstan Adopts Land Code, Citizenship Law', RFEIRL Newsline, 16 
April 1998. 
Fuller, Liz, 'Tatarstan, Bashkortostan Resolve Passport Dispute with Moscow', 
RFEIRL Russian Federation Report, vol. 2, no. 46,20 December 2000. 
Fuller, Liz, 'Turkish Government Delegation Visits Kazan', RFEIRL Newsline, 5 May 
1998. 
Garipov, lagfar, 'Sots ial'no-etnicheskaia struktura rabotnikov i mezhnatsional'nye 
otnosheniia na KamAZc', in Sovremennye natsional'nye protsessy v 
Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Damir M. Iskhakov and Rozalina N. Musina, 
Kazan: 11aL1I KNTs RAN, 1992, pp. 65-82. 
Gel'man, Vladimir Ia., 'Regional'naia vlast' v sovremennoi Rossii: Instituty, rezhimy 
i praktiki', Politicheskie issledovaniia, vol. 7, no. 1,1998, pp. 87-105. 
Gellner, Ernest, Anthropology and Politics: Revolution in the Sacred Grove, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995. 
Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. 
Gibadullin, Rustam, Tatarskoe naselenie Naberezhnykh Chelnov v tsifrakh 
etnosotsiologii, Naberezhnye CheIny, 1993. 
Gibadullin, Rustam, Tatarskoe natsional'noe dvizhenie: Politicheskaia deiatel'nost' i 
vliianie v Tatarstane (1988-1992), Kazan: KGU, 1998. 
Giliazov, Iskander, 'Evoliutsiia sotsial'noi struktury tatarskogo obshchestva i islam 
(vtoraia pol. XVI-XVIH vv. )', Panorama-Forum, no. 11,1997, pp. 13 -2 1. 
Gleason, Gregory, 'The 'National Factor' and the Logic of Sovietology', in The Post- 
Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR, ed. Alexander J. 
Motyl, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, pp. 1-29. 
Golenkova, Zinaida T., 'Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo v Rossii', Sotsiologicheskie 
issledovaniia, no. 3,1997, pp. 25-36. 
Goodrich-Lehmann, Susan, 'Islam and Ethnicity in the Republics of Russia', Post- 
Soviet Affairs, vol. 13, no. 1,1997, pp. 78-103. 
Gorenburg, Dmitry, 'Nationalism for the Masses: Popular Support for Nationalism in 
Russia's Ethnic Republics', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 53, no. 1,2001, pp. 73- 
104. 
Gorenburg, Dmitry, 'Not With One Voice: An Explanation of Intragroup Variation in 
Nationalist Sentiment', World Politics, vol. 5 3, no. 4,2000, pp. 115-142. 
301 
Gorenburg, Dniltry, 'Regional Separatism in Russia: Ethnic Mobilisation or Power 
GrabT. Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 5 1, no. 2,1999, pp. 245-274. 
Grachev, Ivan D., 'Politicheskaia situatsiia v Respubliki Tatarstan razvivaetsiia 
normal'no', Nezavislinata gazeta, 23 April 1994. 
Graney, Katherine E., 'Education Reform in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan: 
Sovereignty Projects in Post-Soviet Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 51 no. 4, 
1999, pp. 611-633. 
Grancy, Katherine E., 'Ten Years of Sovereignty in Tatarstan: End of the Beginning 
or the Beginning of the End', Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 48, no. 5, 
2001, pp. 32-41. 
Graney, Katherine E., 'The Volga Tatars: Diasporas and the Politics of Federalism', in 
Nations Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Fortner 
Soviet Union, eds. Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1999, pp. 153-178. 
Greenfeld, Liah, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992. 
Gress, Franz, 'Interstate Co-operation in the USA and the FRG', in Evaluating 
Federal Systems, ed. Bertus DeVilliers, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 409-429. 
Guboglo, Mikhail N., 'Federalizm vlasti i vlast' federalizma', in Federalizm vlasti i 
vlast' federalizma, eds. Aleksandr N. Arinin and Mikhail N. Guboglo, 
Moscow: Inteltekh, 1997, pp. 10 1- 148. 
Gurushina, Natalia, 'Gazprom Clamps Down on Debtors in Tatarstan', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 2, no. 9,6 March 1997. 
Gurushina, Natalia, 'U. S. to Invest 4.5 Billion Dollars in Tatarstan', Open Media 
Research Institute Daily Digest, 19 September 1996. 
Hale, Henry E., 'Machine Politics and Institutionalised Electorates: A Comparative 
Analysis of Six Duma Elections in Bashkortostan', Journal of Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 15, no. 4,1999, pp. 70-1 10. 
Halperin, Charles J., Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval 
Russian History, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985. 
Hanauer, Laurence S., 'Tatarstan's Bid for Autonomy: Tatarstan as a Model for the 
Devolution of Power in the Russian Federation', Journal of Conununist 
Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 12, no. 1,1996, pp. 63-82. 
Hanson, Philip, 'The Russian Economic Crisis and the Future of Russian Economic 
Reform', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 5 1, no. 7,1999, pp. 1141-1166. 
Hanson, Stephen E., 'The Dilemmas of Russia's Anti-Revolutionary Revolution', 
Current History, vol. 100, no. 648,200 1, pp. 330-335. 
302 
Hechter, Michael, Containing Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Hechter, Michael, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National 
Development, 1536-1966, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. 
Hennessy, Alistair, 'The Renaissance of Federal Ideas in Contemporary Spain', in 
Federalism and Nationalism, ed. Murray Forsyth, Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1989, pp. 11-23. 
Hixson, Walter L., Witness to Disintegration: Provincial Life in the List Year of the 
USSR, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1993. 
Hobsbawm, Eric J., Nations and Nationalism since 1789, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
Hoffman, David, 'Artful Regional Leader Slips Moscow's Grip', Washington Post, 16 
June 1997. 
Horowitz, Donald, 'Patterns of Ethnic Separatism', Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, vol. 23, no. 2,198 1, pp. 165-195. 
Hosking, Geoffrey, 'Can Russia Become a Nation-StateT, Nations and Nationalism, 
vol. 4, no. 4,1998, pp. 449-462. 
Hough, Jerry F., The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision 
Making, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969. 
Hughes, James, 'Moscow's Bilateral Treaties Add to Confusion', Transition, vol. 2, 
no. 19,20 September 1996, pp. 39-43. 
Hughes, James, 'Sub-National Elites and Post-Communist Transformation in Russia: 
A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya & White', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 6, 
1997, pp. 10 17-1037. 
Hughes, James, 'Transition Models and Democratisation in Russia', in Russia after 
the Cold War, eds. Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross, London: Longman, 
1999, pp. 21-49. 
Huntington, Samuel P., 'The Clash of CivilizationsT, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, 
1993, pp. 22-29. 
Hutcheson, Derek S., 'Postcard from Tatarstan', Central Europe Review, vol. 2, no. 25, 
26 June 2000. 
lakubovskaia, Sofiia, Razvitie SSSR kak soiuznogo gosudarstva, 1922-1926 gg., 
Moscow: Nauka, 1972. 
lakupova, Venera A., 'Pokushenie na intematsionalizm', Komsomolets Tatarii, 2 
September 1990. 
lanov, Aleksandr L., Posle El'tsina: Veimarskaia Rossiia, Moscow: KRIK, 1995. 
303 
Ilishev, Ildus G., 'Russian Federalism: Political, Legal and Ethnolingual Aspects -A Zý C) 
View from the Republic of Bashkortostan', Nationalities Papers, vol. 26, no. 4, 
1998, pp. 723-759. 
Immergut, Ellen M., 'The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism', Politics & 
Society, vol. 26, no. 1,1998, pp. 5-35. 
Innes, Abby, 'The Breakup of Czechoslovakia: The h-npact of Party Development on 
the Separation of the State', Fast European Politics and Societies, vol. 11, 
no. 3,1997, pp. 393-435. 
Ishiyama, John T., 'The Russian Proto-parties and the National Republics: Integrative 
Organisations in a Disintegrating WorldT, Communist and Post- Communist 
Studies, vol. 29, no. 4,1998, pp. 395-41 1. 
Iskhaki, Gaiaz, Idel'-Ural, Chally: Kalkan, 1992. 
Iskhakov, Damir M., 'Model' Tatarstana: Za i protiv', in Tatarskaia natsiia: 
Proshloe, nastoiashche, budlishchee, ed. Rafael S. Khakirnov, Kazan: 11 ANT, 
1997, pp. 5-30. 
Iskhakov, Damir M., 'Natsional'nye dvizheniia Tatarstana: Bor'ba za liderstvo', 
Sovetskaia Tatariia, 4 August 1992. 
Iskhakov, Damir M., 'Neformal'nye ob"edineniia v sovremennom Tatarskom 
obshchestve', in Sovremennye natsional'nye protsessy v Respublike 
Tatarstan, eds. Damir M. Iskhakov and Rozalina N. Musina, Kazan: IlaUl 
KNTs RAN, 1992, pp. 5-52. 
Iskhakov, Damir M., 'Sotsial'naia statistika', in Sovremennye natsional'nye protsessy 
v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Damir M. Iskhakov and Rozalina N. Musina, 
Kazan: IIALII KNTs RAN, 1992, pp. 128-139. 
Iskhakov, Damir M., 'Tatarskaia istoriia budet napisana po-tatarskii', Idel, nos. 1-2, 
1997, pp. 24-27. 
Iskhakov, Damir M., 'TOTs Programma i deistviia', Kommunist Tatarii, no. 7,1990, 
pp. 38-44. 
Iskhakov, Damir M., Fenomen tatarskogo dzhadidizma: Kazan: Iman, 1997. 
Iskhakov, Damir M., Problemy stanovleniia i transforfflatsii tatarskoi natsii, Kazan: 
Master Lain, 1997. 
Iskhakov, Damir M., Tatary: Populiarnyi ocherk etnicheskoi istorii i detnograffi, 
Naberezhnye CheIny: KamAZ, 1993. 
Ivanov, Vitalii V., Rossiiskii federalim i vnutri-gosudarstvennaia dogovornaia 
politika, Krasnoyarsk: lzd-vo KGU, 1997. 
Jack, Andrew, 'Tatarstan: A Model Republic', Financial Times, 30 April 1999. 
304 
Jacobs, Pat, Mini FlagsAtlas of'the World, Finchampstead, Berks, UK: 1999. 
Judt, Tony, 'Is There a BelgiumT New York- Review (ýI'Books, vol. 46, no. 19,1999, 
pp. 49-53. 
Kaiser, Robert J. The Geography oj'Nationalisni in Russia and the USSR, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994. 
Kalpana, Sahni, Crucifying the Orient: Russian Orientalisin and the Colonisation oj, 
Caucasus and Central Asia, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1997. 
Kaplan, Cynthia S., 'International Negotiations and Plural Societies: The Cases of 
Estonia and Tatarstan', International Negotiation, vol. 2, no. 1,1997, pp. 43-78. 
Kappeler, Andreas, 'Czarist Policy Toward Muslims of the Russian Empire', in 
Muslim Communities Re-emerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, 
Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ed. 
Edward Allworth, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994, pp. 141-156. 
Kara-Murza, Aleksei, Mezhdu imperiei i smutoi, Moscow: [FRAN, 1996. 
Karaperian, Artem, 'Tatarstan: Chechenskii sindrom', Moskovskie novosti, 19 January 
1992. 
Karklins, Rasma, Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspectivefrom Below, Boston: 
Allen&Unwin, 1986. 
Karush, Sarah, 'Tatars Leave Russian Alphabet Behind', Moscow Times, 14 October 
1999. 
Karush, Sarah, 'Tsar of Tatarstan', Moscow Times, 23 October 1999. 
Kasimov, Aleksandr, 'Tatarstan', Politicheskii monitor, no. 5,1993, p. 78. 
Katz, Rachel, 'Synagogue Reopens After 67 Years', Moscow Times, 17 December 
1996. 
Keating, Michael, Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in 
Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland, London: Macmillan, 1996. 
Kempton, Daniel R., 'The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of Centre- 
Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 48, 
no. 4,1996, pp. 587-614. 
Khalikov, Al'fred Kh., Kto my - Bulgary ili Tatary, Kazan: Izd-vo Kazan, 1992. 
Khalim, Aidar, 'Sovremennye smeshannye braki, ili kol'tso bezotvetstvennosti', 
Argamak, no. 2,1993, pp. 3-16. 
Khalim, Aidar, Ubit'imperiiu, Naberezhnye Chelny: Kalkan, 1997. 
Khamidullin, Filzia G., 'Rynochnye reformy: Pervye itogi i sotsial'nye posledstviia', 
Nauchnyi Tatarstan, vol. 3, no. 3-4,1997, pp. 52-56. 
305 
Khasanov, Mansur Kh., 'Prioritet - interesy respubliki', Sovetskaia Tatariia, 13 
February 1993. 
Khasanova, Gulnara, 'Chally TPC Gets Eviction Notice', RFEIRL Tatar-Bashkir 
Report -Weekly Review, 15 June 200 1. 
Khasanova, Guinara, 'Language and Sovereignty: the Politics of Switching to the 
Latin Alphabet in Tatarstan', Jamestown Foundation Prisin, vol. 3, no. 16,10 
October 1997. 
Khasanova, Gulnara, 'Russian Identity: The View from Tatarstan', The Jamestown 
Foundation Prism, 6 March 1998. 
Khasanova, GuInara, 'Shaimiev Overwhelmingly Reelected', RFEIRL Tatar-Bashkir 
Daily Report, 26 March 2001. 
Khasanova, GuInara, 'Tatarstan to Maintain Status Set by 1992 Referendum', 
RFEIRL Tatar-Bashkir Daily Report, 4 April 2002. 
Khazanov, Anatoly M., 'Ethnic Nationalism in the Russian Federation', Daedalus, 
vol. 124, no. 2,1997, pp. 121-142. 
Khazanov, Anatoly M., After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1995. 
Khodarkovsky, Michael, "'Ignoble Savages and Unfaithful Subjects": Constructing 
Non-Christian Identities in Early Modem Russia', in Russia's Orient: 
Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917, eds. Daniel R. Brower and 
Edward J. Lazzerini, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997, pp. 9- 
26. 
Khudiakov, Mikhail, Ocherki po istorii Kazanskogo Khanstva, Moscow: Insan, 199 1. 
King, Peter, Federalism and Federation, London: Croom Heim, 1982. 
Kirillov, Anatolii D., B. Kirillov and A. Ryzhkov, Vybory pervogo gubernatora 
sverdlovskoi oblasti, Ekaterinburg: Ural politicheskii, 1995. 
Kirkow, Peter, Russia's Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation Versus Local 
Autonomy?, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998. 
Kistanov, Viktor, Federal'nye okruga Rossii: Vazhnyi shag v ukreplenii gosudarstva, 
Moscow: Ekonomika, 2000, pp. 18-30. 
Kliamkin, Igor M. and Viktor V. Lapkin, 'Russkii vopros v Rossii', Politicheskie 
issledovaniia, vol. 6, no. 5,1995, pp. 78-96. 
Kondrashov, Sergei, Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in Tatarstan, 1988- 
92: Origins and Development, London: Macmillan, 2000. 
306 
Korotkov, Vadim E., 'Chechenskaia model' etnopoliticheskikh protsessov', 
Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost', no. 3,1994, pp. 104-112. 
Kramer, John M., 'The Politics of Corruption', Current History, vol. 97, no. 621,1998, 
pp. 329-334. 
Kudfiavtsev, Aleksei V., 'Islamofobiia v postsovetskoi Rossii', in Islam v SNG, ed. 
Aleksei V. Malashenko, Moscow: IV RAN, 1998, pp. 160-17 1. 
Kux, Stephan, 'Soviet Federalism', Problems of Communism, vol. 34, no. 2,1990, 
pp. 1-20. 
Kuzio, Taras, "'Nationalising States" or Nation-Building? A Critical Review of the 
Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence', Nations and Nationalism, 
vol. 7, no. 2,200 1, pp. 135-154. 
Laba, Roman, 'How Yeltsin's Exploitation of Ethnic Nationalism Brought Down an 
Empire', Transitions, no. 2,12 January 1996, pp. 5-13. 
Laitin, David D., Identity in Formation: The Russian -Speaking Populations in the 
Near Abroad, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
Landau, Jacob M., Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Co-operation, London: Hurst, 
1995. 
Lantsman, Mikhail, 'Prezident poluchil doverennyin litsam naiti natsional'nuiu ideiu', 
Segodnia, 13 July 1996. 
Lapidus, Gail W., 'Asymmetrical Federalism and State Breakdown in Russia', Post- 
Soviet Affairs, vol. 15, no. 1,1999, pp. 74-82. 
Lapidus, Gail W., 'From Democratisation to Disintegration: The Impact of Perestroika 
on the National Question', in From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism 
and Separatism in the Soviet Republics, eds. Gail W. Lapidus, et. al., 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 45-70. 
Lazzerini, Edward J., 'Beyond Renewal: The Jadid Response to Pressure for Change 
in the Modem Age', in Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and 
Change, ed. Jo-Ann Gross, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992, 
pp. 151-166. 
Lazzerini, Edward J., 'Defining the Orient: A Nineteenth Century Russo-Tatar 
Polemic over Identity and Cultural Representation', in Muslim Communities 
Re-emerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition 
in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ed. Edward Allworth, Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1994, pp. 33-45. 
Lazzerini, Edward J., 'Ethnicity and the Uses of History: The Case of the Volga Tatars 
and Jadidism', Central Asian Survey, November 1982, pp. 61-69. 
307 
Leff, Carol Skalnik, 'Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The 
Breakup of the Communist Federations', World Politics, vol. 51, no. 2,1999, 
pp. 205-235. 
Lemercier-Quelquejay, Chantal, 'Muslim National Minorities in Revolution and Civil 
War', in Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective, ed. S. Enders Wimbush, 
London: Croom Heim, 1985, pp. 36-60. 
Levada, lurii A., "Chelovek sovetskii' piat' let spustia: 1989-1994', Ekonomicheskie i 
sotsial'nye peretneny: monitoring obshchestvennogo inneniia, no. 1,1995, 
pp. 9-14. 
Lewis, David C., 'Ethnicity and Religion in Tatarstan and the Middle Volga Region', 
Central Asian Survey, vol. 16, no. 2,1997, pp. 215-236. 
Lieven, Anatol, 'Anatol Lieven Replies', National Interest, no. 50,1997/1998, pp. III- 
114. 
Lieven, Anatol, 'Nightmare in the Caucasus', Washington Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 1, 
2000, pp. 145-158. 
Lieven, Anatol, 'Non-Russian Perceptions of Russia', in Rethinking Russia, eds. 
Madhavan K. Palat and Geeti Sen, New Delhi: India International Centre, 
1994, pp. 225-246. 
Lieven, Anatol, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Scholarly Debate and the Realities of 
Eastern Europe', National Interest, no. 49,1997, pp. 10-22. 
Lieven, Anatol, 'Russia-U. S. vs. KhattabT, Moscow Times, 24 September 1999. 
Lieven, Anatol, 'The Weakness of Russian Nationalism', Survival, vol. 41, no. 2,1999, 
pp. 53-70. 
Lieven, Anatol, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998. 
Lieven, Anatol, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry, Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1999. 
Lieven, Dominic, 'The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities', 
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 30, no. 4,1995, pp. 607-636, 
Light, Margot, 'Foreign Policy Thinking' in Neil Malcolm et. al., Internal Factors in 
Russian Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 33-100. 
Lisin, Evgenii A., et. al., Kto est'kto v Respublike Tatarstan, Kazan: Gazetno- 
zhurnal'noe izd-vo, 1993. 
Lisin, Evgenii A., et. al., Kto est'kto v Respublike Tatarstan, Kazan: Star, 1996, 
Lbwenhardt, John, 'The 1996 Presidential Elections in Tatarstan', Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Polities, vol. 13, no. 1,1997, pp. 132-144. 
308 
Luong, Pauline J., 'Tatarstan: Elite Bargaining and Ethnic Separatism', in Growing 
Pains: Russian Deniocrac 
,v and 
the Election oj'1993, eds. Timothy J. Colton 
and Jerry F. Hough, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998, pp. 637- 
668. 
Lussier, Danielle, '1999 State Dunia Results Communist Power on the Decline, OVR 
Could be the Swing', Russian Regional Report, vol. 4, no. 48,22 December 
1999. 
Lynn, Nicholas J. and Alexei V. Novikov, 'Refederalizing Russia: Debates on the Idea 
of Federalism in Russia', Publius, vol. 27, no. 2,1997, pp. 187-203. 
Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, eds. 
Charles R. Kesler and Clinton Rossiter, New York: Mentor, 1999. 
Makhmutov, Mirza I., 'Evraziiskii proekt - Vzgliad iz Tatarstana', Tatarstan, nos. 7-9, 
1995, pp. 3-13. 
Malashenko, Aleksei V., 'Islam v Rossii', Svobodnaia mysl', no. 10,1999, pp. 44-50. 
Malashenko, Aleksei V., 'Russkii natsionalizm i Islam', in Etnicheskie i regional'nye 
konflikty v Evrazii. Rossiia, Ukraina, Belorussiia, eds. Aleksei Zverev, Bruno 
Coppieters and Dmitfii Trenin, Moscow: Ves' mir, 1997, pp. 8-22. 
Malik, Hafeez, 'Tatarstan's Treaty with Russia: Autonomy or Independence', Journal 
of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, no. 1,1994, pp. 1-36. 
Malikov, M. K., 'Rossiiskoi Federatsii i grazhdanstvo ee sub"ektov', Gosudarstvo i 
pravo, no. 8,1997, pp. 21-24. 
Matsuzato, Kimitaka, 'From Ethno-Bonapartism to Centralized Caciquismo: 
Characteristics and Origins of the Tatarstan Political Regime, 1900-2000', 
The Journal of Cotmnunist Studies & Transition Politics, vol. 17, no. 4,200 1, 
pp. 43-77. 
Mawhood, Philip, 'The Politics of Survival: Federal States in the Third World', 
International Political Science Review, vol. 5, no. 4,1984, pp. 521-53 1. 
McAuley, Mary, Russia's Politics of Uncertainty, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997. 
McDaniel, Tim, The Agony of the Russian Idea, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996. 
McFaul, Michael, 'State Power, Institutional Change and the Politics of Privatization 
in Russia', World Politics, vol. 47, no. 2,1995, pp. 210-243. 
Meadwell, Hudson, 'The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec', World Politics, vol. 45, 
no. 2,1993, pp. 203-242. 
Melvin, Neil J., 'The Russians: Diaspora and the End of Empire', in Nations Abroad: 
Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union, 
309 
eds. Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, 
pp. 27-57. 
Melvin, Neil J., Regional Foreign Policies in the Russian Federation, London: RIIA, 
1995. 
Melvin, Neil J., Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity. London: 
Pinter/RIIA, 1995. 
Mendras, Marie, 'How Regional Elites Preserve Their Power', Post-Soviet Affairs, 
vol. 15, no. 4,1999, pp. 295-31 1. 
Mikhailin, Dmitrii, 'Tatarskii mozhern "my ne znat". No mogut s dolzhnosti uvolit", 
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 23 July 1992. 
Mikulskii, Dmitrii, 'Muslims and Their Organisations in Russia', Religion in Eastern 
Europe, vol. 16, no. 4,1996, pp. 19-29. 
Miller, John H., 'Cadre Policy in Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU First and 
Second Secretaries in Non-Russian Republics of the USSR', Soviet Studies, 
vol. 29, no. 1,1977, pp. 3-36. 
Mineev, Aleksandr, 'Boris El'tsin "Berite stol'ko samostoiatel'nosti, skol'ko surneete 
obespechit"', Moskovskie novosti, 19 August 1990. 
Mingnullin, Tufan, 'Iz dnevnikov. Kto kogo ne liubit? Eshche raz o tatarakh i 
tatarstve', Tatarstan, no. 3,1996, pp. 52-55. 
Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, 'Federalism, Chinese 
Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China', World Politics, 
vol. 48, no. 4,1995, pp. 50-81. 
Motyl, Alexander J., 'Soviet Legacies, Post-Soviet Transformations', Freedom 
Review, vol. 28, no. 1,1997, pp. 50-59. 
Motyl, Alexander J., Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity and Stability in 
the USSR, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987. 
Moukhariamov, Nail M., 'Tatarstan Model: A Situational Dyna"c', in Beyond the 
Monolith: The Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia, eds. Peter J. 
Stavrakis, Joan DeBardeleben and Larry Black, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996, pp. 213-232. 
Mukhametshin, Farid, Kh. Aleksandr Lozovoi, et. al., Tatarstan: Na perekrestke 
mnenii, Kazan: Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Tatarstan, 1993. 
Mukhammetdinov, Rafael F., 'Put' ot ummy k natsii', Panorama-Forum, no. 8,1997, 
pp. 156-16 1. 
Mukhariamov, Nail M., 'Khronika politicheskogo protsessa (1988-1998)', in Regiony 
Rossii: Khronika i rukovoditeli. Tom. 7, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato, Sapporo, 
Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2000, pp. 20-115. 
310 
Mukharianiov, Nail M., 'Politicheskaia elita Tatarstana: Biograficheskie svedeniia', 
in Region), Rossii: Khronika i rukovoditeli. Tom. 7, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato, 
Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, HoIckaido University, 2000, pp. 116- 
150. 
Murtazin, Gaial, 'Formirovanic Respublikanskoi Partii Tatarstana i Milli Meilisa 
Tatarskogo naroda', Suverenitet, no. 11,1993, p. 32. 
Musina, Rozalina N. and Rafael Tagirov, 'Etnicheskoe samosoznanie cherez prizmu 
sotsiologii', Natichnyi Tatarstan, no. 4,1995, p. 59. 
Musina, Rozalina N., 'Contemporary Ethnosocial and Ethnopolitical Processes in 
Tatarstan', in Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and 
Analysis, eds. Leokadia M. Drobizheva et al., Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
1996, pp. 195-208. 
Musina, Rozalina N., 'Reislamizatsiia Tatar kak forma religioznogo natsionalizma', 
Rossiia i musul'manskii mir, no. 12,1997, pp. 37-40. 
Mustafin, Marat R. and Rashid G. Khuzeev, Vse o Tatarstane (Ekonomiko- 
geograficheskii spravochnik), Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1994. 
Mustafin, Marat R., 'Natsional'nyi vopros v zerkale statistiki', Sovetskaia Tatariia, 
16 March 1990. 
Mustafin, R. A. and A. Ch. Khasanov, Pervyi prezident Tatarstana: Mintimer 
Shaimiev, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1995. 
Muzaev, Timur M., Chechenskaia Respublika. Organy, vlasti i politicheskie sili, 
Moscow: Panorama, 1995. 
North, Douglass, Institutions, Institutional Changes and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Nugaev, Mordii A. and Renat M. Nugaev, Kontseptual'nye osnovy issledovaniia 
Tatarstanskoi modeli sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia, Kazan: KGU, 
1997. 
Olcott, Martha Brill, 'Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in 
Kazalchstan', in Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
Olcott, Martha Brill, 'The New Nations of Central Asia', in The Successor States to 
the USSR, ed. John W. Blaney, Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1995, 
pp. 208-222. 
Orttung, Robert and Peter Reddaway, 'Russian State-Building: The Regional 
Dimension', The Russia Initiative, Carnegie Corporation of New York, March 
2001, pp. 89-114. 
311 
Orttung, Robert, 'Bashkortostan Cracks Down on Investigative Journalists', Russian 
Regional Report, vol. 1, no. 14,27 November 1996. 
Orttung, Robert, 'Tatarstan's Speaker Warns against Attempts to Remove Him', 
Russian Regional Report, vol. 2, no. 15,30 April 1997. 
Orttung, Robert, 'The Hard Road to Federal Reform', Moscow Times, 28 March 2001. 
Ovrutskii, Lev, Shaimiev - Real'nyi i virtual'nyi, Kazan and loshkar-Ola: Maxim, 
2000. 
Pain, Emil A., 'Opyt vzaimootnoshenii Tatarstana i Rossii', in Mezhdunarodnyi opyt 
uregulirovaniia etno-politicheskikh konfliktov, ed. Rafael S. Khakimov, 
Kazan: Panorama-Forum, 1996, pp. 13-16. 
Pain, Emil A., 'Russkii vopros: Ot internatsionalizma k nomenklatumomu 
natsionalizmu? ', Literaturnaia gazeta, 27 January 1999, p. 3. 
Pain, Emil A., Tatarstanskii dogovor na fone chechenskogo krizisa: Problemy 
stanovleniiafederalizma v Rossii, Moscow: Respublika, 1995. 
Panarin, Sergei A., 'Aziia glazami russkikh', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 20 April 1993. 
Paretskaya, Anna, 'Tatarstan's Constitution Amended', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 1, no. 15,4 December 1996. 
Peeters, Patrick, 'Federalism: A Comparative Perspective - Belgium Transforms from 
a Unitary to a Federal State', in Evaluating Federal Systems, ed. Bertus 
DeVilliers, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, 
pp. 194-207. 
Perepelkin, Lev S., 'Istoki mezhetnicheskogo konflikta v Tatarii', Mir Rossii, vol. 1, 
no. 1,1992, pp. 91-112. 
Petro, Nicolai, 'The Novgorod Region: A Russian Success Story', Post-Soviet Affairs, 
vol. 15, no. 3,1999, pp. 235-261. 
Petrov, Nikolai, 'The President's Representatives: "Moscow's Men" in the Regions', 
Jamestown Foundation Prism, vol. 4, no. 7,3 April 1998. 
Powell, G. Bingham, Contemporary Democracy: Participation, Stability, and 
Violence, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982. 
Ramans, Miervaldis, 'Socialist Federalism: Federalism and Democratic Centralism', 
in Soviet Federalism: Nationalism and Economic De -centralization, ed. 
Alastair McAuley, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 199 1, pp. 128-133. 
Ravieaux, Jean-Robert, 'Tatarstan v tsentre sozdaniia federat'noi struktury Rossii: 
Inventsiia suvereniteta-soiuza', Panorama-Forum, no. 11,1997, pp. 291-324. 
Ravieaux, Jean-Robert, 'Tipy natsionalizma, obshchestvo i politika v Tatarstane', 
Politicheskie issledovaniia, vol. 3, no. 5-6,1992, pp. 42-58. 
312 
Rigby, Thomas H., Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres 
. 
from Lenin to Gorbachev, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990. 
Riker, William H., Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Boston: Little 
Brown, 1964. 
Roi, Ya'acov, 'Islam in the Soviet Union after the Second World War', Religion, 
State & Society, vol. 24, nos. 2/3,1996, pp. 159-166. 
Rorlich, Azade-Ayýe, 'History, Collective Memory and Identity: The Tatars of 
Sovereign Tatarstan', Communist and Post- Communist Studies, vol. 32, no. 4, 
1999, pp. 379-396. 
Rorlich, Azade-Ayýe, 'One or More Tatar Nations', in Muslim Communities Re- 
emerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in 
the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ed. Edward Allworth, Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1994, pp. 61-79. 
Rorlich, Azade-Aype, The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience, Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 
Ross, Cameron, 'Federalism and Regional Politics', in Russia after the Cold War, 
eds. Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross, London: Longman, 1999, pp. 85-102. 
Safin, Rashid, 'Tatar ideiase', Tatarstan, no. 6,1996, pp. 12-13. 
Sagitova, Liliia V., Etnichnost' v Sovremennom Tatarstane: Vosproizvodstvo 
etnichnosti v tatarstanskom obshchestve na rubezhe 1980-1990-kh gg. (Po 
materialam respublikanskoi pressy i etnosotsiologicheskikh issledovanii), 
Kazan: Institut Istorii ANT, 1998. 
Saidasheva, M., Lenin i sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo v Tatarii, 1918-1923, 
Moscow, 1969. 
Sakwa, Richard, 'Christian Democracy and Civil Society in Russia', Religion, State 
and Society, vol. 22, no. 3,1994, pp. 273-303. 
Sakwa, Richard, 'Russian Nationalism and Democratic Development', in Russia after 
the Cold war, eds. Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross, London: Longman, 1999, 
pp. 199-220. 
Sakwa, Richard, 'Russian Political Evolution: A Structural Approach', in Rethinking 
the Soviet Collapse: Sovietology, the Death of Communism and the New 
Russia, ed., Michael Cox, London: Pinter, 1998, pp. 181-201. 
Sakwa, Richard, 'State and Society in Post-Communist Russia' in Institutions and 
Political Change in Russia, ed., Neil Robinson, London: Macmillan, 2000, 
pp. 193-211. 
Sakwa, Richard, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Europe-Asia Studies, 
vol. 47, no. 2,1995, pp. 195-228. 
313 
Sakwa, Richard, Postcommunism, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999. 
Sakwa, Richard, Russian Politics and Society, 2"d ed., London: Routledge, 1996. 
Sarsembayev, Azamat, 'Imagined Communities: Kazak Nationalism and 
Kazakification in the 1990s', Central Asian Survey, vol. 18, no. 3,1999, 
pp. 319-346. 
Sarycheva, Irina, 'Raspolzanie pravovoi sistemy - ugroza konstitutsionnoi 
bezopasnosti Rossii', Federalizm, vol. 2, no. 4,1997, pp. 121-142. 
Sawer, Geoffrey, Modern Federalism, Victoria, Australia: Pitman, 1976. 
Schafer, Daniel E., 'The Politics of National Equality Under early NEP: Factions in 
the Tatar Republic, 1920-1924', Central Asian Survey, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 51-77. 
Schamiloglu, Uli, 'The Formation of a Tatar Historical Consciousness: Sihabaddin 
Mercani, and the Image of the Golden Horde', Central Asian Survey, vol. 9, 
no. 2,1990, pp. 39-49. 
Schatz, Edward, 'The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and Ethnicity in 
Kazakhstan', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 52, no. 3,2000, pp. 489-507. 
Sch6pflin, George, Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe, London: 
Hurst & Co., 2000. 
Semenov, Iurii I., Natsional'naia politika v imperatorskoi Rossii, Moscow: Staryi sad, 
1997. 
Sergeev, Sergei A., 'Ob"edinennaia oppozitsiia i izbratel'noe zakonodatel'stvo v 
Respublike Tatarstan', in Osobaia zona: Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. 
Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 
Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, pp. 188-194. 
Sergeev, Sergei A., 'Vybory i referendurny v Respublike Tatarstan, 1989-2000', in 
Osobaia zona: Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, 
Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, 
Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, pp. 298-303. 
Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Russian Empire: 1801-1917, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1967. 
Shaikhutdinova, Gul'nara R., 'Dogovomo-pravovaia praktika Respubliki Tatarstan na 
sovremennorn etape', Panorama-Forum, no. 2,1995, pp. 16-2 1. 
Sharafetdinov, R. D., Sabantui-Khalyknyn yasheeshe, Kazan: Gasyrlar Avazy, 1997. 
Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz, 'Chechnya Versus Tatarstan', Problems of Post- 
Communism, vol. 47, no. 2,2000, pp. 13 -23. 
Sheehy, Ann, 'Tatarstan and Bashkiria: Obstacles to Confederation', RFEIRL 
Research Report, vol. 1, no. 22,29 May 1992, pp. 33-37. 
314 
Sheehy, Ann, 'The USSR All Union and the RSFSR Referendums of March 17', 
RFEIRL Research Report, 29 March 199 1, p. 22. 
Shevtsova, Liliia F., 'Russia's Post-Communist Politics: Revolution or Continuity? ', 
in The New Russia: Troubled Transftmnation. ed. Gail W. Lapidus, Boulder, 
CO: Westview. 1995. pp. 5-36. 
Shklyar, Natan, 'Economic Crisis Strengthens Governors', Russian Regional Report, 
vol. 3, no. 51,22 December 1998. 
Shlapentokh, Dmitry, 'Eurasianism: Past and Present', Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, vol. 30, no. 2,1997, pp. 129-15 1. 
Shlapentokh, Vladimir, 'Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for Contemporary 
Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 48 no. 3,1996, pp. 392-41 1. 
Shlapentokh, Vladimir, Munir Sendich and Emil Pain, The New Russian Diaspora: 
Russian Minorities in the Fonner Soviet Republics, Armonk, NY: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1994. 
Shlapentokh, Vladimir, Roman Levita and Mikhail Loiberg, From Submission to 
Rebellion: The Provinces versus the Center in Russia, Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1997. 
Shnirelman, Viktor A., Who Gets Past? Competition for Ancestors among Non- 
Russian Intellectuals in Russia, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press 1996. 
Shtanin, Aleksandr V., Tobeda kazalas' neveroiatnoi. Uspekh na vyborakh v 
usloviiakh avtoritarnoi vlasti i fal'sifikatsii rezul'tatov', in Osobaia zona: 
Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. 
Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi 
Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, pp. 100-127. 
Slater, Wendy, 'Russia's Plebiscite on a New Constitution', RFEIRL Research 
Report, vol. 3, no. 3,21 January 1994, pp. 1-7. 
Slocum, John W., 'A Sovereign State within Russia? The External Relations of the 
Republic of Tatarstan', Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary 
International Relations, vol. 13, no. 1,1999, pp. 49-76. 
Slocum, John W., 'Who and When were the lnorodtsy? The Evolution of the Category 
of "Aliens" in Imperial Russia', Russian Review, vol. 57, no. 2,1998, pp. 173- 
191. 
Smeets, Rieks H. J. and Egbert G. C. Wesselink, Chechenya [sic]: One Year of War - 
A Pax Christi International Report in Collaboration with the Caucasus 
Foundation, Brussels: Pax Christi International, 1995. 
Smith, Anthony D., National Identity, London: Penguin, 1991. 
Sn-tith, Anthony D., The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. 
315 
Sinith, Gordon B., 'State-Building in the New Russia: Assessing the Yeltsin Record', 
in State-Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge oj' the 
Future, ed. Gordon B. Smith, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, pp. 3-16. 
Smith, Graham, 'Ethnopolitics of Federation without Federalism', in Russia in 
Transition: Politics, Privatization and Inequality, ed. David Lane, London: 
Longman, 1995, pp. 21-35. 
Smith, Graham, 'Russia, Multiculturalism and Federal Justice', Europe-Asia Studies, 
vol. 50, no. 8,1998, pp. 1393-1411. 
Solnick, Steven L., 'Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997', Post-Soviet 
Affairs, vol. 14, no. 1,1998, pp. 48-80. 
Solnick, Steven L., 'The Political Economy of Russian Federalism', Problems of Post- 
Communism, vol. 44, no. 6,1996, pp. 13-26. 
Solnick, Steven L., Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., Kak nam obustroit' Rossiiu. Posil'nye soobrazheniia, 
Moscow: Patriot, 1991. 
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth 
Century. London: Harvill. 1995. 
Sotnikov, Vladimir, Glavari banditskikh klanov, Minsk: Literatura, 1997. 
Spirdsboel-Hanson, Fleming, 'The 1991 Chechen Revolution: The Response of 
Moscow', Central Asian Survey, vol. 13, no. 3,1994, pp. 395-407. 
Spirin, I. A., 'Etnokratiia v Tatarstane', in Etnopolitika na poroge XXI veka, Kazan, 
1995, p. 87. 
Stalin, Joseph V., Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, Moscow: 
Progress, 1974. 
Stalin, Joseph V., Sochineniia, vol. 4, Moscow: Politizdat, 1947. 
Starr, S. Frederick, Decentralisation and Self Government in Russia, 1830-1870, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972. 
Stepanov, Valerii, 'Ethnic Tensions and Separatism in Russia', Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, vol. 26, no. 2,2000, pp. 305-332. 
Stephan, Alfred, 'Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective', Post-Soviet 
Affairs, vol. 16, no. 2,2000, pp. 133-176. 
Stoliarova, Guzel, 'Mezhetnicheskie sem'i v Tatarstane', in lazyk i natsionalizin v 
postsovetskikh respublikakh, ed. Mikhail N. Guboglo, Moscow: IEA RAN, 
1994, pp. 175-182. 
316 
Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn, 'Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy', Post-Soviet 
, A/jairs, vol. 15, no. 1,1999, pp. 87-106. 
Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional 
Governance Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
Sultanbekov, Bulat F., 'Mir Said Sultan-Galiev: His Character and Fate', Central 
Asian Survey, vol. 9, no. 2,1990, pp. 109-118. 
Szporluk, Roman, Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
Tagirov, Engel R., Tatarstan: Natsioncil'no-gosudarstvennye interesy, Kazan: Izd-vo 
KFEI, 1996. 
Tamir, Yael, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
Tanrisever, Oktay F., 'Review of Sergei Kondrashov's Nationalism and the Drive for 
Sovereignty in Tatarstan, 1988-92: Origins and Development', Slavonic and 
East European Review, vol. 79, no. 2,2001 pp. 370-372. 
Tanrisever, Oktay F., 'The h-npact of the 1994 Tatar-Russian Power Sharing Treaty on 
the Formation of Post-Soviet Tatar National Identity', Slovo, vol. 13, no. 1, 
2001, pp. 43-60. 
Tarlton, Charles D., 'Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: 
Theoretical Speculation', Journal of Politics, vol. 27, no. 11,1965, pp. 861-874. 
Teague, Elizabeth, 'Center-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation', in 
National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. 
Roman Szporluk, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994, pp. 21-57. 
Teague, Elizabeth, 'Russia and Tatarstan Sign Power-Sharing Treaty', RFEIRL 
Research Report, vol. 3, no 14,8 April 1994, pp. 19-27. 
Teague, Elizabeth, 'Russia and the Regions: The Uses of Ambiguity', in 
Transformation from Below: Local Power and the Political Economy of Post- 
Communist Transitions, eds. John Gibson and Philip Hanson, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 1996, pp. 13-36. 
Terkel, Studs, Race: How Blacks and Whites Think and Feel about the American 
Obsession, New York: The New Press, 1992. 
The Territories of the Russian Federation, I" ed., London: Europa, 1999. 
Thornhill, John, 'Island of Pragmatism in Russia', Financial Times, 20 February 
1996. 
Thornhill, John, 'Shaimiev Alligns Himself with Enemy NoX, Financial Times, 6 
August 1999, p. 2. 
317 
Tolz, Vera, 'Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post- 
Communist Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 6,1998, pp. 993-1023. 
Tompson, William J., Khrushchev: A Political Life, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1995. 
Tompson, William, 'Financial Backwardness in Contemporary Perspective: Prospects 
for the Development of Financial Intermediation in Russia', Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 52, no. 4,2000, pp. 605-625. - 
Tompson, William, 'Old Habits Die Hard: Fiscal Imperatives, State Regulation and 
the Role of Russia's Banks', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 7,1997, 
pp. 1159-1186. 
Tompson, William, 'Russia: Putin's Power Plays', World Today, vol. 56, no. 7,2000, 
pp. 14-16. 
Torbakov, Igor, 'The "Statists" and the Ideology of Russian Imperial Nationalism', 
RFEIRL. Research Report, II December 1992, pp. 10- 16. 
Tramifov, Dmitry , 'The Friday Mosques and Their Imams 
in the Former Soviet 
Union', Religion, State & Society, vol. 24, nos. 2/3,1996, pp. 193-219. 
Treisman, Daniel S., 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional 
Leaders in a Postcommunist Order', World Politics, vol. 41, no. 1,1997, 
pp. 212-249. 
Treisman, Daniel S., After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation 
in Russia, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999. 
Trudy, Rubin, 'Holding Russians at Bay', The Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 February 
1995. 
Tuminez, Astrid S., Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of 
Foreign Policy, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 
Urban, Michael, 'The Politics of Identity in Russia's Post-Communist Transition: The 
Nation Against Itself', Slavic Review, vol. 53, no. 3,1994, pp. 733-765. 
Valitova, R. G. and S. G. Vagizov, Latin Khareflere belan yazu hem uku, Kazan: 
Magarif, 1997. 
Vasil'ev, Aleksandr, 'Tretii srok dlia Shaimieva', in Osobaia zona: Vybory v 
Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and 
Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi 
Assamblei, 2000, pp. 294-296. 
Volkov, Vadim E., 'Etnokratiia: nepredvidennyi fenomen posttotalitamogo niira', 
Politicheskie issledovaniia, vol. 4, no. 2,1993, pp. 40-48. 
318 
Walker, Edward W., 'Federalism-Russian Style: The Federation Provisions in 
Russia's New Constitution', Problems of Post- Commun ism, vol. 43, no. 4, 
1995, pp. 3-12. 
Walker, Edward W., 'Negotiating Autonomy: Tatarstan, Asymmetrical Federalism 
and State Consolidation in Russia', in Separatism: Democracy and 
Disintegration, ed. Metta Spencer, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, 
pp. 227-252. 
Walsh, James, 'Wrath of the Prophet', Time International, 19 February 1996. 
Weber, Eugene, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 
1870-1914, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1976. 
Willerton, John P., 'Post-Soviet Clientelist Norms at the Russian Federal Level', in 
Elites and Leadership in Russian Politics, ed. Graeme Gill, London: 
Macmillan, 1998, pp. 52-80. 
Woodruff, David, 'Barter of the Bankrupt: The Politics of Demonetization in Russia's 
Federal State', in Uncertain Transitions: Ethnographies of Change in the 
Postsocialist World, eds. Michael Buraway and Katherine Verdery, Oxford: 
Rowman&Littlefield, 1999, pp. 83-124. 
Wozniuk, Vladimir, 'In Search of Ideology: The Politics of Religion and Nationalism 
in the New Russia', Nationalities Papers, vol. 25 no. 2,1997, pp. 195-210. 
Wyman, Matthew, Public Opinion in Post-Communist Russia, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1997. 
Yakhin, Farid, 'Ber Sharekh', Elluki, 6 June 1997. 
Yanov, Alexander L., The Russian New Right: Right Wing Ideologies in the 
Contemporary USSR, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988. 
Yernelianova, Galina M., 'Islam and Nation Building in Tatarstan and Dagestan of the 
Russian Federation', Nationalities Papers, vol. 27, no. 4,1999, pp. 605-630. 
Yemelianova, Gatina M., 'New Muftis, New RussiansT Jamestown Foundation 
Prism, vol. 5, no. 16,27 August 1999. 
Yernelianova, Galina M., 'Shaimiev's "Khanate" on the Volga and its Russian 
Subjects', Asian Ethnicity, vol. 1, no. 1,2000, pp. 37-52. 
Zagidullin, II'dus, 'Prichiny otpadeniia starokreshchenykh tatar Srednego Povolzh'ia 
v musul'manstvo v XIX v. ', Panorama-Forum, no. 11,1997, pp. 34-56. 
Zakiev, Mirfatykh Z., Tatary: problemy istorii i iazyka, Kazan: HaLl ANT, 1995, 
pp. 144-145. 
Zarakhovich, Yuri, 'A Clash of Kremlins', Time, 14 December 1998, p-27- 
319 
Zaslavsky, Victor, 'The Evolution of Separatism in Soviet Society under Gorbachev', 
in From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet 
Republics, eds. Gail W. Lapidus, et. al., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992, pp. 71-98. 
Zenkovsky, Sergei A., Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1960. 
Zheleznov, Bofis L., Pravovoi status Respubliki Tatarstan, Kazan: Tatknizdat, 1996. 
Zolotov, Andrei, 'Keeping Islam in Line', Moscow Times, 16 May 1998. 
Zolotov, Andrei, 'Tatarstan Closes Down Opposition Newspaper', Moscow Times, 28 
April 1998. 
Zotov, Anatolii F., 'Federalizm v kontekste sporov o "russkoi natsional'noi idee"', 
Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, vol. 7, no. 2,1996, pp. 84-90. 
Zubov, Andrei B. and Aleksei M. Salmin, 'Soiuznyi dogovor i mekhanizm vyrabotki 
novogo natsional'no-gosudarstvennogo ustroistva SSSR', Politicheskie 
issledovaniia, vol. 2, no. 1,199 1, pp. 42-57. 
Zverev, Alexei, 'Qualified Sovereignty: The Tatarstan Model for Resolving 
Conflicting Loyalties', in Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet 
Russia and Eurasia, eds. Michael Waller, Bruno Coppieters, and Aleksei V. 
Malashenko, London: Frank Cass, 1998, pp. 118-144. 
Interviews with Specialists 
Abdurakhmanov, Rafik M., Chairperson of the Volga-Ural Centre for Conflict 
Regulation, Kazan, I June 1998. 
Bukharaev, Ravil, the Russian Service of BBC, Madison, WI, USA, 29 September 
2000. 
Burganov, Akhdas Kh., Professor, the Department of History at the Russian State 
Humanities University, Moscow, 28 July 1998. 
Drobizheva, Leokadia M., Chairperson of the Political Anthropology Department at 
the Institute of Anthropology and Ethnology, the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, Moscow, 24 June 1998. 
Farukshin, Midkhat Kh., Chairperson of the Department of Political Science at the 
Kazan State University, Kazan, 2 June 1998. 
Iskhakov, Damir M., Ethnologist, the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences 
of the Republic of Tatarstan, Kazan, 4 June 1998. 
320 
Ossipov, Aleksandr G., Ethnologist, Chairperson of the Centre for Ethnic Studies at 
the International Institute for Humanities and Political Studies, London, II 
December 1996. 
Schamiloglu, Uli, Chairperson of the Department of Languages and Cultures of Asia 
at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA, 30 September 2000. 
321 
Appendices 
Appendix 1. The Full Texts of the Key Documents on the Status of Tatarstan in the 
Russian Federation 
1.1. Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan 
The Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 
-realising the historical responsibility for the fortunes of multinational peoples; 
-expressing respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples, inhabiting the 
Russian Federation 
and the USSR; 
-realising the incapability of the status of Autonomous Republic, and the 
interests of the 
future political, economic, social and spiritual development of the multinational peoples; 
-ensuring the inherent rights of Tatars, and of the whole population of the Republic to self- 
determination; 
-aiming at the creation of a legal democratic state, 
1. Proclaims the Tatar state sovereignty, and reforms the Autonomous Republic into the 
Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic (The Tatar SSR) - The Republic of Tatarstan. 
2. The land, its natural resources and other resources on the territory of the Tatar SSR shall 
be the exclusive property of the Tatar people. 
3. Irrespective of nationality, social origin, belief, political convictions and other differences, 
the Tatar SSR shall guarantee all the citizens of the Republic equal rights and freedoms. 
Russian and Tatar shall be the state languages and shall be equal in the Tatar SSR, the 
maintenance and development of languages of other nationalities shall be ensured - 
4. The official state name in the Constitution, in other legal acts and in state activity shall be 
'The Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic' ('The Tatar SSR' or 'The Republic of Tatarstan'). The 
Republic's Supreme body of power shall be named 'The Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR' 
and its enacting acts shall be named: the acts of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR. 
5. The present declaration shall be the basis for Tatar Constitution, for Tatar legislation, for 
participation of the Tatar SSR in drafting and signing the Union Treaty, for agreements with 
the RSFSR and other republics. It also shall be the basis for the presentation of the most 
important questions of state fon-nation of the Tatar SSR, its relations with the USSR, with the 
RSFSR and other republics for the consideration of its people. The Constitution and the acts 
of the Tatar SSR shall be supreme on the territory of the Tatar SSR. 
6. Before the adoption of new Constitution of the Tatar SSR, other laws and regulations of 
the Tatar SSR, acting laws of the Tatar SSR, of the Russian Federation and the USSR remain 
valid on the territory of the Tatar SSR, unless they contradict the Declaration on the state 
sovereignty of the Tatar SSR. 
The present Declaration shall come into force from the date of its adoption. 
Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic 
Kazan, 30 August 1990 
Source: 'Deklaratsiia o gosudarstvennom suverenitete TSSR', in Belaia kniga Tatarstana Pitt' k stiverenitelu 
1990-1995 (Sbornik dokumentov), ed. Rafael S. Khakimov, Kazan: 11 ANT, 1995, p. 5. 
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1.2. The Power-Sharing Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Tatarstan 'On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of 
Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of 
the Republic of Tatarstan' 
The plenipotentiaries of the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of 
the Republic of Tatarstan: 
empowered by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the 
Republic of Tatarstan; 
based on the universally recognised right of peoples to self-determination, and the principles 
of equality, voluntariness and free will; 
guaranteeing the preservation of the territorial integrity and the unity of common economic 
space; 
promoting the preservation and development of historical and national customs, cultures, 
languages; 
being concerned about ensuring civil peace, international accord and security of peoples; 
acknowledging the priority of the basic human rights and freedoms regardless of nationality, 
religion, location of habitation and other differences; 
taking into account the fact that the Republic of Tatarstan, as a state that is united with the 
Russian Federation according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution 
of the Republic of Tatarstan. and the Treaty on the Delimitation of Jurisdictional Authority 
and the Mutual Delegation of Powers between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation 
and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, and participates in international and 
foreign economic relations, have agreed to the following: 
Article I 
Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State 
Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be 
governed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of 
Tatarstan and the present Treaty. 
Article R 
The Republic of Tatarstan has its own Constitution and Legislation. 
The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall execute the authority of state power and 
shall: 
1) guarantee the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; 
2) form the republican budget, and define and impose the republican taxes; 
3) decide the issues concerning jurisprudence and notary public; 
4) implement the legal regulation of administrative, family and housing relations as well as 
relations in the area of environmental protection and use of natural resources; 
5) grant amnesty to individuals convicted by the courts of the Republic of Tatarstan; 
6) decide the issues concerning the possession, use and disposal of land, mineral wealth, 
water, timber and other natural resources as well as state enterprises, organizations, and other 
movable and immovable state property, located on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan, 
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which is the exclusive property of the people of Tatarstan except for units of federal property. 
Delimitation of the state property shall be governed by a separate Agreement; 
7) establish the system of State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan as well as their 
organizational structure and activity; 
8) decide the issues of the republican citizenship; 
9) establish the order for alternative civil service on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan 
for citizens having the right to substitute their service in the armed forces in accordance with 
the federal law; 
10) establish and maintain relations, conclude treaties and agreements with the republics, 
territories, regions, autonomous districts and regions, and the cities of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg of the Russian Federation which shall not contradict the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, the present Treaty and 
other agreements between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of 
the Republic of Tatarstan; 
11) participate in international affairs, shall establish relations with foreign states and 
conclude treaties, which shall not contradict the Constitution and international obligations of 
the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the present Treaty, 
shall participate in the activity of corresponding international organizations; 
12) create a National Bank pursuant to a separate agreement; 
13) conduct foreign economic activity independently. The delimitation of authorities in the 
field of foreign economic activity shall be settled by a special agreement; 
14) decide on the order established by a separate agreement, the questions of conversion for 
enterprises which are in the possession of the Republic of Tatarstan; 
15) establish the state awards and honorary titles of the Republic of Tatarstan. 
Article III 
The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan 
jointly are authorized to: 
1) guarantee the civil rights and freedoms of persons and citizens, the fights of national 
minorities; 
2) protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
3) organize mobilization of the national economy, direction of the design and production of 
armaments and military equipment on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan; questions 
concerning the sale of armaments, ammunition, military equipment and other military 
property as well as the conversion of defence industry. The form and share of the Parties' 
participation shall be governed by a separate agreement; 
4) settle the common and contradictory questions of citizenship; 
5) coordinate the international and foreign economic relations; 
6) coordinate pricing policy; 
7) create funds for regional development; 
8) pursue monetary policy; 
9) manage the items of property of the Russian Federation or the Republic of Tatarstan, 
which may be transferred to the joint management according to interest based on voluntary 
and mutual consent. The forms and the order for common management of specific items 
shall be governed by a separate Agreement; 
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10) coordinate activity on the questions of geodesy, meteorology and calendar systern; 
11) create joint funds for the purpose of financing common programmes, elimination of the 
consequences of disasters and catastrophes on the basis of mutual agreements; 
12) coordinate the management of common power system as well as highway, railway, 
pipeline, tubing, air and water transport, communications and information systems; 
13) ensure an unobstructed and duty-free regime for movement and transportation of 
vehicles, cargoes and products by air, sea, river, railway and highway as well as through 
pipeline transport; 
14) estimate the quality of environment conditions according to the international standards 
and promote the measures for its stabilization and rehabilitation; secure the ecology, 
coordinate the action concerning the use of land, water and other natural resources; prevent 
ecological disasters and settle questions on specially protected natural areas; 
15) implement common policy in the social sphere: population employment patterns, 
migration processes and social protection, including social welfare; 
16) coordinate activity on the issues of health care, family, maternity, paternity, childhood, 
education, science, culture, physical education and sport; the preparation of national 
specialists for schools, educational and cultural institutions, mass media and other 
institutions and organizations; shall provide pre-school institutions and educational 
institutions with native language literature; shall co-ordinate scientific research in the field of 
history, national cultures and their languages; 
17) deal with problems of personnel for justice and police enforcement agencies; 
18) settle litigation, arbitration and notary public questions; 
19) coordinate the activity of police enforcement agencies, the cooperation of security 
services, the creation and use of programmes to combat crime; 
20) establish common principles for organising the state bodies and local self-government; 
21) establish administrative, administrative-legal, labour, family, housing, land, water, timber 
legislation, legislation on mineral wealth, on protection of the surrounding environment; 
22) address the questions of common use of land, mineral wealth, water and other natural 
resources; 
23) execute other authority established by mutual agreement. 
Article IV 
Within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its State Bodies are found: 
1) the adoption and alteration of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws 
as well as control of their observance; the implementation of the federal system on the 
territory of the Russian Federation; 
2) the regulation and protection of human and civil fights and freedoms; the questions of 
citizenship in the Russian Federation; the regulation and protection of the fights of national 
minorities; 
3) the establishment of a system of federal legislative, executive and judicial power and the 
order of their organization and activity; formation of federal bodies of state authority; 
4) the federal state property and its management; 
5) the establishment of the basis of federal policy and federal programmes in the fields of 
state, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian 
Federation; 
325 
6) the establishment of the legal basis for a common market; finance, currency, credit, 
customs regulation, money supply, principals of general price policy; federal economic 
agencies, including federal banks; 
7) the federal budget, federal taxes and duties, federal funds for regional development; 
8) the federal power system, nuclear energy, fissionable materials; federal transport, 
communication pathways, information and communication systems, space activity; 
9) foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation, international 
agreements of the Russian Federation; questions of war and peace; 
10) foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation; 
11) defence and security; the defence industry; the determination of the order of sale and 
purchase of armament, ammunition, military equipment and other military property; 
production of toxic substance, drugs and the order of their use; 
12) the determination of the status and the defence of state borders, territorial waters, air 
space, the exclusive economic area and continental shelf of the Russian Federation; 
13) the judicial system; the procurator's Office; penal legislation, criminal procedure and 
penal-executive legislation; amnesty and clemency; civil legislation and procedure and 
arbitration-procedural legislation; 
14) federal law of conflicts; 
15) the meteorological service, standards, standard meters, metric system, time calculation, 
geodesy, cartography, names of geographical places; formal statistics and book-keeping; 
16) state awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation; 
17) Federal State Service. 
Article V 
Judicial documents, issued by the State Bodies, institutions and officials of the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan within the limits of authority of these State Bodies, 
institutions and officials, shall be valid. 
Article VI 
The State Bodies of the Russian Federation as well as the State Bodies of the Republic of 
Tatarstan shall have no rights to issue any legal act on issues which do not relate to their area 
of responsibility. 
The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan as well as the Federal State Bodies shall have 
the right to protest against the acts of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan 
where they infringe upon the present Treaty. 
Disputes on the execution of authority in the sphere of common competence of the State 
Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be 
settled in accordance with the procedure agreed to between the Parties. 
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Article VII 
For the purpose of executing the present Treaty, the State Bodies of the Russian Federation 
and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have the right to conclude additional 
agreements, create joint structures and commissions on an equal footing. 
Article VIH 
The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan 
shall have plenipotentiary representatives in the cities of Moscow and Kazan. 
Article IX 
No unilateral cancellation, alteration or amendment of the present Treaty or its provisions 
shall become valid. 
The Treaty shall become effective 7 days after its signing and shall be published for public 
dissemination. 
The present Treaty is concluded on February 15,1994 in the city of Moscow in two copies, 
each in Russian and Tatar, both texts having equal judicial force. 
On behalf of the Russian Federation: 
Boris N. Eftsin 
President of the Russian Federation 
Viktor S. Chernomyrdin 
Prime Minister of the Russian Federation 
On behalf of the Republic of Tatarstan: 
Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev 
President of the Republic of Tatarstan 
Mukhammat G. Sabirov 
Prime NCnister of the Republic of Tatarstan 
Moscow, 15 February 1994 
Source: 'Dogovor Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Respublild Tatarstan o razgranichenij predmetov vedenfia i vzaitmom 
delegirovanii polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami 
gosudarstvennoi vlasti Respubliki Tatarstana', in Belaia kniga Tatarstana. Put' k suverenitetu 1990-1995 
(Sbomik dokurnentov), ed. Rafael S. Khakimov, Kazan-. 11 ANT, 1995, pp. 86-92. 
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Appendix U. Keynote Policy Statements of Russian President Boris N. El'tsin and 
Tatarstan President Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev on Russian Federalism 
2.1. The Text of Russian President Boris N. El'tsin's Annual Message to the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation 'Federalism and Local Self-Government', 
Moscow, 16 February 1"5. 
Russian history has decreed that the state's sovereignty extends over a vast territory and 
covers numerous peoples. By virtue of the size of the territory and the huge diversity of living 
conditions - historical, national, economic, natural- Russia has two methods of preserving 
itself as a unified state. One is unitarism, rigorously centralised government. It was on this 
basis that Russia existed until recently. This method is based mainly on the command 
principle. The effectiveness of the authority depends here on the might of illegal coercive 
means. Our society has adopted a different path of preserving the state's unity - federalism, 
the decentralisation of government. This method is, naturally, based on law, including the 
strict regulation of the competence of the federal and regional authorities. It is a method of 
not simply preserving Russia's integrity, but also ensuring the effective protection of society 
and the citizens and the harmonious development of the spiritual, cultural, and economic 
links between all the components of the Russian state. 
The majority of Russia's citizens today understand that the problem of Russia's sovereignty 
is firmly linked to the federalisation of the country, and that federalism is the surest path, not 
to undermining the integrity of the state, but to promoting its cohesion. It is federalism that 
offers an outlet for the territorial communities' desire for autonomy and free development. 
The first steps toward the formation of true federalism, in particular the transfer of powers 
from the centre to the regions, were perceived by many as a sign of the state's weakness, an 
encroachment on its sovereignty, and even a threat to its territorial integrity. It must be 
admitted that there were some grounds for such fears. At first, there were politicians who 
built their careers specifically on separatist slogans and on the struggle against the federal 
authority. But federalism in Russia gained strength, and by last year it had become clear that 
the overt threat of separatism had been overcome. This is considerably to the credit of both 
the federal and the territorial authorities. They did not allow the situation to become really 
dangerous to Russia's integrity. With very rare exceptions, the question of any territories' 
seceding from Russia did not arise. We had sufficient statesmanlike wisdom and 
responsibility for this. Treaties between the Russian Federation organs of state power and the 
organs of power of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Kabardino-Balkaria made it possible to 
raise the level of mutual understanding with those components of the Federation and to 
stabilise the political situation there. 
The time has come to formulate and enshrine in legislation the criteria on the basis of which 
the federal organs of power can clarify constitutional relations with the Federation 
components. Here the constitutional principle of our Federation's structure must remain 
inviolate. The Federation components have enormous scope for total self-fulfilment within 
the framework of the Russian Constitution. It guarantees them the broadest powers to resolve 
their own internal problems. They retain all the rights of state power except those fisted as 
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federal prerogatives. In order to reflect the peculiar characteristics of life in their own 
territories, they are entitled to create their own fundamental laws - charters and constitutions. 
Nonetheless the granting to the Federation components of wide autonomy and the 
delimitation of spheres of jurisdiction and powers between the federal organs of power and 
the organs of power of individual Federation components do not entirely solve the problem 
of preserving the unity and integrity of the Russian state. It is necessary to improve regional 
policy. This is the most important area of federal policy, based on an integrated system of 
documents reflecting both the strategic national security interests of Russia as a unified 
federal state, and the developmental needs of the regions themselves, and - most important - 
the need of all the Federation components for co-ordinated co-operation with one another for 
the benefit of each individual territory and the country as a whole. 
Experience shows that the interests of an individual territory by no means always coincide 
with the interests of the state as a whole, and are not infrequently in conflict with the interests 
of neighbouring territories. But despite these complexities and contradictions, last year it 
proved possible to make marked progress in the formulation of regional policy. This problem 
has been studied conceptually both in the presidential structures, and in the government, and 
in the Federal Assembly. It is now a matter of translating concepts into the language of 
concrete measures and programs. This work should be completed by the fall of this year, in 
order to provide for the appropriate measures in next year's budget. 
Last year was the year of the birth of Russian budgetary federalism. Unified norms were 
formulated for the distribution of revenue from the main federal taxes between the federal 
and regional budgets, and a formula was defined for the expenditure of resources from the 
Fund for Financial Support for the Federation Components. As a result the budgetary 
autonomy and responsibility of the Federation components increased, and it was possible to a 
significant extent to relax the tension in inter-budgetary relations. In 1995 a new mechanism 
for budgetary relationships should be established, embracing all the Federation components. 
The granting of federal support funds to the territories should be substantiated to a greater 
degree. 
Local self-government is an important mechanism for ensuring the country's unity. 
Developed local self-government can be one of the most reliable guarantees of the state's 
integrity. It is the cement that, binds Russia's state integrity. The municipal authority is closer 
to the citizens and is engaged primarily in resolving their most urgent, day-to-day problems. 
It has a direct interest in a federal authority that is, legally speaking, strong, and capable of 
ensuring higher social standards in citizens' lives and clamping down on any arbitrariness by 
regional authorities. 
The formation and development of local self-government has been talked about a lot, but 
much less has been done about it in practice. This situation must be rectified. It is not enough 
to adopt a law on the general principles of organisation of local self-government. It is vitally 
important to peg to the implementation of this law a system of measures ensuring the 
development of local self-government as a viable level of power, and at the same time as a 
form of people's self-organisation with the best long-term future. 
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Unfortunately, the draft federal program for state support for local self-government has spent 
more than a year passing from office to office for co-ordination. In 1995 the government 
must ratify this federal program. The rights and interests of local self-government must be 
taken into account in the process of the reform of budgetary, tax, and land relations. The 
objective necessity to organise the compilation of municipal statistics in the Russian 
Federation has become urgent. Without this, we cannot count on a realistic state policy on 
transforming local power on democratic principles. 
Source: Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 February 1995. 
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2.2. The Text of Tatarstan President Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev's Keynote Address 'The 
Future of the Russian Federation: A Look [sic] from Tatarstan', Harvard University 
(USA), 6 October 1994. 
Dear Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
As you all know, a number of independent states emerged following the disintegration of the 
USSR. However, though this is not your fault, most of you don't know that there is a 
Tatarstan, which plays an important role in reforming Russia today. Among the twenty 
former autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, Tatarstan was destined to lead the 
movement for reshaping the Russian Federation through both preventing the development of 
Russia along an imperial fine and doing everything possible for benefiting from this historic 
opportunity to create a democratic Russian Federation. 
Why Tatarstan? There are certain reasons for this. Tatarstan has always kept a very strong 
tradition of statehood, and the development of its relations with the Russian state have been 
very complicated. In the mid-XVI century, the Kazan Khanate, which was located in the 
territory of present-day Tatarstan, was conquered by Ivan the Terrible. Unlike the Russian 
lands that had already joined the Moscow state voluntarily, the Kazan Khanate was captured 
following a really dreadful battle. Certainly, this development left its imprint in the history of 
the Tatar-Russian relations. The second reason is that Tatarstan has a huge industrial- 
agricultural potential. Even in the former Soviet context, Tatarstan was among the first 
twelve republics in terms of economic development. The industrial potential of Tatarstan 
exceeded the potentials of the three Baltic states together. Naturally, this was also an 
important thing. Tatarstan possesses rich natural resources. More than 25 billion tons of oil 
have been extracted in the last fifty years. Because of this, there is a well-developed petro- 
chemical industry in the republic. We produce large amounts of rubber and polyethylene. 
You know that KamAZ joint-stock company, which produces heavy-trucks, is located in 
Tatarstan as well. Furthermore, Tatarstan enjoys highly-developed aircraft and helicopter 
industries and also other industrial branches. Furthermore, Tatarstan fully meets its own 
agricultural demands. So, it is not surprising that we have harvested plentiful crops when the 
harvest rate has decreased throughout Russia for the last three years. Yes, we have enormous 
industrial potential. Yet, we used to five in such a system where the population could not take 
advantage of all these opportunities to make their lives better economically because of the 
over-centralised economy. This intensified the feeling of anger among the unemployed 
labour force. 
I am an experienced official. As a former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
TASSR, I could illustrate the over-centralisation of the economy by one obvious example. 
Without permission from Moscow, it was not possible even to set the fat content of traded 
milk. Hence, you can guess what kind of centralisation and arbitrary practices ruled in the 
regions. In 1985 - the year we had been awaiting for such a long time - the restructuring 
(perestroika) of the whole society started. No matter how we consider Mikhail Gorbachev 
today, he was the first man who had the courage to reform the old machine. Nevertheless, he 
met the fate of many unsuccessful refon-ners. We can definitely say that there is no way back. 
There could be some people who would like to go back to the Soviet system, it is impossible. 
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In the last few years, the people have realised that they are 'the people'. We had always 
wondered why the American state and the American people speak so much of human rights. 
I can even tell you that until perestroika we could not comprehend it. It is only now that we 
conceive how deep their significance is. This is what perestroika gave us. I think this is the 
most valuable thing. Nevertheless, people still face many problems resulting from the 
destruction of the former Soviet system. Now, I would Eke to revert to the main theme of my 
speech. When it became possible to speak freely about everything, the people gained an 
opportunity to recall their past and present. Significant changes occurred in the mentality of 
the people. The people in Tatarstan wondered why they had to five like that. They thought 
that they should be independent and have their own state. The process of restructuring 
(perestroika) of minds was developing very rapidly. 
It should be said that the educational level of the people living in the Republic of Tatarstan is 
very high. Tatarstan and Kazan have always been the histofical, cultural and scientific centre 
linking Europe and Asia. I was given the data about the number of students in Boston. This 
is really amazing! However, I can say the same thing about Kazan. We have some I million 
and 200 thousand people living in Kazan, and the one-tenth of all inhabitants of the city is a 
University student. This stems from our history. Moreover, 922 of every thousand people 
working in the production sector have higher or secondary education. Consequently, the 
whole multinational society started to voice their rights. In 1990,1 was the Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet (our parliament). Taking into account the will of our people, the Parliament 
adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty and proclaimed Tatarstan a sovereign state. 
Since that moment the events ran much faster. 
You know that in 1990 Boris El'tsin, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian 
Federation, visited Tatarstan. At the meeting he spelled a phrase that became a byword: 'You 
can take as much sovereignty as you can swallow'. And, it turned out that we actually 
managed to take a lot of sovereignty into our hands in the last few years. When the law on 
electing the first president of Russia was adopted in 199 1, our parliament raised the issue of 
electing our own president to protect the sovereignty of Tatarstan. The elections for the 
presidents of Tatarstan and the President of the Russian Federation were scheduled for 12 
June 199 1. All the necessary conditions were created for the elections, and the first presidents 
of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation were elected on the same day. It should be said that 
on that day, the voters in Tatarstan did not participate in the elections for the President of the 
Russian Federation. 
In 1992, as the process kept evolving, we organised a referendum on the state status of 
Tatarstan. The question was formulated as follows: 'Do you agree that Tatarstan is a 
sovereign state associated with the Russian Federation on the basis of a treaty on mutual 
delegation of powers'. When the referendum day was specified, we felt a real confrontation 
with Moscow. I do not want to blame any Russian leader personally, but they reactivated 
their old imperial mentality inherited from the totalitarian times in full force. How could the 
people dare to declare their sovereignty? But we were confident that it is nobody else but the 
people who can solve this problem. That is why we adopted the declaration of state 
sovereignty on behalf of the multinational people of Tatarstan. Just a few days before the 
referendum, the Russian Constitutional Court stated that it was an unlawful referendum 
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which should be abolished. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation organised a 
heanng on the speech made by the speaker of our parliament. A group of Russian 
prosecutors were also sent to the republic. At that time, we had 2,611 polling stations; all the 
chairmen of these stations received a written notification stating that if they opened the 
polling stations, they would be sued. I still do not know the reason why, but Boris El'tsin, the 
President of Russia, addressed the people of Tatarstan on TV on the eve of the referendum in 
an attempt to dissuade the people from participating in the referendum, and to call for a 
boycott. He said that if the people of Tatarstan said 'yes' to the referendum question, it would 
possibly lead to bloodshed. On the same evening, I made my own appeal to the people after 
El'tsin's address. I explained the undemocratic character of his addressing. I said that it 
would be only through a positive answer to the referendum question that every family could 
enjoy peace and tranquillity. The next day after the referendum, I received the first data. All 
votes were counted, and over sixty percent of those who participated in the referendum said 
4yes'. I am telling you this to show what a difficult way we had to go through to reach 
democracy. 
Based on the outcomes of the referendum, we adopted the new Constitution of Tatarstan. We 
invited foreign experts, and their assessment is that the Constitution of Tatarstan is the 
Constitution of a democratic society which observes the human rights, the rights of nations, 
the rights of ownership, and that our economy is a socially-oriented market economy. I think 
the most important thing is that we declared two state languages: Russian and Tatar, and that 
the Constitution recognises the rights of all citizens of Tatarstan to have the citizenship of the 
Russian Federation. Today, I can say that those were the main stabilising factors. You know 
the events in Moldavia developed in the negative way just for one reason - they declared one 
state language. You also know that similar situations are also arising in Ukraine and in 
Kazakhstan. And I consider this to be the most important matter. The main thing which 
should be remembered here is that the Russian language is still a language of inter-ethnic 
communication. We declared two official languages yet, eventually, the native language will 
benefit from this, because it should be upgraded, and be given the conditions for its 
development. These are merely the words to remember for future young politicians sitting 
here. 
As the time passed and the democratic processes developed, Russian and international public 
opinion gradually began to recognise everything that was accomplished in Tatarstan. For 
three years, we have conducted arduous negotiations with President El'tsin concerning the 
character of interrelations between Tatarstan and Russia. These were very hard days, but 
President El'tsin should be judged fairly. After three years of negotiations, we have 
succeeded in signing the Treaty on mutual delegation of powers, that corresponds to our 
Declaration of State Sovereignty. The Treaty is, undoubtedly, a bilateral document. We made 
mutual concessions. The principal thing is that we do not violate the integrity of the Russian 
Federation. And finally, we came to a formula that Tatarstan is united with the Russian 
Federation on the basis of this Treaty. While delimiting the authorities of the State Bodies of 
the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, the Treaty recognises both the Russian 
and the Tatarstan constitutions. At the same time, to implement this treaty, we signed 
fourteen intergovernmental agreements on the issues of property, military construction, 
banking, budgets, cadre training, et cetera. 
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I can say that the Treaty was apprehended with satisfaction by the majority, and it has 
resulted in complete stabilisation of the situation in the Republic. The main political meaning 
of the Treaty is that Russia, by signing the Treaty with the former autonomous republic, 
deprived itself of the possibility of developing itself as a unitary state. And I regard this 
Treaty to be to the benefit of both Russia and Tatarstan. There were so many antagonists of 
the Treaty. They blamed me. To a smaller degree, they also blamed President El'tsin. But, he 
could take this liberty to do so as a man adherent to democratic principles. A treaty between 
the Russian Federation and Bashkortostan was already signed, and treaties with other 
republics are under way. This means that true federation starts from below on a democratic 
basis. In my opinion, this is a great achievement, since Russia is a very peculiar country with 
respect to its national, ethnic, and territorial composition. It should be said that today 
economic reforms go on with difficulties. It is my personal opinion that the transition period 
is rather dragged on, it might have been shorter as well. And we as politicians, I also include 
myself in this category, have failed, from the very beginning, to work out a concept of 
transition towards market economy that would prevent a sharp decrease in people's living 
standards. 
Everybody learns from his own mistakes, and tries to minimise them. We needed our own 
way of transition towards market economy. There is no other country in the world that 
transits to a market economy with such a monopolised economic base and centralised system 
of management, as had Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. By now, under conditions of transition towards market, these monopolists, 
unfortunately, are still playing their role. Nevertheless, nowadays in economy the number of 
people with a market mentality is much more higher. Today the main thing is that working- 
people become proprietors, property has already been distributed among people. This 
demolishes the state monopoly and curtails state property. We believe that this process needs 
acceleration. It makes social processes irreversible at large. 
As I said, we have currently been establishing very close economic relations with many large 
companies of some countries, including those of the United States. The opportunities for the 
Tatarstan economy are such that it is able to guarantee stability for any business on mutual 
interest basis. So, I invite young people as well as others to co-operate with Tatarstan, if they 
have this wish. We will support you by all means. 
Thank you for your attention. 
Source: Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev, 'The Future of the Russian Federation: A Look [sic] from Tatarstan', in 
Suverennyi Tatarstan, eds. Farid Kh. Mukharnetshin and R. T. Ismailov, Moscow. Insan, 1997, pp. 53-58. (This 
text is slightly edited in order to correct its grammatical errors and to make its English more understandable - OFF) 
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Appendix IH. Tables of Election and Referendum Results 
Table A'). 1. Election and Referendum Tumouts in Tatarstan, 1991 -1999 
Date Russia-vAde Tatarstan 
Turnout (%) Turnout (%) 
Referendum on the Preservation of the USSR 17 March 1991 75.4 77.1 
Russian Presidential Elections 12 June 1991 74.66 36.59 
Tatarstan Presidential Elections 12 June 1991 n. a. 63.4 
Referendum on the Status of Tatarstan 21 March 1992 n. a. 81.7 
Referendum on Boris El'tsin's Performance 25 April 1993 64.5 21.7 
Russian Constitutional Referendum and State Duma 12 December 54.32 13.9 
Elections 1993 
Russian Parliamentary Elections in Tatarstan 13 March 1994 n. a. 58.5 
Elections for Tatarstan State Council 5 March 1995 n. a. 61.3 
Russian State Duma Elections 17 December 64.37 58.7 
1995 
Tatarstan Presidential Elections 24 March 1996 n. a. . 77.9 
Russian Presidential Elections 16 June 1996 69.81 73.74 
Russian Presidential Elections 3 July 1996 68.88 77.47 
Russian State Duma Elections 19 December 61.68 72.0 
1999 
Source: Sergei A. Sergeev, 'Vybory i referendurny v Respublike Tatarstan , 
1989-2000', in Osobuia zona: 
Iýybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkh at Kh. Farukshin, 
Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assam blei, 2000, pp. 298-303 , and the website of the 
Russian 
Central Elecfion Commission at http: //www. fci. ru/. 
Table A3.2. Referendum on the Preservation of the Soviet Union, 17 March 1991 
Republics Number of Voters Turnout M ', Yes (%) No M 
RSFSR 79,701,169 75.4 71.3 26.4 
, 
Bashkifiiaý 2,719,637: 
Buriatiia 535,802 80.2 83.5 14.6 
heno-Ingus Ell& Ago%& 
Chuvashiia 748,420 83.1 82.4 15.1 
I --V -Daghestan -am A. i- 
ANN 8 xq-ý OR J , M -4 
K 'a%, d +-- 
Kabardino-Balkariia 372,607 76.1 77.9 20.8 
Kalmykiiap', "; I ýq 114- JEW 10: 5 
Karehia 418,101 75.8 76.0 22.2 
Komi 543,403 62.8 76.0 -ý:, r,. 22.0 
Marii-El 418,599 79.6 79.6 18.5 
Mordoviia 571,631 84.3 80.3 17.8 
North Ossetiia 367,858 85.9 90.2 8.9 
Tatariia 1,951,768 77.1 87.5 10.8 
Tyva 138,496 80.6 91.4 6.8 
Udmurtfia 819,140 74.3 76.0 22.0 
lakutiia 541,993 78.7 76.7 21.6 
Source: Pravda, 27 March 1991. 
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Table A3.3. Russian Presidential Elections, 12 June 1991 
Candidates Russia-wide Tatarstan 
Votes (%) Votes (%) 
Boris N. El'tsin 58.56 44.97 
Nikolai 1. Ryzhkov 17.22 16.68 
Vladimir V. Zhirinovskii 7.98 9.37 
Aman G. Tuleev 6.96 11.54 
Al'bert M. Makashov 3.82 5.77 
Vadim V. Bakatin 3.50 4.52 
Other Candidates and Invalid Votes 1.96 7.15 
Sources: 1, -vestHc4 20 June 1991, and Sefgei A. Sefgeev, 'Vybory i refefendurny v Respublike Tatarstan, t989- 
2000', in Osobaia zona: Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and 
Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunafodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assa-mblei, 2000, p. 300. 
Table A3.4. Tatarstan Presidential Elections, 12 June 1991 
Candidates Votes 
Mintimer Sh. Shaimiev 70.6 
Against All 29.3 
Invalid 0.1 
Source. Sergei A. Sergeev, 'Vybory i referendurny v Respublike Tatarstan, 1989-2000', in Osobaia zona: 
Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 
Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, p. 300. 
Table A3.5. Referendum on the Status of Tatarstan, 21 March 1992 
Question Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, the subject of international 
law, forming it% relations with the Russian Federation, other Republics and states on the basis 
of equal agreements? 
Votes Number of Votes Percentage of Votes 
Yes 1,309,056 61.4 
No 794,444 37.2 
Invalid 28,851 1.4 
Source: lzvestiia, 23 March 1992. 
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Table A3.6. Referendum on Eftsm's Performance, 25 April 1993 
Questions 
Do you have confidence in the President of 
the Russian Federation, Boris El'tsin? 
Do you approve the socio-economic policies 
carried out by the President of the Russian 
Federation and the Government of the 
Russian Federation since 1992? 
Russia-wide Tatarstan 
Votes (%) Votes (%) 
Yes No Invalid Yes No Invalid 
58.7 39.2 2.1 66.4 30.5 3.1 
53.0 44.6 2.4 61.4 35.1 3.5 
Do you consider it necessary to hold early 49.5 47.1 3.4 9.8* 11.7' n. a* 
elections to the presidency of the Russian 
Federation? 
Do you consider it necessary to hold early 67.2 30.1 2.7* 15.8* 5.9* n. a* 
elections of the Congress of People's 
Deputies of the Russian Federation? 
. The percentages of the votes for the third and fourth referendum questions in Tatarstan represent the share of 
these votes in the total number of eligible voters. The percentages of the Russia-wide votes and the votes for the 
first and second referendum questions in Tatarstan indicate the share of these votes in the total number of votes 
that were actually cast in the referendum. 
Sources: Rossiiskaia gazetu, 6 May 1993, and Sergei A. Sergeev, 'Vybory i referendurny v Respublike 
Tatarstan, 1989-2000', in Osobaia zonu: Yybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin 
V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assarnblei, 2000, 
pp. 300-301. 
Table A3.7. Russian Constitutional Referendum 12 December 1993 
RussiA -mrideVote ý--Tatarstan Votes 
Yes No Invalid Yes No Invalk 
Do you approve the Russian 58.4 41.5 0.1 71.9 24.1 4. ( 
Constitution 
Source: Pauline J. Luon-, "Fatarstan: I-Aite Bargaining and Ethnic Separatism', in Growing Pains: Russian 11 11 Detnocracy and the Election of 1993, eds. Timothy J. Colton and Jet-ry F. Hough, Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998, p. 648. 
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Table A3.8. Russian State Duma Elections (Party Lists), 12 December 1993 
Parties Russia-wide Tatarstan 
Votes (%) Votes (%) 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 22.92 19.90 
Russia's Choice 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
Women of Russia 
Agrarian Party of Russia 
labloko 
Party of Russian Unity and Concord 
Democratic Party of Russia 
Other Parties and Invalid Votes 
Source: Rossfiskaia gazeta, 28 December 1993, p. I 
15.51 22.40 
12.40 9.38 
8.13 7.66 
7.99 2.12 
7.86 11.55 
6.76 8,54 
. 5.52 5.42 
12.91 13.03 
Table A3.9. Russian State Duma Elections inTatarstan (Siwzle Mandate Districts), 12 December 1993 
Electoral Districts Candidates Party Affiliation Votes (%) 
Al'inetevskii Aleksandr V. Shtanin Russia's ('hoice 6.5 
Moskovskji Vladimir A- Behaev Accord 16.7 
Nabci-ezhno-Chelninskii n. a- n. a. n. a. 
Nizhnekamskii Vasilii P. Kobiakov Equality and Legality 12 
Privolzliskii Valentin V. Milchailov Russia's Choice 21.2 
Source: Respublika Tatarstan, 14 December 1993. 
Table A3.10. Russian Parliamentary Elections in Tatarstan (Single Mandate Districts), 13 March 1994 
Party Afrd*' - Electoral Districts Candidates 'r Nil` Votes 
-! ZVI 
Federation Council Mintinier Sh. Shaimiev Unity and Progress 91.2 
Federation Council Farid Kh. Mukharnetshin, Unity and Progress 
AI'metevskii Gennadii V. Egorov Unity and Proo ess gr 73.9 
Moskovskii Oleg V. Morozov Unity and Pf ogress 46.8 
Naberezhno-(-'helninskfi Vladimir N. Altykhov Communist Party of"I'atarstan 40.8 
Nizhnekaniskii Gabdulvakhid G. Bagautdinov Communist Party of Tatarstan -'69.1 
Privolzhskii Valentin V. Mkhailov Equality and Legality 23.9 
Source: Segodnia, 17 March 1994. 
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Table A3.1 1. Russian State Duma Elections (Party Lists), 17 December 1995 
Parties Russia-wide Tatarstan 
Votes (%) Votes (%) 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 22.3 15.42 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia I Ll 4.84 
Our Home is Russia 10.1 28.62 
labloko 6.9 4.07 
Women of Russia 4.6 3.70 
Communists-Workers' Russia 4.5 7.35 
Party of Workers' Self-Govertunent 4.0 3.37 
Nur 0.5 5.00 
Other Parties and Invalid Votes 35.0 26.63 
Sources: Moscow News, 29 December 1995, p. 2, and Sergei A. Sergeev, 'Vybory i referendurny v Respublike 
Tatafstan, 1989-2000', in Osobaia zona: Vyboty v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikh"ov, Valentin 
V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 20(X), 
p. 301. 
Table A3.12. Russian State Duma Elections in Tatarstan (Single Mandate Districts), 17 
December 1995 
-Electoral Districts Candidates 
jP 
AI'metevskii Azat K. Khainaev Agrarian Party of Russia 
Moskovskii Oleg V. Morozov Independent 
NabereAno-Chelninskii Vladimir N. Altykhov Independent 
Nizhnekamskii Gabdulvakhid G. Bagautdinov Our Home is Russia 
Privolzhskii Sergei 13. Shashurin Independent 
Source. Sergei A. Sergeev, 'Vybory i referendurny v Respublike Tatarstan, 1989-2000', in Osobaia zona: 
Yybory v ResImblike Tatarstaa eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 
Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, p. 301. 
1ý9 -1-1 
Table A3.13. Tatarstan Presidential Elections, 24 March 1996 
Candidates Votes (%) 
Mintirner Sh. Shaimiev 97.1 
Against All 2.8 
I nvalid Votes 0.1 
Source: Sergei A. Serggeev, 'Vybory i referendurny v Respublike Tatarstan, 1989-2000', in Osobaia zona: 
Vvbor-v v Respublike Taturstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 
Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, p. 302. 
Table A3.14. Russian Presidential Elections, 16 June 1996 
Candidates Russia-wide Tatarstan 
Votes Votes 
Boris N. Ellsin 35.79 38.34 
Gennadii A. Ziuganov 
Aleksandr 1. Ubed 
32.49 38.10 
14.73 7.38 
Grigorii A. lavhnskfi 7.45 6.90 
Other Candidates and Invalid Votes 9.54 9.28 
Sources: Rossiiskaia gazeta, 22 June 1.996, and Sergei A. Sergeev, 'Vybory i referendurny v Respublike 
Tatarstan, 1989-2000', in Osobaia zona: Vybory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin 
V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, 
p. 302. 
Table A3.15. Russian Presidential Flections, 3 July 1996 
Candidates 
Bork N. Eksin 
Gennadii A. Ziuganov 
Against All and Invalid Votes 
54.39 61.45 
40.73 32.31 
5.89 7.24 
Source: Sergei A. Sergeev, 'Vybory i referendurny v Respublike Tatarstan, t989-2000', in Osobaia zona: 
Yvbory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 
Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, p. 302. 
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Table A3.16. Russian State Duma Elections (Party Lists), 19 December 1999 
Parties Russia-YAde Tatarstan 
Votes (%) Votes (%) 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 24.29 18.1 
Unity 23.32 15.7 
Fatherland-All Russia 13.33 40.1 
Union of Rightist Powers 8.52 5.2 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 5.98 3.8 
labloko 5.93 4.5 
Our Home is Russia 1.19 0.1 
Other Candidates and Invalid Votes 17.44 12.5 
Source: Sergei A. SergeCv, Nybory i referendurny v Respub&e Tatarstan, 1989-2000', in Osobaia zona: 
Vybory v Respublike Taturstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 
Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, p. 302. 
Table A3.17. Russian State Duma Elections in Tatarstan (Single Mandate Districts), 19 
December 1999 
Electoral Districts Candidates. Party Affiliation- Votes TOW 
Al'inetevskii Fandas Sh. Safiullin Fatherland-All Russia 5-5.47 
Moskovskii Oleg V. Morozov Fathefland-All Russia 45.23 
Naberezlino-Chetninskii Khalinikhan M, ('01111111111ist I'arty of the Russian 27.06 
Akhmetkhanov Federation 
Fliura G. 7iiatdinova - 7, Niihnekamskii Fa AH Ruksiý ther -4. '7 --; 
Ptivolzhskii Sergei P. Shashurin Independent 21.08 
Source: Sergei A- Sergeev, 'Vybory i referendurny v Respublike Tatafstan, 1989-2000', in Osobaia zona: 
Yvbory v Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Valentin V. Bazhanov and Midkhat Kh. Farukshin, 
Ul'ianovsk, Mezhdunarodnoi N-avozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, p. 302. 
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Appendix IV. Tables of Statistics and Sociological Surveys 
Table A4.1. The Ethnic Composition of the Republics of Russia, 1989 
Republics Population Titular nationality (%) Russians 
Adygeia 446,800 22.0 68.0 
Altai 196,700 31.0 60.4 
Bashktostan 4,042,000 22.0 40.0 
Buriatfia 1,056,600 24.0 69.0 
Checheno-Ingushetha' 1,235,000 70.7 23-1 
Chuvashiia 1,359,000 67.8 26.7 
Dagestan 2 1,925,000 80.2 12.0 
Kabardino-Balkafiia3 785,900 58.6 32.0 
Kalmykfia 321,700 45.4 37.7 
Karachai-Cherkessiia4 434,000 41.0 42.0 
Karehia. 799,600 11.0 72.0 
Khakassiia 583,000 11.5 80.0 
Korni 1,246,000 23.3 57.5 
Marii-El 48.0 764,000 43.0 
Mordoviia 963,800 32.5 60.8 
29.9 North Ossedia 651,000 53.0 
Sakha (lakutiia) 1,074,000 33.4 50.3 
Tatarstan 3,723,000 48.5 43.3 
Tyva 306,000 64.3 32.0 
Udmurtiia 1,642,800 30.9 58.9 
TOTAL 21,161,000 48.7 51.3 
'Chechens comprised 57.8 percent and Ingush made-up 12.9 percent of the total population. 
2 The peoples of Dagestan are composed of Agul (0.8 percent); Avar (27.5 percent); Dargin (15.6 percent); 
Kumyk (12.9 percent); Lak (5.1 percent); Lezgin (11.3 percent); Nogai (1.6 percent); Rutul (0.8 percent); 
Tabasaran (4.3 percent) and Tsakhur (0.3 percent). 
3 Kabards formed 49 percent and BaHms constituted 9.6 percent of the population. 
'Karachai formed 31 percent and Cherkess constituted 10 percent of the population. 
Source: Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 1996, p. 34. 
Table A4.2. The Ethnic Composition of Tatarstan, 1989 
Ethnic Groups Population Percentage of Ta . ta rstan Ii S Populitwil 
Tatar 1765400 48.5 
Russian, 1575400 -I, K"6- ý-4gv-k' 
Chuvash 134200 3.7 
Ukrainians 32800 
. 9, 
IL 
Mordvins 28900 0.8 
Udmurts 24800 1 0.7 'IM 
- OMMI 
Mari 19400 0.5 
Bashkirs, 19100 0.5 
Total 3,754,800 100 
Source: Marat R. Mustafin and Rashid G. Khuzeev, Vse o Tatarstane: Ekonomiko-geograficheskii spravochnik 
Kazan: Kazanskoe Knizhnoe lzd-vo, 1994, p. 18. 
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Table A4.3. The Geographical Distribution of Tatars, 1989 
Countries Tatar Population Percentage or total local population 
The Russian Federation 5,552,000 3.8 
Tatarstan 1,765,400 48.5 
Bashkortostan 1,120,702 35.1 
Tiumen Oblast 227,422 7.3 
Cheliabinsk 224,605 6.2 
Sverdlovsk 183,781 4.0 
Ul'ianovsk 159,093 1.1 
Moscow 157,376 1.7 
Orenbur. cl, 158,564 7.3 
Perm 150,469 4.8 
Kuibyshev 115,280 3.5 
Udmurfiia 110,490 6.0 
Khanti-Mansi 97,689 7.6 
Penza 81,307 5.0 
Astrakhan 71,655 7.2 
Uzbekistan* 468,000 2.4 
Kazakhstan* 328,000 2.0 
Ukraine* 87,000 0.2, 
Taiikistan* 72,000 1.4 
Kyrgyzstan* ý. 
-ý w "', 70,000 1.6 
. 
ME% 
China 5,000-10,000 - 
Turkey', '-, 5,0(Xl_j0, q0Q 
Romania and Bulgaria 5,000-10,000 
Poland 5,000 Olt 
linland 1,500-2,000 
The United States of America 1,500-2,000 
The number of the Tatars in Ukraine and Central Asia include Crimean Tatars as well as a small number of 
Volga Tatars. 0 Source: Katherine E. Graney, 'The Volga Tatars: Diasporas and the Politics of Federalism', in Nations Abroad: 
Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union, eds. Charles King and Neil J. 
Melvin, Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1999, p. 157. 
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Table A4.4. The Ethnic Origins of Enterprise Managers in the Autonomous Republics of the 
RSFSR, 1989 
Republics Percentage of Titular Percentage of Titular Index of Executives 
Nation Nation's Executives 
Buriatiia 24.0 36.7 1.53 
Tatariia 48-6 64.1 1.32 
Mordoviia 32.5 37.9 1.17 
lakutiia 33.4 38.2 1.14 
Bashkiriia 21.9 24,2 1.11 
Kalmykiia 45.4 48.1 1.06 
Checheno-ingushetiia 70.7 71.5 1.01 
Dagestan 83.4 83.8 1.00 
Udmurtiia 30.9 30.8 1.00 
Kareffia 10.0 9.0 0.90 
Chuvashiia 67.8 59.2 0.87 
Komi 23.3 18.3 0.79 
Tyva 64.3 39.6 0.62 
Marii-El 43.3 26.4 0.61 
Russian Regions 81.5 77.3 0.95 
Source: Lev S. Perepelkin, 'Istoki mezhetnichekogo konflikta v Tatarii', Mir Rossii, vol. 1, no. 1,1992, pp. 91-112 
(105). 
Table A4.5. The Ethnic Composition of Urban Workforce in Tatarstan, 1992 
Employment Sector., ýý Tatars Russians 
Government 0.5 0.3 
Publi&Se rvic. . 2, 
Infrastructure 5.6 6.8 
34.1 Engineering 
Science and Education 13.1 14.1 
Literature and Press 0.7 03: 
Arts 1.2 0.8 
Unqualified Jobs 43.6 35.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Rashid Akhmetov, 'Elita Tatar. K postanovke problemy', in Sovremenrkye natsional'nye protsessy v 
Respublike Tatarstan, eds. Darnir M. Iskhakov and Rozahna N. Musina, Kazan: IIaLII KNTs RAN, 1992, 
p. 126. 
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Table A4.6. Change in the Ethnic Composition of Tatarstan's, Political Elites between 1993 
and 1996 
Type 1993 1996 Change 
of 
Elites 
Tatar Russian Other Tatar Russian Other Tatar Russian Other 
President 
% too - 100 - 
(No) (1) 
Vice-President 
% 100 -100 
(No) 
Prime Minister 
% 100 100 
(No) (1) 
Speaker of the Parliament 
% 100 100 -100 +100 
(No) (1) (1) 
Members of the Parliament 
% 58 38 4 73 25 2 +15 -13 -2 
(No) (145) (95) (10) (91) (31) (2) 
Cabinet of Ministers and Head s of State Comnid ttees 
% 71 23 6 68 29 3 -3 +6 -3 
(No) (37) (12) (3) (26) (11) (1) 
Heads of City and Raion Administrations 
% 77 19 4 77 19 4 
(No) (40) (10) (2) (40) (10) (2) 
Top-Uvel Judiciary Positions 
% 75 25 75 25 
(No) (3) (1) (3) (1) 
Sources: Evgenii A- Lisin, et. al., Kto estkto v Respublike Tatarstan, Kazan: Gazetno-zhumal'noe izd-vo, 1993, 
Evgenii A. Lisin, et. al., Kto est' kto v Respublike Tatarstan, Kazan: Star, 1996, and Nail M. Mukhariamov, 
'Khronika. polificheskogo protsessa (1988-1998)', in Regiony Rossii: Khronika i rukovoditeli. Tom. 7, ed, 
Kimitaka. Matsuzato, Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2000, pp. 20-115. 
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Table A4.7. Change in the Ethnic Composition of Tatarstan's Economic and Cultural Elites 
between 1993 and 1996 
Type 1993 1996 Change 
of 
Elites 
Tatar Russian Other Tatar Russian Other Tatar Russian Other 
ECONOMIC ELITES 
Industrial Sector Managers 
% 48 48 2 42 46 12 -6 -2 +8 (No) (24) (24) (2) (38) (42) (11) 
Agricultural Sector Managers 
% 73 27 - 73 21 6 - -6 +6 (No) (11) (4) (28) (8) (2) 
Financial Sector Managers 
% 56 35 9 75 17 8 +19 -18, -1 (13) (8) (No) (2) (9) (2) 
Other Sector Managers 
% 41 56 3 41 51 8 -5 +5 (No) (16) (22) (1) (17) (21) (3) 
CUL: FURAL ELITES 
Science and Culture 
% 43 48 9 60 29 11 +17 -19 +2 (No) (9) (10) (2) (80) (39) (15) 
Press - 
% 69 25 6 75 20 5 +6 -5 -1 (No) (11) (4) (1) (15) (4) (1) 
Sources: Evgenii A. Lisin, et. al., Kto est ' kto v Respublike Tatarstan, Kazan: Gazetno-zhumal'noe izd-vo, 1993, 
and Evgenii A. Lisin, et. al., Kto est'kto v Respublike Tatarstan, Kazan: Star, 1996. 
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Table A4.9. Assessments of Economic Status and Ethnic Discrimination among the Working 
Age Populations of Tatarstan, North Ossetlia and Sakha, 1997-1998. 
Tatarstan North Osseffia Sakha 
Tatars Russians Ossetins Russian Yakuts Russians 
A. Sense of Individual Discrimination 
Experienced Ethnic Discrimination 
% 4.2 9.5 1.4 13.0 10.6 13.4 
(No) (331) (295) (357) (193) (369) (402) 
Experienced Hostile Treatment due to Nationality 
% 5.1 16.6 3.1 30.7 24.3 21.8 
(No) 336 290 356 192 358 403 
B. Sense of Collective Discrimination 
Nationality is Important to Get Good Jobs 
% 18.3 62.2 23.8 69.7 31.0 58.5 
(No) 328 283 345 118 345 395 
Nationality Is Important to Get Government Posts 
% 28.9 68.1 20.8 72.2 32.0 72.4 
(No) 329 279 341 187 338 392 
Other Nationalities are Favoured for Good Jobs 
% 2.0 63.9 2.6 74.7 25.3 59.1 
(No) 302 244 308 162 296 347 
Other Nationalities are Favoured for Government Posts 
% 4.1 72.3 1.0 76.3 8.8 75.3 
(No) 316 264 308 169 307 364 
Source: Donna Bahry, 'Ethnicity and Equality in Post-communist Economic Transition: Evidence from Russia's 
Republics', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54, no. 5,2002, p. 690. 
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Table A4.9. Civic Identities in the Republics of Russia, 1993 
Question: Of what polity do you consider yourself a representative'? 
Republics Ethnic Croup (respondents) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bashkiriia Bashkir (211) 25 18 48 4 1 4 
Russian (401) 5 6 51 23 12 3 
Tatar (259) 20 14 52 6 2 6 
Buriatiia Buriat (248) 28 25 40 2 2 3 
Russian (728) 5 5 42 22 21 5 
Checheno-Ingushetiia Chechen (588) 77 10 11 
Ingush (104) 14 41 45 
Russian (211) 9 11 51 18 66 
Chuvashiia Chuvash(377) 14 9 57 7 58 
Russian (230) 2 2 35 32 26 3 
Daghestan Avar (291) 35 15 44 - 06 
Dargin (140) 29 26 31 -.. 14 
Kumyk (162) 40 15 37 6 11 
Lezgm (107) 31 8. 44 3 59 
Laks (83) 25 14 51 - - 10 
Russian (103) 23 17 50 3 25 
Kabardino-Balkariia Kabardin (268) 22 25 47 1 05 
Balkar (112) 15 21 52 2, : -.,. 10 
Russian (316) 4 4 58 18 88 
Kalmykiia Kalmyk (502) 27 19 49 2 12 
Russian (396) 8 7 67 7 83 
Karelfia Karel (204) 12 15 60 4 45 
Russian (636) 5 7 55 17 12 4 
Komi W'R- Xomi (273). 45 . 48,4 3- 8j 
Russian (593) 5 6 43 22 17 7 
Mari ari (354) 
Russian (538) 6 3 56 17 13 5 
Mord "Mordva (29 1) am am A" IFIN Aih 
Russian (624) 7 7 39 20 20 7 
4NDO Qwti- 
, 
-, f 
I 
ýOsset (524) to WA NO W, 
It 
M 
Russian (303) 5 8 58 13 10 6 
atatstAn 7afar'(478jk 
Russian (446) 8 7 49 18 10 8 
Tyva Tyvin (653) 3ý 
Russian (307) 3 4 52 27 13 1 
Udmurtfia Udmurt (315) 17 12 60 4 
Russian (612) 5 6 43 22 18 6 
lakudia lakut(377) 38 21 39 1 -I 
Russian (463) 8 9 56 14 85 
1. Only My Republic, 2- More My Republic than Russia; 3- Equally My Republic a nd Russia 4-More Russia 
than My Republic; 5- Only Russia; 6- No answer. 
Source: Vaterii A. Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: 7he Mind 
Aflame, London: Sage, 1997, p. 262. 
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Table A4.10. Soviet Identity in the Republics of Russia, 1993 
Question: How do you evaluate the break-up of the USSR ? 
Republics Ethnic Group (respondents) 1 2 3 4 5 
Bashkifiia Bashkir (211) 6 10 22 47 15 
Russian (401) 8 12 25 40 15 
Tatar (259) 6 9 27 45 13 
Buriatiia Buriat (248) 6 14 26 35 19 
Russian (728) 6 9 28 45 12 
Checheno-Ingushetfia Chechen (588) 12 9 29 44 6 
Ingush (104) 7 8 36 47 2 
Russian (211) 3 6 26 61 4 
Chuvashiia Chuvash(377) 5 6 19 54 16 
Russian (230) 4 7 24 48 17 
Daghestan Avar (291) 9 12 12 48 19 
Dargin (140) 6 3 14 44 33 
Ktunyk (162) 4 5 16 36 39 
Lezgin (107) 2, 1' 12 68 16 
Laks (83) 7 - 17 58 18 
Russian (103) 4 6 26 51 13 
Kabardino-Balkariia Kabardin (268) 7 8 23 54 8 
Balkar (112) 5 4 20 62 9 
Russian (316) 4 6 24 61 5 
Kalmykiia Kalmyk (502) 9 14 25 44 8 
Russian (396) 9 8 21 55 7 
Kareffia Karel (204) -12 15. 40 22, 
Russian (636) 10 17 20 37 16 
Komi 7ý: Komi (273)- 7, ý 7>ý!, 22, : 44 20 
Russian (593) 6 13 26 41 14 
. 
Mari ij, 'ý 4 JIM' -Mari (354) 
Russian (538) 6 7 21 53 13 
14--" Qfdg V_ -, 
Mordya (291). 
Russian (624) 5 8 28 54 5 
24), osse 
Russian (303) 4 5 17 65 9 
TaW078)'ý, `, "" 'M 
Russian (446) 9 8 28 40 15 
T yva Tyvin (653) 4- 
Russian (307) 8 14 34 39 5 
Udmuriiia Odmuft (315) 8 7 26 '44 15 
Russian (612) 8 15 28 39 10 
lakutiia lakut(377) 15 25 21 19 20 
Russian (463) 8 18 32 32 10 
I- Good-, 2- More Good than Bad; 3- More Bad than Good; 4- Bad; 5- No answer. 
Source: Valerii A. Tis hkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind 
Aflame, London: Sage, 1997, p. 253. 
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Table A4.1 1. Perceptions of Motherland in the Republics of Russia, 1993 
Question: Of what state do you consider yourself to be a citizen? 
Republics Ethnic Group Soviet Union 
(respondents) 
Bashkiriia Bashkir (211) 11 
Russian (40 1) 26 
Tatar (259) 22 
Buriatfia Buriat (248) 13 
Russian (728) 20 
Checheno-Ingushetfia Chechen (588) 8 
Ingush (104) 9 
Russian (211) 40 
Russia Republic No answer 
12 
43 
17 
17 
50 
20 
75 
28 
60 
67 
25 
90 
88 
37 
Chuvashiia Chuvash(377) 42 20 35 3 
Russian (230) 26 52 19 3 
Daghestan Avar (29 1) 21 11 63 5 
Dargin (140) 16 4 64 16 
Kumyk (162) 14 5 72 to 
Lezgin (107) 41 2 50 7 
Laks (83) 34 7 43 16 
Russian (103) 47 25 21 7 
Kabardino-Batkarija Kabardin (268) 9 4 85 2 
Balkar (112) 28 4 65 3 
Russian (316) 33 36 27 4 
Kalmykiia Kalmyk (502) 21 9 68 2 
Russian (396) 34 32 30 4 
Kareliia Karel (204) Z I1 17 69 3 
Russian (636) 17 44 36 3 
ýKon (273 14 4 4g j j" A 
Russian (593) 24 46 24 6 
Russian (538) 27 41 29 3 
*ordVII 
Russian (624) 32 40 26 2 
North Ossefiia 
. 
ýOsset (524). ', ý'. 
- 
ýý 1ýý 
Russian (303) 27 32 37 4 
Tatafstan Tatar (478) 
Russian (446) 29 31 36 4 
Tyva Tyvin (653) 95 
Russian (307) 16 59 24 1 
Udmurtfia. Udmurt (315) 18. 18 n' W'' 60 4 
Russian (612) 25 44 28 3 
lakutiia lakut(377) 9 3 '97 1 
Russian (463) 18 38 39 5 
Source: Valerii A. Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind 
Aflame, London: Sage, 1 997, p. 270. 
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Table A4.12. Interethnic Relations between Tatars and Russians in Tatarstan, 1994 
Tatars Russians 
Have you experienced violation of your rights because of your 
nationality? 
Yes, often 3.5 1.7 
Yes, sornetirnes 18.0 16.9 
No, not at all 68.8 77.2 
No answer 9.7 4.2 
Are you willing to accept a person of another nationality as 
Citizen of Your Republic 77.0 83.7 
Partner in Cominon Experience 61.0 74.1 
Your Boss 46.0 59.0 
Neighbour 68.7 80.2 
Friend in common leisure and entertainment 56.4 71.1 
Mother/ father of your children 31.8 54.3 
Spouse 25.7 47.7 
Other 7.0 10.5 
How do you estimate inter-ethnic relations in your republic? 
Favourable 15.1 11.0 
Cahn 65.4 62.0 
Tense IWO( M-, 7.6 15.1 
Critical, explosive 0.5 0.3 
No Answer 11.4 11.6 
Source: Valerii A. Tishkov, Ethnici(v, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind 
Aflame, London: Sage, 1997, pp. 112-113. 
Table A4.13. The Level of Religiosity among Several Ethnic Groups in the Middle Volga 
and the North Caucasus, 1996 
Level of Believe and Only believe Equivocal Tolerant Fight Number of 
religiosity practice atheist religion reslunidenits 
Chechens T1 27 595 
A i: 74 AvaA x,,, 20 "1-1: 
Kabardins 24 65 830 463 
Balkars; 16 66 4 13 1.7 -103 
Tatars 26 30 15 29 1 432 
Bashkirs 25 31 16 28 0 213 
Russians 9 28 19 43 1 6010 
Source: Susan Goodrich-Lehmann, 'Islam and Ethnicity in the Republics of Russia', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 13, 
no. 1,1997, p. 83. 
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Table A4.14. Key Characteristics of Russianness, 1995 
Characteristics (%) 
To love Russia and view it as a horneland 87 
To know and love Russian culture 84 
To have Russian as native languagge 1 
80 
To regard oneself as a Russian 79 
To have a Russian citizenship 59 
To be identified as Russian in an internal passport 24 
To have Russian parents 24 
To have Russian physical appearance 22 
Source: Iggor M. Kliamkin and Viktor V. Lapkin, 'Russkii vopros v Rossii', Polificheskie issledovaniia, vol. 6, 
no. 5,1995, p. 87. 
Table A4.15. The Russian Attitudes towards Several Post-Soviet Secessionist Movements, 
1992 
Question: Several repuhlics want their independence. Should they be allowed'? 
Republics Allowed Allowed Prevented, -ý Can't Say' 
Unconditionally on C %) ertain Con- la 
152 3 
Table A4.16. Russian Views of Its Minorities, January 1993 
Question: Have you formed a positive or negative attitude toward, for example 
Ethnic Groups Negative Positive No Answer 
Ukrainians 3 67 30 
Jews 8 56 36 
Tatars 11 53 36 
Moldavians 7 47 46 
Latvians 7 47 46 
Armenians 34 37 29 
Georgians 33 36 31 
Gypsies 33 31 36 
Chechens 40 27 33 
Azerbaijanis 46 26 28 
Source: Moskovskii komsomolets, 12 January 1993, p. 2. 
Table A4.17. Russian Views of Its Minorities, October 1993 
Question: How do you relate to..., for example 
EthnkýGroups Negative ' Posifivg .: - '00- Ik 
Chechens 48 35 17 
Gypsies Wp 48 39 
Azerbaijanis 43 43 14 
Armenians W. 45 -A L 41 14" 
Uzbeks 20 61 19 
Estonians 16 64 
. 
20, 
Jews 17 68 15 
Tatars 13 71 16 
Ukrainians 7 81 22 
Russians 2 91 7 
Source: 'lerarkhiia etnicheskikh stereotipov naselen4a', in Intertsentr VrsIOM Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye 
peremeny: Monitoring obshchestven nogo mneniia, no. 1,1994, pp. 17-19. 
UtjV. 
